“And what is there in common,”
you will say to me, “between your belief in
God and your love for the People?” I answer:
My belief in God is not that vague, confused, indefinite,
shadowy sentiment which compels one to suppose a principle
because he sees consequences, a cause where
he contemplates effects, a source where he sees the
rush of the inexhaustible river of life, of forms,
of substances, absorbed for ever in the ocean, and
renewed unceasingly from creation. The belief
in God, which is thus perceived and conceived, is,
so to speak, only a mechanical sensation of the interior
eye, an instinct of intelligence, in some
sort forced and brutal, an evidence, not
reasonable, not religious, not perfect, not meritorious;
but like the material evidence of light, which enters
our eyes when we open them to the day; like the evidence
of sound which we hear when we listen to any noise;
like the evidence of touch when we plunge our limbs
in the waves of the sea, and shiver at the contact.
This elementary, gross, instinctive, involuntary belief
in God, is not the living, intelligent, active, and
legislative faith of humanity. It is almost animal.
I am persuaded that if the brutes even, if
the dog, the horse, the ox, the elephant, the bird,
could speak, they would confess, that, at the bottom
of their nature, their instincts, their sensations,
their obtuse intelligence, assisted by organs less
perfect than ours, there is a clouded, secret sentiment
of this existence of a superior and primordial Being,
from whom all emanates, and to whom all returns, a
shadow of the divinity upon their being, a distant
approach to the conception of that idea, which fills
the worlds, and for which alone the worlds have been
made, the idea of God!
This may be a bold, but it is not
an impious supposition. For God, having made
all things for himself alone, must have placed, upon
all that he made, an impress of himself; more or less
clear, more or less luminous, more or less profound,
a presentiment or a remembrance of a Creator.
But this faith, when it stops here, is not worthy of
the name. It is a species of Pantheism,
that is to say, a confused “visibility,”
a physical working together into indissoluble union
of something impersonal, something blind, something
fatal, and something divine, which, in the elements
composing the universe, we may call god.
But this “visibility” can give to man no
moral decision, can give to God no worship.
The Pantheism of which I am accused as a philosopher
and poet, that Pantheism which I have always scorned
as a contradiction and as a blasphemy, resembles entirely
the reasoning of the man who should say, “I
see an innumerable multitude of rays, therefore there
is no sun.”