THE NEGOTIATIONS

The British Government and the British people do not desire any direct authority in South Africa.  Their one supreme interest is that the various States there should live in concord and prosperity, and that there should be no need for the presence of a British redcoat within the whole great peninsula.  Our foreign critics, with their misapprehension of the British colonial system, can never realise that whether the four-coloured flag of the Transvaal or the Union Jack of a self-governing colony waved over the gold mines would not make the difference of one shilling to the revenue of Great Britain.  The Transvaal as a British province would have its own legislature, its own revenue, its own expenditure, and its own tariff against the mother country, as well as against the rest of the world, and Britain be none the richer for the change.  This is so obvious to a Briton that he has ceased to insist upon it, and it is for that reason perhaps that it is so universally misunderstood abroad.  On the other hand, while she is no gainer by the change, most of the expense of it in blood and in money falls upon the home country.  On the face of it, therefore, Great Britain had every reason to avoid so formidable a task as the conquest of the South African Republic.  At the best she had nothing to gain, and at the worst she had an immense deal to lose.  There was no room for ambition or aggression.  It was a case of shirking or fulfilling a most arduous duty.

There could be no question of a plot for the annexation of the Transvaal.  In a free country the Government cannot move in advance of public opinion, and public opinion is influenced by and reflected in the newspapers.  One may examine the files of the press during all the months of negotiations and never find one reputable opinion in favour of such a course, nor did one in society ever meet an advocate of such a measure.  But a great wrong was being done, and all that was asked was the minimum change which would set it right, and restore equality between the white races in Africa.  ’Let Kruger only be liberal in the extension of the franchise,’ said the paper which is most representative of the sanest British opinion, ’and he will find that the power of the republic will become not weaker, but infinitely more secure.  Let him once give the majority of the resident males of full age the full vote, and he will have given the republic a stability and power which nothing else can.  If he rejects all pleas of this kind, and persists in his present policy, he may possibly stave off the evil day, and preserve his cherished oligarchy for another few years; but the end will be the same.’  The extract reflects the tone of all the British press with the exception of one or two papers which considered that even the persistent ill-usage of our people, and the fact that we were peculiarly responsible for them in this State, did not justify us in interfering in the internal affairs of the republic.  It cannot be denied that the Jameson Raid had weakened the force of those who wished to interfere energetically on behalf of British subjects.  There was a vague but widespread feeling that perhaps the capitalists were engineering the situation for their own ends.  It is difficult to imagine how a state of unrest and insecurity, to say nothing of a state of war, can ever be to the advantage of capital, and surely it is obvious that if some arch-schemer were using the grievances of the Uitlanders for his own ends the best way to checkmate him would be to remove those grievances.  The suspicion, however, did exist among those who like to ignore the obvious and magnify the remote, and throughout the negotiations the hand of Great Britain was weakened, as her adversary had doubtless calculated that it would be, by an earnest but fussy and faddy minority.

It was in April 1899 that the British Uitlanders sent their petition praying for protection to their native country.  Since the April previous a correspondence had been going on between Dr. Leyds, Secretary of State for the South African Republic, and Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, upon the existence or non-existence of the suzerainty.  On the one hand, it was contended that the substitution of a second convention had entirely annulled the first; on the other, that the preamble of the first applied also to the second.  If the Transvaal contention were correct it is clear that Great Britain had been tricked and jockeyed into such a position, since she had received no quid pro quo in the second convention, and even the most careless of Colonial Secretaries could hardly have been expected to give away a very substantial something for nothing.  But the contention throws us back upon the academic question of what a suzerainty is.  The Transvaal admitted a power of veto over their foreign policy, and this admission in itself, unless they openly tore up the convention, must deprive them of the position of a sovereign State.

But now to this debate, which had so little of urgency in it that seven months intervened between statement and reply, there came the bitterly vital question of the wrongs and appeal of the Uitlanders.  Sir Alfred Milner, the British Commissioner in South Africa, a man of liberal politics who had been appointed by a Conservative Government, commanded the respect and confidence of all parties.  His record was that of an able, clear-headed man, too just to be either guilty of or tolerant of injustice.  To him the matter was referred, and a conference was arranged between President Kruger and him at Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State.  They met on May 31, 1899.

