President Buchanan Aroused.-Excitement
in Charleston.-The
Situation at the Beginning
of 1861.-Governor Pickens’s War
Measures.-“My
heart was never in this War.”
Anderson’s movement and the
sudden uprising of the North put an end to the mission
of the South Carolina commissioners. Governor
Pickens seized Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie on
the 27th, and the custom-house and other United States
property on the 28th. Before leaving, the commissioners
made a formal call upon the President. The latter
expected some apology or explanation in relation to
the high-handed outrages which had been perpetrated.
Had they temporized, or even used conciliatory language
on this occasion, it is possible the South might still
have preserved the ascendancy it had always held in
the councils of the President. Fortunately, they
assumed an air of injured innocence, and required
Mr. Buchanan to humble himself before them for the
past, and give guarantees for the future by immediately
ordering Fort Sumter to be vacated; that is, by surrendering
to the State all public property in Charleston harbor
which had not been already stolen. For once, the
President, whose personal integrity was called in question,
was thoroughly roused, and made the only answer which
suited the circumstances. He ordered a man-of-war
to proceed to Charleston immediately, drive the State
garrisons out of the forts, and take possession of
the city. He might, indeed, have arrested the
commissioners for high treason; but his Unionism was
of a very mild type, and far from being aggressive.
One of the commissioners, Mr. Adams,
hastened to telegraph to the authorities of Charleston,
on the 28th, to prepare for war immediately, as there
were no longer any hopes of a peaceful settlement.
This dispatch caused a great uproar
and excitement in Charleston. The banks at once
suspended specie payments. All was terror and
confusion, for it was expected that a fleet would
bombard the city and land troops, and there were no
adequate means of opposing its entrance. Castle
Pinckney, indeed, might offer some resistance, but
as it had been a dependency of Fort Sumter, and unoccupied,
little, if any, ammunition was kept there. The
governor rushed frantically down to Fort Moultrie to
hasten the preparations for defense. Non-combatants
were urged to leave Moultrieville at once. The
laborers formerly employed by Captain Foster were
again hired by the State engineers, and were kept at
work thereafter, night and day, in piling up sand-bags
to shield the troops from the fire of Fort Sumter.
The batteries at the north-eastern extremity of Sullivan’s
Island, which were made up of a few old field-pieces
brought from the Citadel Academy in the city, were
hastily put in order to protect the entrance by that
channel. As for Fort Moultrie, before we left
we had rendered its armament useless. At this
time the guns were still spiked, and the workshops
in the city were going night and day to replace the
gun-carriages that had been burned. In place
of these, some of the guns and carriages were sent
over from Castle Pinckney.
No attempt had been made to fortify
the Morris Island channel, and vessels could enter
there without the slightest difficulty. It took
several days to transfer the guns and make the preparations
I have mentioned. It follows, therefore, that
if the Administration had acted promptly, Charleston
could have been taken at once, and full reparation
exacted for all the wrongs perpetrated against the
United States. Why this was not done will be
explained hereafter.
Foster had not been able to settle
with all his workmen, and the rebels frequently sent
them over under a flag of truce to demand their back
pay and act as spies. I was enabled through this
channel to keep up a correspondence with my wife,
who was still in Moultrieville. I learned all
that was going on there, and took occasion to inform
her that we had no means of lighting up our quarters-a
serious inconvenience in those long winter nights.
She purchased a gross of matches and a box of candles,
and had them put on board one of the boats referred
to, in full view of a rebel sentinel, who was supervising
the embarkation. She then requested one of the
crew, an old soldier named M’Narhamy, who formerly
belonged to my company, to deliver them to me, which
he agreed to do. The sentinel stared, but the
self-possessed manner in which she acted made him
think it must be all right, and he did not interfere.
The box arrived safely, and added very much to our
comfort and convenience.
When the governor found that the spell
of Southern supremacy was broken, and that there was
no probability that we would be ordered back to Fort
Moultrie, he was in a very angry mood. He stopped
our mail for a time, and cut off all communication
with us. We were, of course, prevented from purchasing
fresh provisions, and reduced to pork, beans, and
hard-tack. Anderson was quite indignant at this
proceeding, and again talked of shutting up the port
by putting out the lights in the light-houses.
While the leaders in the city complained
bitterly to the public of Anderson for his perfidy
in occupying Fort Sumter, they did not hesitate, among
themselves, to express their admiration for his acuteness
in evading the dangers and difficulties which surrounded
him, and for the skillful manner in which he had accomplished
it.
Our life now proved to be one of great
hardship. Captain Seymour and myself were the
only officers for duty as officers of the day, Lieutenant
Davis and Lieutenant Hall serving under us as officers
of the guard. The situation required constant
vigilance. Lieutenant Talbot, being a great sufferer
from lung-disease, was unable to do this kind of duty.
