THE FISHERIES DISPUTE
Our glance at the Treaty of Washington
introduces us to an international complication which
has been transmitted from the very birthday of the
nation, and is, alas, still unsettled, spite of the
earnest efforts to this end made since 1885.
Article 3 of the treaty of 1783 was as follows:
“It is agreed that the people of the United States
shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take
fish of every kind on the Grand Bank and on all the
other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulf of St.
Lawrence and at all other places in the sea where the
inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore
to fish; and also that the inhabitants of the United
States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind
on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British
fishermen shall use [but not to dry or cure the same
on that island]; and also on the coasts, bays, and
creeks of all other of his Britannic Majesty’s
dominions in America, and that the American fishermen
shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of
the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of Nova Scotia,
Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as the same
shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same, or
either of them, shall be settled, it shall not be
lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish
at such settlement without a previous agreement for
that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or
possessors of the ground.”
This provision conveyed to fishermen
from the United States two valuable privileges-that
of fishing in British waters, namely, within three
miles of the British coast, and that of drying and
curing fish, wherever caught, upon certain convenient
parts of the British coast. They had, of course,
like the men of all nations, apart from any treaty
stipulation, the right to fish outside the three mile
limit, but this would avail them nothing, under the
then mode of conducting the industry, unless they
could freely make harbor in case of storm, and also
land to cure their catch before lading it for the homeward
cruise. What worth these rights had will be clear
if we remember that fishing had always been one of
New England’s foremost trades, and that the
waters off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia had from, and
probably before, Columbus’s time been known
as the richest fishing grounds of the globe.
The commissioners at Ghent, who drew
up the treaty ending the War of 1812, wrangled long
over the question whether or not the war had nullified
the just cited Article 3 of 1783. Unable to agree,
they signed their treaty without deciding the question,
leaving this for the future to settle as it might.
Great Britain held that our former rights had lapsed
by the war, and excluded our fishing vessels from the
bays, harbors, and creeks named above. Several
of our vessels were arrested on charge of trespass.
The utmost tension still existed, in spite of the
peace, especially as in the United States the view
prevailed that our rights by the old treaty had outlived
the war, notwithstanding the silence of the Ghent
document.
At length, in 1818, a new treaty was
entered into upon the question, signed October 20th,
ratified by England November 2d, and by the United
States January 28, 1819. This instrument ignored
our contention that Article 3 of the treaty of 1783
was of perpetual obligation, and restricted our right
to fish in shore to the southern shores of the Magdalen
Islands, the west and southwest coasts of Newfoundland
from the Rameau Islands round to Quirpon Island, and
the Labrador coast from Mount Joly northward.
Only here could our fishermen fish within the three
mile limit, and they could dry and cure only on the
named parts of Labrador and Newfoundland, Magdalen
Islands being now excluded from this use. Even
on Labrador and Newfoundland the privilege of drying
and curing was to be cut off by settlement, except
as agreement should be made beforehand with the inhabitants.
But the fateful clause of this treaty
was the following: “And the United States
hereby renounce forever any liberty heretofore enjoyed
or claimed by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry,
or cure fish on or within three marine miles of any
of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of his Britannic
Majesty’s dominions in America not included within
the above-mentioned limits: Provided, however,
that the American fishermen shall be admitted to enter
such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter and
of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and
of obtaining water, and for no other purposes whatever.
But they shall be under such restrictions as may be
necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing
fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing
the privileges hereby reserved to them.”
[1854-1870]
Troubles were soon as abundant as
ever. The Canadians applied the word “bay”
to all indentations of their coast, affecting entirely
to exclude our fishermen from great bodies of water
like Fundy, Chaleurs, and Miramichi, however
far parts of these might be from shore. This was
the famous “headland theory” for defining
national waters. They also denied our right to
navigate the Gut of Canso, which separates Cape Breton
Island from Nova Scotia, thus forcing far out of their
nearest course our ships bound for the permitted inshore
fisheries. United States fishermen on their part
persisted in exploiting the great bays, landed upon
the Magdalen Islands, pushed through the Gut, and were
none too careful at any point to find or heed the
three mile line.
