Letters written to
the morning post from the
seat of war in Italy from
our own correspondent
Ferrara, June 22, 1866.
Before this letter reaches London
the guns will have awakened both the echo of the old
river Po and the classical Mincio. The whole of
the troops, about 110,000 men, with which Cialdini
intends to force the passage of the first-named river
are already massed along the right bank of the Po,
anxiously waiting that the last hour of to-morrow should
strike, and that the order for action should be given.
The telegraph will have already informed your readers
that, according to the intimation sent by General
Lamarmora on Tuesday evening to the Austrian headquarters,
the three days fixed by the general’s message
before beginning hostilities will expire at twelve
p.m. of the 23rd of June.
Cialdini’s headquarters have
been established in this city since Wednesday morning,
and the famous general, in whom the fourth corps he
commands, and the whole of the nation, has so much
confidence, has concentrated the whole of his forces
within a comparatively narrow compass, and is ready
for action. I believe therefore that by to-morrow
the right bank of the Po will be connected with the
mainland of the Polesine by several pontoon bridges,
which will enable Cialdini’s corps d’armee
to cross the river, and, as everybody here hopes, to
cross it in spite of any defence the Austrians may
make.
On my way to this ancient city last
evening I met General Cadogan and two superior Prussian
officers, who by this time must have joined Victor
Emmanuel’s headquarters at Cremona; if not, they
have been by this time transferred elsewhere, more
on the front, towards the line of the Mincio, on which,
according to appearance, the first, second, and third
Italian corps d’armee seem destined to operate.
The English general and the two Prussian officers
above mentioned are to follow the king’s staff,
the first as English commissioner, the superior in
rank of the two others in the same capacity.
I have been told here that, before
leaving Bologna, Cialdini held a general council of
the commanders of the seven divisions of which his
powerful corps d’armee is formed, and that he
told them that, in spite of the forces the enemy has
massed on the left bank of the Po, between the point
which faces Stellata and Rovigo, the river
must be crossed by his troops, whatever might be the
sacrifice this important operation requires.
Cialdini is a man who knows how to keep his word, and,
for this reason, I have no doubt he will do what he
has already made up his mind to accomplish. I
am therefore confident that before two or three days
have elapsed, these 110,000 Italian troops, or a great
part of them, will have trod, for the Italians, the
sacred land of Venetia.
Once the river Po crossed by Cialdini’s
corps d’armee, he will boldly enter the Polesine
and make himself master of the road which leads by
Rovigo towards Este and Padua. A glance at
the map will show your readers how, at about twenty
or thirty miles from the first-mentioned town, a chain
of hills, called the Colli Euganei, stretches
itself from the last spur of the Julian Alps, in the
vicinity of Vicenza, gently sloping down towards the
sea. As this line affords good positions for
contesting the advance of an army crossing the Po at
Lago Scuro, or at any other point not far
from it, it is to be supposed that the Austrians will
make a stand there, and I should not be surprised at
all that Cialdini’s first battle, if accepted
by the enemy, should take place within that comparatively
narrow ground which is within Montagnana, Este, Terradura,
Abano, and Padua. It is impossible to suppose
that Cialdini’s corps d’armee, being so
large, is destined to cross the Po only at one point
of the river below its course: it is extremely
likely that part of it should cross it at some point
above, between Revere and Stellata, where the
river is in two or three instances only 450 metres
wide. Were the Italian general to be successful protected
as he will be by the tremendous fire of the powerful
artillery he disposes of in these twofold
operations, the Austrians defending the line of the
Colli Euganei could be easily outflanked by the
Italian troops, who would have crossed the river below
Lago Scuro. Of course these are mere
suppositions, for nobody, as you may imagine, except
the king, Cialdini himself, Lamarmora, Pettiti, and
Menabrea, is acquainted with the plan of the forthcoming
campaign. There was a rumour at Cialdini’s
headquarters to-day that the Austrians had gathered
in great numbers in the Polesine, and especially
at Rovigo, a small town which they have strongly
fortified of late, with an apparent design to oppose
the crossing of the Po, were Cialdini to attempt it
at or near Lago Scuro. There are about
Rovigo large tracts of marshes and fields cut
by ditches and brooks, which, though owing to the
dryness of the season [they] cannot be, as it was
generally believed two weeks ago, easily inundated,
yet might well aid the operations the Austrians may
undertake in order to check the advance of the Italian
fourth corps d’armee. The resistance to
the undertaking of Cialdini may be, on the part of
the Austrians, very stout, but I am almost certain
that it will be overcome by the ardour of Italian
troops, and by the skill of their illustrious leader.
