THE FUTURE IN RELATION TO AMERICAN NAVAL POWER.
June, 1895.
That the United States Navy within
the last dozen years should have been recast almost
wholly, upon more modern lines, is not, in itself
alone, a fact that should cause comment, or give rise
to questions about its future career or sphere of
action. If this country needs, or ever shall
need, a navy at all, indisputably in 1883 the hour
had come when the time-worn hulks of that day, mostly
the honored but superannuated survivors of the civil
war, should drop out of the ranks, submit to well-earned
retirement or inevitable dissolution, and allow their
places to be taken by other vessels, capable of performing
the duties to which they themselves were no longer
adequate.
It is therefore unlikely that there
underlay this re-creation of the navy-for
such in truth it was-any more recondite
cause than the urgent necessity of possessing tools
wholly fit for the work which war-ships are called
upon to do. The thing had to be done, if the
national fleet was to be other than an impotent parody
of naval force, a costly effigy of straw. But,
concurrently with the process of rebuilding, there
has been concentrated upon the development of the
new service a degree of attention, greater than can
be attributed even to the voracious curiosity of this
age of newsmongering and of interviewers. This
attention in some quarters is undisguisedly reluctant
and hostile, in others not only friendly but expectant,
in both cases betraying a latent impression that there
is, between the appearance of the new-comer and the
era upon which we now are entering, something in common.
If such coincidence there be, however, it is indicative
not of a deliberate purpose, but of a commencing change
of conditions, economical and political, throughout
the world, with which sea power, in the broad sense
of the phrase, will be associated closely; not, indeed,
as the cause, nor even chiefly as a result, but rather
as the leading characteristic of activities which
shall cease to be mainly internal, and shall occupy
themselves with the wider interests that concern the
relations of states to the world at large. And
it is just at this point that the opposing lines of
feeling divide. Those who hold that our political
interests are confined to matters within our own borders,
and are unwilling to admit that circumstances may
compel us in the future to political action without
them, look with dislike and suspicion upon the growth
of a body whose very existence indicates that nations
have international duties as well as international
rights, and that international complications will
arise from which we can no more escape than the states
which have preceded us in history, or those contemporary
with us. Others, on the contrary, regarding the
conditions and signs of these times, and the extra-territorial
activities in which foreign states have embarked so
restlessly and widely, feel that the nation, however
greatly against its wish, may become involved in controversies
not unlike those which in the middle of the century
caused very serious friction, but which the generation
that saw the century open would have thought too remote
for its concern, and certainly wholly beyond its power
to influence.
Religious creeds, dealing with eternal
verities, may be susceptible of a certain permanency
of statement; yet even here we in this day have witnessed
the embarrassments of some religious bodies, arising
from a traditional adherence to merely human formulas,
which reflect views of the truth as it appeared to
the men who framed them in the distant past.
But political creeds, dealing as they do chiefly with
the transient and shifting conditions of a world which
is passing away continually, can claim no fixity of
allegiance, except where they express, not the policy
of a day, but the unchanging dictates of righteousness.
And inasmuch as the path of ideal righteousness is
not always plain nor always practicable; as expediency,
policy, the choice of the lesser evil, must control
at times; as nations, like men, will occasionally
differ, honestly but irreconcilably, on questions of
right,-there do arise disputes where agreement
cannot be reached, and where the appeal must be made
to force, that final factor which underlies the security
of civil society even more than it affects the relations
of states. The well-balanced faculties of Washington
saw this in his day with absolute clearness.
Jefferson either would not or could not. That
there should be no navy was a cardinal prepossession
of his political thought, born of an exaggerated fear
of organized military force as a political, factor.