There were three different classes of subject which had to be discussed at the Conference.  One included all those alleged breaches of the Convention of London which had caused so much friction between the two Governments, and which had thrice in eighteen years brought the States to the verge of war.  Among these subjects would be the Boer annexations of native territory, such interference with trade as the stopping of the Drifts, the question of suzerainty, and the possibility of arbitration.  The second class of questions would deal with the grievances of the Uitlanders, which presented a problem which had in no way been provided for in the Conventions.  The third class contained the question of the ill-treatment of British Indians, and other causes of quarrel.  Sir Alfred Milner was faced with the alternative either to argue over each of these questions in turn ­an endless and unprofitable business ­or to put forward some one test-question which would strike at the root of the matter and prove whether a real attempt would be made by the Boer Government to relieve the tension.  The question which he selected was that of the franchise for the Uitlanders, for it was evident that if they obtained not a fair share ­such a request was never made ­but any appreciable share in the government of the country, they would in time be able to relieve their own grievances and so spare the British Government the heavy task of acting as their champions.  But the Conference was quickly wrecked upon this question.  Milner contended for a five-years’ retroactive franchise, with provisions to secure adequate representation for the mining districts.  Kruger offered a seven-years’ franchise, coupled with numerous conditions which whittled down its value very much; promised five members out of thirty-one to represent half the male adult population; and added a provision that all differences should be subject to arbitration by foreign powers ­a condition which is incompatible with any claim to suzerainty.  This offer dropped the term for the franchise from fourteen years to seven, but it retained a number of conditions which might make it illusory, while demanding in exchange a most important concession from the British Government.  The proposals of each were impossible to the other, and early in June Sir Alfred Milner was back in Cape Town and President Kruger in Pretoria, with nothing settled except the extreme difficulty of a settlement.

On June 12 Sir Alfred Milner received a deputation at Cape Town and reviewed the situation.  ‘The principle of equality of races was,’ he said, ’essential for South Africa.  The one State where inequality existed kept all the others in a fever.  Our policy was one not of aggression, but of singular patience, which could not, however, lapse into indifference.’  Two days later Kruger addressed the Raad.  ’The other side had not conceded one tittle, and I could not give more.  God has always stood by us.  I do not want war, but I will not give more away.  Although our independence has once been taken away, God had restored it.’  He spoke with sincerity no doubt, but it is hard to hear God invoked with such confidence for the system which encouraged the liquor traffic to the natives, and bred the most corrupt set of officials that the modern world has seen.

A despatch from Sir Alfred Milner, giving his views upon the situation, made the British public recognise, as nothing else had done, how serious the position was, and how essential it was that an earnest national effort should be made to set it right.  In it he said: 

’The case for intervention is overwhelming.  The only attempted answer is that things will right themselves if left alone.  But, in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse.  It is not true that this is owing to the raid.  They were going from bad to worse before the raid.  We were on the verge of war before the raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution.  The effect of the raid has been to give the policy of leaving things alone a new lease of life, and with the old consequences.

’The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to her Majesty’s Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain within the Queen’s dominions.  A section of the press, not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of war, it would receive from a section of her Majesty’s subjects.  I regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of her Majesty’s Government, is producing a great effect on a large number of our Dutch fellow-colonists.  Language is frequently used which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right, even in this colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth.  Thousands of men peaceably disposed, and if left alone perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding exasperation upon the part of the British.

’I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of her Majesty’s Government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa.’

Such were the grave and measured words with which the British pro-consul warned his countrymen of what was to come.  He saw the stormcloud piling in the north, but even his eyes had not yet discerned how near and how terrible was the tempest.

Throughout the end of June and the early part of July much was hoped from the mediation of the heads of the Afrikander Bond, the political union of the Dutch Cape colonists.  On the one hand, they were the kinsmen of the Boers; on the other, they were British subjects, and were enjoying the blessings of those liberal institutions which we were anxious to see extended to the Transvaal.  ’Only treat our folk as we treat yours!’ Our whole contention was compressed into that prayer.  But nothing came of the mission, though a scheme endorsed by Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt, of the Bond, with Mr. Fischer of the Free State, was introduced into the Raad and applauded by Mr. Schreiner, the Africander Premier of Cape Colony.  In its original form the provisions were obscure and complicated, the franchise varying from nine years to seven under different conditions.  In debate, however, the terms were amended until the time was reduced to seven years, and the proposed representation of the Goldfields placed at five.  The concession was not a great one, nor could the representation, five out of thirty-one, be considered a generous provision for half the adult male population; but the reduction of the years of residence was eagerly hailed in England as a sign that a compromise might be effected.  A sigh of relief went up from the country.  ‘If,’ said the Colonial Secretary, ’this report is confirmed, this important change in the proposals of President Kruger, coupled with previous amendments, leads Government to hope that the new law may prove to be the basis of a settlement on the lines laid down by Sir Alfred Milner in the Bloemfontein Conference.’  He added that there were some vexatious conditions attached, but concluded, ’Her Majesty’s Government feel assured that the President, having accepted the principle for which they have contended, will be prepared to reconsider any detail of his scheme which can be shown to be a possible hindrance to the full accomplishment of the object in view, and that he will not allow them to be nullified or reduced in value by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of administration.’  At the same time, the ‘Times’ declared the crisis to be at an end:  ’If the Dutch statesmen of the Cape have induced their brethren in the Transvaal to carry such a Bill, they will have deserved the lasting gratitude, not only of their own countrymen and of the English colonists in South Africa, but of the British Empire and of the civilised world.’  The reception of the idea that the crisis was at an end is surely a conclusive proof how little it was desired in England that that crisis should lead to war.

