PERILS OF THE AIR
There are people, very many people,
who still regard flying as an undertaking of an unreasonable
peril, essayed mainly by those who are in quest of
money, notoriety, or sensation at any price. Such
people still to be met with have
one mental picture, and one only, of the flight of
an aeroplane. They imagine a man in the air and
this mere idea of altitude makes them shudder; and
they picture this man in a frail apparatus of wood
and wire, capable of breaking to pieces at any moment;
or even if it does not break, needing an incessant
movement of levers to maintain it in a safe equilibrium;
while they reckon also that, should the engine of
the machine suffer any breakdown, the craft will drop
to earth like a stone. Prejudice dies hard; harder
no doubt in England than in other countries. There
are still people, not few of them but many, who would
be ready to declare, offhand, that one aeroplane flight
in six ends in a disaster.
It is a truism, but one that has a
peculiar truth in aviation, to say that history repeats
itself. To-day we find large numbers of people
who still cherish the opinion that save
perhaps when on service in war it is nothing
less than criminal foolishness for men to ascend in
aeroplanes. That attitude of mind persists; the
growing safety of flight has not affected it to any
appreciable degree. But those eager for the progress
of aviation need not despair, or imagine that their
particular industry is being treated with any exceptional
disapprobation. They have only to look back a
little in our history, no great distance, and read
of the receptions that were accorded the first pioneers
of our railways. Public meetings of protest have
not been held to condemn aviation; yet they were frequent
in the days when the first railways were projected.
Vast indignation was indeed aroused; it was declared
to be against all reason, and a matter of appalling
risk, that people should be asked to travel from place
to place in such “engines of destruction.”
But the railways managed to survive this storm.
They were placed here and there about the country;
they were improved rapidly; and it would be hard,
to-day, to find a safer place than the compartment
of a railway train.
Motor-cars, when their turn came,
had to go through a similar ordeal. There was
the same indignation, the same chorus of protest; and
when the first of the pioneers, greatly daring, began
actually to drive their cars on the public highway,
there were people who believed, and who declared forcibly,
that to permit such machines on our roads was the
crime of the century. Had not these pioneers struggled
valiantly, sparing neither time nor money, it is possible
that the motor-car might have been driven from the
highway. But here again progress, though it was
retarded, could not be checked. The motor-car
triumphed. It grew rapidly more reliable, more
silent, more pleasing to the eye; and to-day it glides
in thousands along our roads, a pleasure to those
who occupy it, a nuisance neither to pedestrians nor
to other wheeled traffic; more under control when
it is well driven, and more ready to stop quickly
when required, than any horsed vehicle which it may
have replaced. At one time the papers were full
of such headlines as: “Another Motor-car
Accident.” Each small mishap received prominent
attention: and to the majority of people it seemed
the wildest folly to travel in such vehicles.
Yet to-day such is progress these
same people ride in a motor-car, or a motor-cab, quite
as a matter of course and without a thought of risk.
When one discusses flying and its
dangers, it is essential to maintain an accurate sense
of proportion. In the very earliest days, for
instance, it must be realised that the few men who
then flew they could be numbered on the
fingers of one hand exercised the greatest
caution. They did not fly in high winds; they
treated the air, realising its unknown perils, with
a very great and a very commendable respect.
Thus it was that thousands of miles were flown, even
with the crudest of these early machines, and with
motors that were constantly giving trouble, without
serious accident. But after this, and very quickly,
the number of airmen grew. New aviators appeared
every day; contests were organised extensively; there
were large sums of money to be won, provided that
one pilot could excel another. And the spirit
of caution was abandoned. Even while they were
still using purely experimental machines craft
of which neither the stability nor the structural
strength had been tested adequately there
grew a tendency among airmen to fly in higher winds,
to subject their machines to greater strains, and
to attempt dangerous manoeuvres so as to please the
crowds who paid to see them fly.
It was not surprising, therefore,
that flying entered upon an era of accidents.
Such disasters were inevitable inevitable,
that is to say, in view of the tendencies that then
prevailed; though it is a melancholy reflection that,
had men been content to go ahead with the same slow
sureness of the pioneers, many of those lives which
were lost could have been saved.