Though possessed with a passion for annexation which
dominated much of his political action, he prescribed
as the limit of the country’s geographical expansion
the line beyond which it would entail the maintenance
of a navy. Yet fate, ironical here as elsewhere
in his administration, compelled the recognition that,
unless a policy of total seclusion is adopted,-if
even then,-it is not necessary to acquire
territory beyond sea in order to undergo serious international
complications, which could have been avoided much
more easily had there been an imposing armed shipping
to throw into the scale of the nation’s argument,
and to compel the adversary to recognize the impolicy
of his course as well as what the United States then
claimed to be its wrongfulness.
The difference of conditions between
the United States of to-day and of the beginning of
this century illustrates aptly how necessary it is
to avoid implicit acceptance of precedents, crystallized
into maxims, and to seek for the quickening principle
which justified, wholly or in part, the policy of
one generation, but whose application may insure a
very different course of action in a succeeding age.
When the century opened, the United States was not
only a continental power, as she now is, but she was
one of several, of nearly equal strength as far as
North America was concerned, with all of whom she had
differences arising out of conflicting interests,
and with whom, moreover, she was in direct geographical
contact,-a condition which has been recognized
usually as entailing peculiar proneness to political
friction; for, while the interests of two nations
may clash in quarters of the world remote from either,
there is both greater frequency and greater bitterness
when matters of dispute exist near at home, and especially
along an artificial boundary, where the inhabitants
of each are directly in contact with the causes of
the irritation. It was therefore the natural
and proper aim of the government of that day to abolish
the sources of difficulty, by bringing all the territory
in question under our own control, if it could be
done by fair means. We consequently entered upon
a course of action precisely such as a European continental
state would have followed under like circumstances.
In order to get possession of the territory in which
our interests were involved, we bargained and manoeuvred
and threatened; and although Jefferson’s methods
were peaceful enough, few will be inclined to claim
that they were marked by excess of scrupulousness,
or even of adherence to his own political convictions.
From the highly moral standpoint, the acquisition of
Louisiana under the actual conditions-being
the purchase from a government which had no right
to sell, in defiance of the remonstrance addressed
to us by the power who had ceded the territory upon
the express condition that it should not so be sold,
but which was too weak to enforce its just reclamation
against both Napoleon and ourselves-reduces
itself pretty much to a choice between overreaching
and violence, as the less repulsive means of compassing
an end in itself both desirable and proper; nor does
the attempt, by strained construction, to wrest West
Florida into the bargain give a higher tone to the
transaction. As a matter of policy, however,
there is no doubt that our government was most wise;
and the transfer, as well as the incorporation, of
the territory was facilitated by the meagreness of
the population that went with the soil. With
all our love of freedom, it is not likely that many
qualms were felt as to the political inclinations of
the people concerning their transfer of allegiance.
In questions of great import to nations or to the
world, the wishes, or interests, or technical rights,
of minorities must yield, and there is not necessarily
any more injustice in this than in their yielding to
a majority at the polls.
While the need of continental expansion
pressed thus heavily upon the statesmen of Jefferson’s
era, questions relating to more distant interests
were very properly postponed. At the time that
matters of such immediate importance were pending,
to enter willingly upon the consideration of subjects
our concern in which was more remote, either in time
or place, would have entailed a dissemination of attention
and of power that is as greatly to be deprecated in
statesmanship as it is in the operations of war.
Still, while the government of the day would gladly
have avoided such complications, it found, as have
the statesmen of all times, that if external interests
exist, whatsoever their character, they cannot be
ignored, nor can the measures which prudence dictates
for their protection be neglected with safety.
Without political ambitions outside the continent,
the commercial enterprise of the people brought our
interests into violent antagonism with clear, unmistakable,
and vital interests of foreign belligerent states;
for we shall sorely misread the lessons of 1812, and
of the events which led to it, if we fail to see that
the questions in dispute involved issues more immediately
vital to Great Britain, in her then desperate struggle,
than they were to ourselves, and that the great majority
of her statesmen and people, of both parties, so regarded
them. The attempt of our government to temporize
with the difficulty, to overcome violence by means
of peaceable coercion, instead of meeting it by the
creation of a naval force so strong as to be a factor
of consideration in the international situation, led
us into an avoidable war.
