THE LAST NILE MISSION

When Gordon left Egypt, at the end of the year 1879, he was able to truthfully declare in the words of his favourite book: “No man could lift his hand or his foot in the land of the Soudan without me.” Yet he was fully alive to the dangers of the future, although then they were no more than a little cloud on the horizon, for he wrote in 1878: “Our English Government lives on a hand-to-mouth policy. They are very ignorant of these lands, yet some day or other, they or some other Government, will have to know them, for things at Cairo cannot stay as they are. The Khedive will be curbed in, and will no longer be absolute Sovereign. Then will come the question of these countries.... There is no doubt that if the Governments of France and England do not pay more attention to the Soudan if they do not establish at Khartoum a branch of the mixed tribunals, and see that justice is done the disruption of the Soudan from Cairo is only a question of time. This disruption, moreover, will not end the troubles, for the Soudanese through their allies in Lower Egypt the black soldiers I mean will carry on their efforts in Cairo itself. Now these black soldiers are the only troops in the Egyptian service that are worth anything.” The gift of prophecy could scarcely have been demonstrated in a more remarkable degree, yet the Egyptian Government and everybody else went on acting as if there was no danger in the Soudan, and treated it like a thoroughly conquered province inhabited by a satisfied, or at least a thoroughly subjected population. From this dream there was to be a rude and startling awakening.

It is impossible to say whether there was any connection direct or indirect between the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the military leaders at Cairo and the rebellion in the Soudan, which began under the auspices of the so-called Mahdi. At the very least it may be asserted that the spectacle of successful insubordination in the Delta for it was completely successful, and would have continued so but for the intervention of British arms was calculated to encourage those who entertained a desire to upset the Khedive’s authority in the upper regions of the Nile. That Gordon held that the authors of the Arabi rising and of the Mahdist movement were the same in sympathy, if not in person, cannot be doubted, and in February 1882, when the Mahdi had scarcely begun his career, he wrote: “If they send the Black regiment to the Soudan to quell the revolt, they will inoculate all the troops up there, and the Soudan will revolt against Cairo, whom they all hate.” It will be noted that that letter was written more than twenty months before the destruction of the Hicks Expedition made the Mahdi master of the Soudan.

It was in the year 1880 that the movements of a Mahommedan dervish, named Mahomed Ahmed, first began to attract the attention of the Egyptian officials. He had quarrelled with and repudiated the authority of the head of his religious order, because he tolerated such frivolous practices as dancing and singing. His boldness in this matter, and his originality in others, showed that he was pursuing a course of his own, and to provide for his personal security, as well as for convenience in keeping up his communications with Khartoum and other places, he fixed his residence on an islet in the White Nile near Kawa. Mahomed Ahmed was a native of the lower province of Dongola, and as such was looked upon with a certain amount of contempt by the other races of the Soudan. When he quarrelled with his religious leader he was given the opprobrious name of “a wretched Dongolawi,” but the courage with which he defied and exposed an arch-priest for not rigidly abiding by the tenets of the Koran, redounded so much to his credit that the people began to talk of this wonderful dervish quite as much as of the Khedive’s Governor-General. Many earnest and energetic Mahommedans flocked to him, and among these was the present Khalifa Abdullah, whose life had been spared by Zebehr, and who in return had wished to proclaim that leader of the slave-hunters Mahdi. To his instigation was probably due not merely the assumption of that title by Mahomed Ahmed, but the addition of a worldly policy to what was to have been a strictly religious propaganda.

Little as he deemed there was to fear from this ascetic, the Egyptian Governor-General Raouf, Gordon’s successor, and stigmatised by him as the Tyrant of Harrar, became curious about him, and sent someone to interview and report upon this new religious teacher. The report brought back was that he was “a madman,” and it was at once considered safe to treat him with indifference. Such was the position in the year 1880, and the official view was only modified a year later by the receipt of information that the gathering on the island of Abba had considerably increased, and that Mahomed Ahmed was attended by an armed escort, who stood in his presence with drawn swords. It was at this time too that he began to declare that he had a divine mission, and took unto himself the style of Mahdi the long-expected messenger who was to raise up Islam at first secretly among his chosen friends, but not so secretly that news of his bold step did not reach the ears of Raouf. The assumption of such a title, which placed its holder above and beyond the reach of such ordinary commands as are conveyed in the edicts of a Khedive or a Sultan, convinced Raouf that the time had come to put an end to these pretensions. That conviction was not diminished when Mahomed Ahmed made a tour through Kordofan, spreading a knowledge of his name and intentions, and undoubtedly winning over many adherents to his cause. On his return to Abba he found a summons from the Governor-General to come to Khartoum. That summons was followed by the arrival of a steamer, the captain of which had orders to capture the False Mahdi alive or dead.

Mahomed Ahmed received warning from his friends and sympathisers that if he went to Khartoum he might consider himself a dead man. He probably never had the least intention of going there, and what he had seen of the state of feeling in the Soudan, where the authority of the Khedive was neither popular nor firmly established, rendered him more inclined to defy the Egyptians. When the delegate of Raouf Pasha therefore appeared before him, Mahomed Ahmed was surrounded by such an armed force as precluded the possibility of a violent seizure of his person, and when he resorted to argument to induce him to come to Khartoum, Mahomed Ahmed, throwing off the mask, and standing forth in the self-imposed character of Mahdi, exclaimed: “By the grace of God and His Prophet I am the master of this country, and never shall I go to Khartoum to justify myself.”

After this picturesque defiance it only remained for him and the Egyptians to prove which was the stronger.

It must be admitted that Raouf at once recognised the gravity of the affair, and without delay he sent a small force on Gordon’s old steamer, the Ismailia, to bring Mahomed Ahmed to reason. This was in August 1881. By its numbers and the superior armament of the troops this expedition should have proved a complete success, and a competent commander would have strangled the Mahdist phenomenon at its birth. Unfortunately the Egyptian officers were grossly incompetent, and divided among themselves. They attempted a night attack, and as they were quite ignorant of the locality, it is not surprising that they fell into the very trap they thought to set for their opponents.

In the confusion the divided Egyptian forces fired upon each other, and the Mahdists with their swords and short stabbing spears completed the rest. Of two whole companies of troops only a handful escaped by swimming to the steamer, which returned to Khartoum with the news of this defeat. Even this reverse was very far from ensuring the triumph of Mahomed Ahmed, or the downfall of the Egyptian power; and, indeed, the possession of steamers and the consequent command of the Nile navigation rendered it extremely doubtful whether he could long hold his own on the island of Abba. He thought so himself, and, gathering his forces together, marched to the western districts of Kordofan, where, at Jebel Gedir, he established his headquarters. A special reason made him select that place, for it is believed by Mahommedans that the Mahdi will first appear at Jebel Masa in North Africa, and Mahomed Ahmed had no scruple in declaring that the two places were the same. To complete the resemblance he changed with autocratic pleasure the name Jebel Gedir into Jebel Masa.

During this march several attempts were made to capture him by the local garrisons, but they were all undertaken in such a half-hearted manner, and so badly carried out, that the Mahdi was never in any danger, and his reputation was raised by the failure of the Government.

Once established at Jebel Gedir the Mahdi began to organise his forces on a larger scale, and to formulate a policy that would be likely to bring all the tribes of the Soudan to his side. While thus employed Rashed Bey, Governor of Fashoda, resolved to attack him. Rashed is entitled to the credit of seeing that the time demanded a signal, and if possible, a decisive blow, but he is to be censured for the carelessness and over-confidence he displayed in carrying out his scheme. Although he had a strong force he should have known that the Mahdi’s followers were now numbered by the thousand, and that he was an active and enterprising foe. But he neglected the most simple precautions, and showed that he had no military skill. The Mahdi fell upon him during his march, killed him, his chief officers, and 1400 men, and the small body that escaped bore testimony to the formidable character of the victor’s fighting power. This battle was fought on 9th December 1881, and the end of that year therefore beheld the firm establishment of the Mahdi’s power in a considerable part of the Soudan; but even then the superiority of the Egyptian resources was so marked and incontestable that, properly handled, they should have sufficed to speedily overwhelm him.

At this juncture Raouf was succeeded as Governor-General by Abd-el-Kader Pasha, who had held the same post before Gordon, and who had gained something of a reputation from the conquest of Darfour, in conjunction with Zebehr. At least he ought to have known the Soudan, but the dangers which had been clear to the eye of Gordon were concealed from him and his colleagues. Still, the first task he set himself and indeed it was the justification of his re-appointment was to retrieve the disaster to Rashed, and to destroy the Mahdi’s power. He therefore collected a force of not less than 4000 men, chiefly trained infantry, and he entrusted the command to Yusuf Pasha, a brave officer, who had distinguished himself under Gessi in the war with Suleiman. This force left Khartoum in March 1882, but it did not begin its inland march from the Nile until the end of May, when it had been increased by at least 2000 irregular levies raised in Kordofan. Unfortunately, Yusuf was just as over-confident as Rashed had been. He neglected all precautions, and derided the counsel of those who warned him that the Mahdi’s followers might prove a match for his well-armed and well-drilled troops. After a ten days’ march he reached the neighbourhood of the Mahdi’s position, and he was already counting on a great victory, when, at dawn of day on 7th June, he was himself surprised by his opponent in a camp that he had ostentatiously refused to fortify in the smallest degree. The Egyptian force was annihilated. Some of the local irregulars escaped, but of the regular troops and their commanders not one. This decisive victory not merely confirmed the reputation of the Mahdi, and made most people in the Soudan believe that he was really a heaven-sent champion, but it also exposed the inferiority of the Government troops and the Khedive’s commanders.

The defeat of Yusuf may be said to have been decisive so far as the active forces of the Khedive in the field were concerned, but the towns held out, and El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in particular defied all the Mahdi’s efforts to take it. The possession of this and other strong places furnished the supporters of the Government with a reasonable hope that on the arrival of fresh troops the ground lost might be recovered, and an end put to what threatened to become a formidable rebellion. A lull consequently ensued in the struggle. Unfortunately, it was one that the Mahdi turned to the best advantage by drilling and arming his troops, and summoning levies from the more distant parts of the provinces, while the Khedive’s Government, engrossed in troubles nearer home the Arabi revolt and the intervention of England in the internal administration seemed paralysed in its efforts to restore its authority over the Soudan, which at that moment would have been comparatively easy. The only direct result of Yusuf’s defeat in June 1882 was that two of the Black regiments were sent up to Khartoum, and as their allegiance to the Government was already shaken, their presence, as Gordon apprehended, was calculated to aggravate rather than to improve the situation.