To the public, not aware exactly of
all that was going on, it appeared as though the navigation
of the air, instead of growing safer, was becoming
more dangerous. There were suggestions, indeed,
made quite seriously and in good faith, that these
endeavours to fly should cease; that the law should
step in, and prevent any more men from risking their
lives. What people failed to realise, when they
adopted this view, was that instead of one or two
men flying there were now hundreds who navigated the
air; that flights in large numbers were being made
daily; that thousands of miles instead of hundreds
were being traversed by air and often under
conditions the pioneers would have considered far
too dangerous. These facts, had they been realised,
would have shown people what was actually the true
state of affairs; that, though accidents seemed numerous,
and were indeed more frequent than they had been in
the earliest days of flying, they were as a matter
of proportion, reckoning the greater number of men
who were flying, and the thousands of miles which
were flown, growing steadily less frequent.
There was this important fact to be
reckoned with also. Each accident that happened
taught its lesson, and so made for future safety.
A considerable number of those early accidents can,
for instance, be traced to some structural weakness
in a machine. The need in an aircraft then, as
now, was lightness; and in those days designers and
builders, owing purely to their inexperience, had not
learned the art, as they have to-day, of combining
lightness with strength. So it was that, as more
powerful motors began to be fitted to aeroplanes, and
greater speeds were attained, it happened sometimes,
when a machine was being driven fast through a wind,
that a plane would collapse, and send the machine
crashing to the ground; or in making a dive, perhaps,
either of necessity or to show his skill, a pilot would
subject his machine to such a strain that some part
of it would break.
From such disasters as a rule, greatly
to be regretted though they were, the industry emerged
so much the wiser. The strength of machines was
increased; the engines which drove them were rendered
more reliable; and gradually too, though none too
rapidly, the airmen who piloted them grew in knowledge
and skill. But all this time, while flying was
being made more safe, there were accidents frequently
for the papers to report; and this was due entirely
to the fact that there were now thousands of men flying,
where previously there had been fifties and hundreds.
The public could not realise how rapidly the number
of airmen had grown; that practically every day, at
aérodromes scattered over Europe, flights were
so frequent that they were becoming a commonplace.
It was in 1912, as one of its many services to aviation
that the Aero Club of France was able to show, by means
of statistics which could not be questioned, that
for every fatality which had occurred in France, during
that particular year, a distance of nearly 100,000
miles had been flown in safety.
The cause of many of the early accidents
was, as we have suggested, the breakage of some part
of a machine while in flight. In an analysis
for instance of thirty-two such disasters, it was shown
that fourteen were due to the collapse of sustaining
planes, control-surfaces, or some other vital part
of a machine. And this risk of breakage in the
air was increased, in many cases, by the building of
experimental machines by men who had no qualifications
for their task, and who erred only too frequently,
in their desire to attain lightness, on the side of
a lack, rather than an excess, of structural strength.
There are many cases, unfortunately,
that might be cited; but one may be sufficient here.
A man with an idea for a light type of biplane, a
machine designed mainly for speed, had an experimental
craft built this was in the pioneer days
of 1909 and insisted on fitting to it a
motor of considerable power. It was pointed out
to him that his construction was not sufficiently
strong, in view of the speed at which his machine
would pass through the air. But he was of the
quiet, determined, self-opinionated type, who pursued
his own way and said little. He did not strengthen
his constructional, and he began a series of flying
tests. In the first of these, which were short,
the planes stood up to their work, and the fears of
the critics seemed groundless. But a day came
when, venturing to some height, the aviator encountered
a strong and gusty wind; whereupon one of his main-planes
broke, and he fell to his death.
As a contrast to this tragedy, and
a welcome one, there is a humorous story, that is
true, told of one experimenter. His knowledge
of construction was small, but what he lacked in this
respect he made up for in confidence; and he built
a monoplane. This was in the days just after
the cross-Channel flight, and experimenters all over
the world were building monoplanes, some of them machines
of the weirdest description. The craft built
by this enthusiast seemed all right in its appearance;
nothing had been spared, for instance, in the way of
varnish. When wheeled into the sun, for its first
rolling test under power, it looked an imposing piece
of work. Friends were in attendance, photographers
also; and the would-be aviator was in faultless flying
gear. Mounting a ladder, which had been placed
beside the machine, he allowed his weight to bear
upon the fusilage, and proceeded to settle himself
in his seat. But he, and the onlookers, were startled
as he did so by an ominous cracking of wood.
It grew louder; something serious and very unexpected
was happening to the machine. As a matter of
fact, and just as it stood there without having moved
a yard, the whole of the flimsy structure parted in
the middle, and the machine settled down ignominiously
upon the ground, its back broken, and with the discomfited
inventor struggling in the debris.