The conditions which now constitute
the political situation of the United States, relatively
to the world at large, are fundamentally different
from those that obtained at the beginning of the century.
It is not a mere question of greater growth, of bigger
size. It is not only that we are larger, stronger,
have, as it were, reached our majority, and are able
to go out into the world. That alone would be
a difference of degree, not of kind. The great
difference between the past and the present is that
we then, as regards close contact with the power of
the chief nations of the world, were really in a state
of political isolation which no longer exists.
This arose from our geographical position-reinforced
by the slowness and uncertainty of the existing means
of intercommunication-and yet more from
the grave preoccupation of foreign statesmen with
questions of unprecedented and ominous importance
upon the continent of Europe. A policy of isolation
was for us then practicable,-though even
then only partially. It was expedient, also,
because we were weak, and in order to allow the individuality
of the nation time to accentuate itself. Save
the questions connected with the navigation of the
Mississippi, collision with other peoples was only
likely to arise, and actually did arise, from going
beyond our own borders in search of trade. The
reasons now evoked by some against our political action
outside our own borders might have been used then
with equal appositeness against our commercial enterprises.
Let us stay at home, or we shall get into trouble.
Jefferson, in truth, averse in principle to commerce
as to war, was happily logical in his embargo system.
It not only punished the foreigner and diminished
the danger of international complications, but it
kept our own ships out of harm’s way; and if
it did destroy trade, and cause the grass to grow
in the streets of New York, the incident, if inconvenient,
had its compensations, by repressing hazardous external
activities.
Few now, of course, would look with
composure upon a policy, whatever its ground, which
contemplated the peaceable seclusion of this nation
from its principal lines of commerce. In 1807,
however, a great party accepted the alternative rather
than fight, or even than create a force which might
entail war, although more probably it would have prevented
it. But would it be more prudent now to ignore
the fact that we are no longer-however
much we may regret it-in a position of
insignificance or isolation, political or geographical,
in any way resembling the times of Jefferson, and
that from the changed conditions may result to us
a dilemma similar to that which confronted him and
his supporters? Not only have we grown,-that
is a detail,-but the face of the world
is changed, economically and politically. The
sea, now as always the great means of communication
between nations, is traversed with a rapidity and a
certainty that have minimized distances. Events
which under former conditions would have been distant
and of small concern, now happen at our doors and
closely affect us. Proximity, as has been noted,
is a fruitful source of political friction, but proximity
is the characteristic of the age. The world has
grown smaller. Positions formerly distant have
become to us of vital importance from their nearness.
But, while distances have shortened, they remain for
us water distances, and, however short, for political
influence they must be traversed in the last resort
by a navy, the indispensable instrument by which,
when emergencies arise, the nation can project its
power beyond its own shore-line.
Whatever seeming justification, therefore,
there may have been in the transient conditions of
his own day for Jefferson’s dictum concerning
a navy, rested upon a state of things that no longer
obtains, and even then soon passed away. The
War of 1812 demonstrated the usefulness of a navy,-not,
indeed, by the admirable but utterly unavailing single-ship
victories that illustrated its course, but by the
prostration into which our seaboard and external communications
fell, through the lack of a navy at all proportionate
to the country’s needs and exposure. The
navy doubtless reaped honor in that brilliant sea
struggle, but the honor was its own alone; only discredit
accrued to the statesmen who, with such men to serve
them, none the less left the country open to the humiliation
of its harried coasts and blasted commerce. Never
was there a more lustrous example of what Jomini calls
“the sterile glory of fighting battles merely
to win them.” Except for the prestige which
at last awoke the country to the high efficiency of
the petty force we called our navy, and showed what
the sea might be to us, never was blood spilled more
uselessly than in the frigate and sloop actions of
that day. They presented no analogy to the outpost
and reconnoissance fighting, to the detached services,
that are not only inevitable but invaluable, in maintaining
the morale of a military organization in campaign.
