THE DOWNFALL OF VON TIRPITZ AND VON FALKENHAYN

After the sinking of the Arabic the German Foreign Office intimated to the United States Government and to the American correspondents that methods of submarine warfare would be altered and that ships would be warned before they were torpedoed. But when the Navy heard that the Foreign Office was inclined to listen to Mr. Wilson’s protests it made no attempt to conceal its opposition. Gottlieb von Jagow, the Secretary of State, although he was an intimate friend of the Kaiser and an officer in the German Army, was at heart a pacifist. Every time an opportunity presented itself he tried to mobilise the peace forces of the world to make peace. From time to time, the German financiers and propaganda leaders in the United States, as well as influential Germans in the neutral European countries, sent out peace “feelers.” Von Jagow realised that the sooner peace was made, the better it would be for Germany and the easier it would be for the Foreign Office to defeat the military party at home. He saw that the more victories the army had and the more victories it could announce to the people the more lustful the General Staff would be for a war of exhaustion. Army leaders have always had more confidence in their ability to defeat the world than the Foreign Office. The army looked at the map of Europe and saw so many hundred thousand square miles of territory under occupation. The Foreign Office saw Germany in its relation to the world. Von Jagow knew that every new square mile of territory gained was being paid for, not only by the cost of German blood, but by the more terrible cost of public opinion and German influence abroad. But Germany was under martial law and the Foreign Office had nothing to say about military plans. The Foreign Office also had little to say about naval warfare. The Navy was building submarines as fast as it could and the number of ships lost encouraged the people to believe that the more intensified the submarine war became, the quicker the war would end in Germany’s favour. So the Navy kept sinking ships and relying upon the Foreign Office to make excuses and keep America out of the war.

The repeated violations of the pledges made by the Foreign Office to the United States aroused American public opinion to white heat, and justly so, because the people here did not understand that the real submarine crisis was not between President Wilson and Berlin but between Admiral von Tirpitz and Secretary von Jagow and their followers. President Wilson was at the limit of his patience with Germany and the German people, who were becoming impatient over the long drawn out proceedings, began to accept the inspired thinking of the Navy and to believe that Wilson was working for the defeat of Germany by interfering with submarine activities.

On February 22nd, 1916, in one of my despatches I said: “The patient attitude toward America displayed during the Lusitania negotiations, it is plain to-day, no longer exists because of the popular feeling that America has already hindered so many of Germany’s plans.” At that time it appeared to observers in Berlin that unless President Wilson could show more patience than the German Government the next submarine accident would bring about a break in relations. Commenting on this despatch the Indianapolis News the next day said:

“In this country the people feel that all the patience has been shown by their government. We believe that history will sustain that view. Almost ten months ago more than 100 American citizens were deliberately done to death by the German Government, for it is understood that the submarine commander acted under instructions, and that Germany refuses to disavow on the ground that the murderous act was the act of the German Government. Yet, after all this time, the Lusitania case is still unsettled. The administration has, with marvellous self-restraint, recognised that public opinion in Germany was not normal, and for that reason it has done everything in its power to smooth the way to a settlement by making it as easy as possible for the Imperial Government to meet our just demands. Indeed, the President has gone so far as to expose himself to severe criticism at home. We believe that he would have been sustained if he had, immediately after the sinking of the Lusitania, broken off diplomatic relations.

“But he has stood out against public opinion in his own country, waited ten months for an answer, and done everything that he could in honour due to soften the feeling here. Yet just on the eve of a settlement that would have been unsatisfactory to many of our people, Germany announced the policy that we had condemned as illegal, and that plainly is illegal. The trouble in Berlin is an utter inability to see anything wrong in the attack on the Lusitania, or to appreciate the sense of horror that was stirred in this country by it. The idea seems to be that the policy of frightfulness could be extended to the high seas without in any way shocking the American people. Nothing has come from Berlin that indicates any feeling of guilt on the part of the German people or their Government.

