THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL SOCIAL CONDUCT
Morality has been defined in many
ways. It has been called “a regulation
and control of immediate promptings of impulses in
conformity with some prescribed conduct”; as
“the organization of activity with reference
to a system of fundamental values.” Dewey
says, “Interest in community welfare, an interest
that is intellectual and practical, as well as emotional an
interest, that is to say, in perceiving whatever makes
for social order and progress, and in carrying these
principles into execution is the moral
habit." Palmer defines it as “the choice
by the individual of habits of conduct that are for
the good of the race.” All these definitions
point to control on the part of the individual as
one essential of morality.
Morality is not, then, a matter primarily
of mere conduct. It involves conduct, but the
essence of morality lies deeper than the act itself;
motive, choice, are involved as well. Mere law-abiding
is not morality in the strict sense of the word.
One may keep the laws merely as a matter of blind
habit. A prisoner in jail keeps the laws.
A baby of four keeps the laws, but in neither case
could such conduct be called moral. In neither
of these cases do we find “control” by
the individual of impulses, nor “conscious choice”
of conduct. In the former compulsion was the
controlling force, and in the second blind habit based
on personal satisfaction. Conduct which outwardly
conforms to social law and social progress is unmoral
rather than moral. A moment’s consideration
will suffice to convince any one that the major part
of conduct is of this non-moral type. This is
true of adults and necessarily true of children.
As Hall says, most of the supposedly moral conduct
of the majority of men is blind habit, not thoughtful
choosing. In so far as we are ruled by custom,
by tradition, in so far as we do as the books or the
preacher says, or do as we see others do, without
principles to guide us, without thinking, to that extent
the conduct is likely to be non-moral. This is
the characteristic reaction of the majority of people.
We believe as our fathers believed, we vote the same
ticket, hold in horror the same practices, look askance
on the same doctrines, cling to the same traditions.
Morality, on the other hand, is rationalized conduct.
Now this non-moral conduct is valuable so far as it
goes. It is a conservative force, making for stability,
but it has its dangers. It is antagonistic to
progress. So long as the conditions surrounding
the non-moral individual remain unchanged, he will
be successful in dealing with them, but if conditions
change, if he is confronted by a new situation, if
strong temptation comes, he has nothing with which
to meet it, for his conduct was blind. It is the
person whose conduct is non-moral that suffers collapse
on the one hand, or becomes a bigot on the other,
when criticism attacks what he held as true or right.
Morality requires that men have a reason for the faith
that is in them.
In the second place, morality is conduct.
Ideals, ideas, wishes, desires, all may lead to morality,
but in so far as they are not expressed in conduct,
to that extent they do not come under the head of
morality. One may express the sublimest idea,
may claim the highest ideals, and be immoral.
Conduct is the only test of morality, just as it is
the ultimate test of character. Not only is morality
judged in terms of conduct, but it is judged according
as the conduct is consistent. “Habits of
conduct” make for morality or immorality.
It is not the isolated act of heroism that makes a
man moral, or the single unsocial act that makes a
man immoral. The particular act may be moral or
immoral, and the person be just the reverse. It
is the organization of activity, it is the habits
a man has that places him in one category or the other.
In the third place, morality is a
matter of individual responsibility. It is “choice
by the individual,” the “perceiving whatever
makes for social order and progress.” No
one can choose for another, no one can perceive for
another. The burden of choosing for the good of
the group rests on the individual, it cannot be shifted
to society or the Church, or any other institution.
Each individual is moral or not according as he lives
up to the light that he has, according as he carries
into execution principles that are for the good of
his race. A particular act, then, may be moral
for one individual and immoral for another, and non-moral
for still another.
In the third place, morality is a
matter of individual responsibility. It is “choice
be the individual,” the “perceiving whatever
makes for social order and progress.” No
one can choose for another, no one can perceive for
another. The burden of Choosing for the good of
the group rests on the individual, it cannot be shifted
to society or the Church, or any other institution.
Each individual is moral or not according as he lives
up to the light that he has, according as he carries
into execution principles that are for the good of
his race. A particular act, then, may be moral
for one individual and immoral for another, and non-moral
for still another.