It was far from easy, in the early
days, for even an expert constructor to calculate
the strains encountered under various conditions of
flight. In wind pressure, under certain states
of the air, there are dangerous fluctuations fluctuations
which, even with the knowledge we possess to-day,
and this is far from meagre, exhibit phenomena concerning
which much more information is required. Machines
have collapsed suddenly, while flying on a day when
the wind has been uncertain, and have done so in a
way which has suggested that they had encountered,
suddenly, a gust of an altogether abnormal strength.
Occasionally, though research work in this field is
extremely difficult, it has been possible to gain
data as to the existence of conditions, prevalent
as a rule over a small area, which would spell grave
risk for any aeroplane which encountered them.
There is a strange case, verified beyond question,
which occurred during some tests with man-lifting
kites at Farnborough. These kites are strongly
built, and withstand as a rule extremely high winds.
On this particular day a kite, when it had reached
a certain altitude, was seen to crumple up suddenly.
The wind did not seem specially strong not
at any rate on the ground; and there appeared no reason
for the breakage of the kite. Another was sent
up; but the same thing happened, and at the same altitude.
Then the officer who was in charge of the kites sent
for a superior. A third kite was flown to see
what would happen. This one broke exactly as
the others had done, and at just the same height about
five hundred feet. Precise data could not be
gained as to this phenomenon; but the breaking of these
kites which had withstood extremely high
pressure in previous tests was reckoned
to be due to the fact that, when they reached a certain
point in the air, they were subjected to the violent
strain of a sudden and complete change in the direction
of the wind. To the pilot of an aeroplane, entering
without warning some such area of danger, the result
might naturally be serious in the extreme.
The air has been, and is still, an
uncharted sea. It does not flow with uniformity
over the surface of the earth. It is a constantly
disturbed element, and one that has the disadvantage
of being invisible. An aviator cannot see the
dangerous currents and eddies into which he may be
steering his craft; and so it was not surprising,
in those days when aircraft were frailer than they
should have been, and cross-country flights were first
being made, that machines broke often while in flight
and that the airman’s enemy, the wind, claimed
many victims.
Wind fluctuations that are dangerous,
those which possess for one reason or another an abnormal
strength, are encountered frequently when a pilot
is fairly near the earth; and his peril is all the
greater in consequence. On a windy day, one on
which there are heavy gusts followed by comparative
lulls, it is when he is close to the ground, either
in ascending or before alighting, that a pilot has
most to fear. If he is well aloft, with plenty
of air space beneath him, and particularly if he has
a machine that is inherently stable, he has little
to fear from the wind; save, perhaps, should his engine
fail him, or should he find as has been
the case in war flying that the force of
the wind, blowing heavily against him, and reducing
the speed of his machine, has prevented him from regaining
his own lines before his petrol has become exhausted.
The modern aeroplane, when its engine-power is ample,
and it is at a suitable altitude, can wage battle
successfully even with a gale. But it must rise
from the earth when it begins a flight, and return
to earth again when its journey is done; and here,
in the areas of wind that are disturbed by hills,
woods, and contours of the land, there are often grave
dangers. The wind at these low altitudes blows
flukily. Its direction may be affected, for instance,
owing to the influence of a hill or ridge. A
side gust, blowing powerfully and unexpectedly against
a machine, just as it is nearing the ground before
alighting, may cause it to tilt to such an angle that
it begins a side-slip. If the craft was sufficiently
high in the air, when this happened, the pilot would
be able, probably, to convert the side-slip into a
dive, and the dive into a renewal of his normal flight.
But if such a side-slip begins near the ground, and
there is an insufficient amount of clear space below
the machine, it may strike the ground in its fall,
and become a wreck, before there is time for the pilot,
or for the machine itself, to exercise a righting
influence. The fact that a craft may be forced
temporarily from its equilibrium, say by a side-slip,
is known now to represent no great risk for the airman,
granted always that he has the advantage of altitude.
The machine, in such circumstances, falls a certain
distance. This is inevitable, and for the reason
that it must regain forward speed which
it has lost temporarily in its side-slip before
its own inherent stability can become effective, or
its pilot regain influence over his controls.