They were simply scattered efforts, without relation
either to one another or to any main body whatsoever,
capable of affecting seriously the issues of war, or,
indeed, to any plan of operations worthy of the name.
Not very long after the War of 1812,
within the space of two administrations, there came
another incident, epoch-making in the history of our
external policy, and of vital bearing on the navy,
in the enunciation of the Monroe doctrine. That
pronouncement has been curiously warped at times from
its original scope and purpose. In its name have
been put forth theories so much at odds with the relations
of states, as hitherto understood, that, if they be
maintained seriously, it is desirable in the interests
of exact definition that their supporters advance
some other name for them. It is not necessary
to attribute finality to the Monroe doctrine, any more
than to any other political dogma, in order to deprecate
the application of the phrase to propositions that
override or transcend it. We should beware of
being misled by names, and especially where such error
may induce a popular belief that a foreign state is
outraging wilfully a principle to the defence of which
the country is committed. We have been committed
to the Monroe doctrine itself, not perhaps by any such
formal assumption of obligations as cannot be evaded,
but by certain precedents, and by a general attitude,
upon the whole consistently maintained, from which
we cannot recede silently without risk of national
mortification. If seriously challenged, as in
Mexico by the third Napoleon, we should hardly decline
to emulate the sentiments so nobly expressed by the
British government, when, in response to the emperors
of Russia and France, it declined to abandon the struggling
Spanish patriots to the government set over them by
Napoleon: “To Spain his Majesty is not
bound by any formal instrument; but his Majesty has,
in the face of the world, contracted with that nation
engagements not less sacred, and not less binding upon
his Majesty’s mind, than the most solemn treaties.”
We may have to accept also certain corollaries which
may appear naturally to result from the Monroe doctrine,
but we are by no means committed to some propositions
which lately have been tallied with its name.
Those propositions possibly embody a sound policy,
more applicable to present conditions than the Monroe
doctrine itself, and therefore destined to succeed
it; but they are not the same thing. There is,
however, something in common between it and them.
Reduced to its barest statement, and stripped of all
deductions, natural or forced, the Monroe doctrine,
if it were not a mere political abstraction, formulated
an idea to which in the last resort effect could be
given only through the instrumentality of a navy;
for the gist of it, the kernel of the truth, was that
the country had at that time distant interests on the
land, political interests of a high order in the destiny
of foreign territory, of which a distinguishing characteristic
was that they could be assured only by sea.
Like most stages in a nation’s
progress, the Monroe doctrine, though elicited by
a particular political incident, was not an isolated
step unrelated to the past, but a development.
It had its antecedents in feelings which arose before
our War of Independence, and which in 1778, though
we were then in deadly need of the French alliance,
found expression in the stipulation that France should
not attempt to regain Canada. Even then, and
also in 1783, the same jealousy did not extend to
the Floridas, which at the latter date were ceded by
Great Britain to Spain; and we expressly acquiesced
in the conquest of the British West India Islands
by our allies. From that time to 1815 no remonstrance
was made against the transfer of territories in the
West Indies and Caribbean Sea from one belligerent
to another-an indifference which scarcely
would be shown at the present time, even though the
position immediately involved were intrinsically of
trivial importance; for the question at stake would
be one of principle, of consequences, far reaching
as Hampden’s tribute of ship-money.