As I told you above, the declaration
of war was handed over to an Austrian major for transmission
to Count Stancowick, the Austrian governor of Mantua,
on the evening of the 19th, by Colonel Bariola, sous-chef
of the general staff, who was accompanied by the Duke
Luigi of Sant’ Arpino, the husband of the amiable
widow of Lord Burghersh. The duke is the eldest
son of Prince San Teodoro, one of the wealthiest noblemen
of Naples. In spite of his high position and of
his family ties, the Duke of Sant’ Arpino, who
is well known in London fashionable society, entered
as a volunteer in the Italian army, and was appointed
orderly officer to General Lamarmora. The choice
of such a gentleman for the mission I am speaking
of was apparently made with intention, in order to
show the Austrians, that the Neapolitan nobility is
as much interested in the national movement as the
middle and lower classes of the Kingdom, once so fearfully
misruled by the Bourbons. The Duke of Sant’
Arpino is not the only Neapolitan nobleman who has
enlisted in the Italian army since the war with Austria
broke out. In order to show you the importance
which must be given to this pronunciamiento of
the Neapolitan noblemen, allow me to give you here
a short list of the names of those of them who have
enlisted as private soldiers in the cavalry regiments
of the regular army: The Duke of Policastro; the
Count of Savignano Guevara, the eldest son of the
Duke of Bovino; the Duke d’Ozia d’Angri,
who had emigrated in 1860, and returned to Naples six
months ago; Marquis Rivadebro Serra; Marquis Pisicelli,
whose family had left Naples in 1860 out of devotion
to Francis II.; two Carraciolos, of the historical
family from which sprung the unfortunate Neapolitan
admiral of this name, whose head Lord Nelson would
have done better not to have sacrificed to the cruelty
of Queen Caroline; Prince Carini, the representative
of an illustrious family of Sicily, a nephew of the
Marquis del Vasto; and Pescara, a descendant of
that great general of Charles V., to whom the proud
Francis I. of France was obliged to surrender and
give up his sword at the battle of Pavia. Besides
these Neapolitan noblemen who have enlisted of late
as privates, the Italian army now encamped on the
banks of the Po and of the Mincio may boast of two
Colonnas, a prince of Somma, two Barons Renzi, an Acquaviva,
of the Duke of Atri, two Capece, two Princes Butterà,
etc. To return to the mission
of Colonel Bariola and the Duke of Sant’ Arpino,
I will add some details which were told me this morning
by a gentleman who left Cremona yesterday evening,
and who had them from a reliable source. The
messenger of General Lamarmora had been directed to
proceed from Cremona to the small village of Le Grazie,
which, on the line of the Mincio, marks the Austrian
and Italian frontier.
On the right bank of the Lake of Mantua,
in the year 1340, stood a small chapel containing
a miraculous painting of the Madonna, called by the
people of the locality ‘Santa Maria delle Grazie.’
The boatmen and fishermen of the Mincio, who had been,
as they said, often saved from certain death by the
Madonna as famous in those days as the modern
Lady of Rimini, celebrated for the startling feat of
winking her eyes determined to erect for
her a more worthy abode.
Hence arose the Santuario delle Grazie.
Here, as at Loretto and other holy localities of Italy,
a fair is held, in which, amongst a great number of
worldly things, rosaries, holy images, and other miraculous
objects are sold, and astounding boons are said to
be secured at the most trifling expense. The
Santuario della Madonna delle Grazie enjoying
a far-spread reputation, the dumb, deaf, blind, and
halt-in short, people afflicted with all sorts of
infirmities flock thither during the fair,
and are not wanting even on the other days of the year.
The church of Le Grazie is one of the most curious
of Italy. Not that there is anything remarkable
in its architecture, for it is an Italian Gothic structure
of the simplest style. But the ornamental part
of the interior is most peculiar. The walls of
the building are covered with a double row of wax
statues, of life size, representing a host of warriors,
cardinals, bishops, kings, and popes, who as
the story runs pretended to have received
some wonderful grace during their earthly existence.
Amongst the grand array of illustrious personages,
there are not a few humbler individuals whose history
is faithfully told (if you choose to credit it) by
the painted inscriptions below. There is even
a convict, who, at the moment of being hanged, implored
succour of the all-powerful Madonna, whereupon the
beam of the gibbet instantly broke, and the worthy
individual was restored to society a very
doubtful benefit after all. On Colonel Bariola
and the Duke of Sant’ Arpino arriving at this
place, which is only five miles distant from Mantua,
their carriage was naturally stopped by the commissaire
of the Austrian police, whose duty was to watch the
frontier. Having told him that they had a despatch
to deliver either to the military governor of Mantua
or to some officer sent by him to receive it, the
commissaire at once despatched a mounted gendarme
to Mantua. Two hours had scarcely elapsed when
a carriage drove into the village of Le Grazie, from
which an Austrian major of infantry alighted and hastened
to a wooden hut where the two Italian officers were
waiting. Colonel Bariola, who was trained in the
Austrian military school of Viller Nashstad, and regularly
left the Austrian service in 1848, acquainted the
newly-arrived major with his mission, which was that
of delivering the sealed despatch to the general in
command of Mantua and receiving for it a regular receipt.