To go off into the forest to die if
one is diseased may be a moral act for a savage in
central Africa; but for a civilized man to do so would
probably be immoral because of his greater knowledge.
To give liquor to babies to quiet them may be a non-moral
act on the part of ignorant immigrants from Russia;
but for a trained physician to do so would be immoral.
Morality, then, is a personal matter, and the responsibility
for it rests on the individual.
Of course this makes possible the
setting up of individual opinion as to what is for
the good of the group in opposition to tradition and
custom. This is, of course, dangerous if it is
mere opinion or if it is carried to an extreme.
Few men have the gift of seeing what makes for social
well-being beyond that of the society of thoughtful
people of their time. And yet if a man has the
insight, if his investigations point to a greater
good for the group from doing something which is different
from the standards held by his peers, then morality
requires that he do his utmost to bring about such
changes. If it is borne in mind that every man
is the product of his age and that it is evolution,
not revolution, that is constructive, this essential
of true morality will not seem so dangerous.
All the reformers the world has ever seen, all the
pioneers in social service, have been men who, living
up to their individual responsibility, have acted
as they believed for society’s best good in
ways that were not in accord with the beliefs of the
majority of their time. Shirking responsibility,
not living up to what one believes is right, is immoral
just as truly as stealing from one’s neighbor.
The fourth essential in moral conduct
is that it be for the social good. It is the
governing of impulses, the inhibition of desires that
violate the good of the group, and the choice of conduct
that forwards its interests. This does not mean
that the group and the individual are set over against
each other, and the individual must give way.
It means, rather, that certain impulses, tendencies,
motives, of the individual are chosen instead of others;
it means that the individual only becomes his fullest
self as he becomes a social being; it means that what
is for the good of the group in the long run is for
the good of the units that make up that group.
Morality, then, is a relative term. What is of
highest moral value in one age may be immoral in another
because of change in social conditions. As society
progresses, as different elements come to the front
because of the march of civilization, so the acts
that are detrimental to the good of the whole must
change. To-day slander and stealing a man’s
good name are quite as immoral as stealing his property.
Acts that injure the mental and spiritual development
of the group are even more immoral than those which
interfere with the physical well-being.
A strong will is not necessarily indicative
of a good character. A strong will may be directed
towards getting what gives pleasure to oneself, irrespective
of the effect on other people. It is the goal,
the purpose with which it is exercised, that makes
a man with a strong will a moral man or an immoral
man. Only when one’s will is used to put
into execution those principles that will bring about
social progress is it productive of a good character.
Thus it is seen that morality can
be discussed only in connection with group activity.
It is the individual as a part of a group, acting in
connection with it, that makes the situation a moral
one. Individual morality is discussed by some
authors, but common opinion limits the term to the
use that has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
If social well-being is taken in its
broadest sense, then all moral behavior is social,
and all social behavior comes under one of the three
types of morality. Training for citizenship, for
social efficiency, for earning a livelihood, all have
a moral aspect. It is only as the individual
is trained to live a complete life as one of a group
that he can be trained to be fully moral, and training
for complete social living must include training in
morality. Hence for the remainder of this discussion
the two terms will be considered as synonymous.
We hear it sometimes said, “training in morals
and manners,” as if the two were distinct, and
yet a full, realization of what is for social betterment
along emotional and intellectual lines must include
a realization of the need of manners. Of course
there are degrees of morality or immorality according
as the act influences society much or little all
crimes are not equally odious, nor all virtues equally
commendable, but any act that touches the well-being
of the group must come under this category.
From the foregoing paragraph, the
logical conclusion would be that there is no instinct
or inborn tendency that is primarily and distinctly
moral as over against those that are social.
That is the commonly accepted belief to-day.
There is no moral instinct. Morality finds its
root in the original nature of man, but not in a single
moral instinct. It is, on the other hand, the
outgrowth of a number of instincts all of which have
been listed under the head of the social instinct.
Man has in his original equipment tendencies that
will make him a moral individual if they are
developed, but they are complex, not simple. Some
of these social tendencies which are at the root of
moral conduct are gregariousness, desire for approval,
dislike of scorn, kindliness, attention to human beings,
imitation, and others. Now, although man possesses
these tendencies as a matter of original equipment,
he also possesses tendencies which are opposed to
these, tendencies which lead to the advancement of
self, rather than the well-being of the group.