But this fair prospect was soon destined to be overcast.  Questions of detail arose which, when closely examined, proved to be matters of very essential importance.  The Uitlanders and British South Africans, who had experienced in the past how illusory the promises of the President might be, insisted upon guarantees.  The seven years offered were two years more than that which Sir Alfred Milner had declared to be an irreducible minimum.  The difference of two years would not have hindered their acceptance, even at the expense of some humiliation to our representative.  But there were conditions which excited distrust when drawn up by so wily a diplomatist.  One was that the alien who aspired to burghership had to produce a certificate of continuous registration for a certain time.  But the law of registration had fallen into disuse in the Transvaal, and consequently this provision might render the whole Bill valueless.  Since it was carefully retained, it was certainly meant for use.  The door had been opened, but a stone was placed to block it.  Again, the continued burghership of the new-comers was made to depend upon the resolution of the first Raad, so that should the mining members propose any measure of reform, not only their Bill but they also might be swept out of the house by a Boer majority.  What could an Opposition do if a vote of the Government might at any moment unseat them all?  It was clear that a measure which contained such provisions must be very carefully sifted before a British Government could accept it as a final settlement and a complete concession of justice to its subjects.  On the other hand, it naturally felt loth to refuse those clauses which offered some prospect of an amelioration in their condition.  It took the course, therefore, of suggesting that each Government should appoint delegates to form a joint commission which should inquire into the working of the proposed Bill before it was put into a final form.  The proposal was submitted to the Raad on August 7, with the addition that when this was done Sir Alfred Milner was prepared to discuss anything else, including arbitration without the interference of foreign powers.

The suggestion of this joint commission has been criticised as an unwarrantable intrusion into the internal affairs of another country.  But then the whole question from the beginning was about the internal affairs of another country, since there could be no rest in South Africa so long as one race tried to dominate the other.  It is futile to suggest analogies, and to imagine what France would do if Germany were to interfere in a question of French franchise.  Supposing that France contained nearly as many Germans as Frenchmen, and that they were ill-treated, Germany would interfere quickly enough and continue to do so until some fair modus vivendi was established.  The fact is that the case of the Transvaal stands alone, that such a condition of things has never been known, and that no previous precedent can apply to it, save the general rule that white men who are heavily taxed must have some representation.  Sentiment may incline to the smaller nation, but reason and justice are all on the side of Britain.

A long delay followed upon the proposal of the Secretary of the Colonies.  No reply was forthcoming from Pretoria.  But on all sides there came evidence that those preparations for war which had been quietly going on even before the Jameson Raid were now being hurriedly perfected.  For so small a State enormous sums were being spent upon military equipment.  Cases of rifles and boxes of cartridges streamed into the arsenal, not only from Delagoa Bay, but even, to the indignation of the English colonists, through Cape Town and Port Elizabeth.  Huge packing-cases, marked ‘Agricultural Instruments’ and ‘Mining Machinery,’ arrived from Germany and France, to find their places in the forts of Johannesburg or Pretoria.  As early as May the Orange Free State President, who was looked upon by the simple and trustful British as the honest broker who was about to arrange a peace, was writing to Grobler, the Transvaal official, claiming his share of the twenty-five million cartridges which had then been imported.  This was the man who was posing as mediator between the two parties a fortnight later at Bloemfontein.

