I have already spoken of the so-called
“requisitioning” that took place among
our people while I was working at Saffêd. This,
of course, really amounted to wholesale pillage.
The hand of the Turkish looters had fallen particularly
heavy on carts and draught animals. As the Arabs
know little or nothing of carting, hauling, or the
management of horses and mules, the Turks, simply
enough, had “requisitioned” many of the
owners middle-aged or elderly men and
forced them to go south to help along with the tremendous
preparations that were being made for the attack on
Suez. Among these were a number of men from our
village. In the course of time their families
began to get the most harrowing messages from them.
They were absolutely destitute, no wages being paid
them by the Turks; their clothes were dropping off
them in rags; many were sick. After much excited
planning, it was decided to send another man and myself
down south on a sort of relief expedition, with a
substantial sum of money that had been raised with
great difficulty by our people. Through the influence
of my brother at the Agricultural Experiment Station,
I got permission from the mouchtar to leave
Zicron-Jacob, and about the middle of January, 1915,
I set out for Jerusalem.
To Western minds, the idea of the
Holy City serving as a base for modern military operations
must be full of incongruities. And, as a matter
of fact, it was an amazing sight to see the
streets packed with khaki-clad soldiers and hear the
brooding silence of ancient walls shattered by the
crash of steel-shod army boots. Here, for the
first time, I saw the German officers quantities
of them. Strangely out of place they looked,
with their pink-and-whiteness that no amount of hot
sunshine could quite burn off. They wore the regular
German officer’s uniform, except that the Pickelhaube
was replaced by a khaki sun-helmet. I was struck
by the youthfulness of them; many were nothing but
boys, and there were weak, dissolute faces in plenty a
fact that was later explained when I heard that Palestine
had been the dumping-ground for young men of high
family whose parents were anxious to have them as
far removed as possible from the danger zone.
Fast’s Hotel was the great meeting-place in
Jerusalem for these young bloods. Every evening
thirty or forty would foregather there to drink and
talk women and strategy. I well remember the
evening when one of them a slender young
Prussian with no back to his head, braceleted and
monocled rose and announced, in the decisive
tones that go with a certain stage of intoxication:
“What we ought to do is to hand over the organization
of this campaign to Thomas Cook & Sons!”
However, the German officers were
by no means all incompetents. They realized (I
soon found out) that they had little hope of bringing
a big army through the Egyptian desert and making
a successful campaign there. Their object was
to immobilize a great force of British troops around
the Canal, to keep the Mohammedan population in Palestine
impressed with Turkish power, and to stir up religious
unrest among the natives in Egypt. It must be
admitted that in the first two of these purposes they
have been successful.
The Turks were less far-sighted.
They believed firmly that they were going to sweep
the English off the face of the earth and enter Cairo
in triumph, and preparations for the march on Suez
went on with feverish enthusiasm. The ideas of
the common soldiers on this subject were amusing.
Some of them declared that the Canal was to be filled
up by the sandbags which had been prepared in great
quantities. Others held that thousands of camels
would be kept without water for many days preceding
the attack; then the thirsty animals, when released,
would rush into the Canal in such numbers that the
troops could march to victory over the packed masses
of drowned bodies.
The army operating against Suez numbered
about one hundred and fifty thousand men. Of
these about twenty thousand were Anatolian Turks trained
soldiers, splendid fighting material, as was shown
by their resistance at the Dardanelles. The rest
were Palestinian Arabs, and very inferior troops they
were. The Arab as a soldier is at once stupid
and cunning: fierce when victory is on his side,
but unreliable when things go against him. In
command of the expedition was the famous Djemal Pasha,
a Young Turk general of tremendous energy, but possessing
small ability to see beyond details to the big, broad
concepts of strategy. Although a great friend
of Enver Pasha, he looked with disfavor on the German
officers and, in particular, on Bach Pasha, the German
Governor of Jerusalem, with whom he had serious disagreements.
This dislike of the Germans was reflected among the
lesser Turkish officers. Many of these, after
long years of service, found themselves subordinated
to young foreigners, who, in addition to arbitrary
promotion, received much higher salaries than the Turks.
What is more, they were paid in clinking gold, whereas
the Turks, when paid at all, got paper currency.
Beersheba, a prosperous town of the
ancient province of Idumea, was the southern base
of operations for the advance on Suez. Some of
our villagers had been sent to this district, and,
in searching for them, I had the opportunity of seeing
at least the taking-off place of the expedition.