Some of these are fighting, mastery, rivalry, jealousy,
ownership. Which of these sets of tendencies
is developed and controls the life of the individual
is a matter of training and environment. In the
last chapter it was pointed out that morality was
much more susceptible to environmental influences
than intellectual achievement, because it was much
more a direction and guidance of capacities and tendencies
possessed by every one. One’s character
is largely a product of one’s environment.
In proof of this, read the reports of reform schools,
and the like. Children of criminal parents, removed
from the environment of crime, grow up into moral
persons. The pair of Jukes who left the Juke
clan lost their criminal habits and brought up a family
of children who were not immoral. Education cannot
produce geniuses, but it can produce men and women
whose chief concern is the well-being of the group.
From a psychological point of view
the “choice by the individual of habits of conduct
that are for the good of the group” involves
three considerations: First, the elements implied
in such conduct; second, the stages of development;
third, the laws governing this development. First,
moral conduct involves the use of habits, but these
must be rational habits, so it involves the power
to think and judge in order to choose. But thinking
that shall result in the choice of habits that are
for the well-being of the group must use knowledge.
The individual must have facts and standards at his
disposal by means of which he may evaluate the possible
lines of action presented. Further, an individual
may know intellectually what is right and moral and
yet not care. The interest, the emotional appeal,
may be lacking, hence he must have ideals to which
he has given his allegiance, which will force him to
put into practice what his knowledge tells him is
right. And then, having decided what is for the
social good and having the desire to carry it out,
the moral man must be able to put it into execution.
He must have the “will power.” Morality,
then, is an extremely complex matter, involving all
the powers of the human being, intellectual, emotional,
and volitional involving the cooeperation
of heredity and environment. It is evident that
conduct that is at so high a level, involving experience,
powers of judgment, and control, cannot be characteristic
of the immature individual, but must come after years
of growth, if at all. Therefore we find stages
of development towards moral conduct.
The first stage of development, which
lasts up into the pre-adolescent years, is the non-moral
stage. The time when a child may conform outwardly
to moral law, but only as a result of blind habit not
as a result of rational choice. It is then that
the little child conforms to his environment, reflecting
the characters of the people by whom he is surrounded.
Right to him means what those about him approve and
what brings him satisfaction. If stealing and
lying meet with approval from the people about him,
they are right to him. To steal and be caught
is wrong to the average child of the streets, because
that brings punishment and annoyance. He has
no standards of judging other than the example of
others and his own satisfaction and annoyance.
The non-moral period, then, is characterized by the
formation of habits which outwardly conform
to moral law, or are contrary to it, according as his
environment directs.
The need to form habits that do conform,
that are for the social good, is evident. By
having many habits of this kind formed in early childhood,
truthfulness, consideration for others, respect for
poverty, promptness, regularity, taking responsibility,
and so on, the dice are weighted in favor of the continuation
of such conduct when reason controls. The child
has then only to enlarge his view, build up his principles
in accord with conduct already in operation he
needs only to rationalize what he already possesses.
On the other hand, if during early years his conduct
violates moral law, he is in the grip of habits of
great strength which will result in two dangers.
He may be blind to the other side, he may not realize
how his conduct violates the laws of social progress;
or, knowing, he may not care enough to put forth the
tremendous effort necessary to break these habits and
build up the opposite. From the standpoint of
conduct this non-moral period is the most important
one in the life of the child. In it the twig is
bent. To urge that a child cannot understand
and therefore should be excused for all sorts of conduct
simply evades the issue. He is forming habits that
cannot be prevented; the question is, Are those habits
in line with the demands of social efficiency or are
they in violation of it?
But character depends primarily on
deliberate choice. We dare not rely on blind
habit alone to carry us through the crises of social
and spiritual adjustment. There will arise the
insistent question as to whether the habitual presupposition
is right. Occasions will occur when several possible
lines of conduct suggest themselves; what kind of
success will one choose, what kind of pleasure?
Choice, personal choice, will be forced upon the individual.