It is beyond the professional province
of a naval officer to inquire how far the Monroe doctrine
itself would logically carry us, or how far it may
be developed, now or hereafter, by the recognition
and statement of further national interests, thereby
formulating another and wider view of the necessary
range of our political influence. It is sufficient
to quote its enunciation as a fact, and to note that
it was the expression of a great national interest,
not merely of a popular sympathy with South American
revolutionists; for, had it been the latter, it would
doubtless have proved as inoperative and evanescent
as declarations arising from such emotions commonly
are. From generation to generation we have been
much stirred by the sufferings of Greeks, or Bulgarians,
or Armenians, at the hands of Turkey; but, not being
ourselves injuriously affected, our feelings have
not passed into acts, and for that very reason have
been ephemeral. No more than other nations are
we exempt from the profound truth enunciated by Washington-seared
into his own consciousness by the bitter futilities
of the French alliance in 1778 and the following years,
and by the extravagant demands based upon it by the
Directory during his Presidential term-that
it is absurd to expect governments to act upon disinterested
motives. It is not as an utterance of passing
concern, benevolent or selfish, but because it voiced
an enduring principle of necessary self-interest,
that the Monroe doctrine has retained its vitality,
and has been made so easily to do duty as the expression
of intuitive national sensitiveness to occurrences
of various kinds in regions beyond the sea. At
its christening the principle was directed against
an apprehended intervention in American affairs, which
depended not upon actual European concern in the territory
involved, but upon a purely political arrangement
between certain great powers, itself the result of
ideas at the time moribund. In its first application,
therefore, it was a confession that danger of European
complications did exist, under conditions far less
provocative of real European interest than those which
now obtain and are continually growing. Its subsequent
applications have been many and various, and the incidents
giving rise to them have been increasingly important,
culminating up to the present in the growth of the
United States to be a great Pacific power, and in
her probable dependence in the near future upon an
Isthmian canal for the freest and most copious intercourse
between her two ocean seaboards. In the elasticity
and flexibleness with which the dogma thus has accommodated
itself to varying conditions, rather than in the strict
wording of the original statement, is to be seen the
essential characteristic of a living principle-the
recognition, namely, that not merely the interests
of individual citizens, but the interests of the United
States as a nation, are bound up with regions beyond
the sea, not part of our own political domain, in which
therefore, under some imaginable circumstances, we
may be forced to take action.
It is important to recognize this,
for it will help clear away the error from a somewhat
misleading statement frequently made,-that
the United States needs a navy for defence only, adding
often, explanatorily, for the defence of our own coasts.
Now in a certain sense we all want a navy for defence
only. It is to be hoped that the United States
will never seek war except for the defence of her
rights, her obligations, or her necessary interests.
In that sense our policy may always be defensive only,
although it may compel us at times to steps justified
rather by expediency-the choice of the
lesser evil-than by incontrovertible right.
But if we have interests beyond sea which a navy may
have to protect, it plainly follows that the navy
has more to do, even in war, than to defend the coast;
and it must be added as a received military axiom
that war, however defensive in moral character, must
be waged aggressively if it is to hope for success.
For national security, the correlative
of a national principle firmly held and distinctly
avowed is, not only the will, but the power to enforce
it. The clear expression of national purpose,
accompanied by evident and adequate means to carry
it into effect, is the surest safeguard against war,
provided always that the national contention is maintained
with a candid and courteous consideration of the rights
and susceptibilities of other states. On the
other hand, no condition is more hazardous than that
of a dormant popular feeling, liable to be roused
into action by a moment of passion, such as that which
swept over the North when the flag was fired upon
at Sumter, but behind which lies no organized power
for action. It is on the score of due preparation
for such an ultimate contingency that nations, and
especially free nations, are most often deficient.
Yet, if wanting in definiteness of foresight and persistency
of action, owing to the inevitable frequency of change
in the governments that represent them, democracies
seem in compensation to be gifted with an instinct,
the result perhaps of the free and rapid interchange
of thought by which they are characterized, that intuitively
and unconsciously assimilates political truths, and
prepares in part for political action before the time
for action has come. That the mass of United States
citizens do not realize understandingly that the nation
has vital political interests beyond the sea is probably
true; still more likely is it that they are not tracing
any connection between them and the reconstruction
of the navy. Yet the interests exist, and the
navy is growing; and in the latter fact is the best
surety that no breach of peace will ensue from the
maintenance of the former.