The despatch was addressed to the Archduke Albert,
commander-in-chief of the Austrian army of the South,
care of the governor of Mantua. After the major
had delivered the receipt, the three messengers entered
into a courteous conversation, during which Colonel
Bariola seized an opportunity of presenting the duke,
purposely laying stress on the fact of his belonging
to one of the most illustrious families of Naples.
It happened that the Austrian major had also been
trained in the same school where Colonel Bariola was
brought up a circumstance of which he was
reminded by the Austrian officer himself. Three
hours had scarcely elapsed from the arrival of the
two Italian messengers of war at Le Grazie, on the
Austrian frontier, when they were already on their
way back to the headquarters of Cremona, where during
the night the rumour was current that a telegram had
been received by Lamarmora from Verona, in which Archduke
Albert accepted the challenge. Victor Emmanuel,
whom I saw at Bologna yesterday, arrived at Cremona
in the morning at two o’clock, but by this time
his Majesty’s headquarters must have removed
more towards the front, in the direction of the Oglio.
I should not be at all surprised were the Italian
headquarters to be established by to-morrow either
at Piubega or Gazzoldo, if not actually at Goito, a
village, as you know, which marks the Italian-Austrian
frontier on the Mincio. The whole of the first,
second, and third Italian corps d’armee are by
this time concentrated within that comparatively narrow
space which lies between the position of Castiglione,
Delle Stiviere, Lorrato, and Desenzano, on the Lake
of Garda, and Solferino on one side; Piubega, Gazzoldo,
Sacca, Goito, and Castellucchio on the other.
Are these three corps d’armee to attack when
they hear the roar of Cialdini’s artillery on
the right bank of the Po? Are they destined to
force the passage of the Mincio either at Goito or
at Borghetto? or are they destined to invest
Verona, storm Peschiera, and lay siege to Mantua?
This is more than I can tell you, for, I repeat it,
the intentions of the Italian leaders are enveloped
in a veil which nobody the Austrians included has
as yet been able to penetrate. One thing, however,
is certain, and it is this, that as the clock of Victor
Emmanuel marks the last minute of the seventy-second
hour fixed by the declaration delivered at Le Grazie
on Wednesday by Colonel Bariola to the Austrian major,
the fair land where Virgil was born and Tasso was imprisoned
will be enveloped by a thick cloud of the smoke of
hundreds and hundreds of cannon. Let us hope
that God will be in favour of right and justice, which,
in this imminent and fierce struggle, is undoubtedly
on the Italian side.
Cremona, June 30, 1866.
The telegraph will have already informed
you of the concentration of the Italian army, whose
headquarters have since Tuesday been removed from
Redondesco to Piadena, the king having chosen the adjacent
villa of Cigognolo for his residence. The concentrating
movements of the royal army began on the morning of
the 27th, i.e., three days after the bloody fait
d’armes of the 24th, which, narrated and commented
on in different manners according to the interests
and passions of the narrators, still remains for many
people a mystery. At the end of this letter you
will see that I quote a short phrase with which an
Austrian major, now prisoner of war, portrayed the
results of the fierce struggle fought beyond the Mincio.
This officer is one of the few survivors of a regiment
of Austrian volunteers, uhlans, two squadrons of which
he himself commanded. The declaration made by
this officer was thoroughly explicit, and conveys
the exact idea of the valour displayed by the Italians
in that terrible fight. Those who incline to overrate
the advantages obtained by the Austrians on Sunday
last must not forget that if Lamarmora had thought
proper to persist in holding the positions of Valeggio,
Volta, and Goito, the Austrians could not have prevented
him. It seems the Austrian general-in-chief shared
this opinion, for, after his army had carried with
terrible sacrifices the positions of Monte Vento and
Custozza, it did not appear, nor indeed did the Austrians
then give any signs, that they intended to adopt a
more active system of warfare. It is the business
of a commander to see that after a victory the fruit
of it should not be lost, and for this reason the enemy
is pursued and molested, and time is not left him
for reorganization. Nothing of this happened
after the 24th nothing has been done by
the Austrians to secure such results. The frontier
which separates the two dominions is now the same
as it was on the eve of the declaration of war.