Matters remained very much in this state until the Mahdi’s capture of the important town of El Obeid. Notwithstanding the presence within the walls of an element favourable to the Mahdi, the Commandant, Said Pasha, made a valiant and protracted defence. He successfully repelled all the Mahdi’s attempts to take the place by storm, but he had to succumb to famine after all the privations of a five months’ siege. If there had been other men like Said Pasha, especially at Khartoum, the power of the Mahdi would never have risen to the height it attained. The capture of an important place like El Obeid did more for the spread of the Mahdi’s reputation and power than the several victories he had gained in the field. This important event took place in January 1883. Abd-el-Kader was then removed from the Governor-Generalship, and a successor found in Alla-ed-din, a man of supposed energy and resource. More than that, an English officer Colonel Hicks was given the military command, and it was decided to despatch an expedition of sufficient strength, as it was thought, to crush the Mahdi at one blow.

The preparations for this fresh advance against the Mahdi were made with care, and on an extensive scale. Several regiments were sent from Egypt, and in the spring of the year a permanent camp was established for their accommodation at Omdurman, on the western bank of the Nile, opposite Khartoum. Here, by the end of June 1883, was assembled a force officially computed to number 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers, 300 irregular cavalry, and not fewer than 30 pieces of artillery, including rockets and mortars. Colonel Hicks was given the nominal command, several English and other European officers were appointed to serve under him, and the Khedive specially ordered the Governor-General to accompany the expedition that was to put an end to the Mahdi’s triumph. Such was the interest, and, it may be added, confidence, felt in the expedition, that two special correspondents, one of whom was Edmond O’Donovan, who had made himself famous a few years earlier by reaching the Turcoman stronghold of Merv, were ordered to accompany it, and report its achievements.

The Mahdi learnt in good time of the extensive preparations being made for this expedition, but he was not dismayed, because all the fighting tribes of Kordofan, Bahr Gazelle, and Darfour were now at his back, and he knew that he could count on the devotion of 100,000 fanatical warriors. Still, he and his henchman Abdullah, who supplied the military brains to the cause, were not disposed to throw away a chance, and the threatening appearance of the Egyptian military preparations led them to conceive the really brilliant idea of stirring up trouble in the rear of Khartoum. For this purpose a man of extraordinary energy and influence was ready to their hand in Osman Digma, a slave-dealer of Souakim, who might truly be called the Zebehr of the Eastern Soudan. This man hastened to Souakim as the delegate of the Mahdi, from whom he brought special proclamations, calling on the tribes to rise for a Holy War. Although this move subsequently aggravated the Egyptian position and extended the military triumphs of the Mahdi, it did not attain the immediate object for which it was conceived, as the Hicks Expedition set out on its ill-omened march before Osman had struck a blow.

The power of the Mahdi was at this moment so firmly established, and his reputation based on the double claim of a divine mission and military success so high that it may be doubted whether the 10,000 men, of which the Hicks force consisted when the irregulars raised by the Governor-General had joined it at Duem, would have sufficed to overcome him even if they had been ably led, and escaped all the untoward circumstances that first retarded their progress and then sealed their fate. The plan of campaign was based on a misconception of the Mahdi’s power, and was carried out with utter disregard of prudence and of the local difficulties to be encountered between the Nile and El Obeid. But the radical fault of the whole enterprise was a strategical one. The situation made it prudent and even necessary for the Government to stand on the defensive, and to abstain from military expeditions, while the course pursued was to undertake offensive measures in the manner most calculated to favour the chances of the Mahdi, and to attack him at the very point where his superiority could be most certainly shown.

But quite apart from any original error as to the inception of the campaign, which may fairly be deemed a matter of opinion, there can be no difference between any two persons who have studied the facts that the execution of it was completely mismanaged. In the first place the start of the expedition was delayed, so that the Mahdi got ample warning of the coming attack. The troops were all in the camp at Omdurman in June, but they did not reach Duem till September, and a further delay of two months occurred there before they began their march towards El Obeid. That interval was chiefly taken up with disputes between Hicks and his Egyptian colleagues, and it is even believed that there was much friction between Hicks and his European lieutenants.

The first radical error committed was the decision to advance on El Obeid from Duem, because there were no wells on that route, whereas had the northern route via Gebra and Bara been taken, a certain supply of water could have been counted on, and still more important, the co-operation of the powerful Kabbabish tribe, the only one still hostile to the Mahdi, might have been secured. The second important error was not less fatal. When the force marched it was accompanied by 6000 camels and a large number of women. Encumbered in its movements by these useless impedimenta, the force never had any prospect of success with its active enemy. As it slowly advanced from the Nile it became with each day’s march more hopelessly involved in its own difficulties, and the astute Mahdi expressly forbade any premature attack to be made upon an army which he clearly saw was marching to its doom.

On the 1st November 1883, when the Egyptians were already disheartened by the want of water, the non-arrival of reinforcements from the garrisons near the Equator, which the Governor-General had rashly promised to bring up, and the exhausting nature of their march through a difficult country, the Mahdi’s forces began their attack. Concealed in the high grass, they were able to pour in a heavy fire on the conspicuous body of the Egyptians at short range without exposing themselves. But notwithstanding his heavy losses, Hicks pressed on, because he knew that his only chance of safety lay in getting out of the dense cover in which he was at such a hopeless disadvantage. But this the Mahdi would never permit, and on 4th November, when Hicks had reached a place called Shekan, he gave the order to his impatient followers to go in and finish the work they had so well begun. The Egyptian soldiers seem to have been butchered without resistance. The Europeans and the Turkish cavalry fought well for a short time, but in a few minutes they were overpowered by superior numbers. Of the whole force of 10,000 men, only a few individuals escaped by some special stroke of fortune, for nearly the whole of the 300 prisoners taken were subsequently executed. Such was the complete and appalling character of the destruction of Hicks’s army, which seemed to shatter at a single blow the whole fabric of the Khedive’s power in the Soudan, and rivetted the attention of Europe on that particular quarter of the Dark Continent.

The consequences of that decisive success, which became known in London three weeks after it happened, were immediate throughout the region wherein it occurred. Many Egyptian garrisons, which had been holding out in the hope of succour through the force that Hicks Pasha was bringing from Khartoum, abandoned hope after its destruction at Shekan, and thought only of coming to terms with the conqueror. Among these was the force at Dara in Darfour under the command of Slatin Pasha. That able officer had held the place for months under the greatest difficulty, and had even obtained some slight successes in the field, but the fate of the Hicks expedition convinced him that the situation was hopeless, and that his duty to the brave troops under him required the acceptance of the honourable terms which his tact and reputation enabled him to secure at the hands of the conqueror. Slatin surrendered on 23rd December 1883; Lupton Bey, commander in the Bahr Gazelle, about the same time, and these successes were enhanced and extended by those achieved by Osman Digma in the Eastern Soudan, where, early in February 1884, while Gordon was on his way to Khartoum, that leader inflicted on Baker Pasha at Tokar a defeat scarcely less crushing than that of Shekan.

By New Year’s Day, 1884, therefore, the power of the Mahdi was triumphantly established over the whole extent of the Soudan, from the Equator to Souakim, with the exception of Khartoum and the middle course of the Nile from that place to Dongola. There were also some outlying garrisons, such as that at Kassala, but the principal Egyptian force remaining was the body of 4000 so-called troops, the less efficient part, we may be sure, of those available, left behind at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set out on his unfortunate expedition. If the power of the Mahdi at this moment were merely to be measured by comparison with the collapse of authority, courage, and confidence of the titular upholders of the Khedive’s Government, it might be pronounced formidable. It had sufficed to defeat every hostile effort made against it, and to practically annihilate all the armies that Egypt could bring into the field. Its extraordinary success was no doubt due to the incompetency, over-confidence, and deficient military spirit and knowledge of the Khedive’s commanders and troops. But, while making the fullest admission on these points, it cannot be disputed that some of the elements in the Mahdi’s power would have made it formidable, even if the cause of the Government had been more worthily and efficiently sustained. There is no doubt that, in the first place, he appealed to races which thought they were overtaxed, and to classes whose only tangible property had been assailed and diminished by the Anti-Slavery policy of the Government. Even if it would be going too far to say that Mahomed Ahmed, the long-looked-for Mahdi, was only a tool in the hands of secret conspirators pledged to avenge Suleiman, to restore Zebehr, and to bring back the good old times, when a fortune lay in the easy acquisition of human ivory, there is no doubt that the backbone of his power was provided by those followers of Suleiman, whom Gordon had broken up at Shaka and driven from Dara. But the Mahdi had supplied them in religious fanaticism with a more powerful incentive than pecuniary gain, and when he showed them how easily they might triumph over their opponents, he inspired them with a confidence which has not yet lost its efficacy.

In 1884 all these inducements for the tribes of the Soudan to believe in their religious leader were in their pristine strength. He had succeeded in every thing he undertook, he had armed his countless warriors with the weapons taken from the armies he had destroyed, and he had placed at the disposal of his supporters an immense and easily-acquired spoil. The later experiences of the Mahdists were to be neither so pleasant nor so profitable, but at the end of 1883 they were at the height of their confidence and power. It was at such a moment and against such a powerful adversary that the British Government thought it right to take advantage of the devotion and gallantry of a single man, to send him alone to grapple with a difficulty which several armies had, by their own failure and destruction, rendered more grave, at the same time that they established the formidable nature of the rebellion in the Soudan as an unimpeachable fact instead of a disputable opinion. I do not think his own countrymen have yet quite appreciated the extraordinary heroism and devotion to his country which Gordon showed when he rushed off single-handed to oppose the ever-victorious Mahdi at the very zenith of his power.

