Thoroughly worldly people never understand even the world; they rely altogether on a few cynical maxims which are not true.  Once I remember walking with a prosperous publisher, who made a remark which I had often heard before; it is, indeed, almost a motto of the modern world.  Yet I had heard it once too often, and I saw suddenly that there was nothing in it.  The publisher said of somebody, “That man will get on; he believes in himself.”  And I remember that as I lifted my head to listen, my eye caught an omnibus on which was written “Hanwell.”  I said to him, “Shall I tell you where the men are who believe most in themselves?  For I can tell you.  I know of men who believe in themselves more colossally than Napoleon or Cæsar.  I know where flames the fixed star of certainty and success.  I can guide you to the thrones of the Super-men.  The men who really believe in themselves are all in lunatic asylums.”  He said mildly that there were a good many men after all who believed in themselves and who were not in lunatic asylums.  “Yes, there are,” I retorted, “and you of all men ought to know them.  That drunken poet from whom you would not take a dreary tragedy, he believed in himself.  That elderly minister with an epic from whom you were hiding in a back room, he believed in himself.  If you consulted your business experience instead of your ugly individualistic philosophy, you would know that believing in himself is one of the commonest signs of a rotter.  Actors who can’t act believe in themselves; and debtors who won’t pay.  It would be much truer to say that a man will certainly fail, because he believes in himself.  Complete self-confidence is not merely a sin; complete self-confidence is a weakness.  Believing utterly in one’s self is a hysterical and superstitious belief like believing in Joanna Southcote:  the man who has it has `Hanwell’ written on his face as plain as it is written on that omnibus.”  And to all this my friend the publisher made this very deep and effective reply, “Well, if a man is not to believe in himself, in what is he to believe?” After a long pause I replied, “I will go home and write a book in answer to that question.”  This is the book that I have written in answer to it.

But I think this book may well start where our argument started- in the neighbourhood of the mad-house.  Modern masters of science are much impressed with the need of beginning all inquiry with a fact.  The ancient masters of religion were quite equally impressed with that necessity.  They began with the fact of sin-a fact as practical as potatoes.  Whether or no man could be washed in miraculous waters, there was no doubt at any rate that he wanted washing.  But certain religious leaders in London, not mere materialists, have begun in our day not to deny the highly disputable water, but to deny the indisputable dirt.  Certain new theologians dispute original sin, which is the only part of Christian theology which can really be proved.  Some followers of the Reverend R.J.Campbell, in their almost too fastidious spirituality, admit divine sinlessness, which they cannot see even in their dreams.  But they essentially deny human sin, which they can see in the street.  The strongest saints and the strongest sceptics alike took positive evil as the starting-point of their argument.  If it be true (as it certainly is) that a man can feel exquisite happiness in skinning a cat, then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two deductions.  He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; or he must deny the present union between God and man, as all Christians do.  The new theologians seem to think it a highly rationalistic solution to deny the cat.

In this remarkable situation it is plainly not now possible (with any hope of a universal appeal) to start, as our fathers did, with the fact of sin.  This very fact which was to them (and is to me) as plain as a pikestaff, is the very fact that has been specially diluted or denied.  But though moderns deny the existence of sin, I do not think that they have yet denied the existence of a lunatic asylum.  We all agree still that there is a collapse of the intellect as unmistakable as a falling house.  Men deny hell, but not, as yet, Hanwell.  For the purpose of our primary argument the one may very well stand where the other stood.  I mean that as all thoughts and theories were once judged by whether they tended to make a man lose his soul, so for our present purpose all modern thoughts and theories may be judged by whether they tend to make a man lose his wits.

It is true that some speak lightly and loosely of insanity as in itself attractive.  But a moment’s thought will show that if disease is beautiful, it is generally some one else’s disease.  A blind man may be picturesque; but it requires two eyes to see the picture.  And similarly even the wildest poetry of insanity can only be enjoyed by the sane.  To the insane man his insanity is quite prosaic, because it is quite true.  A man who thinks himself a chicken is to himself as ordinary as a chicken.  A man who thinks he is a bit of glass is to himself as dull as a bit of glass.  It is the homogeneity of his mind which makes him dull, and which makes him mad.  It is only because we see the irony of his idea that we think him even amusing; it is only because he does not see the irony of his idea that he is put in Hanwell at all.  In short, oddities only strike ordinary people.  Oddities do not strike odd people.  This is why ordinary people have a much more exciting time; while odd people are always complaining of the dulness of life.  This is also why the new novels die so quickly, and why the old fairy tales endure for ever.  The old fairy tale makes the hero a normal human boy; it is his adventures that are startling; they startle him because he is normal.  But in the modern psychological novel the hero is abnormal; the centre is not central.  Hence the fiercest adventures fail to affect him adequately, and the book is monotonous.  You can make a story out of a hero among dragons; but not out of a dragon among dragons.  The fairy tale discusses what a sane man will do in a mad world.  The sober realistic novel of to-day discusses what an essential lunatic will do in a dull world.

