When the Church says that, in the dogmas of religion, reason is totally incompetent and blind, and its use to be reprehended, it is in reality attesting the fact that these dogmas are allegorical in their nature, and are not to be judged by the standard which reason, taking all things sensu proprio, can alone apply.  Now the absurdities of a dogma are just the mark and sign of what is allegorical and mythical in it.  In the case under consideration, however, the absurdities spring from the fact that two such heterogeneous doctrines as those of the Old and New Testaments had to be combined.  The great allegory was of gradual growth.  Suggested by external and adventitious circumstances, it was developed by the interpretation put upon them, an interpretation in quiet touch with certain deep-lying truths only half realized.  The allegory was finally completed by Augustine, who penetrated deepest into its meaning, and so was able to conceive it as a systematic whole and supply its defects.  Hence the Augustinian doctrine, confirmed by Luther, is the complete form of Christianity; and the Protestants of to-day, who take Revelation sensu proprio and confine it to a single individual, are in error in looking upon the first beginnings of Christianity as its most perfect expression.  But the bad thing about all religions is that, instead of being able to confess their allegorical nature, they have to conceal it; accordingly, they parade their doctrine in all seriousness as true sensu proprio, and as absurdities form an essential part of these doctrines, you have the great mischief of a continual fraud.  And, what is worse, the day arrives when they are no longer true sensu proprio, and then there is an end of them; so that, in that respect, it would be better to admit their allegorical nature at once.  But the difficulty is to teach the multitude that something can be both true and untrue at the same time.  And as all religions are in a greater or less degree of this nature, we must recognize the fact that mankind cannot get on without a certain amount of absurdity, that absurdity is an element in its existence, and illusion indispensable; as indeed other aspects of life testify.  I have said that the combination of the Old Testament with the New gives rise to absurdities.  Among the examples which illustrate what I mean, I may cite the Christian doctrine of Predestination and Grace, as formulated by Augustine and adopted from him by Luther; according to which one man is endowed with grace and another is not.  Grace, then, comes to be a privilege received at birth and brought ready into the world; a privilege, too, in a matter second to none in importance.  What is obnoxious and absurd in this doctrine may be traced to the idea contained in the Old Testament, that man is the creation of an external will, which called him into existence out of nothing.  It is quite true that genuine moral excellence is really innate; but the meaning of the Christian doctrine is expressed in another and more rational way by the theory of metempsychosis, common to Brahmáns and Buddhists.  According to this theory, the qualities which distinguish one man from another are received at birth, are brought, that is to say, from another world and a former life; these qualities are not an external gift of grace, but are the fruits of the acts committed in that other world.  But Augustine’s dogma of Predestination is connected with another dogma, namely, that the mass of humanity is corrupt and doomed to eternal damnation, that very few will be found righteous and attain salvation, and that only in consequence of the gift of grace, and because they are predestined to be saved; whilst the remainder will be overwhelmed by the perdition they have deserved, viz., eternal torment in hell.  Taken in its ordinary meaning, the dogma is revolting, for it comes to this:  it condemns a man, who may be, perhaps, scarcely twenty years of age, to expiate his errors, or even his unbelief, in everlasting torment; nay, more, it makes this almost universal damnation the natural effect of original sin, and therefore the necessary consequence of the Fall.  This is a result which must have been foreseen by him who made mankind, and who, in the first place, made them not better than they are, and secondly, set a trap for them into which he must have known they would fall; for he made the whole world, and nothing is hidden from him.  According to this doctrine, then, God created out of nothing a weak race prone to sin, in order to give them over to endless torment.  And, as a last characteristic, we are told that this God, who prescribes forbearance and forgiveness of every fault, exercises none himself, but does the exact opposite; for a punishment which comes at the end of all things, when the world is over and done with, cannot have for its object either to improve or deter, and is therefore pure vengeance.  So that, on this view, the whole race is actually destined to eternal torture and damnation, and created expressly for this end, the only exception being those few persons who are rescued by election of grace, from what motive one does not know.