In unrolling the scroll of events connected with an intricate history, it next becomes necessary to explain why Gordon voluntarily, and it may even be admitted, enthusiastically, undertook a mission that, to any man in his senses, must have seemed at the moment at which it was undertaken little short of insanity. Whatever else may be said against the Government and the military authorities who suggested his going, and availed themselves of his readiness to go, to Khartoum, I do not think there is the shadow of a justification for the allegation that they forced him to proceed on that romantic errand, although of course it is equally clear that he insisted as the condition of his going at all that he should be ordered by his Government to proceed on this mission. Beyond this vital principle, which he held to all his life in never volunteering, he was far too eager to go himself to require any real stirring-up or compulsion. It was even a secret and unexpressed grievance that he should not be called upon to hasten to the spot, which had always been in his thoughts since the time he had left it. He could think of nothing else; in the midst of other work he would turn aside to discuss the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan as paramount to every other consideration; and when a great mission, like that to the Congo, which he could have made a turning-point in African history, was placed in his hands, he could only ask for “a respite,” and, with the charm of the Sphinx strong upon him, rushed on his fate in a chivalrous determination to essay the impossible. But was it right or justifiable that wise politicians and experienced generals should take advantage of such enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, and let one man go unaided to achieve what thousands had failed to do?

It is necessary to establish clearly in the first place, and beyond dispute, the frame of mind which induced Gordon to take up his last Nile mission in precisely the confiding manner that he did. Gordon left Egypt at the end of 1879. Although events there in 1880 were of interest and importance, Gordon was too much occupied in India and China to say anything, but in October 1881 he drew up an important memorandum on affairs in Egypt since the deposition of Ismail. Gordon gave it to me specially for publication, and it duly appeared in The Times, but its historical interest is that it shows how Gordons thoughts were still running on the affairs of the country in which he had served so long. The following is the full text:

“On the 16th of August 1879, the Firman installing Tewfik as Khedive was published in Cairo. From the 26th of June 1879, when Ismail was deposed, to this date, Cherif Pasha remained Prime Minister; he had been appointed on the dismissal of the Rivers-Wilson and de Blignieres Ministry in May. Between June and August Cherif had been working with the view of securing to the country a representative form of government, and had only a short time before August 16 laid his proposition before Tewfik. Cherif’s idea was that, the representation being in the hands of the people, there would be more chance of Egypt maintaining her independence than if the Government was a personal one. It will be remembered that, though many states have repudiated their debts, no other ruler of those states was considered responsible except in the case of Ismail of Egypt. Europe considered Ismail responsible personally. She did not consider the rulers of Turkey, Greece, Spain, etc., responsible, so that Cherif was quite justified in his proposition. Cherif has been unjustly considered opposed to any reform. This is not so. Certainly he had shown his independence in refusing to acknowledge Rivers-Wilson as his superior, preferring to give up his position to doing so, but he knew well that reform was necessary, and had always advised it. Cherif is perhaps the only Egyptian Minister whose character for strict integrity is unimpeachable.

“A thoroughly independent man, caring but little for office or its emoluments, of a good family, with antecedents which would bear any investigation, he was not inclined to be questioned by men whose social position was inferior to his own, and whose parti pris was against him. In the Council Chamber he was in a minority because he spoke his mind; but this was not so with other Ministers, whose antecedents were dubious. Had his advice been taken, Ismail would have now been Khedive of Egypt. Any one who knows Cherif will agree to this account of him, and will rate him as infinitely superior to his other colleagues. He is essentially not an intriguer.

“To return, immediately after the promulgation of the Firman on August 16, Tewfik dismisses suddenly Cherif, and the European Press considers he has done a bold thing, and, misjudging Cherif, praise him for having broken with the advisers who caused the ruin of Ismail. My opinion is that Tewfik feared Cherif’s proposition as being likely to curtail his power as absolute ruler, and that he judged that he would by this dismissal gain kudos in Europe, and protect his absolute power.

“After a time Riaz is appointed in Cherif’s place, and then Tewfik begins his career. He concedes this and that to European desires, but in so doing claims for his youth and inexperience exemption from any reform which would take from his absolute power. Knowing that it was the bondholders who upset his father he conciliates them; they in their turn leave him to act as he wished with regard to the internal government of the country. Riaz was so placed as to be between two influences one, the bondholders seeking their advantages; the other, Tewfik, seeking to retain all power. Riaz of course wavers. Knowing better than Tewfik the feeling of Europe, he inclines more to the bondholders than to Tewfik, to whom, however, he is bound to give some sops, such as the Universal Military Service Bill, which the bondholders let pass without a word, and which is the root of the present troubles. After a time Tewfik finds that Riaz will give no more sops, for the simple reason he dares not. Then Tewfik finds him de trop, and by working up the military element endeavours to counterbalance him. The European Powers manage to keep the peace for a time, but eventually the military become too strong for even Tewfik, who had conjured them up, and taking things into their own hands upset Riaz, which Tewfik is glad of, and demand a Constitution, which Tewfik is not glad of. Cherif then returns, and it is to be hoped will get for the people what he demanded before his dismissal.

“It is against all reason to expect any straightforward dealings
in any Sultan, Khedive, or Ameer; the only hope is in the people
they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object.

“There is no real loyalty towards the descendants of the Sandjak of Salonica in Egypt; the people are Arabs, they are Greeks. The people care for themselves. It is reiterated over and over again that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it has altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit of the bondholders. The army may be paid regularly, but the lot of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the Soudan is the same oppressed lot as before. The prisons are as full of unfortunates as ever they were, the local tribunals are as corrupt, and Tewfik will always oppose their being affiliated to the mixed tribunals of Alexandria, and thus afford protection to the judges of the local tribunals, should they adjudicate justly. Tewfik is essentially one of the Ameer class. I believe he would be willing to act uprightly, if by so doing he could maintain his absolute power. He has played a difficult game, making stock of his fear of his father and of Halim, the legitimate heir according to the Moslem, to induce the European Governments to be gentle with him, at the same time resisting all measures which would benefit his people should these measures touch his absolute power. He is liberal only in measures which do not interfere with his prerogative.

“It was inevitable that the present sort of trouble should arise. The Controllers had got the finances in good order, and were bound to look to the welfare of the people, which could only be done by the curtailment of Tewfik’s power. The present arrangement of Controllers and Consul-Generals is defective. The Consul-Generals are charged with the duty of seeing that the country is quiet and the people well treated. They are responsible to their Foreign Offices. The Controllers are charged with the finances and the welfare of the country, but to whom are they responsible? Not to Tewfik; though he pays them, he cannot remove them; yet they must get on well with him. Not to the Foreign Office, for it is repeatedly said that they are Egyptian officials, yet they have to keep on good terms with these Foreign Offices. Not to the bondholders, though they are bound, considering their power, to be on good terms with them. Not to the inhabitants of Egypt, though these latter are taught to believe that every unpopular act is done by the Controllers’ advice.

“The only remedy is by the formation of a Council of Notables, having direct access to Tewfik, and independent of his or of the Ministers’ goodwill, and the subjection of the Controllers to the Consul-Generals responsible to the Foreign Office in fact, Residents at the Court. This would be no innovation, for the supervision exists now, except under the Controllers and Consul-Generals. It is simply proposed to amalgamate Controllers with Consul-Generals, and to give these latter the position of Residents. By this means the continual change of French Consul-Generals would be avoided, and the consequent ill-feeling between France and England would disappear. Should the Residents fall out, the matter would be easily settled by the Governments. As it is at present, a quadruple combat goes on; sometimes it is one Consul-General against the other Consul-General, aided by the two Controllers, or a Consul-General and one Controller against the other Consul-General and the other Controller, in all of which combats Tewfik gains and the people lose.

“One thing should certainly be done the giving of concessions ought not to be in the power of Controllers, nor if Consul-Generals are amalgamated with Controllers as Residents should these Residents have this power. It ought to be exercised by the Council of Notables, who would look to the welfare of the people.”

The progress of events in Lower Egypt during 1881 and 1882 was watched with great care, whether he was vegetating in the Mauritius or absorbed in the anxieties and labours of his South African mission. Commenting on the downfall of Arabi, he explained how the despatch of troops to the Soudan, composed of regiments tainted with a spirit of insubordination, would inevitably aggravate the situation there. Later on, in 1883, when he heard of Hicks being sent to take the command and repair the defeat of Yusuf, he wrote: “Unless Hicks is given supreme command he is lost; it can never work putting him in a subordinate position. Hicks must be made Governor-General, otherwise he will never end things satisfactorily.” At the same time, he came to the conclusion that there was only one man who could save Egypt, and that was Nubar Pasha. He wrote: If they do not make Nubar Pasha Prime Minister or Regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is the only man who can rule that country. This testimony to Nubars capacity is the more remarkable and creditable, as in earlier days Gordon had not appreciated the merit of a statesman who has done more for Egypt than any other of his generation. But at a very early stage of the Soudan troubles Gordon convinced himself that the radical cause of these difficulties and misfortunes was not the shortcomings and errors of any particular subordinate, but the complete want of a definite policy on the part, not of the Khedive and his advisers, but of the British Government itself. He wrote on this point to a friend (2nd September 1883), almost the day that Hicks was to march from Khartoum:

“Her Majesty’s Government, right or wrong, will not take a decided step in re Egypt and the Soudan; they drift, but at the same time cannot avoid the onus of being the real power in Egypt, with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is undoubtedly the fact that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in power against the will of the people; this alone is insufferable from disgusting the people, to whom also Her Majesty’s Government have given no inducement to make themselves popular. Their present action is a dangerous one, for without any advantage over the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore open with France, and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to act in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further than that, Her Majesty’s Government must eventually gain the odium which will fall upon them when the interest of the debt fails to be paid, which will soon be the case. Also, Her Majesty’s Government cannot possibly avoid the responsibility for the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a wretched war drags on in a ruined country at a cost of half a million per annum at least. I say therefore to avoid all this, if Her Majesty’s Government will not act firmly and strongly and take the country (which, if I were they, I would not do), let them attempt to get the Palestine Canal made, and quit Egypt to work out its own salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will take place. This anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is the travail in birth. Her Majesty’s Government do not prevent anarchy now; therefore better leave the country, and thus avoid a responsibility which gives no advantage, and is mean and dangerous.”