This problem does not usually grow acute until early
adolescence, although it may along some lines present
itself earlier. When it appears will depend to
a large extent on the environment. For some people
in some directions it never comes. It should
come gradually and spontaneously. This period
is the period of transition, when old habits are being
scrutinized, when standards are being formulated and
personal responsibility is being realized, when ideals
are made vital and controlling. It may be a period
of storm and stress when the youth is in emotional
unrest; when conduct is erratic and not to be depended
on; when there is reaction against authority of all
kinds. These characteristics are unfortunate and
are usually the result of unwise treatment during
the first period. If, on the other hand, the
period of transition is prepared for during the preadolescent
years by giving knowledge, opportunities for self-direction
and choice, the change should come normally and quietly.
The transition period should be characterized by emphasis
upon personal responsibility for conduct, by the development
of social ideals, and by the cementing of theory and
practice. This period is an ever recurring one.
The transition period is followed
by the period of true morality during which the conduct
chosen becomes habit. The habits characteristic
of this final period are different from the habits
of the non-moral period, in that they have their source
in reason, whereas those of the early period grew
out of instincts. This is the period of most value,
the period of steady living in accordance with standards
and ideals which have been tested by reason and found
to be right. The transition period is wasteful
and uncertain. True morality is the opposite.
But so long as growth in moral matters goes on there
is a continuous change from transition period to truly
moral conduct and back again to a fresh transition
period and again a change to morality of a still higher
order. Each rationalized habit but paves the way
for one still higher. Morality, then, should
be a continual evolution from level to level.
Only so is progress in the individual life maintained.
Morality, then, requires the inhibition
of some instincts and the perpetuation of others,
the formation of habits and ideals, the development
of the power to think and judge, the power to react
to certain abstractions such as ought, right, duty,
and so on, the power to carry into execution values
accepted. The general laws of instinct, of habit,
the response by piecemeal association, the laws of
attention and appreciation, are active in securing
these responses that we call moral, just as they are
operative in securing other responses that do not come
under this category. It is only as these general
psychological laws are carried out sufficiently that
stable moral conduct is secured. Any violation
of these laws invalidates the result in the moral field
just as it would in any other. There is not one
set of principles governing moral conduct and another
set governing all other types of conduct. The
same general laws govern both. This being true,
there is no need of discussing in detail the operation
of laws controlling moral conduct that
has all been covered in the previous chapters.
However, there are some suggestions which should be
borne in mind in the application of these laws to
this field.
First, it is a general principle that
habits, to be fixed and stable, must be followed by
satisfactory results and that working along the opposite
line, that of having annoyance follow a lapse in the
conduct, is uneconomical and unreliable. This
principle applies particularly to moral habits.
Truth telling, bravery, obedience, generosity, thought
for others, church going, and so on must be followed
by positive satisfaction, if they are to be part of
the warp and woof of life. Punishing falsehood,
selfishness, cowardice, and so on is not enough, for
freedom from supervision will usually mean rejection
of such forced habits. A child must find that
it pays to be generous; that he is happier when he
cooeperates with others than when he does not.
Positive satisfaction should follow moral conduct.
Of course this satisfaction must vary in type with
the age and development of the child, from physical
pleasure occasioned by an apple as a reward for self-control
at table to the satisfaction which the consciousness
of duty well done brings to the adolescent.
Second, the part played by suggestion
in bringing about moral habits and ideals must be
recognized. The human personalities surrounding
the child are his most influential teachers in this
line. This influence of personalities begins
when the child is yet a baby. Reflex imitation
first, and later conscious imitation plus the feeling
of dependence which a little child has for the adults
in his environment, results in the child reflecting
to a large extent the characters of those about him.
Good temper, stability, care for others, self-control,
and many other habits; respect for truth, for the
opinion of others, and many other ideals, are unconsciously
absorbed by the child in his early years. Example
not precept, actions not words, are the controlling
forces in moral education. Hence the great importance
of the characters of a child’s companions, friends,
and teachers, to say nothing of his parents.
Next to personalities, theaters, moving pictures, and
books, all have great suggestive power.
Third, there is always a danger that
theory become divorced from practice, and this is
particularly true here because morality is conduct.