“In the United States, on the contrary, the act is regarded as one of the blackest crimes of history. And yet, in spite of that feeling, we have waited patiently for ten months in the hope that the German Government would do justice, and clear its name of reproach. Yet now we are told that it is Germany that has shown a ‘patient attitude,’ the implication or insinuation being that our long suffering administration has been unreasonable and impatient. That will not be the verdict of history, as it is not the verdict of our own people. We have made every allowance for the conditions existing in Germany, and have resolutely refused to take advantage of her distress. We doubt whether there is any other government in the world that would have shown the patience and moderation, under like provocation, that have been shown by the American Government in these Lusitania negotiations.”

I sent the editorial to von Jagow, who returned it the next day with the brief comment on one of his calling cards: “With many thanks.”

About this time Count Reventlow and the other naval writers began to refer to everything President Wilson did as a “bluff.” When Col. E. M. House came to Berlin early in 1916, he tried to impress the officials with the fact that Mr. Wilson was not only not bluffing, but that the American people would support him in whatever he did in dealing with the German Government. Mr. Gerard tried too to impress the Foreign Office but because he could only deal with that branch of the Government, he could not change the Navy’s impression, which was that Wilson would never take a definite stand against Germany. On the 8th of February, the London Times printed the following despatch which I had sent to the United States:

“Mr. Gerard has been accused of not being forceful enough in dealing with the Berlin Foreign Office. In Berlin he has been criticised for just the opposite. It has been stated frequently that he was too aggressive. The Ambassador’s position was that he must carry out Mr. Wilson’s ideas. So he tried for days and weeks to impress officials with the seriousness of the situation. At the critical point in the negotiations various unofficial diplomats began to arrive and they seriously interfered with negotiations. One of these was a politician who through his credentials from Mr. Bryan met many high officials, and informed them that President Wilson was writing his notes for ’home consumption.’ Mr. Gerard, however, appealed to Washington to know what was meant by the moves of this American with authority from Mr. Bryan. This was the beginning of the reason for Secretary Bryan’s resigning.

“Secretary Bryan had informed also former Ambassador Dumba that the United States would never take any position against Germany even though it was hinted so in the Lusitania note. Dumba telegraphed this to Vienna and Berlin was informed immediately. Because of Mr. Gerard’s personal friendship and personal association with Secretary of State von Jagow and Under Secretary of State Zimmermann, he was acquainted with Secretary Bryan’s move. He telegraphed to President Wilson and the result was the resignation of Mr. Bryan.”

In December, the Ancona was torpedoed and it was officially explained that the act was that of an Austrian submarine commander. Wilson’s note to Vienna brought about a near rupture between Austria-Hungary and Germany because Austria and Hungary at that time were much opposed to Germany’s submarine methods. Although the submarines operating in the Mediterranean were flying the Austrian flag, they were German submarines, and members of the crews were German. Throughout the life of the Emperor Franz Josef the Dual Monarchy was ruled, not from Vienna, but from Budapest by Count Stefan Tisza, the Hungarian Premier. I was in Budapest at the time and one evening saw Count Tisza at his palace, which stands on the rocky cliff opposite the main part of Budapest, and which overlooks the valley of the Danube for many miles. Tisza, as well as all Hungarians, is pro-American before he is pro-German.

“To think of trouble between Austria-Hungary and the United States is sheer nonsense,” he said in his quiet but forceful manner. “I must confess, however, that we were greatly surprised to get the American note. It is far from our intention to get into any quarrel with America. Perhaps I should not say quarrel, because I know it would not be that, but of course matters do not depend upon us entirely. There is no reason for any trouble over the Ancona question. It must be settled satisfactorily,” he said emphatically, “not only from the standpoint of the United States, but from our standpoint.”

The Ancona crisis brought the Foreign Office new and unexpected support. Hungary was opposed to a dispute with America. In the first place, Hungarians are more of a liberty loving people than the Germans, and public opinion in Hungary rules the country. While there is a strong Government press, which is loyal to the Tisza party, there is an equally powerful opposition press which follows the leadership of Count Albert Apponyi and Count Julius Andrassy, the two most popular men in Hungarian public life. Apponyi told me on one occasion that while the Government was controlled by Tisza a great majority of the people sided with the opposition. He added that the constant antagonism of the Liberals and Democrats kept the Government within bounds.

