The general tendency of recent scientific
literature dealing with the problem of organic evolution
may fairly be characterized as distinctly and prevailingly
unfavorable to the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection.
In the series of chapters herewith offered for the
first time to English readers, Dr. Dennert has brought
together testimonies which leave no room for doubt
about the decadence of the Darwinian theory in the
highest scientific circles in Germany. And outside
of Germany the same sentiment is shared generally
by the leaders of scientific thought. That the
popularizers of evolutionary conceptions have any
anti-Darwinian tendencies cannot, of course, be for
a moment maintained. For who would undertake
to popularize what is not novel or striking?
But a study of the best scientific literature reveals
the fact that the attitude assumed by one of our foremost
American zoologists, Professor Thomas Hunt Morgan,
in his recent work on “Evolution and Adaptation,”
is far more general among the leading men of science
than is popularly supposed. Professor Morgan’s
position may be stated thus: He adheres to the
general theory of Descent, i.e., he believes
the simplest explanation which has yet been offered
of the structural similarities between species
within the same group, is the hypothesis of a common
descent from a parent species. But he emphatically
rejects the notion and this is the quintessence
of Darwinism that the dissimilarities
between species have been brought about by the purely
mechanical agency of natural selection.
To find out what, precisely, Darwin
meant by the term “natural selection”
let us turn for a moment, to his great work, The
Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection.
In the second chapter of that work, Darwin observes
that small “fortuitous” variations in
individual organisms, though of small interest to the
systematist, are of the “highest importance”
for his theory, since these minute variations often
confer on the possessor of them, some advantage over
his fellows in the quest for the necessaries of life.
Thus these chance individual variations become the
“first steps” towards slight varieties,
which, in turn, lead to sub-species, and, finally,
to species. Varieties, in fact, are “incipient
species.” Hence, small “fortuitous”
fluctuating, individual variations i.e.,
those which chance to occur without predetermined
direction are the “first-steps”
in the origin of species. This is the first element
in the Darwinian theory.
In the third chapter of the same work
we read: “It has been seen in the last
chapter that amongst organic beings in a state of nature
there is some individual variability. But the
mere existence of individual variability and of some
few well-marked varieties, though necessary as a foundation
of the work, helps us but little in understanding
how species arise in nature. How have all those
exquisite adaptations of one part of the organization
to another part, and to the conditions of life, and
of one organic being to another being, been perfected?
” Again it may be asked, how is it that
varieties, which I have called incipient species,
become ultimately converted into good and distinct
species, which in most cases obviously differ from
each other far more than do the varieties of the same
species? How do those groups of species which
constitute what are called distinct genera arise?
All of these results follow from the _struggle for
life_. Owing to this struggle, variations, however
slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if they
be in any degree profitable to the individuals of a
species, in their infinitely complex relations to other
organic beings, and to their physical conditions of
life, will tend to the preservation of such individuals
and will generally be inherited by the offspring.
The offspring also will thus have a better chance of
surviving, for of the many individuals of any species
which are periodically born, but a small number can
survive. I have called this principle by which
each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by
the term, “natural selection.” Mr.
Darwin adds that his meaning would be more accurately
expressed by a phrase of Mr. Spencer’s coinage,
“Survival of the Fittest.”
It may be observed that neither “natural
selection” nor “survival of the fittest”
gives very accurate expression to the idea which Darwin
seems to wish to convey. Natural selection is
at best a metaphorical description of a process, and
“survival of the fittest” describes the
result of that process. Nor shall we find the
moving principle of evolution in individual variability
unless we choose to regard chance as an efficient
agency. Consequently, the only efficient principle
conceivably connected with the process is the “struggle
for existence;” and even this has only a purely
negative function in the origination of species or
of adaptations. For, the “surviving fittest”
owe nothing more to the struggle for existence than
our pensioned veterans owe to the death-dealing bullets
which did not hit them. Mr. Darwin has,
however, obviated all difficulty regarding precision
of terms by the remark that he intended to use his
most important term, “struggle for existence”
in “a large and metaphorical sense.”
We have now seen the second element
of Darwinism, namely, the “struggle for life.”