And it is this unavoidable descent, this short period
during which the machine is recovering its momentum,
and during which the pilot has no power of control,
that represents in a heavy wind the moments of peril,
should a pilot enter an area of disturbance just as
he nears the ground.
An aeroplane, when it sets out to
fly in bad weather, may be likened to a boat that
is being launched from a beach upon a rough and stormy
sea. It is the waves close inshore, which may
raise his craft only to dash it to destruction, that
the boatman has chiefly to fear; and for the aviator,
when he leaves the land and embarks upon the aerial
sea, or when he returns again from this element and
must make his contact with the earth, there lurks
a risk that, caught suddenly by an air wave, and with
insufficient space beneath his machine, he may be
forced into a damaging impact with the ground.
But the skill of designers and constructors, to say
nothing of the growing experience of aviators, is
working constantly towards a greater safety.
Of the risk attached to engine failure,
when he is piloting a craft fitted with only one motor,
an airman is reminded frequently, not only from his
own experience, but from that of other flyers.
With the aeroplane engine, even with types that have
gained a high average of reliability, there are many
possibilities of a slight mishap each of
them sufficient, for the moment, to put an engine out
of action that the pilot who is flying
across country must, all the time he is in the air,
have at the back of his mind the thought that at any
moment, and perhaps without any warning, he may find
that his motive power has gone. A magneto may
fail temporarily; an ignition wire or a valve spring
break. The aeroplane engine of to-day is, of course,
an infinitely more reliable piece of apparatus than
it was in those early days when Henry Farman, working
with extraordinary patience at Issy-les-Moulineaux,
was endeavouring and for a long time without
success to make the motor in his Voisin
biplane run for five consecutive minutes without breakdown.
The war has shown us, and under working conditions
which have been exceptionally trying, how reliable
the aero-motor has become. But until duplicate
plants have been perfected, and more than one motor
is fitted to aircraft as a matter of course, there
must always be this risk of failure.
In the mere stoppage of a motor no
great danger is implied. The pilot must descend;
that is all. His power gone, he must glide earthward.
But where the risk does lie, in engine failure, is
that it may occur at a moment when the airman is in
such a position, either above dangerous country or
while over the sea, that he cannot during his glide
reach a place of safety. A study of flying will
show how awkward, and how perilous on many occasions,
has been the stoppage of a motor while a machine is
in the air. Two historic instances, though they
did not, fortunately, end in a loss of the pilot’s
life, were the compulsory descents into the Channel
made by the late Mr. Hubert Latham, during his attempts,
in 1909, to fly from Calais to Dover. In both
these cases once when only a few miles from
the French shore, and on the second occasion when
the aeroplane was quite near its destination the
motor of the Antoinette monoplane failed suddenly,
and the aviator could do nothing but plane down into
the water. On the first occasion he alighted
neatly, suffering no injury, and being rescued by
a torpedo boat; but in the second descent, striking
the water hard, he was thrown forward in his seat
and his head injured by a strut.
Less fortunate, in a case of presumed
engine failure that will become historic, was Mr.
Gustave Hamel. Eager to reach Hendon, so as to
take part in the Aerial Derby on May 23rd, 1914, his
great experience of Channel flying induced him to
risk the crossing with a motor which, on his flight
from Paris to the coast, had not been running well.
His monoplane was a fast machine, and the flight across
Channel would have taken him less than half an hour.
But at some point during the crossing, it seems obvious,
his engine failed him, and he was unable to prolong
his glide either to gain the shore, or the vicinity
of a passing ship. His monoplane was never recovered;
but the body of the aviator whose loss
was mourned throughout the flying world and by the
general public as well was discovered by
some fishermen while cruising off the French coast,
and identified by means of a map, clothing, and an
inflated motor-cycle tyre; the last-named being carried
by the airman round his body to act as an improvised
life-belt.
Engine failure, though a fruitful
cause of minor accidents, and of the breakage of machines,
has led to few fatalities; and this has been due very
largely to the fact that, though machines have descended
under dangerous circumstances, and have been wrecked
in a manner that would appear almost certain to kill
their occupants, the pilots and passengers have, as
a matter of fact, escaped often with no more than
a shock or bruises. An aeroplane does not strike
the ground with the impact of a hard, unyielding structure.