Hungarians resented the stain upon their honour of the Ancona incident and they were on the verge of compelling Berlin to assume responsibility for the sinking and adjust the matter. But Berlin feared that if the Ancona crime was accredited to the real murderers it would bring about another, and perhaps a fatal crisis with the United States. So Vienna assumed responsibility and promised to punish the submarine commander who torpedoed the ship.

This opposition from Hungary embittered the German Navy but it was helpless. The growing fear of the effects which President Wilson’s notes were having upon Americans and upon the outside neutral world caused opposition to von Tirpitz to gain more force. In desperation von Tirpitz and his followers extended the anti-American propaganda and began personal attacks upon von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Bitterness between these two men became so great that neither of them would go to the Great Headquarters to confer with the Kaiser if the other was there. The personal opposition reached the point where the Kaiser could not keep both men in his cabinet. Von Tirpitz, who thought he was the hero of the German people because of the submarine policy, believed he had so much power that he could shake the hold which the Kaiser had upon the people and frighten the Emperor into the belief that unless he supported him against the Chancellor and the United States, the people would overthrow the Hohenzollern dynasty. But von Tirpitz had made a good many personal enemies especially among financiers and business men. So the Kaiser, instead of ousting the Chancellor, asked von Tirpitz to resign and appointed Admiral von Capelle, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and a friend of the Chancellor, as von Tirpitz’ successor. Admiral von Mueller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, who was always at Great Headquarters as the Kaiser’s personal adviser on naval affairs, was opposed to von Tirpitz and exposed him at the Great Headquarters conferences by saying that von Tirpitz had falsified the Navy’s figures as to the number of submarines available for a blockade of England. Von Capelle supported von Mueller and when the friends of von Tirpitz in the Reichstag demanded an explanation for the ousting of their idol, both the Chancellor and von Capelle explained that Germany could not continue submarine warfare which von Tirpitz had started, because of the lack of the necessary submarines.

This was the first big victory of the Foreign Office. The democratic forces in Germany which had been fighting von Tirpitz for over a year were jubilant. Every one in Germany who realised that not until the hold of the military party upon the Kaiser and the Government was dislodged, would the Government be able to make peace now breathed sighs of relief and began to make plans for the adjustment of all differences with the United States and for a peace without annexation. Von Tirpitz had had the support of all the forces in Germany which looked forward to the annexation of Belgium and the richest portions of Northern France. Von Tirpitz was supported by the men who wanted the eastern border of Germany extended far into Poland and Lithuania.

Even Americans were delighted. Washington for the first time began to see that eleven months of patience was bearing fruit. But this period of exaltation was not destined to last very long. While the Chancellor had cleaned house in the Navy Department at Berlin he had overlooked Kiel. There were admirals and officers in charge there who were making preparations for the Navy. They were the men who talked to the submarine commanders before they started out on their lawless sea voyages.

On March 24th the whole world was shocked by another U-boat crime. The Sussex, a French channel steamer, plying between Folkstone and Dieppe, was torpedoed without warning and Americans were among the passengers killed and wounded. When the news reached Berlin, not only the Chancellor and the Foreign Office were shocked and horrified, but the American Embassy began to doubt whether the Chancellor really meant what he said when he informed Gerard confidentially that now that von Tirpitz was gone there would be no new danger from the submarines. Even the new Admiralty administration was loathe to believe that a German submarine was responsible.

By April 5th it was apparent to every one in Berlin that there would be another submarine crisis with the United States and that the reactionary forces in Germany would attempt again to overthrow the Chancellor. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had been doing everything possible to get some one to propose peace, decided to address the Reichstag again on Germany’s peace aims. It was announced in the newspapers only a few days beforehand. The demand for tickets of admission was so great that early in the morning on the day scheduled for the address such dense crowds surrounded the Reichstag building that the police had to make passages so the military automobiles could reach the building to bring the officials there.