The theory of natural selection, then, postulates the
accumulation of minute “fortuitions” individual
modifications, which are useful to the possessor of
them, by means of a struggle for life of such a sanguinary
nature and of such enormous proportions as to result
in the destruction of the overwhelming majority of
adult individuals. These are the correlative
factors in the process of natural selection.
In view of the popular identification
of Darwinism with the doctrine of evolution, on the
one hand, and with the theory of struggle for life,
on the other hand, it is necessary to insist on the
Darwinian conception of small, fluctuating, useful
variations as the “first-steps” in the
evolutionary process. For, this conception distinguishes
Darwinism from the more recent evolutionary theory,
e.g., of De Vries who rejects the notion that
species have originated by the accumulation of fluctuating
variations; and it is quite as essential to the Darwinian
theory of natural selection as is the “struggle
for life.” It is, in fact, an integral
element in the selection theory.
The attitude of science towards Darwinism
may, therefore, be conveniently summarized in its
answer to the following questions:
1. Is there any evidence that
such a struggle for life among mature forms, as Darwin
postulates, actually occurs?
2. Can the origin of adaptive
structures be explained on the ground of their utility
in this struggle, i.e., is it certain or even
probable that the organism would have perished, had
it lacked the particular adaptation in its present
degree of perfection? On the contrary, is there
not convincing proof that many, and presumably most,
adaptations cannot be thus accounted for?
The above questions are concerned
with “the struggle for life.” Those
which follow have to do with the problem of variations.
3. Is there any reason to believe
that new species may originate by the accumulation
of fluctuating individual variations?
4. Does the evidence of the geological
record which, as Huxley observed, is the
only direct evidence that can be had in the question
of evolution does this evidence tell for
or against the origin of existing species from earlier
ones by means of minute gradual modifications?
We must be content here with the briefest
outline of the reply of science to these inquiries.
1. Darwin invites his readers
to “keep steadily in mind that each organic
being is striving to increase in geometrical ratio.”
If this tendency were to continue unchecked, the progeny
of living beings would soon be unable to find standing
room. Indeed, the very bacteria would quickly
convert every vestige of organic matter on earth into
their own substance. For has not Cohn estimated
that the offspring of a single bacterium, at its ordinary
rate of increase under favorable conditions, would
in three days amount to 4,772 billions of individuals
with an aggregate weight of seven thousand five hundred
tons? And the 19,000,000 elephants which, according
to Darwin, should to-day perpetuate the lives of each
pair that mated in the twelfth century surely
these would be a “magna pars” in the sanguinary
contest. When the imagination views these and
similar figures, and places in contrast to this multitude
of living beings, the limited supply of nourishment,
the comparison of nature with a huge slaughterhouse
seems tame enough. But reason, not imagination,
as Darwin observes more than once, should be our guide
in a scientific inquiry.
It is observed on careful reflection
that Darwin’s theory is endangered by an extremely
large disturbing element, viz., accidental destruction.
Under this term we include all the destruction of life
which occurs in utter indifference to the presence
or absence of any individual variations from the parent
form. Indeed, the greatest destruction takes
place among immature forms before any variation from
the parent stock is discernible at all. In this
connection we may instance the vast amount of eggs
and seeds destroyed annually irrespective of any adaptive
advantage that would be possessed by the matured form.
And the countless forms in every stage of individual
development which meet destruction through “accidental
causes which would not be in the least degree mitigated
by certain changes of structure or of constitution
which would otherwise be beneficial to the species.”
This difficulty, Darwin himself recognized. But
he was of opinion that if even “one-hundredth
or one-thousandth part” of organic beings escaped
this fortuitous destruction, there would supervene
among the survivors a struggle for life sufficiently
destructive to satisfy his theory. This suggestion,
however, fails to meet the difficulty. For, as
Professor Morgan points out, Darwin assumes “that
a second competition takes place after the first destruction
of individuals has occurred, and this presupposes
that more individuals reach maturity than there is
room for in the economy of nature.” It
presupposes that the vast majority of forms that survive
accidental destruction, succumb in the second struggle
for life in which the determining factor is some slight
individual variation, e.g., a little longer neck
in the case of the giraffe, or a wing shorter than
usual in the case of an insect on an island.