June 5, 1854, was signed a treaty
of reciprocity between the United States and the British
provinces, under which all the coasts of British North
America were opened to our fishing vessels, in return
for similar liberty to those of the provinces in all
United States waters north of Cape May, latitude 36
degrees, the salmon and shad fisheries of each country
being, however, reserved to itself. This arrangement
was to continue ten years at least, and then to be
terminable on a year’s notice by either of the
high contracting parties. Such notice having
been given by the United States one year before, reciprocity
in fishing privilege came to an end March 7, 1865.
This, of course, renewed the wry and perplexing rules
of the 1818 convention, with all the naturally consequent
strife. The worst evils were, indeed, put off
for a time, by a continuance to our vessels of the
right to fish in provincial water on the payment of
a small license fee. This favor was taken away
in 1870, for the alleged reason that American captains
failed to procure licenses, and in the course of this
year many of our ships were seized and confiscated.
New sternness had been imparted to the provincial
policy by the Canadian Act of Confederation, valid
from July I, 1867, which joined Ontario and Quebec
with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, thus inspiring
our neighbors to the north with a new sense of their
strength and importance.
[1871-1886]
Now came the Treaty of Washington,
1871. Its Article 18 revived Article 1 of the
1854 Reciprocity Treaty, except that Canadians could
now go so far south as the 39th parallel, and that
two years’ notice must precede abrogation.
Article 21 ordained between the two countries free
trade in fish-oil and in all salt-water fish.
Both sides assumed that mere reciprocity would advantage
the United States the more, so that by Article 22
a commission was provided for to award Canada a proper
balance in money. By bungling diplomacy on our
part the real power in this commission was swayed
by M. Maurice Delfosse, Belgian minister at Washington,
a gentleman certain to favor Great Britain at our expense.
As a consequence, we were forced to pay for reciprocity
to the round note of $5,500,000. The money was
a trifle; but its exorbitant amount had the unhappy
effect of prejudicing our people against the new arrangement.
The result was that at the earliest possible moment,
viz., July 1, 1883, our Government gave the notice
necessary for its abrogation. This followed on
July 1, 1885, in the very midst of the fishing season.
A temporary diplomatic arrangement was effected, which
continued to our fishermen for the remainder of 1885
the advantages of the recent treaty; but with the
dawn of the new year, 1886, the old convention of
1818 came once more into operation.
So soon as the fishing season was
opened the plan of the British Government was evident.
It was to deny the fishing vessels all facilities
not guaranteed by the treaty of 1818-that
is, fishing vessels of the United States would be
permitted to enter Canadian ports for shelter, repairs,
wood, and water, and “for no other purposes
whatever;” also to compel all such vessels strictly
to conform to both customs and port laws. Circular
letters of instruction, enjoining vigilance, were
sent to all customs officers, and swift cruisers fitted
out to look sharply after all fishing vessels from
the States. On the other hand our fishermen
were not, as a whole, disposed to conform to the existing
regulations. The Treaty of Washington had been
abrogated at their request, and now many, probably
most, of them were inclined to exercise all the liberty
possible in the Canadian waters. Least of all
were they willing to submit to the British interpretation
of the treaty of 1818.
Complaints early reached Washington
that the headland theory was being applied by the
provincial customs officials to exclude our vessels
from legitimate fishing places; but the Canadian Government
denied that any such thing had been done by its authority,
and evidently did not incline to push its old contention
on this point. While the fishing schooner Marion
Grimes, of Gloucester, Mass., was under detention at
Shelburne, Nova Scotia, for an infraction of the customs
rules, her captain having hoisted the United States
flag, this was pulled down by order of the Canadian
officer in temporary charge of her. The flag was
again hoisted and again forcibly lowered. This
act awakened great resentment in the United States,
until it, too, was disavowed by the Governor-General
in Council. The Sarah H. Prior lost at sea a
valuable net, which a Canadian schooner picked up
and wished to return. This was forbidden, and
being permitted to purchase no other seine, the ship
came home with a broken voyage and in debt. Captain
Tupper, of the Jeannie Seaverns, having entered the
harbor of Liverpool, Nova Scotia, for shelter, was
denied permission to go and see his relatives near
by or to receive them aboard his vessel. The
water-tank of the schooner Mollie Adams having burst,
her captain sought to buy two or three barrels to hold
water for his crew on their homeward voyage of five
hundred miles. His request was refused.
The same Mollie Adams found a Nova
Scotia vessel in distress and rescued her crew.