At Goito, at Monzambano, and in the other villages
of the extreme frontier, the Italian authorities are
still discharging their duties. Nothing is changed
in those places, were we to except that now and then
an Austrian cavalry party suddenly makes its appearance,
with the only object of watching the movements of
the Italian army. One of these parties, formed
by four squadrons of the Wurtemberg hussar regiment,
having advanced at six o’clock this morning on
the right bank of the Mincio, met the fourth squadron
of the Italian lancers of Foggia and were beaten back,
and compelled to retire in disorder towards Goito and
Rivolta. In this unequal encounter the Italian
lancers distinguished themselves very much, made some
Austrian hussars prisoners, and killed a few more,
amongst whom was an officer. The same state of
thing, prevails at Rivottella, a small village on
the shores of the Lake of Garda, about four miles
distant from the most advanced fortifications of Peschiera.
There, as elsewhere, some Austrian parties advanced
with the object of watching the movements of the Garibaldians,
who occupy the hilly ground, which from Castiglione,
Eseuta, and Cartel Venzago stretches to Lonato, Salo,
and Desenzano, and to the mountain passes of Caffaro.
In the last-named place the Garibaldians came to blows
with the Austrians on the morning of the 28th, and
the former got the best of the fray. Had the
fait d’armes of the 24th, or the battle of Custozza,
as Archduke Albrecht calls it, been a great victory
for the Austrians, why should the imperial army remain
in such inaction? The only conclusion we must
come to is simply this, that the Austrian losses have
been such as to induce the commander-in-chief of the
army to act prudently on the defensive. We are
now informed that the charges of cavalry which the
Austrian lancers and the Hungarian hussars had to sustain
near Villafranca on the 24th with the Italian horsemen
of the Aorta and Alessandria regiments have been so
fatal to the former that a whole division of the Kaiser
cavalry must be reorganised before it can be brought
into the field main.
The regiment of Haller hussars and
two of volunteer uhlans were almost destroyed in that
terrible charge. To give you an idea of this cavalry
encounter, it is sufficient to say that Colonel Vandoni,
at the head of the Aorta regiment he commands, charged
fourteen times during the short period of four hours.
The volunteer uhlans of the Kaiser regiment had already
given up the idea of breaking through the square formed
by the battalion, in the centre of which stood Prince
Humbert of Savoy, when they were suddenly charged
and literally cut to pieces by the Alessandria light
cavalry, in spite of the long lances they carried.
This weapon and the loose uniform they wear makes them
resemble the Cossacks of the Don. There is one
circumstance, which, if I am not mistaken, has not
as yet been published by the newspapers, and it is
this. There was a fight on the 25th on a place
at the north of Roverbella, between the Italian regiment
of Novara cavalry and a regiment of Hungarian hussars,
whose name is not known. This regiment was so
thoroughly routed by the Italians that it was pursued
as far as Villafranca, and had two squadrons put hors
de combat, whilst the Novara regiment only lost twenty-four
mounted men. I think it right to mention this,
for it proves that, the day after the bloody affair
of the 24th, the Italian army had still a regiment
of cavalry operating at Villafranca, a village which
lay at a distance of fifteen kilometres from the Italian
frontier. A report, which is much accredited here,
explains how the Italian army did not derive the advantages
it might have derived from the action of the 24th.
It appears that the orders issued from the Italian
headquarters during the previous night, and especially
the verbal instructions given by Lamarmora and Pettiti
to the staff officers of the different army corps,
were either forgotten or misunderstood by those officers.
Those sent to Durando, the commander of the first
corps, seem to have been as follows: That he should
have marched in the direction of Castelnuovo, without,
however, taking part in the action. Durando,
it is generally stated, had strictly adhered to the
orders sent from the headquarters, but it seems that
General Cerale understood them too literally.
Having been ordered to march on Castelnuovo, and finding
the village strongly held by the Austrians, who received
his division with a tremendous fire, he at once engaged
in the action instead of falling back on the reserve
of the first corps and waiting new instructions.
If such was really the case, it is evident that Cerale
thought that the order to march which he had received
implied that he was to attack and get possession of
Castelnuovo, had this village, as it really was, already
been occupied by the enemy. In mentioning this
fact I feel bound to observe that I write it under
the most complete reserve, for I should be sorry indeed
to charge General Cerale with having misunderstood
such an important order.
I see that one of your leading contemporaries
believes that it would be impossible for the king
or Lamarmora to say what result they expected from
their ill-conceived and worse-executed attempt.
The result they expected is, I think, clear enough;
they wanted to break through the quadrilateral and
make their junction with Cialdini, who was ready to
cross the Po during the night of the 24th. That
the attempt was ill-conceived and worse-executed,
neither your contemporary nor the public at large
has, for the present, the right to conclude, for no
one knows as yet but imperfectly the details of the
terrible fight. What is certain, however, is
that General Durando, perceiving that the Cerale division
was lost, did all that he could to help it. Failing
in this he turned to his two aides-de-camp and coolly
said to them:
’Now, gentlemen, it is time
for you to retire, for I have a duty to perform which
is a strictly personal one the duty of dying.’