Let us begin, then, with the mad-house; from this evil and fantastic inn let us set forth on our intellectual journey.  Now, if we are to glance at the philosophy of sanity, the first thing to do in the matter is to blot out one big and common mistake.  There is a notion adrift everywhere that imagination, especially mystical imagination, is dangerous to man’s mental balance.  Poets are commonly spoken of as psychologically unreliable; and generally there is a vague association between wreathing laurels in your hair and sticking straws in it.  Facts and history utterly contradict this view.  Most of the very great poets have been not only sane, but extremely business-like; and if Shakespeare ever really held horses, it was because he was much the safest man to hold them.  Imagination does not breed insanity.  Exactly what does breed insanity is reason.  Poets do not go mad; but chess-players do.  Mathematicians go mad, and cashiers; but creative artists very seldom.  I am not, as will be seen, in any sense attacking logic:  I only say that this danger does lie in logic, not in imagination.  Artistic paternity is as wholesome as physical paternity.  Moreover, it is worthy of remark that when a poet really was morbid it was commonly because he had some weak spot of rationality on his brain.  Poe, for instance, really was morbid; not because he was poetical, but because he was specially analytical.  Even chess was too poetical for him; he disliked chess because it was full of knights and castles, like a poem.  He avowedly preferred the black discs of draughts, because they were more like the mere black dots on a diagram.  Perhaps the strongest case of all is this:  that only one great English poet went mad, Cowper.  And he was definitely driven mad by logic, by the ugly and alien logic of predestination.  Poetry was not the disease, but the medicine; poetry partly kept him in health.  He could sometimes forget the red and thirsty hell to which his hideous necessitarianism dragged him among the wide waters and the white flat lilies of the Ouse.  He was damned by John Calvin; he was almost saved by John Gilpin.  Everywhere we see that men do not go mad by dreaming.  Critics are much madder than poets.  Homer is complete and calm enough; it is his critics who tear him into extravagant tatters.  Shakespeare is quite himself; it is only some of his critics who have discovered that he was somebody else.  And though St. John the Evangelist saw many strange monsters in his vision, he saw no creature so wild as one of his own commentators.  The general fact is simple.  Poetry is sane because it floats easily in an infinite sea; reason seeks to cross the infinite sea, and so make it finite.  The result is mental exhaustion, like the physical exhaustion of Mr. Holbein.  To accept everything is an exercise, to understand everything a strain.  The poet only desires exaltation and expansion, a world to stretch himself in.  The poet only asks to get his head into the heavens.  It is the logician who seeks to get the heavens into his head.  And it is his head that splits.

It is a small matter, but not irrelevant, that this striking mistake is commonly supported by a striking misquotation.  We have all heard people cite the celebrated line of Dryden as “Great genius is to madness near allied.”  But Dryden did not say that great genius was to madness near allied.  Dryden was a great genius himself, and knew better.  It would have been hard to find a man more romantic than he, or more sensible.  What Dryden said was this, “Great wits are oft to madness near allied”; and that is true.  It is the pure promptitude of the intellect that is in peril of a breakdown.  Also people might remember of what sort of man Dryden was talking.  He was not talking of any unworldly visionary like Vaughan or George Herbert.  He was talking of a cynical man of the world, a sceptic, a diplomatist, a great practical politician.  Such men are indeed to madness near allied.  Their incessant calculation of their own brains and other people’s brains is a dangerous trade.  It is always perilous to the mind to reckon up the mind.  A flippant person has asked why we say, “As mad as a hatter.”  A more flippant person might answer that a hatter is mad because he has to measure the human head.