Knowing what is right is one thing, doing it is another,
and knowing does not result in doing unless definite
connections are made between the two. Instruction
in morals may have but little effect on conduct.
It is only as the knowledge of what is right and good
comes in connection with social situations when there
is the call for action that true morality can be gained.
Mere classroom instruction cannot insure conduct.
It is only as the family and the school become more
truly social institutions, where group activity such
as one finds in life is the dominant note, that we
can hope to have morality and not ethics, ideals and
not passive appreciation, as a result of our teaching.
Fourth, it is without question true
that in so far as the habits fixed are “school
habits” or “Sunday habits,” or any
other special type of habits, formed only in connection
with special situations, to that extent we have no
reason to expect moral conduct in the broader life
situations. The habits formed are those that will
be put into practice, and they are the only ones we
are sure of. Because a child is truthful in school,
prompt in attendance, polite to his teacher, and so
on is no warrant that he will be the same on the playground
or on the street. Because a child can think out
a problem in history or mathematics is no warrant
that he will therefore think out moral problems.
The only sure way is to see to it that he forms many
useful habits out of school as well as in, that he
has opportunity to think out moral problems as well
as problems in school subjects.
Fifth, individual differences must
not be forgotten in moral training. Individual
differences in suggestibility will influence the use
of this factor in habit formation. Individual
differences in power of appreciation will influence
the formation of ideals. Differences in interest
in books will result in differing degrees of knowledge.
Differences in maturity will mean that certain children
in a class are ready for facts concerning sex, labor
and capital, crime, and so on, long before other children
in the same class should have such knowledge.
Differences in thinking power will determine efficiency
in moral situations just as in others.
The more carefully we consider the
problem of moral social conduct, the more apparent
it becomes that the work of the school can be modified
so as to produce more significant results than are
commonly now secured. Indeed, it may be contended
that in some respects the activities of the school
operate to develop an attitude which is largely individualistic,
competitive, and, if not anti-social, at least non-social.
Although we may not expect that the habits and attitudes
which are developed in the school will entirely determine
the life led outside, yet one may not forget that
a large part of the life of children is spent under
school supervision. As children work in an atmosphere
of cooeperation, and as they form habits of helpfulness
and openmindedness, we may expect that in some degree
these types of activity will persist, especially in
their association with each other. In a school
which is organized to bring about the right sort of
moral social conduct we ought to expect that children
would grow in their power to accept responsibility
for each other. The writer knows of a fourth
grade in which during the past year a boy was absent
from the room after recess. The teacher, instead
of sending the janitor, or she herself going to find
the boy, asked the class what they were going to do
about it, and suggested to them their responsibility
for maintaining the good name which they had always
borne as a group. Two of the more mature boys
volunteered to go and find the boy who was absent.
When they brought him into the room a little while
later, they remarked to the teacher in a most matter-of-fact
way, “We do not think that he will stay out
after recess again.” In the corridor of
an elementary school the writer saw during the past
year two boys sitting on a table before school hours
in the morning. The one was teaching the multiplication
tables to the other. They were both sixth-grade
pupils, the one a boy who had for some reason
or other never quite thoroughly learned his tables.
The teacher had suggested that somebody might help
him, and a boy had volunteered to come early to school
in order that he might teach the boy who was backward.
A great many teachers have discovered that the strongest
motive which they can find for good work in the field
of English is to be found in providing an audience,
both for the reading or story-telling, and for the
English composition. The idea which prevails
is that if one is to read, he ought to read well enough
to entertain others. If one has enjoyed a story,
he may, if he prepares himself sufficiently well,
tell it to the class or to some other group.
Much more emphasis on the undertakings
in the attempt to have children accept responsibility,
and to engage in a type of activity which has a definite
moral social value, is to be found in the schools in
which children are responsible for the morning exercises,
or for publishing a school paper, or for preparing
a school festival. One of the most notable achievements
in this type of activity which the writer has ever
known occurred in a school in which a group of seventh-grade
children were thought to be particularly incompetent.
The teachers had almost despaired of having them show
normal development, either intellectually or socially.
After a conference of all of the teachers who knew
the members of this group, it was decided to allow
them to prepare a patriot’s day festival.