For three years the Transvaal had been arming to the teeth.  So many modern magazine-rifles had been imported that there were enough to furnish five to every male burgher in the country.  The importation of ammunition was on the same gigantic scale.  For what were these formidable preparations?  Evidently for a war with Great Britain, and not for a defensive war.  It is not in a defensive war that a State provides sufficient rifles to arm every man of Dutch blood in the whole of South Africa.  No British reinforcements had been sent during the years that the Transvaal was obviously preparing for a struggle.  In that one eloquent fact lies a complete proof as to which side forced on a war, and which side desired to avoid one.  For three weeks and more, during which Mr. Kruger was silent, these preparations went on more energetically and more openly.

But beyond them, and of infinitely more importance, there was one fact which dominated the situation and retarded the crisis.  A burgher cannot go to war without his horse, his horse cannot move without grass, grass will not come until after rain, and it was still some weeks before the rain would be due.  Negotiations, then, must not be unduly hurried while the veldt was a bare russet-coloured dust-swept plain.  Mr. Chamberlain and the British public waited week after week for an answer.  But there was a limit to their patience, and it was reached on August 26, when the Colonial Secretary showed, with a plainness of speech which is as unusual as it is welcome in diplomacy, that the question could not be hung up for ever.  ‘The sands are running down in the glass,’ said he.  ’If they run out we shall not hold ourselves limited by that which we have already offered, but, having taken the matter in hand, we will not let it go until we have secured conditions which once for all shall establish which is the paramount power in South Africa, and shall secure for our fellow-subjects there those equal rights and equal privileges which were promised them by President Kruger when the independence of the Transvaal was granted by the Queen, and which is the least that in justice ought to be accorded them.’  Lord Salisbury, a short time before, had been equally emphatic:  ’No one in this country wishes to disturb the conventions so long as it is recognised that while they guarantee the independence of the Transvaal on the one side, they guarantee equal political and civil rights for settlers of all nationalities upon the other.  But these conventions are not like the laws of the Mèdes and the Persians.  They are mortal, they can be destroyed ... and once destroyed they can never be reconstructed in the same shape.’  The long-enduring patience of Great Britain was beginning to show signs of giving way.

Pressure was in the meanwhile being put upon the old President and upon his advisers, if he can be said ever to have had any advisers, in order to induce him to accept the British offer of a joint committee of inquiry.  Sir Henry de Villiers, representing the highest Africander opinion of the Cape, wrote strongly pleading the cause of peace, and urging Mr. Fischer of the Free State to endeavour to give a more friendly tone to the negotiations.  ’Try to induce President Kruger to meet Mr. Chamberlain in a friendly way, and remove all the causes of unrest which have disturbed this unhappy country for so many years.’  Similar advice came from Europe.  The Dutch minister telegraphed as follows: 

’August 4, 1899. ­Communicate confidentially to the President that, having heard from the Transvaal Minister the English proposal of the International Commission, I recommend the President, in the interest of the country, not peremptorily to refuse that proposition.’

’August 15, 1899. ­Please communicate confidentially to the President that the German Government entirely shares my opinion expressed in my despatch of August 4, not to refuse the English proposal.  The German Government is, like myself, convinced that every approach to one of the Great Powers in this very critical moment will be without any results whatever, and very dangerous for the Republic.’

But neither his Africander brothers nor his friends abroad could turn the old man one inch from the road upon which he had set his foot.  The fact is, that he knew well that his franchise proposals would not bear examination; that, in the words of an eminent lawyer, they ’might as well have been seventy years as seven,’ so complicated and impossible were the conditions.  For a long time he was silent, and when he at last spoke it was to open a new phase of the negotiations.  His ammunition was not all to hand yet, his rifles had not all been distributed, the grass had not appeared upon the veldt.  The game must be kept going for a couple of months.  ’You are such past-masters in the art of gaining time!’ said Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Montague White.  The President proceeded to prove it.

His new suggestions were put forward on August 12.  In them the Joint Commission was put aside, and the proposal was made that the Boer Government should accede to the franchise proposals of Sir Alfred Milner on condition that the British Government withdrew or dropped her claim to a suzerainty, agreed to arbitration by a British and South African tribunal, and promised never again to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic.  To this Great Britain answered that she would agree to such arbitration; that she hoped never again to have occasion to interfere for the protection of her own subjects, but that with the grant of the franchise all occasion for such interference would pass away; and, finally, that she would never consent to abandon her position as suzerain power.  Mr. Chamberlain’s despatch ended by reminding the Government of the Transvaal that there were other matters of dispute open between the two Governments apart from the franchise, and that it would be as well to have them settled at the same time.  By these he meant such questions as the position of the native races and the treatment of Anglo-Indians.