Beyond this point no Jew or Christian was allowed to
pass, with the exception of the physicians, all of
whom were non-Mohammedans who had been forced into
the army.
Beersheba was swarming with troops.
They filled the town and overflowed on to the sands
outside, where a great tent-city grew up. And
everywhere that the Turkish soldiers went, disorganization
and inefficiency followed them. From all over
the country the finest camels had been “requisitioned”
and sent down to Beersheba until, at the time I was
there, thousands and thousands of them were collected
in the neighborhood. Through the laziness and
stupidity of the Turkish commissariat officers, which
no amount of German efficiency could counteract, no
adequate provision was made for feeding them, and
incredible numbers succumbed to starvation and neglect.
Their great carcasses dotted the sand in all directions;
it was only the wonderful antiseptic power of the
Eastern sun that held pestilence in check.
The soldiers themselves suffered much
hardship. The crowding in the tents was unspeakable;
the water-supply was almost as inadequate as the medical
service, which consisted chiefly of volunteer Red Crescent
societies among them a unit of twenty German
nurses sent by the American College at Beirut.
Medical supplies, such as they were, had been taken
from the different mission hospitals and pharmacies
of Palestine these “requisitions”
being made by officers who knew nothing of medical
requirements and simply scooped together everything
in sight. As a result, one of the army physicians
told me that in Beersheba he had opened some medical
chests consigned to him and found, to his horror,
that they were full of microscopes and gynecological
instruments for the care of wounded soldiers
in the desert!
Visits of British aeroplanes to Beersheba
were common occurrences. Long before the machine
itself could be seen, its whanging, resonant hum would
come floating out of the blazing sky, seemingly from
everywhere at once. Soldiers rushed from their
tents, squinting up into the heavens until the speck
was discovered, swimming slowly through the air; then
followed wholesale firing at an impossible range until
the officers forbade it. True to the policy of
avoiding all unnecessary harm to the natives, these
British aviators never dropped bombs on the town,
but what was more dangerous from the Turkish
point of view they would unload packages
of pamphlets, printed in Arabic, informing the natives
that they were being deceived; that the Allies were
their only true friends; that the Germans were merely
making use of them to further their own schemes, etc.
These cleverly worded little tracts came showering
down out of the sky, and at first they were eagerly
picked up. The Turkish commanders, however, soon
announced that any one found carrying them would pay
the death penalty. After that, when the little
bundles dropped near them, the natives would, run as
if from high explosive bombs.
All things considered, it is wonderful
that the Turkish demonstration against the Canal came
as near to fulfillment as it did. Twenty thousand
soldiers actually crossed the desert in six days on
scant rations, and with them they took two big guns,
which they dragged by hand when the mules dropped
from thirst and exhaustion. They also carried
pontoons to be used in crossing the Canal. Guns
and pontoons are now at rest in the Museum at Cairo.
Just what took place in the attack
is known to very few. The English have not seen
fit to make public the details, and there was little
to be got from the demoralized soldiers who returned
to Beersheba. Piece by piece, however, I gathered
that the attacking party had come up to the Canal
at dawn. Finding everything quiet, they set about
getting across, and had even launched a pontoon, when
the British, who were lying in wait, opened a terrific
fire from the farther bank, backed by armored locomotives
and aeroplanes. “It was as if the gates
of Jehannum were opened and its fires turned loose
upon us,” one soldier told me.
The Turks succeeded in getting their
guns into action for a very short while. One
of the men-of-war in the Canal was hit; several houses
in Ismaïlia suffered damage; but the invaders were
soon driven away in confusion, leaving perhaps two
thousand prisoners in the hands of the English.
If the latter had chosen to do so, they could have
annihilated the Turkish forces then and there.
The ticklish state of mind of the Mohammedan population
in Egypt, however, has led them to adopt a policy
of leniency and of keeping to the defensive, which
subsequent developments have more than justified.
It is characteristic of England’s faculty for
holding her colonies that batteries manned by Egyptians
did the finest work in defense of the Canal.
The reaction in Palestine after the
defeat at Suez was tremendous. Just before the
attack, Djemal Pasha had sent out a telegram announcing
the overwhelming defeat of the British vanguard, which
had caused wild enthusiasm. Another later telegram
proclaimed that the Canal had been reached, British
men-of-war sunk, the Englishmen routed with
a loss to the Turks of five men and two camels, “which
were afterwards recovered.” “But,”
added the telegram, “a terrible sand-storm having
arisen, the glorious army takes it as the wish of
Allah not to continue the attack, and has therefore
withdrawn in triumph.”
