INCIDENTS IN THE AFGHAN WAR.

[I would like to follow this brief and unpretentious narrative of my life with a sketch of the operations of a British force, in which my old regiment was brigaded, in the Afghan war.]

Just before sunset on the twentieth of November, 1878, the 2nd Brigade of the Peshawur Valley Field Force, consisting of the Guides Infantry, the 1st Sikhs, and the 17th Foot under Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler the strength being forty British officers, 1,700 men, of whom 600 were Europeans left its camp at Jamrud to begin the flank march which was to ensure the completeness of Sir Sam. Browne’s victory over the garrison of Masjid. The 17th Regiment had spent the summer in the Murree Hills, where it had been carefully trained for the work that lay before it. Evatt, in his Recollections, says: “It was about the last of the long service battalions of that army which was just then disappearing before the short system, and better specimens of that old regime could not be seen than the men of the 17th, who for weight and space occupied per man were probably thirty per cent. heavier and much broader than the younger soldiers of to-day.” Speed being essential to success and the difficulties presented by the country to be traversed very great, tents, bedding and baggage were left behind, to be sent up later through the Pass; and the troops took with them only a small hospital establishment, a reserve of ammunition, two days’ cooked rations, and a supply of water stored in big leather bags, known as pukkals. In addition to their great coats, seventy rounds of ammunition and one day’s cooked rations was carried by each man.

Unfortunately the greater part of the transport allotted to the brigade consisted of bullocks instead of mules a mistake which was to leave the men without food for over twenty-four hours. Darkness soon closed in upon the column, and when the comparatively easy road across the Jam plain gave place to an ill-defined track running up a deep ravine, sometimes on one side of a mountain stream, sometimes on the other, sometimes in its very bed, even the native guides, men of the district, familiar with its every rock and stone, were often at fault. The transport animals blundered into the midst of the troops. One corps lost touch with another. A large part of the 17th Regiment wandered away from the path, and was with difficulty brought back to it by the shouting and whistling of its commander. There was so much confusion and so many delays that it was ten o’clock before the force, tired and cold, the men’s boots and putties soaked through and through from frequent crossing and recrossing of the Lashora River, arrived at the little hamlet of the same name. Here it settled down to such rest as could be obtained under these uncomfortable conditions, for fires were out of the question where there was no certainty that hidden foes might not be lurking close at hand.

The 1st Brigade, consisting of the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade, the 4th Gurkhas, the 20th Punjab Infantry, and the Hazars Mountain Battery, fared even worse than the 2nd, for it had to begin the day with marching from Hari Singhka-Burg to Jamrud, where it arrived to find, to the disgust of its commander, Brigadier-General Macpherson, that the supplies and transports which ought to have been awaiting it were not ready, and to be kept hanging about till 11 p.m. before it could get a fresh start. What with the darkness, the difficulty of getting the laden bullocks along, the practical absence of a road, the subsequent march proved very trying, and the position of the troops throughout the night was potentially one of great peril. If the Mohmands had come down the eastern slopes of the Rhotas Heights and fallen upon them as they stumbled and groped their way along the Lashora ravine, Macpherson would have had to choose between a retreat or an advance up the steep mountain side, three thousand feet high, in pursuit of an invisible enemy, and exposed to a shower of rocks and stones missiles which every hill-man knows well how to handle.