And if great reasoners are often maniacal, it is equally true that maniacs are commonly great reasoners.  When I was engaged in a controversy with the Clarion on the matter of free will, that able writer Mr. R.B.Suthers said that free will was lunacy, because it meant causeless actions, and the actions of a lunatic would be causeless.  I do not dwell here upon the disastrous lapse in determinist logic.  Obviously if any actions, even a lunatic’s, can be causeless, determinism is done for.  If the chain of causation can be broken for a madman, it can be broken for a man.  But my purpose is to point out something more practical.  It was natural, perhaps, that a modern Marxian Socialist should not know anything about free will.  But it was certainly remarkable that a modern Marxian Socialist should not know anything about lunatics.  Mr. Suthers evidently did not know anything about lunatics.  The last thing that can be said of a lunatic is that his actions are causeless.  If any human acts may loosely be called causeless, they are the minor acts of a healthy man; whistling as he walks; slashing the grass with a stick; kicking his heels or rubbing his hands.  It is the happy man who does the useless things; the sick man is not strong enough to be idle.  It is exactly such careless and causeless actions that the madman could never understand; for the madman (like the determinist) generally sees too much cause in everything.  The madman would read a conspiratorial significance into those empty activities.  He would think that the lopping of the grass was an attack on private property.  He would think that the kicking of the heels was a signal to an accomplice.  If the madman could for an instant become careless, he would become sane.  Every one who has had the misfortune to talk with people in the heart or on the edge of mental disorder, knows that their most sinister quality is a horrible clarity of detail; a connecting of one thing with another in a map more elaborate than a maze.  If you argue with a madman, it is extremely probable that you will get the worst of it; for in many ways his mind moves all the quicker for not being delayed by the things that go with good judgment.  He is not hampered by a sense of humour or by charity, or by the dumb certainties of experience.  He is the more logical for losing certain sane affections.  Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is in this respect a misleading one.  The madman is not the man who has lost his reason.  The madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason.

The madman’s explanation of a thing is always complete, and often in a purely rational sense satisfactory.  Or, to speak more strictly, the insane explanation, if not conclusive, is at least unanswerable; this may be observed specially in the two or three commonest kinds of madness.  If a man says (for instance) that men have a conspiracy against him, you cannot dispute it except by saying that all the men deny that they are conspirators; which is exactly what conspirators would do.  His explanation covers the facts as much as yours.  Or if a man says that he is the rightful King of England, it is no complete answer to say that the existing authorities call him mad; for if he were King of England that might be the wisest thing for the existing authorities to do.  Or if a man says that he is Jesus Christ, it is no answer to tell him that the world denies his divinity; for the world denied Christ’s.

Nevertheless he is wrong.  But if we attempt to trace his error in exact terms, we shall not find it quite so easy as we had supposed.  Perhaps the nearest we can get to expressing it is to say this:  that his mind moves in a perfect but narrow circle.  A small circle is quite as infinite as a large circle; but, though it is quite as infinite, it is not so large.  In the same way the insane explanation is quite as complete as the sane one, but it is not so large.  A bullet is quite as round as the world, but it is not the world.  There is such a thing as a narrow universality; there is such a thing as a small and cramped eternity; you may see it in many modern religions.  Now, speaking quite externally and empirically, we may say that the strongest and most unmistakable mark of madness is this combination between a logical completeness and a spiritual contraction.  The lunatic’s theory explains a large number of things, but it does not explain them in a large way.  I mean that if you or I were dealing with a mind that was growing morbid, we should be chiefly concerned not so much to give it arguments as to give it air, to convince it that there was something cleaner and cooler outside the suffocation of a single argument.  Suppose, for instance, it were the first case that I took as typical; suppose it were the case of a man who accused everybody of conspiring against him.  If we could express our deepest feelings of protest and appeal against this obsession, I suppose we should say something like this:  “Oh, I admit that you have your case and have it by heart, and that many things do fit into other things as you say.  I admit that your explanation explains a great deal; but what a great deal it leaves out!  Are there no other stories in the world except yours; and are all men busy with your business?  Suppose we grant the details; perhaps when the man in the street did not seem to see you it was only his cunning; perhaps when the policeman asked you your name it was only because he knew it already.  But how much happier you would be if you only knew that these people cared nothing about you!  How much larger your life would be if your self could become smaller in it; if you could really look at other men with common curiosity and pleasure; if you could see them walking as they are in their sunny selfishness and their virile indifference!  You would begin to be interested in them, because they were not interested in you.  You would break out of this tiny and tawdry theatre in which your own little plot is always being played, and you would find yourself under a freer sky, in a street full of splendid strangers.”  Or suppose it were the second case of madness, that of a man who claims the crown, your impulse would be to answer, “All right!  Perhaps you know that you are the King of England; but why do you care?  Make one magnificent effort and you will be a human being and look down on all the kings of the earth.”  Or it might be the third case, of the madman who called himself Christ.  If we said what we felt, we should say, “So you are the Creator and Redeemer of the world:  but what a small world it must be!  What a little heaven you must inhabit, with angels no bigger than butterflies!  How sad it must be to be God; and an inadequate God!  Is there really no life fuller and no love more marvellous than yours; and is it really in your small and painful pity that all flesh must put its faith?  How much happier you would be, how much more of you there would be, if the hammer of a higher God could smash your small cosmos, scattering the stars like spangles, and leave you in the open, free like other men to look up as well as down!”