These reports hoodwinked the ignorant
natives for a little while, but when the stream of
haggard soldiers, wounded and exhausted, began pouring
back from the south, they guessed what had happened,
and a fierce revulsion against the Germano-Turkish
régime set in. A few weeks before the
advance on Suez, I was in Jaffa, where the enthusiasm
and excitement had been at fever-pitch. Parades
and celebrations of all kinds in anticipation of the
triumphal march into Egypt were taking place, and
one day a camel, a dog, and a bull, decorated respectively
with the flags of Russia, France, and England, were
driven through the streets. The poor animals
were horribly maltreated by the natives, who rained
blows and flung filth upon them by way of giving concrete
expression to their contempt for the Allies. Mr.
Glazebrook, the American Consul at Jerusalem, happened
to be with me in Jaffa that day; and never shall I
forget the expression of pain and disgust on his face
as he watched this melancholy little procession of
scapegoats hurrying along the street.
Now, however, all was changed.
The Arabs, who take defeat badly, turned against the
authorities who had got them into such trouble.
Rumors circulated that Djemal Pasha had been bought
by the English and that the defeat at Suez had been
planned by him, and persons keeping an ear close to
the ground began to hear mutterings of a general massacre
of Germans. In fact, things came within an ace
of a bloody outbreak. I knew some Germans in
Jaffa and Haifa who firmly believed that it was all
over with them. In the defeated army itself the
Turkish officers gave vent to their hatred of the
Germans. Three German officers were shot by their
Turkish comrades during the retreat, and a fourth committed
suicide. However, Djemal Pasha succeeded in keeping
order by means of stern repressive methods and by
the fear roused by his large body-guard of faithful
Anatolians.
We felt sure that the Turkish defeat
would put a damper on the arrogance of the soldiery.
But even the Mohammedan population were hoping that
the Allies would push their victory and land troops
in Syria and Palestine; for though they hated the
infidel, they loved the Turk not at all, and the country
was exhausted and the blockade of the Mediterranean
by the Allies prevented the import and export of articles.
The oranges were rotting on the trees because the
annual Liverpool market was closed to Palestine, and
other crops were in similar case. The country
was short, too, of petroleum, sugar, rice, and other
supplies, and even of matches. We had to go back
to old customs and use flint and steel for fire, and
we seldom used our lamps. Money was scarce, too,
and, Turkey having declared a moratorium, cash was
often unobtainable even by those who had money in
the banks, and much distress ensued.
As the defeated army was pouring in
from the south, I decided to leave Beersheba and go
home. The roads and the fields were covered with
dead camels and horses and mules. Hundreds of
soldiers were straggling in disorder, many of them
on leave but many deserting. Soon after the defeat
at the Canal several thousand soldiers deserted, but
an amnesty was declared and they returned to their
regiments.
When I arrived at Jerusalem I found
the city filled with soldiers. Djemal Pasha had
just returned from the desert, and his quarters were
guarded by a battery of two field guns. Nobody
knew what to expect; some thought that the country
would have a little more freedom now that the soldiery
had lost its braggadocio, while others expected the
lawlessness that attends disorganization. I went
to see Consul Glazebrook. He is a true American,
a Southerner, formerly a professor of theology at
Princeton. He was most earnest and devoted in
behalf of the American citizens that came under his
care, rendering at Jerusalem the same sort of service
that Ambassador Morgenthau has rendered at Constantinople.
He was practically the only man who stood up for the
poor, defenseless people of the city. He received
me kindly, and I told him what I knew of conditions
in the country, what I had heard among the Arabs, and
of my own fears and apprehensions. He was visibly
impressed and he advised me to see Captain Decker,
of the U.S.S. Tennessee, who was then in Jaffa,
promising to write himself to the captain of my proposed
visit.
I went to Jaffa the same day and after
two days’ delay succeeded in seeing Captain
Decker, with the further help of Mr. Glazebrook, who
took me with him. The police interfered and tried
to keep me from going aboard the ship, but after long
discussions I was permitted to take my place in the
launch that the captain had sent for the consul.
Captain Decker was interested in what
I had to say, and at his request I dictated my story
to his stenographer. What became of my report
I do not know, whether it was transmitted
to the Department of State or whether Captain Decker
communicated with Ambassador Morgenthau, but
at all events we soon began to see certain reforms
inaugurated in parts of the country, and these reforms
could have been effected only through pressure from
Constantinople. The presence of the two American
cruisers in the Mediterranean waters has without any
doubt been instrumental in the saving of many lives.