By the year 1824, the West had become
a section to be reckoned with by those who were calculating
their chances in the presidential race. Since
the war six Western States had been admitted into the
Union. The population west of the Alleghanies
had increased by nearly a million and a half within
a decade. The relative importance of this new
section appears in the census returns. In 1790,
less than six per cent of the total population lived
west of the Alleghanies; in 1820, nearly thirty-two
per cent were domiciled in this vast region. In
the National Legislature the West had acquired notable
weight. By the apportionment of 1822, it had
forty-seven out of two hundred and thirteen members
of the House; in the Senate, eighteen out of forty-eight.
But these figures do not tell the whole tale.
As Professor Turner has well said, rightly to estimate
the weight of Western population we must add the people
of western New York and of the interior counties of
Pennsylvania, and of the trans-Alleghany counties
of Virginia, as well as the people of the back-country
of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, North Carolina, and
Georgia. “All of these regions were to be
influenced by the ideals of democratic rule which
were springing up in the Mississippi Valley.”
Economic conditions bred a democratic
society in the West. What Gallatin said of Pennsylvania
was true of the greater West: “An equal
distribution of property made every individual independent
and produced a true and real equality.”
The basal characteristic of the West was individual
ownership of land; and the reaction of the sense of
proprietorship upon individual character was the most
significant fact in the history of its population.
Intense individualism and rugged self-reliance were
the salient characteristics of the Westerner.
So far as he reflected upon his social relations,
he believed in complete social equality. In numberless
instances the pioneer had migrated to escape the social
inequalities and depressing conventions of older communities;
and he was not minded to encourage the reproduction
of these conditions in his new home. “America,
then, exhibits in her social state an extraordinary
phenomenon,” wrote De Tocqueville in his notable
study of American democracy. “Men are there
seen on a greater equality in point of fortune and
intellect, or, in other words, more equal in their
strength, than in any other country of the world, or
in any age of which history has preserved the remembrance.”
Life on the frontier, where a man
wrestled with the primitive forces of Nature and conquered
by dint of his indomitable will, made the Westerner
perhaps overconfident in his ability to deal with all
obstacles in the way of human achievement and withal
somewhat impatient under the restraints imposed by
the more complicated social order in the older communities
to the East. The sweep of the prairies and the
wide horizon lines of the Middle West may have exercised
a subtle influence upon temperament. At all events,
the Westerner was buoyant and optimistic, taking large
views of national destiny and of the possibilities
of human achievement in a democracy.
There was danger, indeed, that in
cutting loose from the irritating restraints of the
older communities, the people of the West would sacrifice
much of the grace and many of the intellectual and
spiritual refinements of an older civilization.
“In this part of the American continent,”
observes De Tocqueville, “population has escaped
the influence not only of great names and great wealth,
but even of the natural aristocracy of knowledge and
virtue.” It seemed to two young New Englanders
who traversed the vast region from the Western Reserve
to New Orleans in 1813, in the interests of missionary
societies, that the people were wrapped in spiritual
darkness, “being ignorant, often vicious, and
utterly destitute of Bibles and religious literature.”
The General Bible Society of the United States was
founded in 1816 to dispel this irreligious gloom.
Within five years this organization and its numerous
auxiliaries had distributed one hundred and forty thousand
Bibles and Testaments through the new States.
Yet the irreligion of the West was
painted darker than it really was. Methodism
had struck root where other denominations could not
thrive. Its methods and organization, indeed,
were peculiarly adapted to a people which could not
support a settled pastor. “A sect, therefore,
which marked out the region into circuits, put a rider
on each and bade him cover it once a month, preaching
here to-day and there to-morrow, but returning at
regular intervals to each community, provided the
largest amount of religious teaching and preaching
at the least expense.” The Baptists, too,
secured a footing in the new communities and labored
effectively in creating religious ties between the
old and the new sections of the country. In religion
as in politics the people of the West were responsive
to emotional appeals. The circuit rider, with
his intense conviction of sin and his equally strong
conviction of salvation through repentance, wrought
great crowds in camp meetings into ecstasies of religious
excitement. Odd religious sects and strange “isms”
were to be found in the back-country. At New Harmony
on the Wabash River were the Rappites, a sect of German
peasants who came first to Pennsylvania under their
leader George Rapp, and who afterward returned thither.