Captain Jacobs, of the Mollie, cared for the men several
days, and finally, as no assistance of any sort was
proffered by the Canadians, sent them home at his
own expense. His aid to them delayed his homeward
journey, and he was also caught in a harbor from which
his vessel could pass only during very high water,
which caused further delay. Owing to these incidents
his supply of provisions ran low, yet he was denied
permission to purchase anything, and as a result his
homeward tour was made on half rations or less.
Many other aggravating circumstances were connected
with this case.
In quite a number of instances American
masters were refused water, the only excuse being
that they had not conformed to all the port or customs
regulations. There can be no doubt that many fishing
captains were quite too lax in this, presuming on
the power of their nation and remembering the liberties
enjoyed under reciprocity, while too forgetful of the
stern letter of the treaty which the Canadians were
executing against them. It was plain on the other
hand that however wrongly Canadian subalterns may
at times have acted, both the Canadian and the British
Government intended to keep within the letter of the
law, while forcing us to fish off their coasts at
as great a disadvantage as possible.
The real source of the difficulty
was well characterized by Mr. Phelps, our Minister
to England. “It is to be found in the irritation
that has taken place among a portion of the Canadian
people on account of the termination by the United
States Government of the treaty of Washington on the
1st of July, 1885, whereby fish imported from Canada
into the United States, which so long as that treaty
remained in force was admitted free, is now liable
to the import duty provided by the general revenue
laws; and the opinion appears to have gained ground
in Canada that the United States may be driven, by
harassing and annoying their fishermen, into the adoption
of a new treaty, by which Canadian fish shall be admitted
free.”
In their efforts to carry out such
a policy the treaty gave the Canadians a very great
advantage. As Mr. Secretary Bayard insisted, it
certainly trangressed usual international comity when
our ships were refused needed pilots, or our hungry
crews were forbidden to purchase food in Canadian
ports; but our President and Senate had, in 1818,
agreed that such cruelty should be legal. To ask
for comity in the matter was to ask for the voidance
of the treaty.
As little could we, agreeably to the
treaty, presume, by use of home permits to “touch
and trade,” to turn a fishing vessel at will
into a merchant vessel, as was often tried in order
to evade the offensive restrictions, or demand the
liberty of freighting fish home overland in bond.
It would equally have amounted to a quashing of the
treaty, had the British and Canadians interpreted
it by the easy canon of Mr. Phelps: “The
question is not what is the technical effect of the
words, but what is the construction most consonant
to the dignity, the just interests, and the friendly
relations of the sovereign powers.”
Interesting but also untenable was
our Government’s plea for freedom to purchase
bait for deep-sea fishing. Of old, mackerel had
been caught almost solely with hooks, by the “chumming”
process. In 1850 the purse seine was introduced.
Soon after 1870 its use became general, and entirely
revolutionized the business of taking mackerel.
Huge quantities of the fish could now be captured
far out in the open sea, making fishing much more
profitable near home, and greatly lessening the value
to us of Canada’s fishing-grounds. From
these premises Mr. Bayard argued that the true intent
of the 1818 agreement, which was to protect inshore
fishing territory, would not be violated should we
be allowed to buy bait in Canada. It was replied
that the old treaty was meant to prevent our fishermen
from making Canadian harbors in any way a base of
operations.
“It was framed with the object
of affording a complete and exclusive definition of
the rights and liberties which the fishermen of the
United States were thenceforward to enjoy in following
their vocation, so far as those rights could be affected
by facilities for access to the shores or waters of
the British Provinces, or for intercourse with their
people. It is therefore no undue expansion of
the scope of that convention to interpret strictly
those of its provisions by which such access is denied,
except to vessels requiring it for the purposes specifically
described. Such an undue expansion would, upon
the other hand, certainly take place if, under cover
of its provisions, or of any agreements relating to
general commercial intercourse which may have since
been made, permission were accorded to United States
fishermen to resort habitually to the harbors of the
Dominion, not for the sake of seeking safety for their
vessels or of avoiding risk to human life, but in
order to use those harbors as a general base of operations
from which to prosecute and organize with greater
advantage to themselves the industry in which they
are engaged.
“Mr. Bayard suggests that the
possession by a fishing vessel of a permit to ‘touch
and trade,’ should give her a right to enter
Canadian ports for other than the purposes named in
the treaty, or, in other words, should give her perfect
immunity from its provisions. This would amount
to a practical repeal of the treaty, because it would
enable a United States collector of customs, by issuing
a license, originally only intended for purposes of
domestic customs regulation, to give exemption from
the treaty to every United States fishing vessel.