We were, therefore, very busy during the day superintending
measures for defense, and were obliged to be on the
alert, and wide awake every other night, so that we
were completely exhausted in a short time. Assistant-surgeon
Crawford, having no sick in hospital, generously offered
to do duty as officer of the day, and his offer was
gladly accepted. The two young engineer officers,
Snyder and Meade, were also willing to serve as line
officers; but Captain Foster thought it was contrary
to precedent, and they were not detailed.
As the Engineer department is regarded
in this country as the highest branch of the military
service, and as its officers are really very able
men, I can not conceive what induced them to build
Fort Sumter without any flanking defenses whatever,
and without fire-proof quarters for the officers.
The first defect I endeavored to remedy by projecting
iron-plated, bullet-proof galleries over the angles
of the parapet. I left small trap-doors in the
bottom of these, for the purpose of throwing down
shells on the heads of any party below attempting to
force an entrance through the embrasures.
The other defect-the presence of so much
combustible matter in the quarters-it was
impossible to remedy, and it ultimately cost the loss
of the fort. The excuse that it never could have
been anticipated that the fort would be attacked from
the land side is hardly a valid one, for a foreign
fleet might possibly have effected a landing on Morris
Island; or they might have set fire to the quarters
from the decks of the vessels by means of incendiary
shells.
As may well be supposed, there was
a great deal of excitement in New York in relation
to us; and, in view of the small number of men available
for service in the regular army, three of the principal
citizens, James A. Hamilton, Moses H. Grinnell, and
I.E. Williams, offered, at their own expense,
about the last of December, to send us four hundred
picked artillerists from the citizen soldiery of the
city; but General Scott refused to entertain the proposition.
On the 1st of January, 1861, we took
an account of our resources, and found we had but
one month’s supply of fuel for cooking purposes,
but few candles, and no soap. There was, however,
a small light-house inside the fort, and we found
a little oil stored there.
It seemed to me that the time had
now come when forbearance ceased to be a virtue.
Even our opponents were willing to acknowledge that
we represented a legitimate government, and that both
duty and propriety called upon us to resist the numerous
war measures which the governor of South Carolina
had inaugurated. He had taken forcible possession
of two United States forts, of the money in the custom-house,
of the custom-house itself, and of other national
property in Charleston. He had closed the harbor,
by destroying the costly prismatic lenses in the light-houses,
and by withdrawing the warning light-ship from Rattlesnake
Shoal. He had cut off all communication between
us and the city, and had seized the United States
mails. His steamboats, laden with war material
to be used in erecting batteries against us, were allowed
to pass and repass Fort Sumter, not only without opposition,
but without even a protest. Worse than all, he
had commenced imprisoning the crews of merchant vessels
for contumacy in refusing to acknowledge his authority
as the head of an independent nation. In vain
did these vessels reverse their flags in a mute appeal
to us to use our guns in their defense. Anderson
would do nothing-not even send a communication
to the governor on the subject, although the latter,
without authority from the State Legislature, was
thus wielding all the powers of a military dictator.
The enemy were greatly emboldened at our weakness or
timidity, and with good reason, for they saw us stand
by with folded arms, and allow steamboat loads of
ammunition and war material to pass us, on their way
to Morris Island, to be used in the erection and arming
of batteries to prevent any United States vessels
from coming to our assistance.
Major Anderson was neither timid nor
irresolute, and he was fully aware of his duties and
responsibilities. Unfortunately, he desired not
only to save the Union, but to save slavery with it.
Without this, he considered the contest as hopeless.
In this spirit he submitted to every thing, and delayed
all action in the expectation that Congress would
make some new and more binding compromise which would
restore peace to the country. He could not read
the signs of the times, and see that the conscience
of the nation and the progress of civilization had
already doomed slavery to destruction. If he
had taken this view of the situation, he would have
made more strenuous efforts to hold on to the harbor
of Charleston, and the one hundred and twenty millions
of dollars, more or less, spent to regain it might
still have formed part of the national treasury.
The applause which, both in the North
and South, greeted his masterly movement of the 26th
of December, made him feel more like an arbiter between
two contending nations than a simple soldier engaged
in carrying out the instructions of his superiors.
To show the spirit in which he acted, it is only necessary
to quote from his letter to Governor Pickens while
the rebellion was still pending. He wrote:
“My dear Governor, my heart was never in this
war.” This sentiment was repeated by him
in letters to other parties, and, strange to say, was
actually sent in the form of an official communication
to the adjutant-general of the army.
The difficulties he experienced in
his unavailing attempts to defer hostilities seriously
impaired his health and spirits, and ultimately brought
on the disease which kept him almost entirely out of
service during the remainder of the war, and in all
probability hastened his death.
However much I differed from him in
regard to his pro-slavery sentiments, I take pleasure
in stating that, aside from his political career,
the graces of his private life were such as to win
the esteem and regard of all who knew him.