Putting these aside, it looks as if the Blessed Lord had created the world for the benefit of the devil! it would have been so much better not to have made it at all.  So much, then, for a dogma taken sensu proprio.  But look at it sensu allegorico, and the whole matter becomes capable of a satisfactory interpretation.  What is absurd and revolting in this dogma is, in the main, as I said, the simple outcome of Jewish theism, with its “creation out of nothing,” and really foolish and paradoxical denial of the doctrine of metempsychosis which is involved in that idea, a doctrine which is natural, to a certain extent self-evident, and, with the exception of the Jews, accepted by nearly the whole human race at all times.  To remove the enormous evil arising from Augustine’s dogma, and to modify its revolting nature, Pope Gregory I., in the sixth century, very prudently matured the doctrine of Purgatory, the essence of which already existed in Origen (cf.  Bayle’s article on Origen, note B.).  The doctrine was regularly incorporated into the faith of the Church, so that the original view was much modified, and a certain substitute provided for the doctrine of metempsychosis; for both the one and the other admit a process of purification.  To the same end, the doctrine of “the Restoration of all things” [Greek:  apokatastasis] was established, according to which, in the last act of the Human Comedy, the sinners one and all will be reinstated in integrum.  It is only Protestants, with their obstinate belief in the Bible, who cannot be induced to give up eternal punishment in hell.  If one were spiteful, one might say, “much good may it do them,” but it is consoling to think that they really do not believe the doctrine; they leave it alone, thinking in their hearts, “It can’t be so bad as all that.”

The rigid and systematic character of his mind led Augustine, in his austere dogmatism and his resolute definition of doctrines only just indicated in the Bible and, as a matter of fact, resting on very vague grounds, to give hard outlines to these doctrines and to put a harsh construction on Christianity:  the result of which is that his views offend us, and just as in his day Pelagianism arose to combat them, so now in our day Rationalism does the same.  Take, for example, the case as he states it generally in the De Civitate Dei, Bk. xii. ch. 21.  It comes to this:  God creates a being out of nothing, forbids him some things, and enjoins others upon him; and because these commands are not obeyed, he tortures him to all eternity with every conceivable anguish; and for this purpose, binds soul and body inseparably together, so that, instead, of the torment destroying this being by splitting him up into his elements, and so setting him free, he may live to eternal pain.  This poor creature, formed out of nothing!  At least, he has a claim on his original nothing:  he should be assured, as a matter of right, of this last retreat, which, in any case, cannot be a very evil one:  it is what he has inherited.  I, at any rate, cannot help sympathizing with him.  If you add to this Augustine’s remaining doctrines, that all this does not depend on the man’s own sins and omissions, but was already predestined to happen, one really is at a loss what to think.  Our highly educated Rationalists say, to be sure, “It’s all false, it’s a mere bugbear; we’re in a state of constant progress, step by step raising ourselves to ever greater perfection.”  Ah! what a pity we didn’t begin sooner; we should already have been there.

In the Christian system the devil is a personage of the greatest importance.  God is described as absolutely good, wise and powerful; and unless he were counterbalanced by the devil, it would be impossible to see where the innumerable and measureless evils, which predominate in the world, come from, if there were no devil to account for them.  And since the Rationalists have done away with the devil, the damage inflicted on the other side has gone on growing, and is becoming more and more palpable; as might have been foreseen, and was foreseen, by the orthodox.  The fact is, you cannot take away one pillar from a building without endangering the rest of it.  And this confirms the view, which has been established on other grounds, that Jéhovah is a transformation of Ormuzd, and Satan of the Ahriman who must be taken in connection with him.  Ormuzd himself is a transformation of Indra.

Christianity has this peculiar disadvantage, that, unlike other religions, it is not a pure system of doctrine:  its chief and essential feature is that it is a history, a series of events, a collection of facts, a statement of the actions and sufferings of individuals:  it is this history which constitutes dogma, and belief in it is salvation.  Other religions, Buddhism, for instance, have, it is true, historical appendages, the life, namely, of their founders:  this, however, is not part and parcel of the dogma but is taken along with it.  For example, the Lalitavistara may be compared with the Gospel so far as it contains the life of Sakya-muni, the Buddha of the present period of the world’s history:  but this is something which is quite separate and different from the dogma, from the system itself:  and for this reason; the lives of former Buddhas were quite other, and those of the future will be quite other, than the life of the Buddha of to-day.  The dogma is by no means one with the career of its founder; it does not rest on individual persons or events; it is something universal and equally valid at all times.  The Lalitavistara is not, then, a gospel in the Christian sense of the word; it is not the joyful message of an act of redemption; it is the career of him who has shown how each one may redeem himself.  The historical constitution of Christianity makes the Chinese laugh at missionaries as story-tellers.