Fortunately no such alternative was presented to him, and the head of the column the rear guard being still far behind reached Lashora between six and seven o’clock on the morning of the 21st, just as the 2nd Brigade was preparing to leave it, and halted to look up and give Tytler a fair start. The latter did his best to get and keep well ahead, but though his brigade, led by that active officer, Colonel F. H. Jenkins, pushed on as fast as it could, its progress was painfully slow. The column advancing in single file extended over a distance of nearly three miles, and as the sun rose high in the heavens the reflected heat from the bare slaty rocks became almost insupportable. There were no trees to give the men shade, or springs to slake their thirst. For the first four miles the road continued to ascend the Lashora ravine between hills on the right hand and rocky, overhanging spurs a thousand feet high on the left. On issuing thence it dwindled to a mere goat track which ran uphill and downhill, scaling cliffs and dropping into gorges, the shaly soil at every step slipping away from under the feet of men, mules and bullocks, retarding the advance of the two former and almost bringing the latter to a standstill. It was two o’clock in the afternoon when the column, having crossed the Sapparia, or grassy flats, leading up to the watersheds, arrived at Pani Pal at the foot of the pass connecting the Rhotas Heights with the Tartara Mountain, the highest peak in this group of hills. Here a wide and varied view became suddenly visible. Far away to the north the snowcapped Himalayas gleamed in the sunshine; to the south the broad Indus washed the base of Fort Attock, and wound through the salt hills and plains of the Derajat; whilst to the west, almost immediately below the wilderness of rocks in which the invaders had halted, lay, in deep shadow, the yawning chasm of the Khyber a magnificent prospect; but a spring of cool fresh water which was soon discovered had more attractions for the hot and thirsty troops, and Tytler’s whole attention was absorbed in scanning the country for a possible enemy and trying to trace the course of the three paths which branched off from this commanding point. One of these runs northward by a circuitous and comparatively easy route, through Mohmand territory to the Khyber. The second descends abruptly to the same pass through the gorge which separates the Tartara Mountain from the Rhotas Heights. The third follows the crest of those heights to their highest point, just over Ali Masjid. It was by the second of these roads that the column was to find its way down to Kata Kushtia, and Tytler, though hard pressed for time, felt so strongly that he must not entangle his troops in such difficult ground without first ascertaining whether danger would threaten their left flank and rear, that he decided to halt his force, whilst Jenkins and a company of the Guides reconnoitred towards the heights. Scarcely had this party left Pani Pal when a strange reverberation filled the air, which Jenkins, on laying his ear to the ground, at once pronounced to be the booming of heavy guns, and as the reconnoiterers drew near to the edge of the ridge overlooking Ali Masjid, the sound of artillery fire became more and more clear and distinct. Though cave dwellings and patches of cultivation had occasionally been passed, with here and there the tower of some robber chieftain, the country, but for one small band of marauders which exchanged shots with the head of the column, had appeared to be entirely deserted by its inhabitants. Now a large number of armed Mohmands came suddenly into sight, rushing down the hillside, and Jenkins fell back upon Pani Pal to report what he had seen and heard.

The news that the main body of the division was engaged with the enemy quickly spread through the ranks, and the men, forgetting fatigue and hunger the last of the food carried by them had been eaten before leaving Lashora, and the bullocks carrying the rest of the rations had long since parted company with the troops were eager to push on. But Tytler saw clearly that the circumstances in which he now found himself demanded a change in the original plan, by which the whole of his force was to take up its position across the Khyber defile.

As the Mohmands were evidently present in great strength and hostilely inclined, and as his hospital establishment and commissariat were six miles in rear, and the brigade which ought to have covered his left flank was also behind by abandoning Pani Pal he would not only lose his communications with the latter and expose the former to danger and the risk of being cut off and captured, but would leave open the road by which the Mohmand contingent in Ali Masjid might retire from that fortress after its fall, or by which it could be reinforced in case that fall should be delayed. Very reluctantly, therefore, though with soldier-like promptness, he made up his mind to send Jenkins with the Guides and the major portion of the 1st Sikhs to Kata Kushtia, whilst he himself, with a detachment of the latter corps and Her Majesty’s 17th Regiment, remained at Pani Pal to guard Jenkins’ rear and keep in touch with Macpherson. That general, having detached the 20th Punjaub Infantry under Major H. W. Gordon to cover his left, had resumed his march at 8 a.m., and following in Tytler’s wake had soon overtaken that officer’s commissariat bullocks, which so blocked the narrow path that the troops had considerable difficulty in forcing their way through them.

Between two and three o’clock the column arrived at the lower edge of the flats (Sapparia) previously mentioned, where it was fortunate enough to find a little water. By this time the men, who had been over thirty hours under arms, were so worn out that Colonels Newdigate and Turton reported their respective regiments, the Rifle Brigade and the 4th Gurkhas, unfit to go farther, and Macpherson, like Tytler, had to accept the responsibility of modifying the part assigned to him in the common programme, and to some extent for the same reason, viz., the danger to which his hospital and commissariat transport would be exposed if, by pushing on to the summit of the Rhotas Heights, he were to put it out of his power to protect them during the dark hours which were close at hand.