It is essentially frail in its construction; and this
frailness, though it spells destruction for the machine
in a bad descent, provides at the same time an element
of safety for its crew. Take the case for instance
of a machine falling sideways, and striking the ground
with one plane or planes. These planes, built
of nothing stronger as a rule than wood, crumple under
the impact. But in their collapse, which is telescopic
and to a certain extent gradual, a large part of the
shock is absorbed. By the time the fusilage which
contains the pilot touches ground, the full force
of the impact is gone. And it is the same, often,
if a machine makes a bad landing, say on awkward ground,
and strikes heavily bow-first. Granted that the
occupants of the machine are well-placed, and prevented
by retaining belts from being flung from the machine,
they should escape injury from the fact that there
is so much to be broken, in the way of landing-gear
and other parts, before the shock of the impact can
reach them in their seats.
Had it not been for the capacity of
the aeroplane to alight in awkward places without
injury to its pilot, many lives might have been lost
through descents in which motors have failed.
Aviators have been obliged to land in most unsuitable
places: on the roofs of houses, for instance,
in small gardens, and frequently on the tops of trees.
If he finds his engine fail him when he is over a
wood or forest, and there is no chance save to descend
upon the trees, a skilled pilot may save himself as
a rule from injury. Planing down, till he is just
above the tree-tops, he will then check suddenly,
by a movement of his elevator, the forward speed of
his machine. The craft will come to a standstill
in the air; then, the support gone from its planes
owing to the loss of forward speed, it will sink down
almost vertically, and with very little violence,
on to the tops of the trees. The machine itself
will naturally be damaged, seeing that boughs will
pierce its wings in many places, and that one or more
of its planes may possibly collapse. But the
net result of such a landing and this is
the point which is important for the pilot is
that the machine will be caught up and suspended on
the trees, making a comparatively light and gradual
contact, instead of there being any risk of its driving
through the trees and making a heavy impact with the
ground.
Humour, sometimes, may be extracted
from such a predicament as engine failure, though
it needs an aviator with a very deeply ingrained sense
of humour to do so. The story is told, however,
of a pilot who, flying across difficult country with
a passenger, found that his motor failed as
they often will just at a moment when there
seemed no possible landing-point below. Looking
over the side of his machine, and glancing quickly
here and there, the aviator saw no alternative but
to bring his craft down in an orchard that lay below.
Pointing downward, to acquaint his passenger with
their unpleasant situation, and to call his attention
also to the orchard, the pilot said with a smile:
“I hope you’re fond of apples!”
There is a risk in engine failure
which has been emphasised more than once; and it is
that which may attend the pilot who, while prolonging
a glide in order to reach some landing-point, may be
struck by a gust, or enter some area of disturbed
wind, just before he reaches the ground and while
his machine, moving slowly, is not in a position to
respond effectually to its controls. In one case
an aviator, struggling back towards the aerodrome
with a motor which was not giving its power, found
that it stopped suddenly when he was not far from
a wood. Beyond the wood, which stood on a ridge,
there was a stretch of grassland. Endeavouring
to reach this promised landing-point, and holding
his machine on a long glide, the airman came across
above the trees. He had almost reached his goal
when his machine entered a sudden down-current of
wind occasioned, no doubt, by the proximity
of the trees and ridge. Caught by this eddy, with
no motive power to help him and very little speed
on his machine, the pilot could not check its sudden
dive; and the craft struck ground so heavily that
both he and his passenger were killed.
We have mentioned previously, as a
fruitful cause of accident, that structural weakness
of machines which has led, when conditions have been
unfavourable, to a sudden collapse in the air.
But apart from weakness in construction, and notably
in accidents with early-type machines, there was the
risk attached to mistakes in design, which produced
machines which were unstable under certain conditions and
the dangers also which were due to inefficient controlling
surfaces. It was no uncommon thing, in pioneer
days, for a machine to be built which would not respond
adequately to its elevator or rudder; though this
unpleasant fact might not be discovered by the pilot
until he was actually in flight, and perhaps at some
distance from the earth. In one case, which is
authenticated, a two-seated monoplane of a new type
was tested at first in a series of straight flights,
and found to be promising in its behaviour. A
skilled pilot then took charge of it, and, carrying
a passenger, proceeded to some more ambitious flights.
Steering the machine away across the aerodrome, and
flying at a low elevation, he approached a belt of
woods. The machine was too near the ground to
pass over the tops of the trees; so the aviator decided
to make a turn, and fly parallel with the wood.