I may mention here another fundamental error of Christianity, an error which cannot be explained away, and the mischievous consequences of which are obvious every day:  I mean the unnatural distinction Christianity makes between man and the animal world to which he really belongs.  It sets up man as all-important, and looks upon animals as merely things.  Brahmanism and Buddhism, on the other hand, true to the facts, recognize in a positive way that man is related generally to the whole of nature, and specially and principally to animal nature; and in their systems man is always represented by the theory of metempsychosis and otherwise, as closely connected with the animal world.  The important part played by animals all through Buddhism and Brahmanism, compared with the total disregard of them in Judaism and Christianity, puts an end to any question as to which system is nearer perfection, however much we in Europe may have become accustomed to the absurdity of the claim.  Christianity contains, in fact, a great and essential imperfection in limiting its precepts to man, and in refusing rights to the entire animal world.  As religion fails to protect animals against the rough, unfeeling and often more than bestial multitude, the duty falls to the police; and as the police are unequal to the task, societies for the protection of animals are now formed all over Europe and America.  In the whole of uncircumcised Asia, such a procedure would be the most superfluous thing in the world, because animals are there sufficiently protected by religion, which even makes them objects of charity.  How such charitable feelings bear fruit may be seen, to take an example, in the great hospital for animals at Surat, whither Christians, Mohammedans and Jews can send their sick beasts, which, if cured, are very rightly not restored to their owners.  In the same way when a Brahman or a Buddhist has a slice of good luck, a happy issue in any affair, instead of mumbling a Te Deum, he goes to the market-place and buys birds and opens their cages at the city gate; a thing which may be frequently seen in Astrachan, where the adherents of every religion meet together:  and so on in a hundred similar ways.  On the other hand, look at the revolting ruffianism with which our Christian public treats its animals; killing them for no object at all, and laughing over it, or mutilating or torturing them:  even its horses, who form its most direct means of livelihood, are strained to the utmost in their old age, and the last strength worked out of their poor bones until they succumb at last under the whip.  One might say with truth, Mankind are the devils of the earth, and the animals the souls they torment.  But what can you expect from the masses, when there are men of education, zoologists even, who, instead of admitting what is so familiar to them, the essential identity of man and animal, are bigoted and stupid enough to offer a zealous opposition to their honest and rational colleagues, when they class man under the proper head as an animal, or demonstrate the resemblance between him and the chimpanzee or ourang-outang.  It is a revolting thing that a writer who is so pious and Christian in his sentiments as Jung Stilling should use a simile like this, in his Scenen aus dem Geisterreich. (Bk.  II. sc. i., .) “Suddenly the skeleton shriveled up into an indescribably hideous and dwarf-like form, just as when you bring a large spider into the focus of a burning glass, and watch the purulent blood hiss and bubble in the heat.”  This man of God then was guilty of such infamy! or looked on quietly when another was committing it! in either case it comes to the same thing here.  So little harm did he think of it that he tells us of it in passing, and without a trace of emotion.  Such are the effects of the first chapter of Genesis, and, in fact, of the whole of the Jewish conception of nature.  The standard recognized by the Hindus and Buddhists is the Mahavakya (the great word), ­“tat-twam-así” (this is thyself), which may always be spoken of every animal, to keep us in mind of the identity of his inmost being with ours.  Perfection of morality, indeed!  Nonsense.

