There are two excellent roads leading from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg-one a plank road, which keeps up near the sources of the streams along the dividing line between Mott Run on the north and Lewis Creek and Massaponax Creek on the South, and the other called the old turnpike, which was more direct but more broken, as it passed over several ravines. There was still a third road, a very poor one, which ran near the river and came out at Banks’ Ford.

On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four columns.

Slocum’s corps, followed by that of Howard, took the plank road on the right.

Sykes’ division of Meade’s corps, followed by Hancock’s division of Couch’s corps, went by the turnpike in the centre.

The remainder of Meade’s corps-Griffin’s division, followed by that of Humphreys-took the river road.

Lastly, French’s division of Couch’s corps was under orders to turn off and march to Todd’s Tavern.

Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton’s cavalry, which, in fact, had been close to Anderson’s pickets all the morning.

Before these troops started, Sickles’ corps arrived, after a short march, from Hartwood Church, and were posted in rear of the Chancellorsville House as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out to Dowdall’s Tavern, otherwise known as Melzi Chancellor’s house. Another brigade was left at the Ford to guard the passage against Fitz Hugh Lee’s cavalry.

Hooker, who was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form line of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle Church, and his left covering Banks’ Ford. It did not seem to occur to him that the enemy might be there before him and prevent the formation, or that he would have any difficulty in moving and deploying his troops; but he soon found himself hampered in every direction by dense and almost impenetrable thickets, which had a tendency to break up every organization that tried to pass through them into mere crowds of men without order or alignment. Under these circumstances concert of action became exceedingly difficult, and when attempts were made to communicate orders off the roads, aids wandered hopelessly through the woods, struggling in the thick undergrowth, without being able to find any one. It was worse then fighting in a dense fog. The enemy, of course, were also impeded in their movements, but they had the advantage of being better acquainted with the country, and in case they were beaten they had a line at Tabernacle Church already intrenched to fall back upon. The ravines also, which crossed the upper roads at right angles, offered excellent defensive positions for them.

[ One brigade of Griffin’s division was out all night trying to find its way through the thickets, and did not reach the main army until 4 A.M. Wilcox’s brigade, which came the next day from Banks’ Ford to reinforce the enemy, had a similar experience.]

McLaws, who had advanced on the turnpike, managed to form line of battle with his division on each side of the pike, against Sykes, who had now come forward to sustain his cavalry detachment, which, in spite of their gallantry-for they rode up and fired in the faces of the enemy-were driven in by the 11th Virginia Infantry of Mahone’s brigade. Jackson on his arrival, had stopped the fortifying which Anderson had commenced, and according to his invariable custom to find and fight his enemy as soon as possible, had moved forward; so that the two armies encountered each other about two and half miles from Chancellorsville. Sykes indeed, met the advance of McLaws’ division only a mile out, and drove it back steadily a mile farther, when it was reinforced by Anderson’s division, and Ramseur’s brigade of Rodes’ division. Anderson gave Sykes a lively fight and succeeded in getting in on his flanks; for, owing to the divergence of the roads, neither Slocum on the right nor Meade’s two divisions on the left were abreast with him. He tried to connect with Slocum by throwing out a regiment deployed as skirmishers, but did not succeed. As the enemy were gaining the advantage he fell back behind Hancock, who came to the front and took his place. Slocum now formed on the right, with his left resting on the plank road, and his right on high ground which commanded the country around. Altogether the general line was a good one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery could move and manoeuvre, and the army were almost out of the thickets. The reserves could have struggled through those in the rear, and have filled the gaps, so that there is no reason to suppose our forces could have not continued to advance, or at all events have held the position, which, from its elevation and the other advantages I have stated, was an important one, especially as the column on the river road was in sight of Banks’ Ford, which it could have seized and held, or have struck the right flank of the enemy with great effect. The troops had come out to obtain possession of Banks’ Ford, and all the surplus artillery was waiting there. To retreat without making any adequate effort to carry out his plans made the General appear timid, and had a bad effect on the morale of the army. It would have been time enough to fall back in case of defeat; and if such a result was anticipated, the engineers with their 4,000 men, aided by Sickles’ corps, could easily have laid out a strong line in the rear for the troops to fall back upon. General Warren, the Chief Engineer on Hooker’s staff, thought the commanding ridge with the open space in front, upon which Hancock was posted, a very advantageous position for the army to occupy, and urged Couch not to abandon it until he (Warren) had conferred with Hooker. After the order came to retire, Couch sent to obtain permission to remain, but it was peremptorily refused. Hooker soon afterward changed his mind and countermanded his first order, but it was then too late; our troops had left the ridge and the enemy were in possession of it. There was too much vacillation at headquarters. Slocum, who was pressing the enemy back, was very much vexed when he received the order, but obeyed it, and retreated without being molested. It is true, Wright’s brigade had formed on his right, but the advance of the Eleventh Corps would have taken that in flank, so that the prospect was generally good at this time for an advance. The column on the river road also retired without interference. As Couch had waited to hear from Hooker, Hancock’s right flank became somewhat exposed by the delay, but he fell back without serious loss. French also, who had started for Todd’s Tavern, returned. He encountered the enemy, but was ordered in and did not engage them.