In a letter to myself, dated 3rd January 1884, from Brussels, he enters into some detail on matters that had been forgotten or were insufficiently appreciated, to which the reported appointment of Zebehr to proceed to the Soudan and stem the Mahdis advance lent special interest:

“I send you a small note which you can make use of, but I beg you will not let my name appear under any circumstances. When in London I had printed a pamphlet in Arabic, with all the papers (official) concerning Zebehr Pasha and his action in pushing his son to rebel. It is in Arabic. My brother has it. It is not long, and would repay translating and publishing. It has all the history and the authentic letters found in the divan of Zebehr’s son when Gessi took his stockade. It is in a cover, blue and gold. It was my address to people of Soudan Apologia. Isaiah XI, 20, 21 has a wonderful prophecy about Egypt and the saviour who will come from the frontier.”

The note enclosed was published in The Times of 5th January, and read as follows:

“A correspondent writes that it may seem inexplicable why the Mahdi’s troops attacked Gezireh, which, as its name signifies, is an isle near Berber, but there is an old tradition that the future ruler of the Soudan will be from that isle. Zebehr Rahama knew this, but he fell on leaving his boat at this isle, and so, though the Soudan people looked on him as a likely saviour, this omen shook their confidence in him. He was then on his way to Cairo after swearing his people to rebel (if he was retained there), under a tree at Shaka. Zebehr will most probably be taken prisoner by the Mahdi, and will then take the command of the Mahdi’s forces. The peoples of the Soudan are very superstitious, and the fall of the flag by a gust of wind, on the proclamation of Tewfik at Khartoum, was looked on as an omen of the end of Mehemet Ali’s dynasty. There is an old tree opposite Cook’s office at Jerusalem in Toppet, belonging to an old family, and protected by Sultan’s Firman, which the Arabs consider will fall when the Sultan’s rule ends. It lost a large limb during the Turco-Russian war, and is now in a decayed state. There can be no doubt but that the movement will spread into Palestine, Syria, and Hedjaz. At Damascus already proclamations have been posted up, denouncing Turks and Circassians, and this was before Hicks was defeated. It is the beginning of the end of Turkey. Austria backed by Germany will go to Salonica, quieting Russia by letting her go into Armenia England and France neutralising one another.

“If not too late, the return of the ex-Khedive Ismail to Egypt, and the union of England and France to support and control the Arab movement, appears the only chance. Ismail would soon come to terms with the Soudan, the rebellion of which countries was entirely due to the oppression of the Turks and Circassians.”

These expressions of opinion about Egypt and the Soudan may be said to have culminated in the remarkable pronouncement Gordon made to Mr W. T. Stead, the brilliant editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, on 8th January 1884, which appeared in his paper on the following day. The substance of that statement is as follows:

“So you would abandon the Soudan? But the Eastern Soudan is indispensable to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your hold upon Egypt proper if you abandon your hold of the Eastern Soudan to the Mahdi or to the Turk than what it would to retain your hold upon Eastern Soudan by the aid of such material as exists in the provinces. Darfour and Kordofan must be abandoned. That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White Nile should be retained, and north of Sennaar. The danger to be feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature. It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering Mahommedan Power established close to your frontiers will exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Placards have been posted in Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive out the Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the Mahdi, the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take fire. In self-defence the Turks are bound to do something to cope with so formidable a danger, for it is quite possible that if nothing is done the whole of the Eastern Question may be reopened by the triumph of the Mahdi. I see it is proposed to fortify Wady Halfa, and prepare there to resist the Mahdi’s attack. You might as well fortify against a fever. Contagion of that kind cannot be kept out by fortifications and garrisons. But that it is real, and that it does exist, will be denied by no one cognisant with Egypt and the East. In self-defence the policy of evacuation cannot possibly be justified.

“There is another aspect of the question. You have 6000 men in Khartoum. What are you going to do with them? You have garrisons in Darfour, in Bahr el Gazelle, and Gondokoro. Are they to be sacrificed? Their only offence is their loyalty to their Sovereign. For their fidelity you are going to abandon them to their fate. You say they are to retire upon Wady Halfa. But Gondokoro is 1500 miles from Khartoum, and Khartoum is only 350 from Wady Halfa. How will you move your 6000 men from Khartoum to say nothing of other places and all the Europeans in that city through the desert to Wady Halfa? Where are you going to get the camels to take them away? Will the Mahdi supply them? If they are to escape with their lives, the garrison will not be allowed to leave with a coat on their backs. They will be plundered to the skin, and even then their lives may not be spared. Whatever you may decide about evacuation, you cannot evacuate, because your army cannot be moved. You must either surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards. The latter is the only course which ought to be entertained. There is no serious difficulty about it. The Mahdi’s forces will fall to pieces of themselves; but if in a moment of panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against the security of Egypt and the peace of the East, which may have fatal consequences.

“The great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo. It is the weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Soudan. It is because Hicks was not adequately supported at the first, but was thrust forward upon an impossible enterprise by the men who had refused him supplies when a decisive blow might have been struck, that the Western Soudan has been sacrificed. The Eastern Soudan may, however, be saved if there is a firm hand placed at the helm in Egypt. Everything depends on that.

“What then, you ask, should be done? I reply, Place Nubar in power! Nubar is the one supremely able man among Egyptian Ministers. He is proof against foreign intrigue, and he thoroughly understands the situation. Place him in power; support him through thick and thin; give him a free hand; and let it be distinctly understood that no intrigues, either on the part of Tewfik or any of Nubar’s rivals, will be allowed for a moment to interfere with the execution of his plans. You are sure to find that the energetic support of Nubar will, sooner or later, bring you into collision with the Khedive; but if that Sovereign really desires, as he says, the welfare of his country, it will be necessary for you to protect Nubar’s Administration from any direct or indirect interference on his part. Nubar can be depended upon: that I can guarantee. He will not take office without knowing that he is to have his own way; but if he takes office, it is the best security that you can have for the restoration of order to the country. Especially is this the case with the Soudan. Nubar should be left untrammelled by any stipulations concerning the evacuation of Khartoum. There is no hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at present. Let them continue to hold on until disunion and tribal jealousies have worked their natural results in the camp of the Mahdi. Nubar should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he will deal with the Soudan, of course, I cannot profess to say; but I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at Khartoum, with full powers, and furnish him with two millions sterling a large sum, no doubt, but a sum which had much better be spent now than wasted in a vain attempt to avert the consequences of an ill-timed surrender. Sir Samuel Baker, who possesses the essential energy and single tongue requisite for the office, might be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan, and he might take his brother as Commander-in-Chief.

“It should be proclaimed in the hearing of all the Soudanese, and engraved on tablets of brass, that a permanent Constitution was granted to the Soudanese, by which no Turk or Circassian would ever be allowed to enter the province to plunder its inhabitants in order to fill his own pockets, and that no immediate emancipation of slaves would be attempted. Immediate emancipation was denounced in 1833 as confiscation in England, and it is no less confiscation in the Soudan to-day. Whatever is done in that direction should be done gradually, and by a process of registration. Mixed tribunals might be established, if Nubar thought fit, in which European judges would co-operate with the natives in the administration of justice. Police inspectors also might be appointed, and adequate measures taken to root out the abuses which prevail in the prisons.

“With regard to Darfour, I should think that Nubar would probably send back the family and the heir of the Sultan of Darfour. If subsidized by the Government, and sent back with Sir Samuel Baker, he would not have much difficulty in regaining possession of the kingdom of Darfour, which was formerly one of the best governed of African countries. As regards Abyssinia, the old warning should not be lost sight of “Put not your trust in princes”; and place no reliance upon the King of Abyssinia, at least outside his own country. Zeylah and Bogos might be ceded to him with advantage, and the free right of entry by the port of Massowah might be added; but it would be a mistake to give him possession of Massowah which he would ruin. A Commission might also be sent down with advantage to examine the state of things in Harrar, opposite Aden, and see what iniquities are going on there, as also at Berbera and Zeylah. By these means, and by the adoption of a steady, consistent policy at headquarters, it would be possible not to say easy to re-establish the authority of the Khedive between the Red Sea and Sennaar.

“As to the cost of the Soudan, it is a mistake to suppose that it will necessarily be a charge on the Egyptian Exchequer. It will cost two millions to relieve the garrisons and to quell the revolt; but that expenditure must be incurred any way; and in all probability, if the garrisons are handed over to be massacred and the country evacuated, the ultimate expenditure would exceed that sum. At first, until the country is pacified, the Soudan will need a subsidy of L200,000 a year from Egypt. That, however, would be temporary. During the last years of my administration the Soudan involved no charge upon the Egyptian Exchequer. The bad provinces were balanced against the good, and an equilibrium was established. The Soudan will never be a source of revenue to Egypt, but it need not be a source of expense. That deficits have arisen, and that the present disaster has occurred, is entirely attributable to a single cause, and that is, the grossest misgovernment.

“The cause of the rising in the Soudan is the cause of all popular risings against Turkish rule, wherever they have occurred. No one who has been in a Turkish province, and has witnessed the results of the Bashi-Bazouk system, which excited so much indignation some time ago in Bulgaria, will need to be told why the people of the Soudan have risen in revolt against the Khedive. The Turks, the Circassians, and the Bashi-Bazouks have plundered and oppressed the people in the Soudan, as they plundered and oppressed them in the Balkan peninsula. Oppression begat discontent; discontent necessitated an increase of the armed force at the disposal of the authorities; this increase of the army force involved an increase of expenditure, which again was attempted to be met by increasing taxation, and that still further increased the discontent. And so things went on in a dismal circle, until they culminated, after repeated deficits, in a disastrous rebellion. That the people were justified in rebelling, nobody who knows the treatment to which they were subjected will attempt to deny. Their cries were absolutely unheeded at Cairo. In despair, they had recourse to the only method by which they could make their wrongs known; and, on the same principle that Absalom fired the corn of Joab, so they rallied round the Mahdi, who exhorted them to revolt against the Turkish yoke. I am convinced that it is an entire mistake to regard the Mahdi as in any sense a religious leader: he personifies popular discontent. All the Soudanese are potential Mahdis, just as all the Egyptians are potential Arabis. The movement is not religious, but an outbreak of despair. Three times over I warned the late Khedive that it would be impossible to govern the Soudan on the old system, after my appointment to the Governor-Generalship. During the three years that I wielded full powers in the Soudan, I taught the natives that they had a right to exist. I waged war against the Turks and Circassians, who had harried the population. I had taught them something of the meaning of liberty and justice, and accustomed them to a higher ideal of government than that with which they had previously been acquainted. As soon as I had gone, the Turks and Circassians returned in full force; the old Bashi-Bazouk system was re-established; my old employes were persecuted; and a population which had begun to appreciate something like decent government was flung back to suffer the worst excesses of Turkish rule. The inevitable result followed; and thus it may be said that the egg of the present rebellion was laid in the three years during which I was allowed to govern the Soudan on other than Turkish principles.