The fundamental characteristics of the Jewish religion are realism and optimism, views of the world which are closely allied; they form, in fact, the conditions of theism.  For theism looks upon the material world as absolutely real, and regards life as a pleasant gift bestowed upon us.  On the other hand, the fundamental characteristics of the Brahman and Buddhist religions are idealism and pessimism, which look upon the existence of the world as in the nature of a dream, and life as the result of our sins.  In the doctrines of the Zendavesta, from which, as is well known, Judaism sprang, the pessimistic element is represented by Ahriman.  In Judaism, Ahriman has as Satan only a subordinate position; but, like Ahriman, he is the lord of snakes, scorpions, and vermin.  But the Jewish system forthwith employs Satan to correct its fundamental error of optimism, and in the Fall introduces the element of pessimism, a doctrine demanded by the most obvious facts of the world.  There is no truer idea in Judaism than this, although it transfers to the course of existence what must be represented as its foundation and antecedent.

The New Testament, on the other hand, must be in some way traceable to an Indian source:  its ethical system, its ascetic view of morality, its pessimism, and its Avatar, are all thoroughly Indian.  It is its morality which places it in a position of such emphatic and essential antagonism to the Old Testament, so that the story of the Fall is the only possible point of connection between the two.  For when the Indian doctrine was imported into the land of promise, two very different things had to be combined:  on the one hand the consciousness of the corruption and misery of the world, its need of deliverance and salvation through an Avatar, together with a morality based on self-denial and repentance; on the other hand the Jewish doctrine of Monotheism, with its corollary that “all things are very good” [Greek:  panta kala lian].  And the task succeeded as far as it could, as far, that is, as it was possible to combine two such heterogeneous and antagonistic creeds.

As ivy clings for the support and stay it wants to a rough-hewn post, everywhere conforming to its irregularities and showing their outline, but at the same time covering them with life and grace, and changing the former aspect into one that is pleasing to the eye; so the Christian faith, sprung from the wisdom of India, overspreads the old trunk of rude Judaism, a tree of alien growth; the original form must in part remain, but it suffers a complete change and becomes full of life and truth, so that it appears to be the same tree, but is really another.

Judaism had presented the Creator as separated from the world, which he produced out of nothing.  Christianity identifies this Creator with the Saviour, and through him, with humanity:  he stands as their representative; they are redeemed in him, just as they fell in Adam, and have lain ever since in the bonds of iniquity, corruption, suffering and death.  Such is the view taken by Christianity in common with Buddhism; the world can no longer be looked at in the light of Jewish optimism, which found “all things very good”:  nay, in the Christian scheme, the devil is named as its Prince or Ruler ([Greek:  ho archon tou kosmoutoutou.] John 12, 33).  The world is no longer an end, but a means:  and the realm of everlasting joy lies beyond it and the grave.  Resignation in this world and direction of all our hopes to a better, form the spirit of Christianity.  The way to this end is opened by the Atonement, that is the Redemption from this world and its ways.  And in the moral system, instead of the law of vengeance, there is the command to love your enemy; instead of the promise of innumerable posterity, the assurance of eternal life; instead of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generations, the Holy Spirit governs and overshadows all.

We see, then, that the doctrines of the Old Testament are rectified and their meaning changed by those of the New, so that, in the most important and essential matters, an agreement is brought about between them and the old religions of India.  Everything which is true in Christianity may also be found in Brahmanism and Buddhism.  But in Hinduism and Buddhism you will look in vain for any parallel to the Jewish doctrines of “a nothing quickened into life,” or of “a world made in time,” which cannot be humble enough in its thanks and praises to Jéhovah for an ephemeral existence full of misery, anguish and need.

Whoever seriously thinks that superhuman beings have ever given our race information as to the aim of its existence and that of the world, is still in his childhood.  There is no other revelation than the thoughts of the wise, even though these thoughts, liable to error as is the lot of everything human, are often clothed in strange allegories and myths under the name of religion.  So far, then, it is a matter of indifference whether a man lives and dies in reliance on his own or another’s thoughts; for it is never more than human thought, human opinion, which he trusts.  Still, instead of trusting what their own minds tell them, men have as a rule a weakness for trusting others who pretend to supernatural sources of knowledge.  And in view of the enormous intellectual inequality between man and man, it is easy to see that the thoughts of one mind might appear as in some sense a revelation to another.