On saying these words he galloped to the front and
placed himself at about twenty paces from a battalion
of Austrian sharp-shooters which were ascending the
hill. In less than five minutes his horse was
killed under him, and he was wounded in the right
hand. I scarcely need add that his aides-de-camp
did not flinch from sharing Durando’s fate.
They bravely followed their general, and one, the
Marquis Corbetta, was wounded in the leg; the other,
Count Esengrini, had his horse shot under him.
I called on Durando, who is now at Milan, the day
before yesterday. Though a stranger to him, he
received me at once, and, speaking of the action of
the 24th, he only said: ’I have the satisfaction
of having done my duty. I wait tranquilly the
judgement of history.’
Assuming, for argument’s sake,
that General Cerale misunderstood the orders he had
received, and that, by precipitating his movement,
he dragged into the same mistake the whole of Durando’s
corps assuming, I say, this to be the right
version, you can easily explain the fact that neither
of the two contending parties are as yet in a position
clearly to describe the action of the 24th. Why
did neither the one nor the other display and bring
into action the whole forces they could have had at
their disposal? Why so many partial engagements
at a great distance one from the other? In a
word, why that want of unity, which, in my opinion,
constituted the paramount characteristic of that bloody
struggle? I may be greatly mistaken, but I am
of opinion that neither the Italian general-in-chief
nor the Austrian Archduke entertained on the night
of the 23rd the idea of delivering a battle on the
24th. There, and only there, lies the whole mystery
of the affair. The total want of unity of action
on the part of the Italians assured to the Austrians,
not the victory, but the chance of rendering impossible
Lamarmora’s attempt to break through the quadrilateral.
This no one can deny; but, on the other hand, if the
Italian army failed in attaining its object, the failure-owing
to the bravery displayed both by the soldiers and
by the generals-was far from being a disastrous or
irreparable one. The Italians fought from three
o’clock in the morning until nine in the evening
like lions, showing to their enemies and to Europe
that they know how to defend their country, and that
they are worthy of the noble enterprise they have
undertaken.
But let me now register one of the
striking episodes of that memorable day. It was
five o’clock p.m. when General Bixio, whose division
held an elevated position not far from Villafranca,
was attacked by three strong Austrian brigades, which
had debouched at the same time from three different
roads, supported with numerous artillery. An officer
of the Austrian staff, waving a white handkerchief,
was seen galloping towards the front of Bixio’s
position, and, once in the presence of this general,
bade him surrender. Those who are not personally
acquainted with Bixio cannot form an idea of the impression
this bold demand must have made on him. I have
been told that, on hearing the word ‘surrender,’
his face turned suddenly pale, then flushed like purple,
and darting at the Austrian messenger, said, ’Major,
if you dare to pronounce once more the word surrender
in my presence, I tell you and Bixio always
keeps his word that I will have you shot
at once.’ The Austrian officer had scarcely
reached the general who had sent him, than Bixio,
rapidly moving his division, fell with such impetuosity
on the Austrian column, which were ascending the hill,
that they were thrown pellmell in the valley, causing
the greatest confusion amongst their reserve.
Bixio himself led his men, and with his aides-de-camp,
Cavaliere Filippo Fermi, Count Martini, and Colonel
Malenchini, all Tuscans, actually charged the enemy.
I have been told that, on hearing this episode, Garibaldi
said, ’I am not at all surprised, for Bixio is
the best general I have made.’ Once the
enemy was repulsed, Bixio was ordered to manoeuvre
so as to cover the backward movement of the army,
which was orderly and slowly retiring on the Mincio.
Assisted by the co-operation of the heavy cavalry,
commanded by General Count de Sonnaz, Bixio covered
the retreat, and during the night occupied Goito, a
position which he held till the evening of the 27th.
In consequence of the concentrating
movement of the Italian army which I have mentioned
at the beginning of this letter, the fourth army corps
(Cialdini’s) still holds the line of the Po.
If I am rightly informed, the decree for the formation
of the fourth army corps was signed by the king yesterday.
This corps is that of Garibaldi, and is about 40,000
strong. An officer who has just returned from
Milan told me this morning that he had had an opportunity
of speaking with the Austrian prisoners sent from
Milan to the fortress of Finestrelle in Piedmont.