For a moment there seemed now to be a fair prospect of peace.  There was no very great gap between the two parties, and had the negotiations been really bona fide it seems incredible that it could not be bridged.  But the Transvaal was secure now of the alliance of the Orange Free State; it believed that the Colony was ripe for rebellion; and it knew that with 60,000 cavalry and 100 guns it was infinitely the strongest military power in Africa.  One cannot read the negotiations without being convinced that they were never meant to succeed, and the party which did not mean them to succeed was the party which prepared all the time for war.  De Villiers, a friendly critic, says of the Transvaal Government:  ’Throughout the negotiations they have always been wriggling to prevent a clear and precise decision.’  Surely the sequel showed clearly enough why this was so.  Their military hand was stronger than their political one, and it was with that that they desired to play the game.  It would not do, therefore, to get the negotiations into such a stage that a peaceful solution should become inevitable.  What was the use of all those rifles and cannon if the pen were after all to effect a compromise?  ‘The only thing that we are afraid of,’ wrote young Blignant, ’is that Chamberlain with his admitted fitfulness of temper should cheat us out of our war and, consequently, the opportunity of annexing the Cape Colony and Natal, and forming the Republican United States of South Africa’ ­a legitimate national ambition perhaps, but not compatible with bona-fide peaceful negotiations.

It was time, then, to give a less promising turn to the situation.  On September 2 the answer of the Transvaal Government was returned.  It was short and uncompromising.  They withdrew their offer of the franchise.  They reasserted the non-existence of the suzerainty.  The negotiations were at a deadlock.  It was difficult to see how they could be reopened.  In view of the arming of the burghers, the small garrison of Natal had been taking up positions to cover the frontier.  The Transvaal asked for an explanation of their presence.  Sir Alfred Milner answered that they were guarding British interests, and preparing against contingencies.  The roar of the fall was sounding loud and near.

On September 8 there was held a Cabinet Council ­one of the most important in recent years.  The military situation was pressing.  The handful of troops in Africa could not be left at the mercy of the large and formidable force which the Boers could at any time hurl against them.  On the other hand, it was very necessary not to appear to threaten or to appeal to force.  For this reason reinforcements were sent upon such a scale as to make it evident that they were sent for defensive, and not for offensive, purposes.  Five thousand men were sent from India to Natal, and the Cape garrisons were strengthened from England.

At the same time that they took these defensive measures, a message was sent to Pretoria, which even the opponents of the Government have acknowledged to be temperate, and offering the basis for a peaceful settlement.  It begins by repudiating emphatically the claim of the Transvaal to be a sovereign international State in the same sense in which the Orange Free State is one.  Any proposal made conditional upon such an acknowledgment could not be entertained.  The status of the Transvaal was settled by certain conventions agreed to by both Governments, and nothing had occurred to cause us to acquiesce in a radical change in it.

The British Government, however, was prepared to accept the five years’ franchise as stated in the note of August 19, assuming at the same time that in the Raad each member might use his own language.

’Acceptance of these terms by the South African Republic would at once remove tension between the two Governments, and would in all probability render unnecessary any future intervention to secure redress for grievances which the Uitlanders themselves would be able to bring to the notice of the Executive Council and the Volksraad.

’Her Majesty’s Government are increasingly impressed with the danger of further delay in relieving the strain which has already caused so much injury to the interests of South Africa, and they earnestly press for an immediate and definite reply to the present proposal.  If it is acceded to they will be ready to make immediate arrangements ... to settle all details of the proposed tribunal of arbitration....  If, however, as they most anxiously hope will not be the case, the reply of the South African Republic should be negative or inconclusive, I am to state that Her Majesty’s Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation de novo, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement.’

This despatch was so moderate in form and so courteous in tone that press and politicians of every shade of opinion were united in approving it, and hoping for a corresponding reply which would relax the tension between the two nations.  Mr. Morley, Mr. Leonard Courtney, the ’Daily Chronicle’ ­all the most strenuous opponents of the Government policy ­were satisfied that it was a message of peace.  But nothing at that time, save a complete and abject surrender upon the part of the British, could have satisfied the Boers, who had the most exaggerated ideas of their own military prowess and no very high opinion of our own.  The continental conception of the British wolf and the Transvaal lamb would have raised a laugh in Pretoria, where the outcome of the war was looked upon as a foregone conclusion.  The burghers were in no humour for concessions.  They knew their own power, and they concluded with justice that they were for the time far the strongest military power in South Africa.  ’We have beaten England before, but it is nothing to the licking that we shall give her now!’ said one prominent citizen.  ’Reitz seemed to treat the whole matter as a big joke,’ remarked de Villiers.  ’Is it really necessary for you to go,’ said the Chief Justice of the Transvaal to an English clergyman.  ’The war will be over in a fortnight.  We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking and give the English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace.’  Such were the extravagant ideas which caused them to push aside the olive-branch of peace.