At Zoar in Ohio was the Separatist community led by
Joseph Baumeler. Shaker societies were formed
at many places; and Mormonism was just beginning its
strange history through the revelations of Joseph
Smith in western New York.
The intellectual horizon of the Western
world was necessarily limited. Absorbed in the
stern struggle for existence, the people had no leisure
and no heart to enjoy the finer aspects of life.
Education was a luxury which only the prosperous might
possess. The purpose to make elementary education
a public charge developed tardily. Outside of
New England, indeed, a public school system did not
exist. Throughout the older portions of the West
the traveler might find academies and so-called colleges,
but none supported at public expense. The State
of Indiana, it is true, entered the Union with a constitution
which made it the duty of the legislature to provide,
as soon as circumstances permitted, “for a general
system of education, ascending in a regular gradation
from township schools to a State University, wherein
tuition shall be gratis, and equally open to all.”
But years passed before circumstances permitted the
realization of this ideal. Meantime, the prosperous
planters of the Southwest employed tutors for their
children, and the well-to-do farmers of the Northwest
paid tuition for their boys at academies. But
young Abraham Lincoln had to teach himself Euclid and
to cipher on the back of a wooden shovel, by the flickering
embers of a log-cabin fire.
The new Commonwealths entered the
Union as self-confessed democracies. In all the
States formed after the War of 1812, with one exception,
property qualifications such as prevailed in the older
States were swept away and the right to vote was accorded
to every adult white male. In Mississippi alone
there was the additional qualification that a voter
should be enrolled in the militia or have paid a state
or county tax. Everywhere, too, the principle
was accepted that representation should be based upon
population and not upon property. The men who
framed these new constitutions believed that they
were establishing the rule of the people. It
was, indeed, unthinkable that, believing themselves
equal in all other respects, they should not accept
the principle of political equality and popular sovereignty.
There is evidence in these new constitutions,
however, that the people placed less reliance in their
legislative bodies than did the people of the Revolutionary
era. Instead of general grants of legislative
power, there are specific prohibitions and positive
injunctions. Important limitations are imposed
upon the form and mode of legislation. It is
clear, too, that fear of an over-strong executive had
given way to a belief in the necessity of having a
stronger countervailing influence, capable of checking
the legislative. Everywhere the governor was made
elective directly by the people and given the veto
power. The conviction was often expressed in
constitutional conventions that the governor was peculiarly
the representative of the people, a popular tribune
who would protect them against the indiscretions of
their legislative representatives. The extension
of the elective principle to all important offices
was accompanied also by a general conviction that life
tenure of office is undemocratic. “Rotation
in office,” said Andrew Jackson, voicing a popular
feeling, “is a cardinal principle of democracy.”
The spirit of Western democracy leavened
also the older States. The people of Maine, breaking
away from Massachusetts and her ancient ideals, boldly
declared for manhood suffrage in their new constitution.
Connecticut adopted a constitution in 1818 to replace
the old charter, and dissolved the old union of Church
and State by declaring that no preference should be
given by law to any Christian sect or mode of worship.
At the same time Connecticut extended the suffrage
to all who served in the militia or paid a state tax.
New York in the constitution of 1821 and Massachusetts
by a constitutional amendment in the same year abandoned
the old property qualifications for voting.
In both Massachusetts and New York,
conservative men like Chancellor Kent and Daniel Webster
frankly avowed their apprehensions of universal suffrage.
“The tendency of universal suffrage,” said
Kent in the New York convention, “is to jeopardize
the rights of property, and the principles of liberty.”
He held society to be an association for the protection
of property as well as of life, “and the individual
who contributes only one cent to the common stock
ought not to have the same power and influence in
directing the property concerns of the partnership
as he who contributes his thousands.”
The democratic movement affected not
only the formal organization of State Governments,
but also the machinery and methods of political parties.
In the Northern States there was increasing dissatisfaction
with the practice of nominating candidates for office
by legislative caucus. The rank and file of the
parties were no longer willing to submit blindly to
the dictation of leaders. In deference to party
voters in districts which were not represented by
men of their political faith, the leaders of the respective
parties now found it expedient to summon special delegates
to their party conclaves, in order to give a more
truly representative character to the organization
of party. The legislative caucus, in short, gave
way to the mixed caucus.