The observation that similar vessels under the British
flag have the right to enter the ports of the United
States for the purchase of supplies loses its force
when it is remembered that the convention of 1818 contained
no restriction on British vessels, and no renunciation
of any privileges in regard to them.”
For some weeks in the spring and summer
of 1886, the fishery dispute greatly excited our country.
Even threats of war with Canada were uttered in case
its government should not recede from its aggravating
position, and careful estimates made of the force we
could throw across our northern border in three days.
In May, 1886, Congress placed in the President’s
hands power to suspend commercial intercourse between
the two countries. Later in the year a bill was
introduced in the House cutting off all commercial
relations with Canada by land or water. The Senate
advanced a more moderate proposition, to limit the
proposed arrest of traffic to water commerce and to
Canadian vessels, also to leave its enforcement optional
with the President. This became law on March
3, 1887. Under this legislation the President,
on being assured that fishing masters or crews were
treated in Canadian ports any less favorably than
masters or crews of trading vessels from the most favored
nations, could, “in his discretion, by proclamation
to that effect, deny vessels, their masters and crews,
of the British dominions of North America, any entrance
into the waters, ports, or places of or within the
United States.”
The President, however, did not think
best at once to use this fearful power, likely enough
to lead to war. He preferred to make another
attempt at a peaceful settlement, through a new treaty.
This had constantly been the wish of the British Government.
Accordingly, later in the year 1887, a joint commission,
consisting of Secretary Bayard, President Angell,
of Michigan University, Hon. William L. Putnam, of
Maine, on the part of the United States, and of Rt.
Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Charles Tupper, of Canada,
and Sir Lionel West, the British minister, on the
part of Great Britain, met at Washington. The
commission toiled nearly all winter, and passed to
the President the result of its deliberations on February
16, 1888.
The treaty which it drafted was necessarily
a compromise. Canada thought the British commissioners
had yielded too much; many in the United States believed
our commissioners to have done the same. The document,
approved by the President, went to the Senate, where,
after long debate, it was refused ratification, August
21st.
The commission had agreed upon a modus
vivendi, to hold good, unless revoked by the
Governor-General and Council of Canada, till February,
1890, under which our fishermen might obtain in Canadian
ports, on payment of a license, the privileges of
merchantmen. Many such licenses were taken out
during the season of 1888, showing the advantages which
they conveyed. Most of the fishing-masters, however,
did not seek licenses and were averse to the new treaty,
preferring the terms of 1818 to granting their rivals
any further rights in our markets. Fresh fish,
including frozen and slack-salted, was already free
in our ports, competing sharply with our own catch.
No one longer cared to fish inside, or, except in
emergencies, to provision at Canadian towns.
Convenient as would be the power to obtain bait near
the fishing-grounds and to trans-ship fish home
in bond, neither was indispensable. Cod are still
caught with trawls and baited hooks. The best
bait is squid, whose abundance upon the Banks is what
causes the cod so to frequent them. The squid
can be had freshest as well as cheapest from the peasantry
of the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia coasts; but clams
carried from home were found to do nearly as well.
They would remain fresh better than squid, but got
off the hooks more easily. Accordingly, few collisions
occurred in 1888, and as the season of that year closed
there was prospect that, even without a new convention,
no necessity for American retaliation would arise.
This chapter shall close with a word
touching the Alaska fisheries question, which, fortunately,
had advanced a good step. In 1870 the United
States leased the Pribylov, or Seal Islands off Alaska,
to the Alaska Commercial Co. Pressed by this
company, which naturally wished the completest possible
monopoly of seal-fishing, our Government foolishly
affected to treat the entire Behring Sea as a mare
clausum, belonging to the United States.
Several British craft engaged in taking seals were
seized by United States vessels considerably more than
three miles from land. Great Britain of course
protesting, a treaty, ratified in March, 1892, submitted
to arbitration the question between the two governments.
Seven arbitrators sat, two from the United States,
Justice Harlan and Senator Morgan, and one each from
Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, France, and Italy.
This Board decided against the American contention,
denying the right of the United States to assume the
protection of seals or any property in them outside
the ordinary three-mile limit. Happy provisions
were, however, made for a joint police of Behring
Sea by the two nations, for an open and a closed fishing
season, and for the careful licensing of sealing vessels.