On September 18 the official reply of the Boer Government to the message sent from the Cabinet Council was published in London.  In manner it was unbending and unconciliatory; in substance, it was a complete rejection of all the British demands.  It refused to recommend or propose to the Raad the five-years’ franchise and the other provisions which had been defined as the minimum which the Home Government could accept as a fair measure of justice towards the Uitlanders.  The suggestion that the debates of the Raad should be bilingual, as they are in the Cape Colony and in Canada, was absolutely waved aside.  The British Government had stated in their last despatch that if the reply should be negative or inconclusive they reserved to themselves the right to ’reconsider the situation de novo, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement.’  The reply had been both negative and inconclusive, and on September 22 a council met to determine what the next message should be.  It was short and firm, but so planned as not to shut the door upon peace.  Its purport was that the British Government expressed deep regret at the rejection of the moderate proposals which had been submitted in their last despatch, and that now, in accordance with their promise, they would shortly put forward their own plans for a settlement.  The message was not an ultimatum, but it foreshadowed an ultimatum in the future.

In the meantime, upon September 21, the Raad of the Orange Free State had met, and it became more and more evident that this republic, with whom we had no possible quarrel, but, on the contrary, for whom we had a great deal of friendship and admiration, intended to throw in its weight against Great Britain.  Some time before, an offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded between the two States, which must, until the secret history of these events comes to be written, appear to have been a singularly rash and unprofitable bargain for the smaller one.  She had nothing to fear from Great Britain, since she had been voluntarily turned into an independent republic by her, and had lived in peace with her for forty years.  Her laws were as liberal as our own.  But by this suicidal treaty she agreed to share the fortunes of a State which was deliberately courting war by its persistently unfriendly attitude, and whose reactionary and narrow legislation would, one might imagine, have alienated the sympathy of her progressive neighbour.  The trend of events was seen clearly in the days of President Brand, who was a sane and experienced politician.  ‘President Brand,’ says Paul Botha (himself a voortrekker and a Boer of the Boers), ’saw clearly what our policy ought to have been.  He always avoided offending the Transvaal, but he loved the Orange Free State and its independence for its own sake and not as an appendage to the Transvaal.  And in order to maintain its character he always strove for the friendship of England.

’President Brand realised that closer union with the turbulent and misguided Transvaal, led by Kruger’s challenging policy, would inevitably result in a disastrous war with England.

’I [Paul Botha] felt this as strongly, and never ceased fighting against closer union.  I remember once stating these arguments in the Volksraad, and wound up my speech by saying, “May Heaven grant that I am wrong in what I fear, because, if I am right, then woe, woe to the Orange Free State."’

It is evident that if the Free State rushed headlong to utter destruction it was not for want of wise voices which tried to guide her to some safer path.  But there seems to have been a complete hallucination as to the comparative strength of the two opponents, and as to the probable future of South Africa.  Under no possible future could the Free State be better off than it was already, a perfectly free and independent republic; and yet the country was carried away by race-prejudice spread broadcast from a subsidised press and an unchristian pulpit.  ’When I come to think of the abuse the pulpit made of its influence,’ says Paul Botha, ’I feel as if I cannot find words strong enough to express my indignation.  God’s word was prostituted.  A religious people’s religion was used to urge them to their destruction.  A minister of God told me himself, with a wink, that he had to preach anti-English because otherwise he would lose favour with those in power.’  Such were the influences which induced the Free State to make an insane treaty, compelling it to wantonly take up arms against a State which had never injured it and which bore it nothing but good will.