The idea among those teachers who had failed with
this group was that if the children had a large responsibility,
they would show a correspondingly significant development.
The children responded to the motive which was provided,
became earnest students of history in order that they
might find a dramatic situation, and worked at their
composition when they came to write their play, some
of them exercising a critical as well as a creative
faculty which no one had known that they possessed.
But possibly the best thing about the whole situation
was that every member of the class found something
to do in their cooeperative enterprise. Some
members of the class were engaged in building and
in decorating the stage scenery; others were responsible
for costumes; those who were strong in music devoted
themselves to this field. The search for a proper
dramatic situation in history and the writing of the
play have already been suggested. The staging
of the play and its presentation to a large group
of parents and other interested patrons of the school
required still further specialization and ability.
Out of it all came a realization of the possibility
of accomplishing great things when all worked together
for the success of a common enterprise. When
the festival day came, the most common statement heard
in the room on the part of the parents and others interested
in the work of the children was expressed by one who
said: “This is the most wonderful group
of seventh-grade children that I have ever seen.
They are as capable as most high school boys and girls.”
It is to be recalled that this was the group in whom
the teachers originally had little faith, and who
had sometimes been called in their school a group of
misfits.
Some schools have found, especially
in the upper grades, an opportunity for a type of
social activity which is entirely comparable with the
demand made upon the older members of our communities.
This work for social improvement or betterment is
carried on frequently in connection with a course
in civics. In some schools there is organized
what is known as the junior police. This organization
has been in some cases coordinated with the police
department. The boys who belong pledge themselves
to maintain, in so far as they are able, proper conditions
on the streets with respect to play, to abstain from
the illegal use of tobacco or other narcotics, and
to be responsible for the correct handling of garbage,
especially to see that paper, ashes, and other refuse
are placed in separate receptacles, and that these
receptacles are removed from the street promptly after
they are emptied by the department concerned.
In one city with which the writer is acquainted, the
children in the upper grades, according to the common
testimony of the citizens of their community, have
been responsible for the cleaning up of the street
cars. In other cities they have become interested,
and have interested their parents, in the question
of milk and water supply. In some cases they
have studied many different departments of the city
government, and have, in so far as it was possible,
lent their cooeperation. In one case a group
of children became very much excited concerning a
dead horse that was allowed to remain on a street near
the school, and they learned before they were through
just whose responsibility it was, and how to secure
the action that should have been taken earlier.
Still another type of activity which
may have significance for the moral social development
of children is found in the study of the life activities
in the communities in which they live. There is
no reason why children, especially in the upper grades
or in the high school, should not think about working
conditions, especially as they involve sweat-shops
or work under unsanitary conditions. They may
very properly become interested in the problems of
relief, and of the measures taken to eliminate crime.
Indeed, from the standpoint of the development of
socially efficient children, it would seem to be more
important that some elementary treatment of industrial
and social conditions might be found to be more important
in the upper grades and in the high school than any
single subject which we now teach.
Another attempt to develop a reasonable
attitude concerning moral situations is found in the
schools which have organized pupils for the participation
in school government. There is no particular value
to be attached to any such form of organization.
It may be true that there is considerable advantage
in dramatizing the form of government in which the
children live, and for that purpose policemen, councilmen
or aldermen, mayors, and other officials, together
with their election, may help in the understanding
of the social obligations which they will have to
meet later on. But the main thing is to have these
children come to accept responsibility for each other,
and to seek to make the school a place where each
respects the rights of others and where every one is
working together for the common good. In this
connection it is important to suggest that schemes
of self-government have succeeded only where there
has been a leader in the position of principal or other
supervisory officer concerned. Children’s
judgments are apt to be too severe when they are allowed
to discipline members of their group. There will
always be need, whatever attempt we may make to have
them accept responsibility, for the guidance and direction
of the more mature mind.