“The Soudanese are a very nice people. They deserve the sincere compassion and sympathy of all civilised men. I got on very well with them, and I am sincerely sorry at the prospect of seeing them handed over to be ground down once more by their Turkish and Circassian oppressors. Yet, unless an attempt is made to hold on to the present garrisons, it is inevitable that the Turks, for the sake of self-preservation, must attempt to crush them. They deserve a better fate. It ought not to be impossible to come to terms with them, to grant them a free amnesty for the past, to offer them security for decent government in the future. If this were done, and the government entrusted to a man whose word was truth, all might yet be re-established. So far from believing it impossible to make an arrangement with the Mahdi, I strongly suspect that he is a mere puppet, put forward by Elias, Zebehr’s father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he had assumed a religious title to give colour to his defence of the popular rights.

“There is one subject on which I cannot imagine any one can differ about. That is the impolicy of announcing our intention to evacuate Khartoum. Even if we were bound to do so we should have said nothing about it. The moment it is known that we have given up the game, every man will go over to the Mahdi. All men worship the rising sun. The difficulties of evacuation will be enormously increased, if, indeed, the withdrawal of our garrison is not rendered impossible.

“The late Khedive, who is one of the ablest and worst-used men in Europe, would not have made such a mistake, and under him the condition of Egypt proper was much better than it is to-day. Now, with regard to Egypt, the same principle should be observed that must be acted upon in the Soudan. Let your foundations be broad and firm, and based upon the contentment and welfare of the people. Hitherto, both in the Soudan and in Egypt, instead of constructing the social edifice like a pyramid, upon its base, we have been rearing an obelisk which a single push may overturn. Our safety in Egypt is to do something for the people. That is to say, you must reduce their rent, rescue them from the usurers, and retrench expenditure. Nine-tenths of the European employes might probably be weeded out with advantage. The remaining tenth thoroughly efficient should be retained; but, whatever you do, do not break up Sir Evelyn Wood’s army, which is destined to do good work. Stiffen it as much as you please, but with Englishmen, not with Circassians. Circassians are as much foreigners in Egypt as Englishmen are, and certainly not more popular. As for the European population, let them have charters for the formation of municipal councils, for raising volunteer corps, and for organising in their own defence. Anything more shameful than the flight from Egypt in 1882 I never read. Let them take an example from Shanghai, where the European settlement provides for its own defence and its own government. I should like to see a competent special Commissioner of the highest standing such a man, for instance, as the Right Honourable W. E. Forster, who is free at once from traditions of the elders and of the Foreign Office and of the bondholders, sent out to put Nubar in the saddle, sift out unnecessary employes, and warn evil-doers in the highest places that they will not be allowed to play any tricks. If that were done, it would give confidence everywhere, and I see no reason why the last British soldier should not be withdrawn from Egypt in six months’ time.”

A perusal of these passages will suffice to show the reader what thoughts were uppermost in Gordon’s mind at the very moment when he was negotiating about his new task for the King of the Belgians on the Congo, and those thoughts, inspired by the enthusiasm derived from his noble spirit, and the perfect self-sacrifice with which he would have thrown himself into what he conceived to be a good and necessary work, made him the ready victim of a Government which absolutely did not know what course to pursue, and which was delighted to find that the very man, whom the public designated as the right man for the situation, was ready nay, eager to take all the burden on his shoulders whenever his own Government called on him to do so, and to proceed straight to the scene of danger without so much as asking for precise instructions, or insisting on guarantees for his own proper treatment. There is no doubt that from his own individual point of view, and as affecting any selfish or personal consideration he had at heart, this mode of action was very unwise and reprehensible, and a worldly censure would be the more severe on Gordon, because he acted with his eyes open, and knew that the gravity of the trouble really arose from the drifting policy and want of purpose of the very Ministers for whom he was about to dare a danger that Gordon himself, in a cooler moment, would very likely have deemed it unnecessary to face.

Into the motives that filled him with a belief that he might inspire a Government, which had no policy, with one created by his own courage, confidence, and success, it would be impossible to enter, but it can be confidently asserted that, although they were drawn after him sed pede claudo to expend millions of treasure and thousands of lives, they were never inspired by his exhortations and example to form a definite policy as to the main point in the situation, viz., the defence of the Egyptian possessions. In the flush of the moment, carried along by an irresistible inclination to do the things which he saw could be done, he overlooked all the other points of the case, and especially that he was dealing with politicians tied by their party principles, and thinking more of the passage through the House of some domestic measure of fifth-rate importance than of the maintenance of an Imperial interest and the arrest of an outbreak of Mahommedan fanaticism which, if not checked, might call for a crusade. Gordon overlooked all these considerations. He never thought but that he was dealing with other Englishmen equally mindful with himself of their country’s fame.

If Gordon, long before he took up the task, had been engrossed in the development of the Soudan difficulty and the Mahdi’s power, those who had studied the question and knew his special qualifications for the task, had, at a very early stage of the trouble, called upon the Government to avail themselves of his services, and there is no doubt that if that advice had been promptly taken instead of slowly, reluctantly, and only when matters were desperate, there is no doubt, I repeat, remembering what he did later on, that Gordon would have been able, without a single English regiment, to have strangled the Mahdi’s power in its infancy, and to have won back the Soudan for the Khedive.

But it may be said, where was it ever prominently suggested that General Gordon should be despatched to the Soudan at a time before the Mahdi had become supreme in that region, as he undoubtedly did by the overthrow of Hicks and his force?

I reply by the following quotations from prominent articles written by myself in The Times of January and February 1883. Until the capture of El Obeid at that period the movement of the Mahdi was a local affair of the importance of which no one, at a distance, could attempt to judge, but that signal success made it the immediate concern of those responsible in Egypt. On 9th January 1883, in an article in The Times on The Soudan, occurs this passage:

“It is a misfortune, in the interests of Egypt, of civilisation, and of the mass of the Soudanese, that we cannot send General Gordon back to the region of the Upper Nile to complete there the good work he began eight years ago. With full powers, and with the assurance that the good fruits of his labours shall not be lost by the subsequent acts of corrupt Pashas, there need be little doubt of his attaining rapid success, while the memory of his achievements, when working for a half-hearted Government, and with incapable colleagues, yet lives in the hearts of the black people of the Soudan, and fills one of the most creditable pages in the history of recent administration of alien races by Englishmen.”

Again, on 17th February, in another article on the same subject:

“The authority of the Mahdi could scarcely be preserved save by constant activity and a policy of aggression, which would constitute a standing danger to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt. On the other hand, the preservation of the Khedive’s sovereign rights through our instrumentality will carry with it the responsibility of providing the unhappy peoples of Darfour, Dongola, Kordofan, and the adjacent provinces with an equitable administration and immunity from heavy taxation. The obligation cannot be avoided under these, or perhaps under any circumstances, but the acceptance of it is not a matter to be entertained with an easy mind. The one thing that would reconcile us to the idea would be the assurance that General Gordon would be sent back with plenary powers to the old scene of his labours, and that he would accept the charge.”

As Gordon was not resorted to when the fall of El Obeid in the early part of the year 1883 showed that the situation demanded some decisive step, it is not surprising that he was left in inglorious inaction in Palestine, while, as I and others knew well, his uppermost thought was to be grappling with the Mahdi during the long lull of preparing Hicks’s expedition, and of its marching to its fate. The catastrophe to that force on 4th November was known in London on 22nd November.

I urged in every possible way the prompt employment of General Gordon, who could have reached Egypt in a very short time from his place of exile at Jaffa. But on this occasion I was snubbed, being told by one of the ablest editors I have known, now dead, that “Gordon was generally considered to be mad.” However, at this moment the Government seem to have come to the conclusion that General Gordon had some qualifications to undertake the task in the Soudan, for at the end of November 1883, Sir Charles Dilke, then a member of the Cabinet as President of the Local Government Board, but whose special knowledge and experience of foreign affairs often led to his assisting Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, offered the Egyptian Government Gordon’s services. They were declined, and when, on 1st December 1883, Lord Granville proposed the same measure in a more formal manner, and asked in an interrogatory form whether General Charles Gordon would be of any use, and if so in what capacity, Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord Cromer, threw cold water on the project, and stated on 2nd December that “the Egyptian Government were very much averse to employing him.” Subsequent events make it desirable to call special attention to the fact that when, however tardily, the British Government did propose the employment of General Gordon, the suggestion was rejected, not on public grounds, but on private. Major Baring did not need to be informed as to the work Gordon had done in the Soudan, and as to the incomparable manner in which it had been performed. No one knew better than he that, with the single exception of Sir Samuel Baker, who was far too prudent to take up a thankless task, and to remove the mountain of blunders others had committed, there was no man living who had the smallest pretension to say that he could cope with the Soudan difficulty, save Charles Gordon. Yet, when his name is suggested, he treats the matter as one that cannot be entertained. There is not a word as to the obvious propriety of suggesting Gordon’s name, but the objection of a puppet-prince like Tewfik is reported as fatal to the course. Yet six weeks, with the mighty lever of an aroused public opinion, sufficed to make him withdraw the opposition he advanced to the appointment, not on public grounds, which was simply impossible, but, I fear, from private feelings, for he had not forgotten the scene in Cairo in 1878, when he attempted to control the action of Gordon on the financial question. There would be no necessity to refer to this matter, but for its consequences. Had Sir Evelyn Baring done his duty, and given the only honest answer on 2nd December 1883, that if any one man could save the situation, that man was Charles Gordon, Gordon could have reached Khartoum early in January instead of late in February, and that difference of six weeks might well have sufficed to completely alter the course of subsequent events, and certainly to save Gordon’s life, seeing that, after all, the Nile Expedition was only a few days too late. The delay was also attended with fatal results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children, making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of February had been spent.