The whole theory of struggle, as formulated by Darwin,
is, therefore, a violent assumption. Men of science
now recognize that “egoism and struggle play
a very subordinate part in organic development, in
comparison with co-operation and social action.”
What, indeed, but a surrender of the paramountcy of
struggle for life, is Huxley’s celebrated Romanes
lecture in which he supplants the cosmic process by
the ethical? The French free-thinker, Charles
Robin, gave expression to the verdict of exact science
when he declared: “Darwinism is a fiction,
a poetical accumulation of probabilities without proof,
and of attractive explanations without demonstration.”
2. The hopeless inadequacy of
the struggle for life to account for adaptive structures
has been dealt with at considerable length by Professor
Morgan in the concluding chapters of the work already
mentioned. We cannot here follow him in his study
of the various kinds of adaptations, e.g., form
and symmetry, mutual adaptation of colonial forms,
protective coloration, organs of extreme perfection,
tropisms and instincts, etc., in regard to the
origin of each of which he is forced to abandon the
Darwinian theory. It will suffice to call attention
to his conclusions concerning the phenomena of regeneration
of organs. By his research in this special field
Professor Morgan has won international recognition
among men of science. It was while prosecuting
his studies in this field that he became impressed
with the utter bankruptcy of the theory of natural
selection which Darwinians put forward to explain
the acquisition by organisms of this most useful power
of regeneration. It is not difficult to show that
regeneration could not in many cases, and presumably
in none, have been acquired through natural selection. If an earth worm (allolobophora
foctida) be cut in two in the middle, the posterior
piece regenerates at its anterior cut end, not a head
but a tail. “Not by the widest stretch
of the imagination can such a result be accounted
for on the selection theory.” Quite the
reverse case presents itself in certain planarians.
If the head of planaria lugubris is cut off
just behind the eyes, there develops at the cut surface
of the head-piece another head turned in the opposite
direction. “These and other reasons,”
concludes Professor Morgan, “indicate
with certainty that regeneration cannot be explained
by the theory of natural selection.”
The ingenuity of the Darwinian imagination,
however, will hardly fail to assign some reason why
two heads are more useful than one in the above instance,
and thus reconcile the phenomenon with Darwinism.
For, according to Professor Morgan “to imagine
that a particular organ is useful to its possessor
and to account for its origin because of the imagined
benefit conferred, is the general procedure of the
followers of the Darwinian school.” “Personal
conviction, mere possibility,” writes Quatrefages,
“are offered as proofs, or at least as arguments
in favor of the theory.” “The realms
of fancy are boundless,” is Blanchard’s
significant comment on Darwin’s explanation of
the blindness of the mole. “On this class
of speculation,” says Bateson in his “Materials
for the Study of Variation,” referring to Darwinian
speculation as to the beneficial or detrimental nature
of variations, “on this class of speculation
the only limitations are those of the ingenuity of
the author.” The general form of Darwin’s
argument, declared the writer of a celebrated article
in the North British Review, is as follows: “All
these things may have been, therefore my theory is
possible; and since my theory is a possible one, all
those hypotheses which it requires are rendered probable.”
3. We pass now to the question
of the possibility of building up a new species by
the accumulation of chance individual variations.
That species ever originate in this way is denied
by the advocates of the evolutionary theory which
is now superseding Darwinism. Typical of the
new school is the botanist Hugo De Vries of Amsterdam.
The “first-steps” in the origin of new
species according to De Vries are not fluctuating
individual variations, but mutations, i.e., definite
and permanent modifications. According to the
mutation theory a new species arises from the parent
species, not gradually but suddenly. It appears
suddenly “without visible preparation and without
transitional steps.” The wide acceptance
with which this theory is meeting must be attributed
to the fact that men of science no longer believe in
the origin of species by the accumulation of slight
fluctuating modifications. To quote the words
of De Vries, “Fluctuating variation cannot overstep
the limits of the species, even after the most prolonged
selection still less can it lead to the
production of new, permanent characters.”
It has been the wont of Darwinians to base their speculations
on the assumption that “an inconceivably long
time” could effect almost anything in the matter
of specific transformations. But the evidence
which has been amassed during the past forty years
leaves no doubt that there is a limit to individual
variability which neither time nor skill avail to
remove. As M. Blanchard asserts in his work,
La vie des êtres animes, “All
investigation and observation make it clear that,
while the variability of creatures in a state of nature
displays itself in very different degrees, yet, in
its most astonishing manifestations, it remains confined
within a circle beyond which it cannot pass.”