On the flats, then, the main body of the turning party bivouacked on the evening of November 21st, whilst the flanking regiment, after many hours of stiff climbing, during the course of which it had been threatened by a large number of Mohmands, established itself at dusk on the top of Turhai, a ridge parallel to and immediately under the Rhotas Heights.

No sooner had the Guides and the 1st Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, taken up a position on the hill opposite the village of Kata Kushtia, which completely commanded the Khyber Pass, here some 600 yards broad, than a party of the enemy’s cavalry, about fifty in number, was perceived at 4:30 p.m., leisurely making their way up the pass. To make the garrison of Ali Masjid realise that their retreat was cut off, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins ordered his men to open fire upon these Afghan horsemen at a range of about 500 yards. Several were dismounted and the rest galloped away, some back to Ali Masjid and some up the Khyber Pass. As it began to grow dusk a larger body of the enemy’s cavalry, accompanied by a small party of infantry, came from the direction of Ali Masjid riding hard for their lives as they passed the place where the troops were posted, from which it was evident that the retreat from Ali Masjid had commenced. This body of Afghans came under fire of 200 or 300 rifles within 300 to 500 yards’ range and suffered some loss. As darkness closed in the Guides and the 1st Sikhs lay down on the rocks about one hundred feet above the level of the stream, and no large body of the enemy passed during the night, although, doubtless, men moving singly or in small parties escaped. Meanwhile, at 2:15 a.m., on the 21st of November, the 1st Infantry Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., marched from the camp at Jamrud and followed in the track of the 2nd Brigade, which preceded them by eight hours and forty minutes. The fighting strength of the brigade amounted to 43 British officers, 569 British rank and file, and 1,345 natives of all ranks.

Marching under the same conditions, as regards equipment and supplies, as the 2nd Brigade, this column reached Lashora in four and a quarter hours, although the 20th Punjaubis made a slight detour by mistake.

On reaching the foot of the Tabai spur leading to the Rhotas ridge, about six miles from Jamrud, four companies of the 20th Punjaub Infantry, amounting to 243 men, commanded by Major Gordon, were detached to occupy the Tabai ridge below the Rhotas summit, and there to await the arrival of the remainder of the brigade on the main ridge leading to the enemy’s sangars on the summit, when a simultaneous attack would be made on it about noon. The Rhotas peak was to be occupied, if possible, and heliographic communication established with Jamrud, for which purpose four signalers were attached to this detachment.

As has been seen, the 2nd Brigade was just moving off as the 1st Brigade arrived at Lashora, and it became necessary for the 1st Brigade to halt for an hour to allow Tytler’s column to get clear. But at 7:30 a.m. Macpherson’s force resumed its march, ascending a tolerably easy path from the bed of the river and crossing the ridge to the left into the Lashora Nala. Above Lashora the path wound through a narrow, rocky ravine, overhung by precipitous and rugged hills, where the progress of the column was much impeded by the baggage animals of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, many of which (bullocks and buffaloes) were quite unfit for such service. These animals can never move but at a very slow pace, and in difficult places often come to a complete standstill.

The 17th Regiment and the 27th Punjaub Infantry were ordered to advance, and they were met by a determined resistance, the flags of the Afghans keeping well to the front in spite of the heavy fire of our infantry.

Here Lieutenant N. C. Wiseman, 17th Foot, followed by two or three of his men, charged one standard bearer and ran him through, but the gallant officer was instantly surrounded and cut to pieces. The enemy now showed signs of giving way, upon which an order was sent to the cavalry on the right to attack on the first favorable opportunity. But before this order was received both regiments charged successfully. The troops were then ordered to retire to camp, as the enemy was completely dispersed. The action commenced about 2 p.m. and by 4:30 p.m. the enemy’s position was captured. The estimated loss of the Afghans was between 300 and 400 men, while the casualties among the troops amounted to two British officers, one native officer, twenty horses and three men killed and four native officers and thirty-six men wounded.