But the old vice remained. The
selection of candidates for office was still made
by those who had no mandate to act for the party except
in a legislative capacity. If the voters of the
party were in truth the source of authority within
the party, then a means had to be devised of ascertaining
their will. The democratic principle, in short,
had to be applied to party. In response to this
feeling, mass meetings and irregular conventions were
held; but these methods of securing an expression
of party opinion were only transitional. Indeed,
so long as the means of communication were defective,
popular gatherings were necessarily poorly attended.
The next step in the democratization of party organization
could only be taken when the barriers of space were
overcome by the application of the steam engine to
transportation. The nominating delegate convention
waited on the development of transportation.
Much the same popular hostility was
directed against the congressional caucus. Candidates
for the presidential nomination were not blind to
this movement, and for the most part they sought other
means of promoting their chances. Monroe had
hardly entered upon his second term when state legislative
caucuses began to nominate favorite sons. In
1821, the legislature of South Carolina put forward
the name of William Lowndes, and upon his death named
John C. Calhoun as its candidate for the Presidency.
In 1822, the legislature of Tennessee presented the
name of Andrew Jackson, “the soldier, the statesman,
the honest man,” to the consideration of the
people of the United States. In the same year
Republican members of the legislature of Kentucky recommended
Henry Clay “as a suitable person to succeed
James Monroe as President.” A “joint
meeting of the Republican members of the Massachusetts
legislature and of Republican delegates from the various
towns of the Commonwealth not represented in the legislature”
nominated John Quincy Adams for the Presidency in
January, 1823. And finally, illustrative of the
varied methods in use and of the strange vicissitudes
of politics at this time, a public gathering or mass
meeting at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in March, 1824,
nominated Adams for President and Jackson for Vice-President.
A series of resolutions passed by
the legislature of Tennessee in 1823 called attention
in no uncertain language to the shortcomings of the
congressional caucus and called for its overthrow.
A canvass of the members of Congress showed that one
hundred and eighty-one out of two hundred and sixty-one
believed a caucus inexpedient at this time. Nevertheless,
the minority, acting in Crawford’s interest,
took their courage in both hands and held a caucus
on February 14, 1824. Sixty-four out of sixty-eight
votes were cast for William H. Crawford, who thus
became by all precedents the “regular”
candidate of the Republican party. This nomination
and the indorsement of Jackson by the Republicans
of Pennsylvania spoiled Calhoun’s chances.
In the spring of 1824, he allied himself with the
Jackson faction by accepting the nomination for Vice-President
at the hands of a state nominating convention at Harrisburg,
which had put Jackson at the head of the ticket.
Such issues as were discoverable in
the presidential contest of 1824 were formulated in
the debates in Congress during the early part of the
year. As the country recovered from financial
depression, the question of internal improvements
again forged to the front. In 1822, a bill to
authorize the collection of tolls on the Cumberland
Road had been vetoed by the President. In an
elaborate essay Monroe set forth his views on the
constitutional aspects of a policy of internal improvements.
Congress might appropriate money, he admitted, but
it might not undertake the actual construction of
national works nor assume jurisdiction over them.
For the moment the drift toward a larger participation
of the National Government in internal improvements
was stayed. Two years later, however, Congress
authorized the President to institute surveys for
such roads and canals as he believed to be needed
for commerce and military defense. The vote on
this bill shows that the source of opposition to internal
improvements was chiefly in the Northeast, in Virginia,
and in the Carolinas. The West and Southwest,
with Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey, were a
unit in support of the general survey.
No one pleaded more eloquently for
a larger conception of the functions of the National
Government than Clay. No one voiced the aspirations
of his section more faithfully. He called the
attention of his hearers to provisions made for coast
surveys and lighthouses on the Atlantic seaboard and
deplored the neglect of the great interior of the country.
“A new world has come into being since the Constitution
was adopted,” he exclaimed. “Are
the narrow, limited necessities of the old thirteen
States, of, indeed, parts only of the old thirteen
States as they existed at the formation of the present
Constitution, forever to remain the rule of its interpretation?”
Of the other presidential candidates, Jackson voted
in the Senate for the general survey bill; and Adams
left no doubt in the public mind that he did not reflect
the narrow views of his section on this issue.