Amongst them was an officer of a uhlan regiment, who
had all the appearance of belonging to some aristocratic
family of Austrian Poland. Having been asked
if he thought Austria had really gained the battle
on the 24th, he answered: ’I do not know
if the illusions of the Austrian army go so far as
to induce it to believe it has obtained a victory I
do not believe it. He who loves Austria cannot,
however, wish she should obtain such victories, for
they are the victories of Pyrrhus!
There is at Verona some element in
the Austrian councils of war which we don’t
understand, but which gives to their operations in
this present phase of the campaign just as uncertain
and as vacillating a character as it possessed during
the campaign of 1859. On Friday they are still
beyond the Mincio, and on Saturday their small fleet
on the Lake of Garda steams up to Desenzano, and opens
fire against this defenceless city and her railway
station, whilst two battalions of Tyrolese sharp-shooters
occupy the building. On Sunday they retire, but
early yesterday they cross the Mincio, at Goito and
Monzambano, and begin to throw two bridges over the
same river, between the last-named place and the mills
of Volta. At the same time they erect batteries
at Goito, Torrione, and Valeggio, pushing their
reconnoitring parties of hussars as far as Medole,
Castiglione delle Stiviere, and Montechiara, this
last-named place being only at a distance of twenty
miles from Brescia. Before this news reached
me here this morning I was rather inclined to believe
that they were playing at hide-and-seek, in the hope
that the leaders of the Italian army should be tempted
by the game and repeat, for the second time, the too
hasty attack on the quadrilateral. This news,
which I have from a reliable source, has, however,
changed my former opinion, and I begin to believe
that the Austrian Archduke has really made up his
mind to come out from the strongholds of the quadrilateral,
and intends actually to begin war on the very battlefields
where his imperial cousin was beaten on the 24th June
1859. It may be that the partial disasters sustained
by Benedek in Germany have determined the Austrian
Government to order a more active system of war against
Italy, or, as is generally believed here, that the
organisation of the commissariat was not perfect enough
with the army Archduke Albert commands to afford a
more active and offensive action. Be that as
it may, the fact is that the news received here from
several parts of Upper Lombardy seems to indicate,
on the part of the Austrians, the intention of attacking
their adversaries.
Yesterday whilst the peaceable village
of Gazzoldo five Italian miles from Goito was
still buried in the silence of night it was occupied
by 400 hussars, to the great consternation of the
people who were roused from their sleep by the galloping
of their unexpected visitors. The sindaco,
or mayor of the village, who is the chemist of the
place, was, I hear, forcibly taken from his house
and compelled to escort the Austrians on the road
leading to Piubega and Redondesco. This worthy
magistrate, who was not apparently endowed with sufficient
courage to make at least half a hero, was so much
frightened that he was taken ill, and still is in
a very precarious condition. These inroads are
not always accomplished with impunity, for last night,
not far from Guidizzuolo, two squadrons of Italian
light cavalry Cavalleggieri di Lucca,
if I am rightly informed at a sudden turn
of the road leading from the last-named village to
Cerlongo, found themselves almost face to face with
four squadrons of uhlans. The Italians, without
numbering their foes, set spurs to their horses and
fell like thunder on the Austrians, who, after a fight
which lasted more than half an hour, were put to flight,
leaving on the ground fifteen men hors de combat, besides
twelve prisoners.
Whilst skirmishing of this kind is
going on in the flat ground of Lombardy which lies
between the Mincio and the Chiese, a more decisive
action has been adopted by the Austrian corps which
is quartered in the Italian Tyrol and Valtellina.
A few days ago it was generally believed that the
mission of this corps was only to oppose Garibaldi
should he try to force those Alpine passes. But
now we suddenly hear that the Austrians are already
masters of Caffaro, Bagolino, Riccomassino, and Turano,
which points they are fortifying. This fact explains
the last movements made by Garibaldi towards that
direction. But whilst the Austrians are massing
their troops on the Tyrolese Alps the revolution is
spreading fast in the more southern mountains of the
Friuli and Cadorre, thus threatening the flank and
rear of their army in Venetia. This revolutionary
movement may not have as yet assumed great proportions,
but as it is the effect of a plan proposed beforehand
it might become really imposing, more so as the ranks
of those Italian patriots are daily swollen by numerous
deserters and refractory men of the Venetian regiments
of the Austrian army.
Although the main body of the Austrians
seems to be still concentrated between Peschiera and
Verona, I should not wonder if they crossed the Mincio
either to-day or to-morrow, with the object of occupying
the heights of Volta, Cavriana, and Solferino, which,
both by their position and by the nature of the ground,
are in themselves so many fortresses. Supposing
that the Italian army should decide for action and
there is every reason to believe that such will be
the case it is not unlikely that, as we
had already a second battle at Custozza, we may have
a second one at Solferino.