But when he put his rudder over, so as to bring the
machine round in a half-circle, he found to his dismay
that there was no response. In the design of the
machine, as it was found afterwards, the rudder had
been made too small: it would not steer the machine
at all. In the little space that was left him,
and to avoid crashing into the trees, the pilot had
to bring his craft to earth in such an abrupt dive
that it was wrecked completely. He and the passenger,
though, escaped unhurt.
Carelessness has, fairly frequently,
played its part in aeroplane disasters. Sometimes
a pilot has been careless, or perhaps in a hurry,
and has failed to locate some defect which, had it
been seen and attended to, would have saved a disaster
when a machine was in flight. Such inattention,
which is sufficiently dangerous in the handling of
any piece of mechanism, is deadly in its peril when
those who are guilty of it navigate the air.
A man who brings out a machine time after time, and
ascends without examining it carefully, is adding
vastly to the risks that may attend his flight; and
the same remark will apply to the carelessness of
mechanics; though as a class, in view of the arduous
nature of their work, and of the long hours they have
frequently to be on duty, with no more than hasty intervals
for rest, their average of care and accuracy is very
high. But there have been cases mostly
in the past though in which a machine has
developed a structural defect, or some defect say in
its control gear, which ought to have been observed
by its mechanics, but which has not been so detected,
and has led to a catastrophe in flight. With
machines built lightly, and subjected to heavy strains
when at high speeds, it is vital that the inspection
of such craft, that the examination of every detail
of them, should be carried out in a spirit of the
greatest care. The fraying through of a control
wire, unnoticed by those in charge of a machine, has
been sufficient to cause a disaster; while carelessness
in overhauling a motor, a task of supreme importance,
seeing that its engine is the heart of an aeroplane,
has been another cause of accident. It is vital
that, when an airman ascends, both his machine and
his motor should be in perfect working trim.
He himself, before he flies, and after his aeroplane
has been wheeled from its shed, should make it a habit
to look over the machine, so as to impose his own
personal check upon the work his mechanics have done.
Even when every care has been taken,
and a machine ascends in perfect trim, there is the
human factor, represented by the pilot, which must
be considered always in a study of aeroplane accidents.
There is often, when a catastrophe seems imminent,
a choice of things that may be done. If an engine
fails, for instance, under awkward circumstances,
the pilot may have, say, three courses open to him
in regard to his descent. Two may spell disaster
and the third safety. It is here that the innate
judgment of a pilot, combined with his experience,
will tell its tale. But this personal element
in flying, and particularly in regard to an accident,
is often a very difficult one for which to make allowances.
The whole problem of aeroplane disasters
is, to the analyst, one of unusual complexity.
Take for example the case of a pilot who is flying
alone in his machine, and at an altitude of several
thousand feet. Suddenly something happens; the
machine is seen to fall and the pilot is killed.
Experts come to examine the aircraft, but it is wrecked
so completely that little which is reliable can be
gathered from any inspection; while the man who could
explain what has happened the pilot of
the machine is dead. The statements
of eyewitnesses, when taken on such occasions, are
often misleading. One person heard a crash, and
saw something fall away from the machine. Another
declares the engine stopped suddenly and that the
machine “fell like a stone.” Another
says he is sure he saw one of the wings fold upwards
and the machine swing and fall. And so on.
It is extremely difficult, even for a technical eye-witness,
to be sure of what he sees when things happen quickly
and at a distance from him; while the statements of
non-technical people, who are not trained in observation,
are generally so unreliable as to be useless.
It has happened often therefore, far
too often, in aeroplane fatalities that have happened
from time to time, that the cause of such accidents
has, even after the most careful investigation, had
to be written down a mystery. But in more than
a few cases, though the evidence has been far from
conclusive, it has been considered that a pilot has
been guilty of some error of judgment. There were
puzzling instances, notably in the early days of flying,
when airmen began first to make cross-country flights,
of engines being heard to fail suddenly, and machines
seen to fall to destruction. That engines should
break down was not surprising; they were doing so constantly;
but there was no reason why, even if they did fail,
a machine should fall helplessly instead of gliding.
But what was thought to have happened, in more than
one of these cases, was that the pilot, through an
error of judgment, had failed to get down the bow of
his machine when his motor gave signs of stopping.