The conviction that Gordon’s appointment and departure were retarded by personal animus and an old difference is certainly strengthened by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly informed our representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient, and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: “Zebehr will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt.”

But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the situation required that something should be done as soon as possible, for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population. The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with 10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and “concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan.” In fact the British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been adopted, but as he had not, the only way to get rid of the responsibility was to thrust it on Gordon, who was soon discovered to be ready to accept it without delay or conditions.

On 22nd December 1883 Sir Evelyn Baring wrote: “It would be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full powers to withdraw the garrisons, and to make the best arrangements possible for the future government of the country.” News from Khartoum showed that everything there was in a state verging on panic, that the people thought they were abandoned by the Government, and that the enemy had only to advance for the place to fall without a blow. Lastly Colonel de Coetlogon, the governor after Hicks’s death, recommended on 9th January the immediate withdrawal of the garrison from Khartoum, which he thought could be accomplished if carried out with the greatest promptitude, but which involved the desertion of the other garrisons. Abd-el-Kader, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan and Minister of War, offered to proceed to Khartoum, but when he discovered that the abandonment of the Soudan was to be proclaimed, he absolutely refused on any consideration to carry out what he termed a hopeless errand.

All these circumstances gave special point to Sir Evelyn Baring’s recommendation on 22nd December that “an English officer of high authority should be sent to Khartoum,” and the urgency of a decision was again impressed on the Government in his telegram of 1st January, because Egypt is on the point of losing the Soudan, and moreover possesses no force with which to defend the valley of the Nile downwards. But in the many messages that were sent on this subject during the last fortnight of the year 1883, the name of the one “English officer of high authority” specially suited for the task finds no mention. As this omission cannot be attributed to ignorance, some different motive must be discovered. At last, on 10th January, Lord Granville renews his suggestion to send General Gordon, and asks whether he would not be of some assistance under the altered circumstances. The “altered circumstances” must have been inserted for the purpose of letting down Sir Evelyn Baring as lightly as possible, for the only alteration in the circumstances was that six weeks had been wasted in coming to any decision at all. On 11th January Sir Evelyn Baring replied that he and Nubar Pasha did not think Gordon’s services could be utilised, and yet three weeks before he had recommended that “an English officer of high authority” should be sent, and he had even complained because prompter measures were not taken to give effect to his recommendation. The only possible conclusion is that, in Sir Evelyn Baring’s opinion, General Gordon was not “an English officer of high authority.” As if to make his views more emphatic, Sir Evelyn Baring on 15th January again telegraphed for an English officer with the intentional and conspicuous omission of Gordon’s name, which had been three times urged upon him by his own Government. But determined as Sir Evelyn Baring was that by no act or word of his should General Gordon be appointed to the Soudan, there were more powerful influences at work than even his strong will.

The publication of General Gordon’s views in the Pall Mall Gazette of 9th January 1884 had roused public opinion to the importance and urgency of the matter. It had also revealed that there was at least one man who was not in terror of the Mahdi’s power, and who thought that the situation might still be saved. There is no doubt that that publication was the direct and immediate cause of Lord Granville’s telegram of 10th January; but Sir Evelyn Baring, unmoved by what people thought or said at home, coldly replied on 11th January that Gordon is not the man he wants. If there had been no other considerations in the matter, I have no doubt that Sir Evelyn Baring would have beaten public opinion, and carried matters in the high, dictatorial spirit he had shown since the first mention of Gordon’s name. But he had not made allowance for an embarrassed and purposeless Government, asking only to be relieved of the whole trouble, and willing to adopt any suggestion even to resign its place to “the unspeakable Turk” so long as it was no longer worried in the matter.

At that moment Gordon appears on the scene, ready and anxious to undertake single-handed a task for which others prescribe armies and millions of money. Public opinion greets him as the man for the occasion, and certainly he is the man to suit “that” Government. The only obstruction is Sir Evelyn Baring. Against any other array of forces his views would have prevailed, but even for him these are too strong.

On 15th January Gordon saw Lord Wolseley, as described in the last chapter, and then and there it is discovered and arranged that he will go to the Soudan, but only at the Government’s request, provided the King of the Belgians will consent to his postponing the fulfilment of his promise, as Gordon knows he cannot help but do, for it was given on the express stipulation that the claim of his own country should always come first. King Leopold, who has behaved throughout with generosity, and the most kind consideration towards Gordon, is naturally displeased and upset, but he feels that he cannot restrain Gordon or insist on the letter of his bond. The Congo Mission is therefore broken off or suspended, as described in the last chapter. In the evening of the 15th Lord Granville despatched a telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring, no longer asking his opinion or advice, but stating that the Government have determined to send General Gordon to the Soudan, and that he will start without delay. To that telegram the British representative could make no demur short of resigning his post, but at last the grudging admission was wrung from him that “Gordon would be the best man.” This conclusion, to which anyone conversant with the facts, as Sir Evelyn Baring was, would have come at once, was therefore only arrived at seven weeks after Sir Charles Dilke first brought forward Gordon’s name as the right person to deal with the Soudan difficulty. That loss of time was irreparable, and in the end proved fatal to Gordon himself.

In describing the last mission, betrayal, and death of Gordon, the heavy responsibility of assigning the just blame to those individuals who were in a special degree the cause of that hero’s fate cannot be shirked by any writer pretending to record history. Lord Cromer has filled a difficult post in Egypt for many years with advantage to his country, but in the matter of General Gordon’s last Nile mission he allowed his personal feelings to obscure his judgment. He knew that Gordon was a difficult, let it be granted an impossible, colleague; that he would do things in his own way in defiance of diplomatic timidity and official rigidity; and that, instead of there being in the Egyptian firmament the one planet Baring, there would be only the single sun of Gordon. All these considerations were human, but they none the less show that he allowed his private feelings, his resentment at Gordon’s treatment of him in 1878, to bias his judgment in a matter of public moment. It was his opposition alone that retarded Gordon’s departure by seven weeks, and indeed the delay was longer, as Gordon was then at Jaffa, and that delay, I repeat it solemnly, cost Gordon his life. Whoever else was to blame afterwards, the first against whom a verdict of Guilty must be entered, without any hope of reprieve at the bar of history, was Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord Cromer.

Mr Gladstone and his Government are certainly clear of any reflection in this stage of the matter. They did their best to put forward General Gordon immediately on the news coming of the Hicks disaster, and although they might have shown greater determination in compelling the adoption of their plan, which they were eventually obliged to do, this was a very venial fault, and not in any serious way blameworthy. Nor did they ever seek to repudiate their responsibility for sending Gordon to the Soudan, although a somewhat craven statement by Lord Granville, in a speech at Shrewsbury in September 1885, to the effect that “Gordon went to Khartoum at his own request,” might seem to infer that they did. This remark may have been a slip, or an incorrect mode of saying that Gordon willingly accepted the task given him by the Government, but Mr Gladstone placed the matter in its true light when he wrote that “General Gordon went to the Soudan at the request of H.M.’s Government.”

Gordon, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Stewart, an officer who had visited the Soudan in 1883, and written an able report on it, left London by the Indian mail of 18th January 1884. The decision to send Colonel Stewart with him was arrived at only at the very last moment, and on the platform at Charing Cross Station the acquaintance of the two men bound together in such a desperate partnership practically began. It is worth recalling that in that hurried and stirring scene, when the War Office, with the Duke of Cambridge, had assembled to see him off, Gordon found time to say to one of Stewart’s nearest relations, “Be sure that he will not go into any danger which I do not share, and I am sure that when I am in danger he will not be far behind.”

Gordons journey to Egypt was uneventful, but after the exciting events that preceded his departure he found the leisure of his sea-trip from Brindisi beneficial and advantageous, for the purpose of considering his position and taking stock of the situation he had to face. By habit and temperament Gordon was a bad emissary to carry out cut-and-dried instructions, more especially when they related to a subject upon which he felt very strongly and held pronounced views. The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordons hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province after providing for its administration. The letter given in the previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the start the Governments view of the matter and his presented no glaring difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in the affair. Gordons marvellous qualities were to extricate them from the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied. The following instructions should be read by the light of these reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and had widely different goals in view:

“FOREIGN OFFICE, January 18th, 1884.

“Her Majesty’s Government are desirous that you should proceed at once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum.

“You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best be secured.

“In connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior.

“You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty’s Agent and
Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her
Majesty’s Government should be sent, under flying seal.

“You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will assist you in the duties thus confided to you.

“On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go yourself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum via the Nile.”

General Gordon had not got very far on his journey before he began to see that there were points on which it would be better for him to know the Government’s mind and to state his own. Neither at this time nor throughout the whole term of his stay at Khartoum did Gordon attempt to override the main decision of the Government policy, viz. to evacuate the Soudan, although he left plenty of documentary evidence to show that this was not his policy or opinion. Moreover, his own policy had been well set forth in the Pall Mall Gazette, and might be summed up in the necessity to keep the Eastern Soudan, and the impossibility of fortifying Lower Egypt against the advance of the Mahdi. But he had none the less consented to give his services to a Government which had decided on evacuation, and he remained loyal to that purpose, although in a little time it was made clear that there was a wide and impassable gulf between the views of the British Government and its too brilliant agent.