We seek in all of these activities,
as has already been suggested, to have children come
to take, in so far as they are able, the rational
attitude toward the problems of conduct which they
have to face. It is important for teachers to
realize the fallacy of making a set of rules by which
all children are to be controlled. It is only
with respect to those types of activity in which the
response, in order to further the good of the group,
must be invariable that we should expect to have pupils
become automatic. It is important in the case
of a fire drill, or in the passing of materials, and
the like, that the response, although it does involve
social obligation, should be reduced to the level of
mechanized routine. Most school situations involve,
or may involve, judgment, and it is only as pupils
grow in power of self-control and in their willingness
to think through a situation before acting, that we
may expect significant moral development. In the
case of offenses which seem to demand punishment,
that teacher is wise who is able to place responsibility
with the pupil who has offended. The question
ought to be common, “What can I do to help you?”
The question which the teacher should ask herself
is not, “What can I do to punish the pupil?”
but rather, “How can I have him realize the
significance of his action and place upon him the
responsibility of reinstating himself with the social
group?” The high school principal who solved
the problem of a teacher who said that she would not
teach unless a particular pupil were removed from
her class, and of the pupil who said that she would
not stay in school if she had to go to that teacher,
by telling them both to take time to think it through
and decide how they would reconcile their differences,
is a case in point. What we need is not the punishment
which follows rapidly upon our feeling of resentment,
but rather the wisdom of waiting and accepting the
mistake or offense of the pupil as an opportunity
for careful consideration upon his part and as a possible
means of growth for him.
There has been considerable discussion
during recent years concerning the obligation of the
school to teach children concerning matters of sex.
Traditionally, our policy has been one of almost entire
neglect. The consequence has been, on the whole,
the acquisition upon the part of boys and girls of
a large body of misinformation, which has for the most
part been vicious. It is not probable that we
can ever expect most teachers to have the training
necessary to give adequate instruction in this field.
For children in the upper grades, during the preadolescent
period especially, some such instruction given by the
men and women trained in biology, or possibly by men
and women doctors who have made a specialty of this
field, promises a large contribution to the development
of the right attitudes with respect to the sex life
and the elimination of much of the immorality which
has been due to ignorance or to the vicious misinformation
which has commonly been spread among children.
The policy of secrecy and ignorance cannot well be
maintained if we accept the idea of responsibility
and the exercise of judgment as the basis of moral
social activity. In no other field are the results
of a lack of training or a lack of morality more certain
to be disastrous both for the individual and for the
social group.
QUESTIONS
1. How satisfactory is the morality
of the man who claims that he does no wrong?
2. How is it possible for a child
to be unmoral and not immoral?
3. Are children who observe school
rules and regulations necessarily growing in morality?
4. Why is it important, from
the standpoint of growth in morality, to have children
form socially desirable habits, even though we may
not speak of this kind of activity as moral conduct?
5. What constitutes growth in morality for the
adult?
6. In what sense is it possible
for the same act to be immoral, unmoral, and moral
for individuals living under differing circumstances
and in different social groups? Give an example.
7. Why have moral reformers sometimes
been considered immoral by their associates?
8. What is the moral significance
of earning a living? Of being prompt? Of
being courteous?
9. What are the instincts upon
which we may hope to build in moral training?
What instinctive basis is there for immoral conduct?
10. To what extent is intellectual
activity involved in moral conduct? What is the
significance of one’s emotional response?
11. What stages of development
are distinguishable in the moral development of children?
Is it possible to classify children as belonging to
one stage or the other by their ages?
12. Why is it true that one’s
character depends upon the deliberate choices which
he makes among several possible modes or types of action?
13. Why is it important to have
positive satisfaction follow moral conduct?
14. How may the conduct of parents
and teachers influence conduct of children?
15. What is the weakness of direct
moral instruction, e.g. the telling of stories
of truthfulness, the teaching of moral precepts, and
the like?
16. What opportunities can you
provide in your class for moral social conduct?
17. Children will do what is
right because of their desire to please, their respect
for authority, their fear of unpleasant consequences,
their careful, thoughtful analysis of the situation
and choice of that form of action which they consider
right. Arrange these motives in order of their
desirability. Would you be satisfied to utilize
the motive which brings results most quickly and most
surely?
18. In what sense is it true
that lapses from moral conduct are the teacher’s
best opportunity for moral teaching?
19. How may children contribute
to the social welfare of the school community?
Of the larger social group outside of the school?
20. How may pupil participation
in school government be made significant in the development
of social moral conduct?