That at the Italian headquarters something
has been decided upon which may hasten the forward
movement of the army, I infer from the fact that the
foreign military commissioners at the Italian headquarters,
who, after the 24th June had gone to pass the leisure
of their camp life at Cremona, have suddenly made
their appearance at Torre Malamberti, a villa belonging
to the Marquis Araldi, where Lamarmora’s staff
is quartered. A still more important event is
the presence of Baron Ricasoli, whom I met yesterday
evening on coming here. The President of the
Council was coming from Florence, and, after stopping
a few hours at the villa of Cicognolo, where Victor
Emmanuel and the royal household are staying, he drove
to Torre Malamberti to confer with General Lamarmora
and Count Pettiti. The presence of the baron at
headquarters is too important an incident to be overlooked
by people whose business is that of watching the course
of events in this country. And it should be borne
in mind that on his way to headquarters Baron Ricasoli
stopped a few hours at Bologna, where he had a long
interview with Cialdini. Nor is this all; for
the most important fact I have to report to-day is,
that whilst I am writing (five o’clock a.m.)
three corps of the Italian army are crossing the Oglio
at different points all three acting together
and ready for any occurrence. This reconnaissance
en force may, as you see, be turned into a regular
battle should the Austrians have crossed the Mincio
with the main body of their army during the course
of last night. You see that the air around me
smells enough of powder to justify the expectation
of events which are likely to exercise a great influence
over the cause of right and justice the
cause of Italy.
Marcaria, July 3, Evening.
Murray’s guide will save me
the trouble of telling you what this little and dirty
hole of Marcaria is like. The river Oglio runs
due south, not far from the village, and cuts the
road which from Bozzolo leads to Mantua.
It is about seven miles from Castellucchio, a town
which, since the peace of Villafranca, marked the
Italian frontier in Lower Lombardy. Towards this
last-named place marched this morning the eleventh
division of the Italians under the command of General
Angioletti, only a month ago Minister of the Marine
in Lamarmora’s Cabinet. Angioletti’s
division of the second corps was, in the case of an
attack, to be supported by the fourth and eighth,
which had crossed the Oglio at Gazzuolo four hours
before the eleventh had started from the place from
which I am now writing. Two other divisions also
moved in an oblique line from the upper course of
the above-mentioned river, crossed it on a pontoon
bridge, and were directed to maintain their communications
with Angioletti’s on the left, whilst the eighth
and fourth would have formed its right. These
five divisions were the avant garde of the main body
of the Italian army. I am not in a position to
tell you the exact line the army thus advancing from
the Oglio has followed, but I have been told that,
in order to avoid the possibility of repeating the
errors which occurred in the action of the 24th, the
three corps d’armee have been directed to march
in such a manner as to enable them to present a compact
mass should they meet the enemy. Contrary to all
expectations, Angioletti’s division was allowed
to enter and occupy Castellucchio without firing a
shot. As its vanguard reached the hamlet of Ospedaletto
it was informed that the Austrians had left Castellucchio
during the night, leaving a few hussars, who, in their
turn, retired on Mantua as soon as they saw the cavalry
Angioletti had sent to reconnoitre both the country
and the borough of Castellucchio.
News has just arrived here that General
Angioletti has been able to push his outposts as far
as Rivolta on his left, and still farther forward
on his front towards Curtalone. Although the
distance from Rivolta to Goito is only five miles,
Angioletti, I have been told, could not ascertain
whether the Austrians had crossed the Mincio in force.
What part both Cialdini and Garibaldi
will play in the great struggle nobody can tell.
It is certain, however, that these two popular leaders
will not be idle, and that a battle, if fought, will
assume the proportions of an almost unheard of slaughter.
General headquarters of
the Italian army, Torre MALIMBERTI,
July 7, 1866.
Whilst the Austrian emperor throws
himself at the feet of the ruler of France I
was almost going to write the arbiter of Europe Italy
and its brave army seem to reject disdainfully the
idea of getting Venetia as a gift of a neutral power.
There cannot be any doubt as to the feeling in existence
since the announcement of the Austrian proposal by
the Moniteur being one of astonishment, and even indignation
so far as Italy herself is concerned. One hears
nothing but expressions of this kind in whatever Italian
town he may be, and the Italian army is naturally
anxious that she should not be said to relinquish her
task when Austrians speak of having beaten her, without
proving that she can beat them too. There are
high considerations of honour which no soldier or
general would ever think of putting aside for humanitarian
or political reasons, and with these considerations
the Italian army is fully in accord since the 24th
June. The way, too, in which the Kaiser chose
to give up the long-contested point, by ignoring Italy
and recognising France as a party to the Venetian
question, created great indignation amongst the Italians,
whose papers declare, one and all, that a fresh insult
has been offered to the country. This is the state
of public opinion here, and unless the greatest advantages
are obtained by a premature armistice and a hurried
treaty of peace, it is likely to continue the same,
not to the entire security of public order in Italy.