The Chamber itself was crowded to the rafters. On the floor of the House practically every member was in his seat. On the rostrum were several hundred army and naval officers, all members of the cabinet, prominent business men and financiers. Every one awaited the entrance of the Chancellor with great expectations. The National Liberals, who had been clamouring for the annexation of Belgium, the conservatives, who wanted a stronger war policy against England, the Socialists, who wanted real guarantees for the German people for the future and a peace without annexation, sat quietly in their seats anxiously awaiting the Chancellor’s remarks which were expected to satisfy all wants.

The Chancellor entered the chamber from the rear of the rostrum and proceeded to his desk in the front platform row, facing the House and galleries. After a few preliminary remarks by President Kaempf, the Chancellor arose. To the Chancellor’s left, near the rear of the hall among his Socialist colleagues, sat a nervous, determined and defiant radical. He was dressed in the uniform of a common soldier. Although he had been at the front several months and in the firing line, he had not received the iron cross of the second class which practically every soldier who had seen service had been decorated with. His clothes were soiled, trousers stuffed into the top of heavy military boots. His thick, curly hair was rumpled. At this session of the Reichstag the Chancellor was to have his first encounter with Dr. Karl Liebknecht, the Socialist radical, who in his soldier’s uniform was ready to challenge anything the Chancellor said.

The Chancellor began his address, as he began all others, by referring to the strong military position of the German army. He led up, gradually, to the subject of peace. When the Chancellor said: “We could have gotten what we wanted by peaceful work. Our enemies chose war.” Liebknecht interjected in his sharp, shrill voice, “You chose the war!” There was great excitement and hissing; the President called for order. Members shouted: “Throw him out!” But Liebknecht sat there more determined than ever.

The Chancellor continued for a few minutes until he reached the discussion of the establishment of a Flemish nation in Belgium, when Liebknecht again interrupted, but the Chancellor continued: “Gentlemen, we want neighbours who will not again unite against us in order to strangle us, but such that we can work with them and they with us to our mutual advantage.” A storm of applause greeted this remark. Liebknecht was again on his feet and shouted, “Then you will fall upon them!”

“The Europe which will arise from this, the most gigantic of all crises, will in many respects not resemble the old one,” continued von Bethmann-Hollweg. “The blood which has been shed will never come back; the wealth which has been wasted will come back but only slowly. In any case, it must become, for all living in it, a Europe of peaceful labour. The peace which shall end this war must be a lasting one and not containing the germ of a fresh war, but establishing a final and peaceful order of things in European affairs.”

Before the applause had gotten a good start the fiery private in the Socialists’ rank was again on his feet, this time shouting, “Liberate the German people first!”

Throughout the Chancellor’s speech there was not one reference to the Sussex. The Chancellor was anxious if he could to turn the world’s attention from the Sussex to the larger question of peace, but the world was not so inclined. On the 18th of April I asked Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the Admiralty Staff, for his opinion about the Sussex. Two days later he approved the interview, in which I quoted him as saying:

“We did not sink the Sussex. I am as convinced of that as of anything which has happened in this war. If you read the definite instructions, the exact orders each submarine commander has you would understand that the torpedoing of the Sussex was impossible. Many of our submarines have returned from rounding up British vessels. They sighted scores of passenger ships going between England and America but not one of these was touched.

“We have definitely agreed to warn the crews and passengers of passenger liners. We have lived up to that promise in every way. We are not out to torpedo without warning neutral ships bound for England. Our submarines have respected every one of them so far, and they have met scores in the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic.”