It is interesting to observe how writers
of the Darwinian school attempt to explain the origin
of articulate language as a gradual development of
animal sounds. “It does not,” observes
Darwin, “appear altogether incredible that some
unusually wise ape-like animal should have thought
of imitating the growl of a beast of prey, so as to
indicate to his fellow monkeys the nature of the expected
danger. And this would have been a first step
in the formation of a language.” But what
a tremendous step! An ape-like animal that “thought”
of imitating a beast must certainly have been “unusually
wise.” In bridging the chasm which rational
speech interposes between man and the brute creation,
the Darwinian is forced to assume that the whole essential
modification is included in the first step. Then
he conceals the assumption by parcelling out the accidental
modification in a supposed series of transitional
stages. He endeavors to veil his inability to
explain the first step, as Chevalier Bunsen remarked,
by the easy but fruitless assumption of an infinite
space of time, destined to explain the gradual development
of animals into men; as if millions of years could
supply the want of an agent necessary for the first
movement, for the first step in the line of progress.
“How can speech, the expression of thought,
develop itself in a year or in millions of years, out
of unarticulated sounds which express feelings of
pleasure, pain, and appetite? The common-sense
of mankind will always shrink from such theories.”
4. The hopes and fears of Darwinians
have rightly been centered on the history of organic
development as outlined in the geological record.
It has been pointed out repeatedly by the foremost
men of science that if the theory of genetic descent
with the accumulation of small variations be the true
account of the origin of species, a complete record
of the ancestry of any existing species would reveal
no distinction of species and genera. Between
any two well-defined species, if one be derived from
the other, there must be countless transition forms.
But palaeontology fails to support the theory of evolution
by minute variations. Darwinism has been shattered
on the geologic rocks. “The complete absence
of intermediate forms,” says Mr. Carruthers,
“and the sudden and contemporaneous appearance
of highly organized and widely separated groups, deprive
the hypothesis of genetic evolution of any countenance
from the plant record of these ancient rocks.
The whole evidence is against evolution (i.e., by
minute modification) and there is none for it.”
(cf. History of Plant Life and its Bearing on Theory
of Evolution, 1898). Similar testimony regarding
the animal kingdom is borne by Mr. Mivart in the following
carefully worded statement: “The mass of
palaeontological evidence is indeed overwhelmingly
against minute and gradual modification.”
“The Darwinian theory,” declared Professor
Fleischmann of Erlangen, recently, “has not
a single fact to confirm it in the realm of nature.
It is not the result of scientific research, but purely
the product of the imagination.”
On one occasion Huxley expressed his
conviction that the pedigree of the horse as revealed
in the geological record furnished demonstrative evidence
for the theory of evolution. The question has
been entered into in detail by Professor Fleischmann
in his work, Die Descendenstheorie. In
this book the Erlangen professor makes great capital
out of the “trot-horse” (Paradepferd) of
Huxley and Haeckel; and as regards the evolutionary
theory, easily claims a verdict of “not proven.”
In this connection the moderate statement of Professor
Morgan is noteworthy: “When he (Fleischmann)
says there is no absolute proof that the common plan
of structure must be the result of blood relationship,
he is not bringing a fatal argument against the theory
of descent, for no one but an enthusiast sees anything
more in the explanation than a very probable theory
that appears to account for the facts. To demand
an absolute proof is to ask for more than any reasonable
advocate of the descent theory claims for it.”
(Professor Morgan, as we have already seen, rejects
Darwinism, and inclines to the mutation theory of
De Vries.) The vast majority of Darwinians must, therefore,
be classed as “enthusiasts” who are not
“reasonable advocates of the descent theory.”
For has not Professor Marsh told his readers that
“to doubt evolution is to doubt science?”
And similar assertions have been so frequently made
and reiterated by Darwinians that the claim that Darwinism
has become a dogma contains, as Professor Morgan notes,
more truth than the adherents of that school find
pleasant to hear.