Crawford felt the constitutional scruples which were
everywhere being voiced in the South, and followed
the old expedient of advocating a constitutional amendment
to sanction national internal improvements.
The Tariff Act of 1824 also entered
somewhat into the presidential campaign. The
failure of the protectionists to secure a higher tariff
in 1820 had been followed by other efforts to secure
congressional action; but none succeeded until Clay
was again elected Speaker of the House and thrust
the matter into the foreground of discussion.
Clay dwelt eloquently upon the loss of the foreign
market for agricultural products and upon the consequent
widespread distress. To his mind the remedy was
the establishment of an American market by fostering
manufactures. That such a policy would involve
a clash of sectional interests, he did not deny; but
he believed that “reconciliation by mutual concessions”
could be effected and a genuine “American system”
be brought into existence.
The tariff bill presented in 1824
was avowedly a protective measure. Among lesser
changes, increased duties were proposed on iron, lead,
wool, hemp, cotton bagging, and cotton and woolen goods.
At once the clash of sectional interests began.
New England shippers protested against the duty on
hemp, which they needed for cordage; and Southern
planters made common cause with them on this item,
because the cheap bagging which they used for baling
their cotton was made of coarse hemp. For the
same reason the maritime sections of New England opposed
the duty on iron. For precisely opposite reasons,
Kentucky clamored for the protection of her hemp-growers,
and Pennsylvania, for the protection of her iron-workers.
It was well understood that the cotton industry was
established and needed no protection; nevertheless,
the minimum duty on cotton fabrics was raised.
The increased duty on woolens, however, was offset
by an increased duty on raw wool, so that the woolen
manufacturers profited little by the change of rate.
A proposal to apply to woolens the minimum principle
which had been extended to cottons in 1816 was defeated
by the opposition of the South. Any increase in
the cost of cheap woolen goods was bound to enhance
the cost of clothing the slaves. On the other
hand, the representatives of the great grain-growing
and farming States of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania,
together with the States of the Ohio Valley, were almost
unanimously in favor of the proposed bill. When
the bill came to a vote in the House on April 16,
1824, only nine of the combined ninety-five votes
of these sections were cast in the negative. Equally
emphatic was the protest of the South and Southwest:
only six out of seventy-six Representatives favored
the bill. New England by its divided vote revealed
the internal conflict between the commercial and manufacturing
interests. The bill passed both houses of Congress
by small majorities and received the signature of
the President.
Of the presidential candidates, only
one spoke with uncertain sound on the tariff issue.
Clay was the outspoken advocate of a far-reaching
American system; Adams thought the tariff of 1824 a
fair compromise; Jackson, properly coached by his
intimates, put himself on record as a supporter of
a protective policy to create a home market; only Crawford,
representative of the peculiar interests of the South
and candidate for Northern support, felt the impossibility
of harmonizing the conflicting interests of his followers
by a clear-cut and explicit utterance on the tariff.
With so many candidates in the field,
it was difficult to forecast the outcome of the presidential
campaign. Even if there had been a pronounced
popular drift toward any candidate, the result would
have remained in doubt until the six States which
still gave the choice of electors to their legislatures
had completed the complicated electoral process.
There was a strong likelihood, however, that the election
would go to the House of Representatives. As
the choice would then be confined to the three candidates
having the highest vote, there was not a little bargaining
in the States where the legislatures chose the electors.
The completed returns gave Jackson 99 electoral votes;
Adams, 84; Crawford, 41; and Clay, 37. Calhoun
was elected Vice-President by more than two thirds
of the electoral vote. The House, therefore, as
wiseacres had foretold, was called upon for the second
time to decide a contested presidential election.
The position of Clay was one of unenviable
distinction and power. He could not be elected
President, but he could, it was believed, determine
which of his rivals should have the coveted office.
His own State favored Jackson as a second choice;
but Clay wrote to a friend that he could not consider
the killing of twenty-five hundred Englishmen at New
Orleans proved the fitness of Jackson for the chief
civil magistracy. Crawford was personally less
objectionable to Clay; but he had suffered a paralytic
stroke and his health was precarious. Besides,
Crawford had opposed some of the policies which Clay
had most at heart. For years Clay had been a
bitter opponent of Adams; yet after all was said, he
was bound to admit that his interests would be best
served by an alliance with this stiff-necked New Englander.