On the same day that Ambassador Gerard handed von Jagow Secretary Lansing’s note, Under Secretary of State Zimmermann approved the von Holtzendorff interview. Zimmermann could not make himself believe that a German submarine was responsible and the Government had decided to disavow all responsibility. But such convincing reports began to arrive from the United States and from neutral European countries which proved beyond a doubt that a German submarine was responsible, that the Government had to again bring up the submarine issue at Great Headquarters. When the von Holtzendorff interview was published in the United States it caused a sensation because if Germany maintained the attitude which the Chief of the Admiralty Staff had taken with the approval of the Foreign Office, a break in diplomatic relations could not be avoided. Secretary Lansing telegraphed Ambassador Gerard to inquire at the Foreign Office whether the statements of von Holtzendorff represented the opinions of the German Government. Gerard called me to the Embassy but before I arrived Dr. Heckscher, of the Reichstag Foreign Relations Committee, came. Gerard called me in in Heckscher’s presence to ask if I knew that the von Holtzendorff interview would bring about a break in diplomatic relations unless it was immediately disavowed. He told Dr. Heckscher to inform Zimmermann that if the Chief of the Admiralty Staff was going to direct Germany’s foreign policies he would ask his government to accredit him to the naval authorities and not to the Foreign Office. Heckscher would not believe my statement that Zimmermann had approved the interview and assured Gerard that within a very short time the Foreign Office would disavow von Holtzendorff’s statements. When he arrived at the Foreign Office, however, Zimmermann not only refused to disavow the Admiral’s statement but informed Heckscher that he had the same opinions.

President Wilson was at the end of his patience. Probably he began to doubt whether he could rely upon the reports of Ambassador Gerard that there was a chance of the democratic forces in Germany coming out ahead of the military caste. Wilson showed his attitude plainly in the Sussex note when he said:

“The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful considerations of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and the Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as of course given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped even against hope that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognised principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation. It now owes it to a just regard, for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely that the use of submarines for the destruction of enemy commerce is of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods, of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.

“If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognised dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Government altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.”

After von Jagow read the note the Foreign Office Telegraph Bureau sent it to Great Headquarters, which at this time was still located in Charleville, France, for the information of the Kaiser and General von Falkenhayn. It was evident to every one in Berlin that again, not only the submarine issue was to be debated at Great Headquarters, but that the Kaiser was to be forced again to decide between the Chancellor and his democratic supporters and von Falkenhayn and the military party. Before the Conference convened General Headquarters sent inquiries to five government departments, the Foreign Office, the Navy, the Ministry of War, the Treasury, and Interior. The Ministers at the head of these departments were asked to state whether in their opinion the controversy with America should be adjusted, or whether the submarine warfare should be continued. Dr. Karl Helfferich, the Vice Chancellor and Minister of Interior, Secretary of State von Jagow, and Count von Roedern, Minister of Finance, replied to adjust the difficulty. The Army and Navy said in effect: “If you can adjust it without stopping the submarine warfare and without breaking with the United States do so.”

The latter part of April the Kaiser summoned all of his ministers and his leading generals to the French chateau which he used as his headquarters in Charleville. This city is one of the most picturesque cities in the occupied districts of northern France. It is located on the banks of the Meuse and contains many historic, old ruins. At one end of the town is a large stone castle, surrounded by a moat. This was made the headquarters of the General Staff after the Germans invaded this section of France. Near the railroad station there was a public park. Facing it was a French chateau, a beautiful, comfortable home. This was the Kaiser’s residence. All streets leading in this direction were barricaded and guarded by sentries. No one could pass without a special written permit from the Chief of the General Staff. Von Falkenhayn had his home nearby in another of the beautiful chateaux there. The chief of every department of the General Staff lived in princely fashion in houses which in peace time were homes for distinguished Frenchmen. There were left in Charleville scarcely a hundred French citizens, because obviously French people, who were enemies of Germany, could not he permitted to go back and forth in the city which was the centre of German militarism.

When the ministers arrived at the Kaiser’s headquarters, His Majesty asked each one to make a complete report on the submarine war as it affected his department. Dr. Helfferich was asked to go into the question of German finance and the relation of America to it. Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, who had been a very good friend of Ambassador Gerard, discussed the question of the submarine warfare from the stand-point of its relation to Germany’s position as a world power. Admiral von Capelle placed before the Kaiser the figures of the number of ships sunk, their tonnage, the number of submarines operating, the number under construction and the number lost. General von Falkenhayn reported on the military situation and discussed the hypothetical question as to what effect American intervention would have upon the European war theatres.