As a matter of course, all eyes are turned towards
Villa Pallavicini, two miles from here, where the
king is to decide upon either accepting or rejecting
the French emperor’s advice, both of which decisions
are fraught with considerable difficulties and no
little danger. The king will have sought the
advice of his ministers, besides which that of Prussia
will have been asked and probably given. The matter
may be decided one way or the other in a very short
time, or may linger on for days to give time for public
anxiety and fears to be allayed and to calm down.
In the meantime, it looks as if the king and his generals
had made up their mind not to accept the gift.
An attack on the Borgoforte tete-de-pont on the right
side of the Po, began on 5th at half-past three in
the morning, under the immediate direction of General
Cialdini. The attacking corps was the Duke of
Mignano’s. All the day yesterday the gun
was heard at Torre Malamberti, as it was also this
morning between ten and eleven o’clock.
Borgoforte is a fortress on the left side of the Po,
throwing a bridge across this river, the right end
of which is headed by a strong tete-de-pont, the object
of the present attack. This work may be said
to belong to the quadrilateral, as it is only an advanced
part of the fortress of Mantua, which, resting upon
its rear, is connected to Borgoforte by a military
road supported on the Mantua side by the Pietolo fortress.
The distance between Mantua and Borgoforte is only
eleven kilometres. The fête-de-poet is thrown
upon the Po; its structure is of recent date, and
it consists of a central part and of two wings, called
Rocchetta and Bocca di Ganda respectively.
The lock here existing is enclosed in the Rocchetta
work.
Since I wrote you my last letter Garibaldi
has been obliged to desist from the idea of getting
possession of Bagolino, Sant’ Antonio, and Monte
Suello, after a fight which lasted four hours, seeing
that he had to deal with an entire Austrian brigade,
supported by uhlans, sharp-shooters (almost a battalion)
and twelve pieces of artillery. These positions
were subsequently abandoned by the enemy, and occupied
by Garibaldi’s volunteers. In this affair
the general received a slight wound in his left leg,
the nature of which, however, is so very trifling,
that a few days will be enough to enable him to resume
active duties. It seems that the arms of the
Austrians proved to be much superior to those of the
Garibaldians, whose guns did very bad service.
The loss of the latter amounted to about 100 killed
and 200 wounded, figures in which the officers appear
in great proportion, owing to their having been always
at the head of their men, fighting, charging, and
encouraging their comrades throughout. Captain
Adjutant-Major Battino, formerly of the regular army,
died, struck by three bullets, while rushing on the
Austrians with the first regiment. On abandoning
the Caffaro line, which they had reoccupied after
the Lodrone encounter in consequence of
which the Garibaldians had to fall back because of
the concentration following the battle of Custozza the
Austrians have retired to the Lardara fortress, between
the Stabolfes and Tenara mountains, covering the route
to Tione and Trento, in the Italian Tyrol. The
third regiment of volunteers suffered most, as two
of their companies had to bear the brunt of the terrible
Austrian fire kept up from formidable positions.
Another fight was taking place almost at the same
time in the Val Camonico, i.e., north of the Caffaro,
and of Rocca d’Anfo, Garibaldi’s point
d’appui. This encounter was sustained in
the same proportions, the Italians losing one of their
bravest and best officers in the person of Major Castellini,
a Milanese, commander of the second battalion of Lombardian
bersaglieri. Although these and Major Caldesi’s
battalion had to fall back from Vezza, a strong position
was taken near Edalo, while in the rear a regiment
kept Breno safe.
Although still at headquarters only
two days ago, Baron Ricasoli has been suddenly summoned
by telegram from Florence, and, as I hear, has just
arrived. This is undoubtedly brought about by
the new complications, especially as, at a council
of ministers presided over by the baron, a vote, the
nature of which is as yet unknown, was taken on the
present state of affairs. As you know very well
in England, Italy has great confidence in Ricasoli,
whose conduct, always far from obsequious to the French
emperor, has pleased the nation. He is thought
to be at this moment the right man in the right place,
and with the great acquaintance he possesses of Italy
and the Italians, and with the co-operation of such
an honest man as General Lamarmora, Italy may be pronounced
safe, both against friends and enemies.
From what I saw this morning, coming
back from the front, I presume that something, and
that something new perhaps, will be attempted to-morrow.
So far, the proposed armistice has had no effect upon
the dispositions at general headquarters, and did
not stay the cannon’s voice. In the middle
of rumours, of hopes and fears, Italy’s wish
to push on with the war has as yet been adhered to
by her trusted leaders.