The tone of President Steyn at the meeting of the Raad, and the support which he received from the majority of his burghers, showed unmistakably that the two republics would act as one.  In his opening speech Steyn declared uncompromisingly against the British contention, and declared that his State was bound to the Transvaal by everything which was near and dear.  Among the obvious military precautions which could no longer be neglected by the British Government, was the sending of some small force to protect the long and exposed line of railway which lies just outside the Transvaal border from Kimberley to Rhodesia.  Sir Alfred Milner communicated with President Steyn as to this movement of troops, pointing out that it was in no way directed against the Free State.  Sir Alfred Milner added that the Imperial Government was still hopeful of a friendly settlement with the Transvaal, but if this hope were disappointed they looked to the Orange Free State to preserve strict neutrality and to prevent military intervention by any of its citizens.  They undertook that in that case the integrity of the Free State frontier would be strictly preserved.  Finally, he stated that there was absolutely no cause to disturb the good relations between the Free State and Great Britain, since we were animated by the most friendly intentions towards them.  To this the President returned a somewhat ungracious answer, to the effect that he disapproved of our action towards the Transvaal, and that he regretted the movement of troops, which would be considered a menace by the burghers.  A subsequent resolution of the Free State Raad, ending with the words, ’Come what may, the Free State will honestly and faithfully fulfil its obligations towards the Transvaal by virtue of the political alliance existing between the two republics,’ showed how impossible it was that this country, formed by ourselves, and without a shadow of a cause of quarrel with us, could be saved from being drawn into the whirlpool.

In the meantime, military preparations were being made upon both sides, moderate in the case of the British and considerable in that of the Boers.

On August 15, at a time when the negotiations had already assumed a very serious phase, after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference and the despatch of Sir Alfred Milner, the British forces in South Africa were absolutely and absurdly inadequate for the purpose of the defence of our own frontier.  Surely such a fact must open the eyes of those who, in spite of all the evidence, persist that the war was forced on by the British.  A statesman who forces on a war usually prepares for a war, and this is exactly what Mr. Kruger did and the British authorities did not.  The overbearing suzerain power had at that date, scattered over a huge frontier, two cavalry regiments, three field batteries, and six and a half infantry battalions ­say six thousand men.  The innocent pastoral States could put in the field more than fifty thousand mounted riflemen, whose mobility doubled their numbers, and a most excellent artillery, including the heaviest guns which have ever been seen upon a battlefield.  At this time it is most certain that the Boers could have made their way easily either to Durban or to Cape Town.  The British force, condemned to act upon the defensive, could have been masked and afterwards destroyed, while the main body of the invaders would have encountered nothing but an irregular local resistance, which would have been neutralised by the apathy or hostility of the Dutch colonists.  It is extraordinary that our authorities seem never to have contemplated the possibility of the Boers taking the initiative, or to have understood that in that case our belated reinforcements would certainly have had to land under the fire of the republican guns.  They ran a great military risk by their inaction, but at least they made it clear to all who are not wilfully blind how far from the thoughts or wishes of the British Government it has always been that the matter should be decided by force.

In answer to the remonstrances of the Colonial Prime Minister the garrison of Natal was gradually increased, partly by troops from Europe, and partly by the despatch of 5,000 British troops from India.  Their arrival late in September raised the number of troops in South Africa to 22,000, a force which was inadequate to a contest in the open field with the numerous, mobile, and gallant enemy to whom they were to be opposed, but which proved to be strong enough to stave off that overwhelming disaster which, with our fuller knowledge, we can now see to have been impending.

In the weeks which followed the despatch of the Cabinet message of September 8, the military situation had ceased to be desperate, but was still precarious.  Twenty-two thousand regular troops were on the spot who might hope to be reinforced by some ten thousand Colonials, but these forces had to cover a great frontier, the attitude of Cape Colony was by no means whole-hearted and might become hostile, while the black population might conceivably throw in its weight against us.  Only half the regulars could be spared to defend Natal, and no reinforcements could reach them in less than a month from the outbreak of hostilities.  If Mr. Chamberlain was really playing a game of bluff, it must be confessed that he was bluffing from a very weak hand.

For purposes of comparison we may give some idea of the forces which Mr. Kruger and Mr. Steyn could put in the field.  The general press estimate of the forces of the two republics varied from 25,000 to 35,000 men.  Mr. J. B. Robinson, a personal friend of President Kruger’s and a man who had spent much of his life among the Boers, considered the latter estimate to be too high.  The calculation had no assured basis to start from.  A very scattered and isolated population, among whom large families were the rule, is a most difficult thing to estimate.  Some reckoned from the supposed natural increase during eighteen years, but the figure given at that date was itself an assumption.  Others took their calculation from the number of voters in the last presidential election; but no one could tell how many abstentions there had been, and the fighting age is five years earlier than the voting age in the republics.  We recognise now that all calculations were far below the true figure.  It is probable, however, that the information of the British Intelligence Department was not far wrong.  No branch of the British Service has come better out of a very severe ordeal than this one, and its report before the war is so accurate, alike in facts and in forecast, as to be quite prophetic.