It is, not, then the indication of
a formal political purpose, far less of anything like
a threat, that is, from my point of view, to be recognized
in the recent development of the navy. Nations,
as a rule, do not move with the foresight and the
fixed plan which distinguish a very few individuals
of the human race. They do not practise on the
pistol-range before sending a challenge; if they did,
wars would be fewer, as is proved by the present long-continued
armed peace in Europe. Gradually and imperceptibly
the popular feeling, which underlies most lasting
national movements, is aroused and swayed by incidents,
often trivial, but of the same general type, whose
recurrence gradually moulds public opinion and evokes
national action, until at last there issues that settled
public conviction which alone, in a free state, deserves
the name of national policy. What the origin
of those particular events whose interaction establishes
a strong political current in a particular direction,
it is perhaps unprofitable to inquire. Some will
see in the chain of cause and effect only a chapter
of accidents, presenting an interesting philosophical
study, and nothing more; others, equally persuaded
that nations do not effectively shape their mission
in the world, will find in them the ordering of a
Divine ruler, who does not permit the individual or
the nation to escape its due share of the world’s
burdens. But, however explained, it is a common
experience of history that in the gradual ripening
of events there comes often suddenly and unexpectedly
the emergency, the call for action, to maintain the
nation’s contention. That there is an increased
disposition on the part of civilized countries to
deal with such cases by ordinary diplomatic discussion
and mutual concession can be gratefully acknowledged;
but that such dispositions are not always sufficient
to reach a peaceable solution is equally an indisputable
teaching of the recent past. Popular emotion,
once fairly roused, sweeps away the barriers of calm
deliberation, and is deaf to the voice of reason.
That the consideration of relative power enters for
much in the diplomatic settlement of international
difficulties is also certain, just as that it goes
for much in the ordering of individual careers.
“Can,” as well as “will,” plays
a large share in the decisions of life.
Like each man and woman, no state
lives to itself alone, in a political seclusion resembling
the physical isolation which so long was the ideal
of China and Japan. All, whether they will or
no, are members of a community, larger or, smaller;
and more and more those of the European family to
which we racially belong are touching each other throughout
the world, with consequent friction of varying degree.
That the greater rapidity of communication afforded
by steam has wrought, in the influence of sea power
over the face of the globe, an extension that is multiplying
the points of contact and emphasizing the importance
of navies, is a fact, the intelligent appreciation
of which is daily more and more manifest in the periodical
literature of Europe, and is further shown by the
growing stress laid upon that arm of military strength
by foreign governments; while the mutual preparation
of the armies on the European continent, and the fairly
settled territorial conditions, make each state yearly
more wary of initiating a contest, and thus entail
a political quiescence there, except in the internal
affairs of each country. The field of external
action for the great European states is now the world,
and it is hardly doubtful that their struggles, unaccompanied
as yet by actual clash of arms, are even under that
condition drawing nearer to ourselves. Coincidently
with our own extension to the Pacific Ocean, which
for so long had a good international claim to its name,
that sea has become more and more the scene of political
development, of commercial activities and rivalries,
in which all the great powers, ourselves included,
have a share. Through these causes Central and
Caribbean America, now intrinsically unimportant, are
brought in turn into great prominence, as constituting
the gateway between the Atlantic and Pacific when
the Isthmian canal shall have been made, and as guarding
the approaches to it. The appearance of Japan
as a strong ambitious state, resting on solid political
and military foundations, but which scarcely has reached
yet a condition of equilibrium in international standing,
has fairly startled the world; and it is a striking
illustration of the somewhat sudden nearness and unforeseen
relations into which modern states are brought, that
the Hawaiian Islands, so interesting from the international
point of view to the countries of European civilization,
are occupied largely by Japanese and Chinese.
In all these questions we have a stake,
reluctantly it may be, but necessarily, for our evident
interests are involved, in some instances directly,
in others by very probable implication. Under
existing conditions, the opinion that we can keep
clear indefinitely of embarrassing problems is hardly
tenable; while war between two foreign states, which
in the uncertainties of the international situation
throughout the world may break out at any time, will
increase greatly the occasions of possible collision
with the belligerent countries, and the consequent
perplexities of our statesmen seeking to avoid entanglement
and to maintain neutrality.