The first doubt that flashed through his mind, strangely enough, was about Zebehr. He knew, of course, that it had been proposed to employ him, and that Mr Gladstone had not altogether unnaturally decided against it. But Gordon knew the man’s ability, his influence, and the close connection he still maintained with the Soudan, where his father-in-law Elias was the Mahdi’s chief supporter, and the paymaster of his forces. I believe that Gordon was in his heart of the opinion that the Mahdi was only a lay figure, and that the real author of the whole movement in the Soudan was Zebehr, but that the Mahdi, carried away by his exceptional success, had somewhat altered the scope of the project, and given it an exclusively religious or fanatical character. It is somewhat difficult to follow all the workings of Gordon’s mind on this point, nor is it necessary to do so, but the fact that should not be overlooked is Gordon’s conviction in the great power for good or evil of Zebehr. Thinking this matter over in the train, he telegraphed from Brindisi to Lord Granville on 30th January, begging that Zebehr might be removed from Cairo to Cyprus. There is no doubt as to the wisdom of this suggestion, and had it been adopted the lives of Colonel Stewart and his companions would probably have been spared, for, as will be seen, there is good ground to think that they were murdered by men of his tribe. In Cyprus Zebehr would have been incapable of mischief, but no regard was paid to Gordon’s wish, and thus commenced what proved to be a long course of indifference.

During the voyage from Brindisi to Port-Said Gordon drew up a memorandum on his instructions, correcting some of the errors that had crept into them, and explaining what, more or less, would be the best course to follow. One part of his instructions had to go by the board that enjoining him to restore to the ancient families of the Soudan their long-lost possessions, for there were no such families in existence. One paragraph in that memorandum was almost pathetic, when he begged the Government to take the most favourable view of his shortcomings if he found himself compelled by necessity to deviate from his instructions. Colonel Stewart supported that view in a very sensible letter, when he advised the Government, “as the wisest course, to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge of the country.”

General Gordon’s original plan was to proceed straight to Souakim, and to travel thence by Berber to Khartoum, leaving the Foreign Office to arrange at Cairo what his status should be, but this mode of proceeding would have been both irregular and inconvenient, and it was rightly felt that he ought to hold some definite position assigned by the Khedive, as the ruler of Egypt. On arriving at Port-Said he was met by Sir Evelyn Wood, who was the bearer of a private letter from his old Academy and Crimean chum, Sir Gerald Graham, begging him to “throw over all personal feelings” and come to Cairo. The appeal could not have come from a quarter that would carry more weight with Gordon, who had a feeling of affection as well as respect for General Graham; and, moreover, the course suggested was so unmistakably the right one, that he could not, and did not, feel any hesitation in taking it, although he was well aware of Sir Evelyn Baring’s opposition, which showed that the sore of six years before still rankled. Gordon accordingly accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood to Cairo, where he arrived on the evening of 24th January. On the following day he was received by Tewfik, who conferred on him for the second time the high office of Governor-General of the Soudan. It is unnecessary to lay stress on any minor point in the recital of the human drama which began with the interview with Lord Wolseley on 15th January, and thence went on without a pause to the tragedy of 26th January in the following year; but it does seem strange, if the British Government were resolved to stand firm to its evacuation policy, that it should have allowed its emissary to accept the title of Governor-General of a province which it had decided should cease to exist.

This was not the only nor even the most important consequence of his turning aside to go to Cairo. When there, those who were interested for various reasons in the proposal to send Zebehr to the Soudan, made a last effort to carry their project by arranging an interview between that person and Gordon, in the hope that all matters in dispute between them might be discussed, and, if possible, settled. Gordon, whose enmity to his worst foe was never deep, and whose temperament would have made him delight in a discussion with the arch-fiend, said at once that he had no objection to meeting Zebehr, and would discuss any matter with him or any one else. The penalty of this magnanimity was that he was led to depart from the uncompromising but safe attitude of opposition and hostility he had up to this observed towards Zebehr, and to record opinions that were inconsistent with those he had expressed on the same subject only a few weeks and even days before. But even in what follows I believe it is safe to discern his extraordinary perspicuity; for when he saw that the Government would not send Zebehr to Cyprus, he promptly concluded that it would be far safer to take or have him with him in the Soudan, where he could personally watch and control his movements, than to allow him to remain at Cairo, guiding hostile plots with his money and influence in the very region whither Gordon was proceeding.

This view is supported by the following Memorandum, drawn up by General Gordon on 25th January 1884, the day before the interview, and entitled by him “Zebehr Pasha v. General Gordon":

“Zebehr Pasha’s first connection with me began in 1877, when I was named Governor-General of Soudan. Zebehr was then at Cairo, being in litigation with Ismail Pasha Eyoub, my predecessor in Soudan. Zebehr had left his son Suleiman in charge of his forces in the Bahr Gazelle. Darfour was in complete rebellion, and I called on Suleiman to aid the Egyptian army in May 1877. He never moved. In June 1877 I went to Darfour, and was engaged with the rebels when Suleiman moved up his men, some 6000, to Dara. It was in August 1877. He and his men assumed an hostile attitude to the Government of Dara. I came down to Dara and went out to Suleiman’s camp, and asked them to come and see me at Dara. Suleiman and his chiefs did so, and I told them I felt sure that they meditated rebellion, but if they rebelled they would perish. I offered them certain conditions, appointing certain chiefs to be governors of certain districts, but refusing to let Suleiman be Governor of Bahr Gazelle. After some days’ parleying, some of Suleiman’s chiefs came over to my side, and these chiefs warned me that, if I did not take care, Suleiman would attack me. I therefore ordered Suleiman to go to Shaka, and ordered those chiefs who were inclined to accept my terms in another direction, so as to separate them. On this Suleiman accepted my terms, and he and others were made Beys. He left for Shaka with some 4000 men. He looted the country from Dara to Shaka, and did not show any respect to my orders. The rebellion in Darfour being settled, I went down to Shaka with 200 men. Suleiman was there with 4000. Then he came to me and begged me to let him have the sole command in Bahr Gazelle. I refused, and I put him, Suleiman, under another chief, and sent up to Bahr Gazelle 200 regular troops. Things remained quiet in Bahr Gazelle till I was ordered to Cairo in April 1878, about the finances. I then saw Zebehr Pasha, who wished to go up to Soudan, and I refused. I left for Aden in May, and in June 1878 Suleiman broke out in revolt, and killed the 200 regular troops at Bahr Gazelle. I sent Gessi against him in August 1878, and Gessi crushed him in the course of 1879. Gessi captured a lot of letters in the divan of Suleiman, one of which was from Zebehr Pasha inciting him to revolt. The original of this letter was given by me to H.H. the Khedive, and I also had printed a brochure containing it and a sort of expose to the people of Soudan why the revolt had been put down viz. that it was not a question of slave-hunting, but one of revolt against the Khedive’s authority. Copies of this must exist. On the production of this letter of Zebehr to Suleiman, I ordered the confiscation of Zebehr’s property in Soudan, and a court martial to sit on Zebehr’s case. This court martial was held under Hassan Pasha Halmi; the court condemned Zebehr to death; its proceedings were printed in the brochure I alluded to. Gessi afterwards caught Suleiman and shot him. With details of that event I am not acquainted, and I never saw the papers, for I went to Abyssinia. Gessi’s orders were to try him, and if guilty to shoot him. This is all I have to say about Zebehr and myself.

“Zebehr, without doubt, was the greatest slave-hunter who ever existed. Zebehr is the most able man in the Soudan; he is a capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zebehr has a capacity of government far beyond any statesman in the Soudan. All the followers of the Mahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi on Zebehr’s approach, for they are ex-chiefs of Zebehr. Personally, I have a great admiration for Zebehr, for he is a man, and is infinitely superior to those poor fellows who have been governors of Soudan; but I question in my mind, ’Will Zebehr ever forgive me the death of his son?’ and that question has regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it if one is a father.

“I would even now risk taking Zebehr, and would willingly bear the responsibility of doing so, convinced, as I am, that Zebehr’s approach ends the Mahdi, which is a question which has its pulse in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine.

“It cannot be the wish of H.M.’s Government, or of the Egyptian Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its evacuation, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which could prevent it is the restoration of Zebehr, who would be accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of months. My duty is to obey orders of H.M.’s Government, i.e. to evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible, vis-a-vis the safety of the Egyptian employes.

“To do this I count on Zebehr; but if the addenda is made that I
leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zebehr becomes a
sine qua non.

“Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Does H.M.’s Government or Egyptian Government desire a settled state of affairs in Soudan after the evacuation? Do these Governments want to be free of this religious fanatic? If they do, then Zebehr should be sent; and if the two Governments are indifferent, then do not send him, and I have confidence one will (D.V.) get out the Egyptian employes in three or four months, and will leave a cockpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be done. I will only say, first, I was justified in my action against Zebehr; second, that if Zebehr has no malice personally against me, I should take him at once as a humanly certain settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. I have written this Minute, and Zebehr’s story may be heard. I only wish that after he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish this inquiry to be official, and in such a way that, whatever may be the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence.

“With respect to the slave-trade, I think nothing of it, for there will always be slave-trade as long as Turkey and Egypt buy the slaves, and it may be Zebehr will or might in his interest stop it in some manner. I will therefore sum up my opinion, viz. that I would willingly take the responsibility of taking Zebehr up with me if, after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar Pasha, they tell ‘the mystic feeling’ I could trust him, and which ‘mystic feeling’ I felt I had for him to-night when I met him at Cherif Pasha’s house. Zebehr would have nothing to gain in hunting me, and I would have no fear. In this affair my desire, I own, would be to take Zebehr. I cannot exactly say why I feel towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going would settle the Soudan affair to the benefit of H.M.’s Government, and I would bear the responsibility of recommending it.

“C. G. GORDON, Major-General.”

An interview between Gordon and Zebehr was therefore arranged for 26th January, the day after this memorandum was written. On 25th it should also be remembered that the Khedive had again made Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan. Besides the two principals, there were present at this interview Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Gerald Graham, Colonel Watson, and Nubar Pasha. Zebehr protested his innocence of the charges made against him; and when Gordon reminded him of his letter, signed with his hand and bearing his seal, found in the divan of his son Suleiman, he called upon Gordon to produce this letter, which, of course, he could not do, because it was sent with the other incriminating documents to the Khedive in 1879. The passage in that letter establishing the guilt of Zebehr may, however, be cited, it being first explained that Idris Ebter was Gordon’s governor of the Bahr Gazelle province, and that Suleiman did carry out his father’s instructions to attack him.