More interesting, however, than Huxley’s
geological pedigree of the horse is Haeckel’s
geological pedigree of man. One who reads Haeckel’s
Natural History of Creation can hardly escape
the impression that the author had actually seen specimens
of each of the twenty-one ancestral forms of which
his pedigree of man is composed. Such, however,
was not the case. Quatrefages, speaking of this
wonderful genealogical tree which Haeckel has drawn
up with such scientific accuracy of description, observes:
“The first thing to remark is that not one of the creatures
exhibited in this pedigree has ever been seen, either living or in fossil. Their
existence is based entirely upon theory. “Man’s
pedigree as drawn up by Haeckel,” says the distinguished
savant, Du Bois-Reymond, “is worth about as
much as is that of Homer’s heroes for critical
historians.”
In constructing his genealogies Haeckel
has frequent recourse to his celebrated “Law
of Biogenesis.” The “Law of Biogenesis”
which is the dignified title Haeckel has given to
the discredited recapitulation theory, asserts that
the embryological development of the individual (ontogeny),
is a brief recapitulation, a summing up, of the stages
through which the species passed in the course of its
evolution in the geologic past, (phylogeny).
Ontogeny is a brief recapitulation of phylogeny.
This, says Haeckel, is what the “fundamental
Law of Biogenesis” teaches us. (The reader of
Haeckel and other Darwinians will frequently find
laws put forward to establish facts: whereas other
men of science prefer to have facts establish laws).
When, therefore, as Quatrefages remarks, the transition
between the types which Haeckel has incorporated into
his genealogical tree, appears too abrupt, he often
betakes himself to ontogeny and describes the embryo
in the corresponding interval of development.
This description he inserts in his genealogical mosaic,
by virtue of the “Law of Biogenesis.”
Many theories have been constructed
to explain the phenomena of embryological development.
Of these the simplest and least mystical is that of
His in the great classic work on embryology, “Unsere
Koerperform.” His tells us: “In
the entire series of forms which a developing organism
runs through, each form is the necessary antecedent
step of the following. If the embryo is to reach
the complicated end-form, it must pass, step by step,
through the simpler ones. Each step of the series
is the physiological consequence of the preceding
stage, and the necessary condition for the following.”
But whatever theory be accepted by men of science,
it is certainly not that proposed by Haeckel.
Carl Vogt after giving Haeckel’s statement of
the “Law of Biogenesis” wrote: “This
law which I long held as well-founded, is absolutely
and radically false.” Even Oskar Hertwig,
perhaps the best known of Haeckel’s former pupils,
finds it necessary to change Haeckel’s expression
of the biogenetic law so that “a contradiction
contained in it may be removed.” Professor
Morgan, finally, rejects Haeckel’s boasted “Law
of Biogenesis” as “in principle, false.”
And he furthermore seems to imply that Fleischmann
merits the reproach of men of science, for wasting
his time in confuting “the antiquated and generally
exaggerated views of writers like Haeckel.”
“Antiquated and generally exaggerated
views.” Such is the comment of science
on Haeckel’s boast that Darwin’s pre-eminent
service to science consisted in pointing out how purposive
adaptations may be produced by natural selection without
the direction of mind just as easily as they may be
produced by artificial selection and human design.
And yet the latest and least worthy production from
the pen of this Darwinian philosopher, The Riddle
of the Universe, is being scattered broad-cast
by the anti-Christian press, in the name and guise
of popular science. It is therein that
the evil consists. For the discerning reader
sees in the book itself, its own best refutation.
The pretensions of Haeckel’s “consistent
and monistic theory of the eternal cosmogenetic process”
are best met by pointing to the fact that its most
highly accredited and notorious representative has
given to the world in exposition and defense of pure
Darwinian philosophy, a work, which, for boldness
of assertion, meagerness of proof, inconsequence of
argument, inconsistency in fundamental principles and
disregard for facts which tell against the author’s
theory, has certainly no equal in contemporary literature.
In the apt and expressive phrase of Professor Paulsen,
the book “fairly drips with superficiality”
(von Seichtigkeit triefen). If the man of
science is to be justified, as Huxley suggested, not
by faith but by verification, Haeckel and his docile
Darwinian disciples have good reason to tremble for
their scientific salvation.
EDWIN V. O’HARA.
St. Paul, Minn.