While the conferences were going on, Dr. Heckscher and Under Secretary Zimmermann, who at that time were anxious to avoid a break with the United States, sounded Ambassador Gerard as to whether he would be willing to go to Great Headquarters to confer with the Kaiser. The Foreign Office at the same time suggested the matter to the General Staff and within a few hours Mr. Gerard was invited to go to Charleville. Before the ambassador arrived the Kaiser called all of his ministers together for a joint session and asked them to make a brief summary of their arguments. This was not a peace meeting. Not only opponents of submarine warfare but its advocates mobilised all their forces in a final attempt to win the Kaiser’s approval. His Majesty, at this time, was inclined towards peace with America and was very much impressed by the arguments which the Chancellor and Dr. Helfferich presented. But, at this meeting, while Helfferich was talking and pointing to the moral effect which the ruthless torpedoing of ships was having upon neutral countries, von Falkenhayn interrupted with the succinct statement:

“Neutrals? Damn the neutrals! Win the war! Our task is to win. If we win we will have the neutrals with us; if we lose we lose.”

“Falkenhayn, when you are versed in foreign affairs I’ll ask you to speak,” interrupted the Kaiser. “Proceed, Dr. Helfferich.”

Gentleman that he is, von Falkenhayn accepted the Imperial rebuke, but not long afterward his resignation was submitted.

As a result of these conferences and the arguments advanced by Ambassador Gerard, Secretary von Jagow on May 4th handed the Ambassador the German note in reply to President Wilson’s Sussex ultimatum. In this communication Germany said:

“Fully conscious of its strength, the German Government has twice in the course of the past few months expressed itself before all the world as prepared to conclude a peace safeguarding the vital interests of Germany. In doing so, it gave expression to the fact that it was not its fault if peace was further withheld from the peoples of Europe. With a correspondingly greater claim of justification, the German Government may proclaim its unwillingness before mankind and history to undertake the responsibility, after twenty-one months of war, to allow the controversy that has arisen over the submarine question to take a turn which might seriously affect the maintenance of peace between these two nations.

“The German Government guided by this idea notifies the Government of the United States that instructions have been issued to German naval commanders that the precepts of the general international fundamental principles be observed as regards stopping, searching and destruction of merchant vessels within the war zone and that such vessels shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human life unless the ship attempts to escape or offers resistance.”

At the beginning of the war it was a group of military leaders consisting of General von Moltke, General von Falkenhayn, General von Mackensen, General von Herringen, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, and a few of the Prussian military clique, which prevailed upon the Kaiser to go to war after the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife. The Allies proclaimed in their publications, in the press and in Parliaments that they were fighting to destroy and overthrow the military party in Germany which could make war without public consent. Millions of Allied soldiers were mobilised and fighting in almost a complete ring surrounding Germany, Austria Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. They had been fighting since August, 1914, for twenty-one months, and still their fighting had not shattered or weakened the hold which the military party had upon the people and the Kaiser. Von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn, who, shortly after the war began, became the ringleaders of Germany’s organised Might, had fallen not before the armed foes on the battlefield but before an unarmed nation with a president whose only weapon was public opinion. First, von Tirpitz fell because he was ready to defy the United States. Then came the downfall of von Falkenhayn, because he was prepared to damn the United States and all neutrals. Surely a nation and a government after thirteen months of patience and hope had a right to believe that after all public opinion was a weapon which was sometimes more effective than any other. Mr. Wilson and the State Department were justified in feeling that their policy toward Germany was after all successful not alone because it had solved the vexing submarine issue, but because it had aided the forces of democracy in Germany. Because, with the downfall of von Falkenhayn and von Tirpitz, there was only one recognised authority in Germany. That was the Chancellor and the Foreign Office, supported almost unanimously by the Socialists and by the Liberal forces which were at work to reform the German Government.

But this was in May, 1916, scarcely eight months before the Kaiser changed his mind and again decided to support the people who were clamouring for a ruthless, murderous, defiant war against the whole world, if the world was “foolish” enough to join in.