“Now since this same Idris Ebter has not appreciated our kindness towards him, nor shown regard for his duty towards God, therefore do you accomplish his ejection by compulsory force, threats, and menaces, without personal hurt, but with absolute expulsion and deprivation from the Bahr-el-Gazelle, leaving no remnant of him in that region, no son, and no relation. For he is a mischief-maker, and God loveth not them who make mischief.”

It is highly probable, from the air of confidence with which Zebehr called for the production of the letter, that, either during the Arabi rising or in some other way, he had recovered possession of the original; but Gordon had had all the documents copied in 1879, and bound in the little volume mentioned in the preceding Memorandum, as well as in several of his letters, and the evidence as to Zebehr’s complicity and guilt seems quite conclusive.

In his Memorandum Gordon makes two conditions: first, “if Zebehr bears no malice personally against me, I will take him to the Soudan at once,” and this condition is given further force later on in reference to “the mystic feeling.” The second condition was that Zebehr was only to be sent if the Government desired a settled state of affairs after the evacuation. From the beginning of the interview it was clear to those present that no good would come of it, as Zebehr could scarcely control his feelings, and showed what they deemed a personal resentment towards Gordon that at any moment might have found expression in acts. After a brief discussion it was decided to adjourn the meeting, on the pretence of having search made for the incriminating document, but really to avert a worse scene. General Graham, in the after-discussion on Gordon’s renewed desire to take Zebehr with him, declared that it would be dangerous to acquiesce; and Colonel Watson plainly stated that it would mean the death of one or both of them. Gordon, indifferent to all considerations of personal danger, did not take the same view of Zebehr’s attitude towards him personally, and would still have taken him with him, if only on the ground that he would be less dangerous in the Soudan than at Cairo; but the authorities would not acquiesce in a proposition that they considered would inevitably entail the murder of Gordon at an early stage of the journey. They cannot, from any point of view, be greatly blamed in this matter; and when Gordon complains later on, as he frequently did complain, about the matter, the decision must be with his friends at Cairo, for they strictly conformed with the first condition specified in his own Memorandum. At the same time, he was perfectly correct in his views as to Zebehr’s power and capacity for mischief, and it was certainly very unfortunate and wrong that his earlier suggestion of removing him to Cyprus or some other place of safety was not adopted.

The following new correspondence will at least suggest a doubt whether Gordon was not more correct in his view of Zebehr’s attitude towards himself than his friends. What they deemed strong resentment and a bitter personal feeling towards Gordon on the part of Zebehr, he considered merely the passing excitement from discussing a matter of great moment and interest. He would still have taken Zebehr with him, and for many weeks after his arrival at Khartoum he expected that, in reply to his frequently reiterated messages, “Send me Zebehr,” the ex-Dictator of the Soudan would be sent up from Cairo. In one of the last letters to his sister, dated Khartoum, 5th March 1884, he wrote: “I hope much from Zebehr’s coming up, for he is so well known to all up here.” I come now to the correspondence referred to.

Some time after communications were broken off with Khartoum, Miss Gordon wrote to Zebehr, begging him to use his influence with the Mahdi to get letters for his family to and from General Gordon. To that Zebehr replied as follows:

“TO HER EXCELLENCY MISS GORDON, I am very grateful to you for having had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th, and am very sorry to say that I am not able to write to the Mahdi, because he is new, and has appeared lately in the Soudan. I do not know him. He is not of my tribe nor of my relations, nor of the tribes with which I was on friendly terms; and for these reasons I do not see the way in which I could carry out your wish. I am ready to serve you in all that is possible all my life through, but please accept my excuse in this matter.

“Please accept my best respects.

ZEBEHR RAHAMAH, Pasha.

“CAIRO, 22nd January 1885.”

Some time after the fall of Khartoum, Miss Gordon made a further communication to Zebehr, but, owing to his having been exiled to Gibraltar, it was not until October 1887 that she received the following reply, which is certainly curious; and I believe that this letter and personal conversations with Zebehr induced one of the officers present at the interview on 26th January 1884 to change his original opinion, and to conclude that it would have been safe for General Gordon to have taken Zebehr with him:

“CAIRO [received by Miss Gordon
about 12th October 1887].

“HONOURABLE LADY, I most respectfully beg to acknowledge the
receipt of your letter, enclosed to that addressed to me by His
Excellency Watson Pasha.

“This letter has caused me a great satisfaction, as it speaks of the friendly relations that existed between me and the late Gordon Pasha, your brother, whom you have replaced in my heart, and this has been ascertained to me by your inquiring about me and your congratulating me for my return to Cairo” [that is, after his banishment to Gibraltar].

“I consider that your poor brother is still alive in you, and for
the whole run of my life I put myself at your disposal, and beg
that you will count upon me as a true and faithful friend to you.

“You will also kindly pay my respects to the whole family of
Gordon Pasha, and may you not deprive me of your good news at any
time.

“My children and all my family join themselves to me, and pay you
their best respects.

“Further, I beg to inform you that the messenger who had been previously sent through me, carrying Government correspondence to your brother, Gordon Pasha, has reached him, and remitted the letter he had in his own hands, and without the interference of any other person. The details of his history are mentioned in the enclosed report, which I hope you will kindly read. Believe me, honourable Lady, to remain yours most faithfully,

ZEBEHR RAHAMAH.”

REPORT ENCLOSED.

“When I came to Cairo and resided in it as I was before, I kept myself aside of all political questions connected with the Soudan or others, according to the orders given me by the Government to that effect. But as a great rumour was spread over by the high Government officials who arrived from the Soudan, and were with H.E. General Gordon Pasha at Khartoum before and after it fell, that all my properties in that country had been looted, and my relations ill-treated, I have been bound, by a hearty feeling of compassion, to ask the above said officials what they knew about it, and whether the messenger sent by me with the despatches addressed by the Government to General Gordon Pasha had reached Khartoum and remitted what he had.

“These officials informed me verbally that on the 25th Ramadan 1301 (March 1884), at the time they were sitting at Khartoum with General Gordon, my messenger, named Fadhalla Kabileblos, arrived there, and remitted to the General in his proper hands, and without the interference of anyone, all the despatches he had on him. After that the General expressed his greatest content for the receipt of the correspondence, and immediately gave orders to the artillery to fire twenty-five guns, in sign of rejoicing, and in order to show to the enemy his satisfaction for the news of the arrival of British troops. General Gordon then treated my messenger cordially, and requested the Government to pay him a sum of L500 on his return to Cairo, as a gratuity for all the dangers he had run in accomplishing his faithful mission. Besides that, the General gave him, when he embarked with Colonel Stewart, L13 to meet his expenses on the journey. A few days after the arrival of my messenger at Khartoum, H.E. General Gordon thought it proper to appoint Colonel Stewart for coming to Cairo on board a man-of-war with a secret mission, and several letters, written by the General in English and Arabic, were put in two envelopes, one addressed to the British and the other to the Egyptian Government, and were handed over to my messenger, with the order to return to Cairo with Colonel Stewart on board a special steamer.

“But when Khartoum fell, and the rebels got into it, making all the inhabitants prisoners, the Government officials above referred to were informed that my messenger had been arrested, and all the correspondence that he had on him, addressed by General Gordon to the Government, was seized; for when the steamer on board of which they were arrived at Abou Kamar she went on rocks, and having been broken, the rebels made a massacre of all those who were on board; and as, on seeing the letters carried by my messenger, they found amongst them a private letter addressed to me by H.E. Gordon Pasha, expressing his thanks for my faithfulness to him, the rebels declared me an infidel, and decided to seize all my goods and properties, comprising them in their Beit-el-Mal (that is, Treasury) as it happened in fact.

“Moreover, the members of my family who were in the Soudan were
treated most despotically, and their existence was rendered most
difficult.

“Such a state of things being incompatible with the suspicion thrown upon me as regards my faithfulness to the Government, I have requested the high Government officials referred to above to give me an official certificate to that effect, which they all gave; and the enclosed copies will make known to those who take the trouble to read them that I have been honest and faithful in all what has been entrusted to me. This is the summary of the information I have obtained from persons I have reason to believe.”

Some further evidence of Zebehrs feelings is given in the following letter from him to Sir Henry Gordon, dated in October 1884:

“Your favour of 3rd September has been duly received, for which I
thank you. I herewith enclose my photograph, and hope that you
will kindly send me yours.

“The letter that you wished me to send H.E. General Gordon was sent on the 18th August last, registered. I hope that you will excuse me in delaying to reply, for when your letter arrived I was absent, and when I returned I was very sorry that they had not forwarded the letter to me; otherwise I should have replied at once.

“I had closed this letter with the photograph when I received fresh news, to the effect that the messengers we sent to H.E. Gordon Pasha were on their way back. I therefore kept back the letter and photograph till they arrived, and I should see what tidings they brought.... You have told me that Lord Northbrook knows what has passed between us. I endeavoured and devised to see His Excellency, but I did not succeed, as he was very busy. I presented a petition to him that he should help to recover the property of which I was robbed unjustly, and which H.E. your brother ordered to be restored, and at the same time to right me for the oppression I had suffered. I have had no answer up to this present moment.

“Hoping that H.E. Gordon Pasha will return in safety, accept my
best regards, dear Sir, and present my compliments to your
sister.

“ZEBEHR.
“28th Oc.”

To sum up on this important matter. There never was any doubt that the authorities in the Delta took on themselves a grave responsibility when they remained deaf to all Gordon’s requests for the co-operation of Zebehr. They would justify themselves by saying that they had a tender regard for Gordon’s own safety. At least this was the only point on which they showed it, and they would not like to be deprived of the small credit attached to it; but the evidence I have now adduced renders even this plea of doubtful force. As to the value of Zebehr’s co-operation, if Gordon could have obtained it there cannot be two opinions. Gordon did not exaggerate in the least degree when he said that on the approach of Zebehr the star of the Mahdi would at once begin to wane, or, in other words, that he looked to Zebehr’s ability and influence as the sure way to make his own mission a success.

On the very night of his interview with Zebehr, and within forty-eight hours of his arrival in Cairo, General Gordon and his English companion, with four Egyptian officers, left by train for Assiout, en route to Khartoum.