The craft concerned were, it should be mentioned,
“pusher” biplanes; and the same rule applied
to them, in cases of engine failure, as has been explained
in a previous chapter, and as is emphasised nowadays
in the instruction of the novice. But in those
days the beginner had frequently to learn, not from
wise tuition, but from bitter experience; and he was
lucky, often, if he learned his lesson and still retained
his life. On certain early-type biplanes, for
instance, machines with large tail-planes, and engined
as a rule by a motor which was giving less than its
proper amount of power, it was most dangerous for
a pilot if, on observing any signs of failing in his
engine, he sought to fly on in the hope that the motor
would “pick up” again, and continue its
work. Directly there was a tendency of the motor
to miss-fire, or lessen in the number of its revolutions
per minute, the consequent reduction of the propeller
draught, as it acted on the tail of the machine, would
cause this tail to droop, and the machine to assume
very quickly a dangerous position. And when once
it began to get tail-down, as pilots found to their
cost, there was nothing to be done. The machine
lost what little forward speed it had, and either
fell tail-first, or slipped down sideways. Such
risks as these, which were very real, were rendered
worse owing to the fact that, in much of the cross
country flying of the early days, pilots flew too
low. They lacked the confidence of those who
followed them, and were too prone to hug the earth,
instead of attaining altitude. It was not realised
clearly then, as it is now, that in height lies safety.
And so when a machine lost headway through engine
failure, and was not put quickly enough into a glide,
it happened often that it had come in contact with
the earth, and had been wrecked, before there was
any chance for the pilot to regain control, or for
the machine itself to exhaust its side-slip, and come
back to anything like a normal position.
But the failure of the human factor
in flying, the lack of skill of a pilot that may lead
to disaster, is shown by statistics to play no more
than a small part, when accidents are studied in numbers
and in detail. Some time before the war, in an
analysis of the accidents that had befallen aviators
in France accidents concerning which there
was adequate data it was shown that only
15 per cent. of them could be attributed to a failure
in judgment or skill on the part of the pilot.
Apart from errors, however, in what
may be called legitimate piloting, there have been
regrettable accidents due to trick or fancy flying.
Putting a machine through a series of evolutions, to
interest and amuse spectators, is not of course in
itself to be condemned. In such flying, and notably
for instance in “looping the loop,” facts
were learnt concerning the navigation of the air,
and as to the apparently hopeless positions from which
an aeroplane would extricate itself, which were of
very high value, from both a scientific and practical
standpoint. Public interest in aviation was increased
also by such displays; and it is very necessary that
there should be public interest in flying, seeing
that it is the public which is asked to pay for the
development of our air-fleets. But the man who
undertakes exhibition flying needs not only to be
a highly-skilled pilot, but a man also of an exceptional
temperament a man whose familiarity with
the air never leads him into a contempt for its hidden
dangers; a man who will not, even though he is called
on to repeat a feat time after time, abate in any
way the precautions which may be necessary for his
safety. In looping the loop, for instance, or
in upside-down flying, it is necessary always that
the aeroplane should be at a certain minimum height
above the ground. Then, should anything unexpected
happen, and the pilot lose command temporarily over
his machine, he knows he has a certain distance which
he may fall, before striking the ground; and during
this fall the natural stability of his machine, aided
by his own operation of the guiding surfaces, may bring
it back again within control. But if he has been
tempted to fly too near the ground, and has ignored
for the moment this vital precaution, and if something
happens for which he is not prepared, then the impact
may come before he can do anything to save himself.
In the early days of flying, when
aviators attempted an acrobatic feat, they ran a far
heavier risk than would be the case to-day; and for
the simple reason that their machines, not having a
strength sufficient to withstand any abnormal stresses,
were likely to collapse in the air if they were made
to dive too rapidly, or placed suddenly at any angle
which threw a heavy strain on their planes. A
machine for exhibition flying needs to be constructed
specially; but this was not realised till accidents
had taught their lesson.
It is a regrettable fact, one which
emerges directly from a study of aeroplane accidents,
that many of them might have been avoided had men
been content to follow warily in the footsteps of the
pioneers, and not run heavy risks till they themselves,
and the machines they controlled, had been prepared,
by a long period of steady flying, to meet such greater
dangers. The first men who flew realised fully
the risks they ran. But when flying became more
general, and men found machines ready to their hands,
machines which it was a simple matter to learn to
fly, this early spirit of caution was forsaken, and
feats were attempted which brought fatalities in their
train, and which seemed to emphasise the risks of
aviation, and did it the very bad service that they
fixed in the public mind a notion of its dangers,
and prevented men from coming forward to take up flying
as a sport.