Although peace is not only the avowed
but for the most part the actual desire of European
governments, they profess no such aversion to distant
political enterprises and colonial acquisitions as
we by tradition have learned to do. On the contrary,
their committal to such divergent enlargements of
the national activities and influence is one of the
most pregnant facts of our time, the more so that their
course is marked in the case of each state by a persistence
of the same national traits that characterized the
great era of colonization, which followed the termination
of the religious wars in Europe, and led to the world-wide
contests of the eighteenth century. In one nation
the action is mainly political,-that of
a government pushed, by long-standing tradition and
by its passion for administration, to extend the sphere
of its operations so as to acquire a greater field
in which to organize and dominate, somewhat regardless
of economical advantage. In another the impulse
comes from the restless, ubiquitous energy of the
individual citizens, singly or in companies, moved
primarily by the desire of gain, but carrying ever
with them, subordinate only to the commercial aim,
the irresistible tendency of the race to rule as well
as to trade, and dragging the home government to recognize
and to assume the consequences of their enterprise.
Yet again there is the movement whose motive is throughout
mainly private and mercantile, in which the individual
seeks wealth only, with little or no political ambition,
and where the government intervenes chiefly that it
may retain control of its subjects in regions where
but for such intervention they would become estranged
from it. But, however diverse the modes of operation,
all have a common characteristic, in that they bear
the stamp of the national genius,-a proof
that the various impulses are not artificial, but
natural, and that they therefore will continue until
an adjustment is reached.
What the process will be, and what
the conclusion, it is impossible to foresee; but that
friction at times has been very great, and matters
dangerously near passing from the communications of
cabinets to the tempers of the peoples, is sufficiently
known. If, on the one hand, some look upon this
as a lesson to us to keep clear of similar adventures,
on the other hand it gives a warning that not only
do causes of offence exist which may result at an
unforeseen moment in a rupture extending to many parts
of the world, but also that there is a spirit abroad
which yet may challenge our claim to exclude its action
and interference in any quarter, unless it finds us
prepared there in adequate strength to forbid it,
or to exercise our own. More and more civilized
man is needing and seeking ground to occupy, room over
which to expand and in which to live. Like all
natural forces, the impulse takes the direction of
least resistance, but when in its course it comes
upon some region rich in possibilities, but unfruitful
through the incapacity or negligence of those who
dwell therein, the incompetent race or system will
go down, as the inferior race ever has fallen back
and disappeared before the persistent impact of the
superior. The recent and familiar instance of
Egypt is entirely in point. The continuance of
the existing system-if it can be called
such-had become impossible, not because
of the native Egyptians, who had endured the like
for ages, but because there were involved therein
the interests of several European states, of which
two principally were concerned by present material
interest and traditional rivalry. Of these one,
and that the one most directly affected, refused to
take part in the proposed interference, with the result
that this was not abandoned, but carried out solely
by the other, which remains in political and administrative
control of the country. Whether the original
enterprise or the continued presence of Great Britain
in Egypt is entirely clear of technical wrongs, open
to the criticism of the pure moralist, is as little
to the point as the morality of an earthquake; the
general action was justified by broad considerations
of moral expediency, being to the benefit of the world
at large, and of the people of Egypt in particular-however
they might have voted in the matter.
But what is chiefly instructive in
this occurrence is the inevitableness, which it shares
in common with the great majority of cases where civilized
and highly organized peoples have trespassed upon
the technical rights of possession of the previous
occupants of the land-of which our own
dealings with the American Indian afford another example.
The inalienable rights of the individual are entitled
to a respect which they unfortunately do not always
get; but there is no inalienable right in any community
to control the use of a region when it does so to
the detriment of the world at large, of its neighbors
in particular, or even at times of its own subjects.