According to this the fighting strength of the Transvaal alone was 32,000 men, and of the Orange Free State 22,000.  With mercenaries and rebels from the colonies they would amount to 60,000, while a considerable rising of the Cape Dutch would bring them up to 100,000.  Our actual male prisoners now amount to 42,000, and we can account for 10,000 casualties, so that, allowing another 10,000 for the burghers at large, the Boer force, excluding a great number of Cape rebels, would reach 62,000.  Of the quality of this large force there is no need to speak.  The men were brave, hardy, and fired with a strange religious enthusiasm.  They were all of the seventeenth century, except their rifles.  Mounted upon their hardy little ponies, they possessed a mobility which practically doubled their numbers and made it an impossibility ever to outflank them.  As marksmen they are supreme.  Add to this that they had the advantage of acting upon internal lines with shorter and safer communications, and one gathers how formidable a task lay before the soldiers of the Empire.  When we turn from such an enumeration of their strength to contemplate the 12,000 men, split into two detachments, who awaited them in Natal, we may recognise that, far from bewailing our disasters, we should rather congratulate ourselves upon our escape from losing that great province which, situated as it is between Britain, India, and Australia, must be regarded as the very keystone of the imperial arch.

But again one must ask whether in the face of these figures it is still possible to maintain that Great Britain was deliberately attempting to overthrow by force the independence of the republics.

There was a lull in the political exchanges after the receipt of the Transvaal despatch of September 16, which rejected the British proposals of September 8.  In Africa all hope or fear of peace had ended.  The Raads had been dissolved and the old President’s last words had been that war was certain, with a stern invocation of the Lord as the final arbiter.  Britain was ready less obtrusively, but no less heartily, to refer the quarrel to the same dread judge.

On October 2 President Steyn informed Sir Alfred Milner that he had deemed it necessary to call out the Free State burghers ­that is, to mobilise his forces.  Sir A. Milner wrote regretting these preparations, and declaring that he did not yet despair of peace, for he was sure that any reasonable proposal would be favourably considered by her Majesty’s Government.  Steyn’s reply was that there was no use in negotiating unless the stream of British reinforcements ceased coming into South Africa.  As our forces were still in a great minority, it was impossible to stop the reinforcements, so the correspondence led to nothing.  On October 7 the army reserves for the First Army Corps were called out in Great Britain, and other signs shown that it had been determined to send a considerable force to South Africa.  Parliament was also summoned, that the formal national assent might be gained for those grave measures which were evidently pending.

It has been stated that it was the action of the British in calling out the reserves which caused the ultimatum from the Boers and so precipitated the war.  Such a contention is absurd, for it puts the cart before the horse.  The Transvaal commandos had mobilised upon September 27, and those of the Free State on October 2.  The railways had been taken over, the exodus from Johannesburg had begun, and an actual act of war had been committed by the stopping of a train and the confiscation of the gold which was in it.  The British action was subsequent to all this, and could not have been the cause of it.  But no Government could see such portents and delay any longer to take those military preparations which were called for by the critical situation.  As a matter of fact, the Boer ultimatum was prepared before the date of the calling out of the reserves, and was only delivered later because the final details for war were not quite ready.

It was on October 9 that the somewhat leisurely proceedings of the British Colonial Office were brought to a head by the arrival of an unexpected and audacious ultimatum from the Boer Government.  In contests of wit, as of arms, it must be confessed that the laugh has up to now been usually upon the side of our simple and pastoral South African neighbours.  The present instance was no exception to the rule.  The document was very firm and explicit, but the terms in which it was drawn were so impossible that it was evidently framed with the deliberate purpose of forcing an immediate war.  It demanded that the troops upon the borders of the republic should be instantly withdrawn, that all reinforcements which had arrived within the last year should leave South Africa, and that those who were now upon the sea should be sent back without being landed.  Failing a satisfactory answer within forty-eight hours, ’The Transvaal Government will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of her Majesty’s Government as a formal declaration of war, for the consequences of which it will not hold itself responsible.’  The audacious message was received throughout the empire with a mixture of derision and anger.  The answer was despatched next day through Sir Alfred Milner.

’October 10. ­Her Majesty’s Government have received with great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the South African Republic, conveyed in your telegram of the 9th October.  You will inform the Government of the South African Republic in reply that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South African Republic are such as her Majesty’s Government deem it impossible to discuss.’