That portion of the country around Chancellorsville within the Union lines on the morning of May 2d, may, with some exceptions, be described as a plain, covered by dense thickets, with open spaces in the vicinity of the houses, varied by the high ground at Talley’s on the west and by the hills of Fairview and Hazel Grove on the south, and terminating in a deep ravine near the river. Our general line was separated from that of the enemy by small streams, which principally ran through ravines, forming obstacles useful for defensive purposes. This was the case on the east and south, but on the west, where Howard’s line terminated, there was nothing but the usual thickets to impede the enemy’s approach.

As the narrative proceeds, the position of the Confederate army, who held the broken ground on the other side of those ravines, will be more particularly described.

After all, a defensive battle in such a country is not a bad thing, for where there are axes and timber it is easy to fortify and hard to force the line; always provided that free communications are kept open to the central reserve and from one part of the line to another. It must be confessed that the concealment of the thickets is also favorable to the initiative, as it enables the attacking party to mass his troops against the weak parts without being observed. Hooker probably thought if Lee assailed a superior force in an intrenched position he would certainly be beaten; and if he did not attack he would soon be forced to fall back on his depots near Richmond for food and ammunition. In either case the prestige would remain with the Union general.

The rebels followed up our army closely, and it is quite possible that a sudden attack, when it was heaped up around Chancellorsville, might have been disastrous to us. Gradually, under the skilful guidance of Captain Payne of the Engineers, who had made himself well acquainted with the country, the different corps took the positions they had occupied on the previous night, and order came out of chaos. The line, as thus established, covered all the roads which passed through Chancellorsville. The left, held by Meade’s corps, rested on the Rappahannock, near Scott’s Dam; the line was then continued in a southerly direction by Couch’s corps, facing east, French’s division being extended to a point near to and east of Chancellorsville, with Hancock’s division of the same corps holding an outpost still further to the east. Next came the Twelfth Corps under Slocum, facing south, and then, at some distance to the west, in echelon to the rear along the Plank Road, Howard’s corps was posted. The Third Corps under Sickles was kept in reserve, back of the mansion. The next morning two brigades and two batteries of Birney’s division were interposed between Slocum and Howard, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out in front. The 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry picketed the roads and kept the enemy in sight. The thickets which surrounded this position were almost impenetrable, so that an advance against the enemy’s lines became exceedingly difficult and manoeuvring nearly impracticable, nor was this the only defect. Batteries could be established on the high ground to the east, which commanded the front facing in that direction, while our own artillery had but little scope; and last, but most important of all, the right of Howard’s corps as “in the air,” that is, rested on no obstacle.

Hooker was sensible that this flank was weak, and sent Graham’s brigade of Sickles’ corps with a battery to strengthen it; but Howard took umbrage at this, as a reflection on the bravery of his troops or his own want of skill, and told Graham that he did not need his services; that he felt so secure in his position that he would send his compliments to the whole rebel army if they lay in front of him, and invite them to attack him. As Hooker had just acquiesced in the appointment of Howard to be Commander of the Eleventh Corps, he disliked to show a want of confidence in him at the very beginning of his career, and therefore yielded to his wishes and ordered the reinforcements to return and report to Sickles again.

Chancellorsville being a great center of communication with the plank road and turnpike heading east and west, and less important roads to the south, and southeast, Hooker desired above all things to retain it; for if it should once fall into the hands of the enemy, our army would be unable to move in any direction except to the rear.

General Lee formed his line with Wickham’s and Owens’ regiments of cavalry on his right, opposite Meade’s corps, supported by Perry’s brigade of Anderson’s division; Jackson’s line stretched from the Plank Road around toward the Furnace.

Before night set in, Wright and Stuart attacked an outlying part of Slocum’s corps and drove it in on the main body. They then brought up some artillery and opened fire against Slocum’s position on the crest of the hill. Failing to make any impression they soon retired and all was quiet once more.

The enemy soon posted batteries on the high ground a mile east of Chancellorsville, and opened on Hancock’s front with considerable effect. They also enfiladed Geary’s division of Slocum’s corps, and became very annoying, but Knap’s battery of the Twelfth Corps replied effectively and kept their fire down to a great extent.

As the Union army was hidden by a thick undergrowth, Lee spent the rest of the day in making a series of feigned attacks to ascertain where our troops were posted.

When night set in, the sound of the axe was heard in every direction, for both armies thought it prudent to strengthen their front as much as possible.

The prospect for Lee as darkness closed over the scene was far from encouraging. He had examined the position of the Union army carefully, and had satisfied himself that as regards its centre and left it was unassailable. Let any man with a musket on his shoulder, encumbered with a cartridge-box, haversack, canteen, etc., attempt to climb over a body of felled timber to get at an enemy who is coolly shooting at him from behind a log breastwork, and he will realize the difficulty of forcing a way through such obstacles. Our artillery, too, swept every avenue of approach, so that the line might be considered as almost impregnable. Before giving up the attack, however, Stuart was directed to cautiously reconnoitre on the right, where Howard was posted, and see if there was not a vulnerable point there.