Witness, for example, the present angry resistance
of the Arabs at Jiddah to the remedying of a condition
of things which threatens to propagate a deadly disease
far and wide, beyond the locality by which it is engendered;
or consider the horrible conditions under which the
Armenian subjects of Turkey have lived and are living.
When such conditions obtain, they can be prolonged
only by the general indifference or mutual jealousies
of the other peoples concerned-as in the
instance of Turkey-or because there is sufficient
force to perpetuate the misrule, in which case the
right is inalienable only until its misuse brings
ruin, or until a stronger force appears to dispossess
it. It is because so much of the world still remains
in the possession of the savage, or of states whose
imperfect development, political or economical, does
not enable them to realize for the general use nearly
the result of which the territory is capable, while
at the same time the redundant energies of civilized
states, both government and peoples, are finding lack
of openings and scantiness of livelihood at home,
that there now obtains a condition of aggressive restlessness
with which all have to reckon.
That the United States does not now
share this tendency is entirely evident. Neither
her government nor her people are affected by it to
any great extent. But the force of circumstances
has imposed upon her the necessity, recognized with
practical unanimity by her people, of insuring to
the weaker states of America, although of racial and
political antecedents different from her own, freedom
to develop politically along their own lines and according
to their own capacities, without interference in that
respect from governments foreign to these continents.
The duty is self-assumed; and resting, as it does,
not upon political philanthropy, but simply upon our
own proximate interests as affected by such foreign
interference, has towards others rather the nature
of a right than a duty. But, from either point
of view, the facility with which the claim has been
allowed heretofore by the great powers has been due
partly to the lack of pressing importance in the questions
that have arisen, and partly to the great latent strength
of our nation, which was an argument more than adequate
to support contentions involving matters of no greater
immediate moment, for example, than that of the Honduras
Bay Islands or of the Mosquito Coast. Great Britain
there yielded, it is true, though reluctantly and
slowly; and it is also true that, so far as organized
force is concerned, she could have destroyed our navy
then existing and otherwise have injured us greatly;
but the substantial importance of the question, though
real, was remote in the future, and, as it was, she
made a political bargain which was more to her advantage
than ours. But while our claim thus far has received
a tacit acquiescence, it remains to be seen whether
it will continue to command the same if the states
whose political freedom of action we assert make no
more decided advance towards political stability than
several of them have done yet, and if our own organized
naval force remains as slender, comparatively, as
it once was, and even yet is. It is probably
safe to say that an undertaking like that of Great
Britain in Egypt, if attempted in this hemisphere
by a non-American state, would not be tolerated by
us if able to prevent it; but it is conceivable that
the moral force of our contention might be weakened,
in the view of an opponent, by attendant circumstances,
in which case our physical power to support it should
be open to no doubt.
That we shall seek to secure the peaceable
solution of each difficulty as it arises is attested
by our whole history, and by the disposition of our
people; but to do so, whatever the steps taken in any
particular case, will bring us into new political relations
and may entail serious disputes with other states.
In maintaining the justest policy, the most reasonable
influence, one of the political elements, long dominant,
and still one of the most essential, is military strength-in
the broad sense of the word “military,”
which includes naval as well-not merely
potential, which our own is, but organized and developed,
which our own as yet is not. We wisely quote
Washington’s warning against entangling alliances,
but too readily forget his teaching about preparation
for war. The progress of the world from age to
age, in its ever-changing manifestations, is a great
political drama, possessing a unity, doubtless, in
its general development, but in which, as act follows
act, one situation alone can engage, at one time,
the attention of the actors. Of this drama war
is simply a violent and tumultuous political incident.
A navy, therefore, whose primary sphere of action
is war, is, in the last analysis and from the least
misleading point of view, a political factor of the
utmost importance in international affairs, one more
often deterrent than irritant. It is in that
light, according to the conditions of the age and
of the nation, that it asks and deserves the appreciation
of the state, and that it should be developed in proportion
to the reasonable possibilities of the political future.