At an early date, therefore, he determined to throw
his support to Adams.
For weeks the capital was enveloped
in an atmosphere of intrigue. Clay was courted
by all factions. The possibility of securing his
support was a standing temptation to wire-pullers.
Even Adams wrote in his diary, “Incedo super
ignes” (I walk over fires). When Clay
announced positively, on January 24, that he and his
friends would support Adams, a storm of passionate
denunciation broke upon him. An anonymous letter
appeared in a Philadelphia newspaper, charging that
friends of Adams had offered Clay the Secretaryship
of State in return for his support, and that friends
of Clay had reported the offer to friends of Jackson,
with the intimation that Clay would support the general
on similar terms. When the friends of Jackson
spurned these overtures, Clay sold out to Adams.
With quite unnecessary heat Clay branded the author
of this letter as “a base and infamous calumniator,
a dastard, and a liar.” His first instinct
was to challenge the author whoever he might be; but
when Representative George Kremer, an odd character
who was chiefly conspicuous by reason of the leopard-skin
coat which he wore avowed himself the writer of the
offensive letter, Clay wisely concluded not to make
himself ridiculous by an affair of honor with this
Gil Blas. He demanded a congressional investigation
instead.
While this investigation of the alleged
bargain between Adams and Clay was pending, the House
proceeded to the election of a President. On the
first ballot, Adams received the votes of thirteen
States, while Jackson was the choice of seven States,
and Crawford of four. New England, New York,
Louisiana, Maryland, and the States of the Northwest,
except Indiana, supported Adams. Combined with
these were now Missouri and Kentucky, which had voted
for Clay. Jackson received the votes of the Southwest,
together with those of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana,
and South Carolina. Crawford was supported by
Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.
Two days later the President-elect announced that
he had invited Henry Clay to be his Secretary of State.
After some hesitation, Clay accepted the post.
The cry of corruption is a recurrent
note in the history of democracies. The American
democracy is no exception. With most of the charges
of corruption, the historian has little concern; but
the bargain and corruption cry of 1825 has a historical
significance. The falsity of the charge against
Clay has been proved as nearly as a negative can be.
Adams may not have been above the uncongenial task
of soliciting votes, but he kept safely within the
moral domain which his conscience marked out.
The motive which governed his appointment of Clay as
Secretary of State is stated frankly in a letter to
Monroe, two days after the election by the House.
He considered the appointment “due to his talents
and services to the western section of the Union, whence
he comes, and to the confidence in me manifested by
their delegations.” Upon one individual
these considerations made no impression: Andrew
Jackson left the capital with wrath in his soul.
He felt that he had been defrauded by a corrupt bargain.
From this time on his hand was against Clay,-that
“Judas of the West,” as he afterward called
him,-who had conspired to “impair
the pure principles of our republican institutions”
and to “prostrate that fundamental maxim which
maintains the supremacy of the people’s will.”
Years after the events of 1824-25,
the belief of Jackson that the will of the people
had been defeated found classic expression in Thomas
H. Benton’s Thirty Years’ View of Congress.
What Benton termed “the Demos Krateo principle”
was thoroughly in accord with the spirit of the new
democracy, but it rested upon an entire misunderstanding
of the Constitution. A direct popular election
of the President was never contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution. It is impossible to find
in either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution
any justification for the view that the House of Representatives
is bound to elect the candidate having the highest
popular vote.
What the will of the people really
was in the presidential election of 1824 is by no
means clear. Even in those States where presidential
electors were chosen by popular vote, Jackson received
less than half of the popular vote; and in many of
these States the actual vote fell far below the potential.
In Massachusetts, where 66,000 votes had been cast
for governor the year before, only 37,000 voters took
the trouble to vote for President. In Pennsylvania,
which boasted of a population of over a million, less
than 48,000 voted in 1824. Moreover, the six States
which chose the presidential electors through their
legislatures, contained one fourth of the population
of the country. One fact, however, stands out
with unmistakable clearness,-and it did
not escape politicians like Van Buren, of New York,
who had their fingers on the pulse of the people,-this
martial hero from out of the West had an unprecedented
vote-getting capacity. It were well to observe
the Western horizon more intently.