And it must be remembered that the most purely practical science does take this view of mental evil; it does not seek to argue with it like a heresy but simply to snap it like a spell.  Neither modern science nor ancient religion believes in complete free thought.  Theology rebukes certain thoughts by calling them blasphemous.  Science rebukes certain thoughts by calling them morbid.  For example, some religious societies discouraged men more or less from thinking about sex.  The new scientific society definitely discourages men from thinking about death; it is a fact, but it is considered a morbid fact.  And in dealing with those whose morbidity has a touch of mania, modern science cares far less for pure logic than a dancing Dervish.  In these cases it is not enough that the unhappy man should desire truth; he must desire health.  Nothing can save him but a blind hunger for normality, like that of a beast.  A man cannot think himself out of mental evil; for it is actually the organ of thought that has become diseased, ungovernable, and, as it were, independent.  He can only be saved by will or faith.  The moment his mere reason moves, it moves in the old circular rut; he will go round and round his logical circle, just as a man in a third-class carriage on the Inner Circle will go round and round the Inner Circle unless he performs the voluntary, vigorous, and mystical act of getting out at Gower Street.  Decision is the whole business here; a door must be shut for ever.  Every remedy is a desperate remedy.  Every cure is a miraculous cure.  Curing a madman is not arguing with a philosopher; it is casting out a devil.  And however quietly doctors and psychologists may go to work in the matter, their attitude is profoundly intolerant- as intolerant as Bloody Mary.  Their attitude is really this:  that the man must stop thinking, if he is to go on living.  Their counsel is one of intellectual amputation.  If thy head offend thee, cut it off; for it is better, not merely to enter the Kingdom of Heaven as a child, but to enter it as an imbecile, rather than with your whole intellect to be cast into hell- or into Hanwell.

Such is the madman of experience; he is commonly a reasoner, frequently a successful reasoner.  Doubtless he could be vanquished in mere reason, and the case against him put logically.  But it can be put much more precisely in more general and even aesthetic terms.  He is in the clean and well-lit prison of one idea:  he is sharpened to one painful point.  He is without healthy hesitation and healthy complexity.  Now, as I explain in the introduction, I have determined in these early chapters to give not so much a diagram of a doctrine as some pictures of a point of view.  And I have described at length my vision of the maniac for this reason:  that just as I am affected by the maniac, so I am affected by most modern thinkers.  That unmistakable mood or note that I hear from Hanwell, I hear also from half the chairs of science and seats of learning to-day; and most of the mad doctors are mad doctors in more senses than one.  They all have exactly that combination we have noted:  the combination of an expansive and exhaustive reason with a contracted common sense.  They are universal only in the sense that they take one thin explanation and carry it very far.  But a pattern can stretch for ever and still be a small pattern.  They see a chess-board white on black, and if the universe is paved with it, it is still white on black.  Like the lunatic, they cannot alter their standpoint; they cannot make a mental effort and suddenly see it black on white.

Take first the more obvious case of materialism.  As an explanation of the world, materialism has a sort of insane simplicity.  It has just the quality of the madman’s argument; we have at once the sense of it covering everything and the sense of it leaving everything out.  Contemplate some able and sincere materialist, as, for instance, Mr. McCabe, and you will have exactly this unique sensation.  He understands everything, and everything does not seem worth understanding.  His cosmos may be complete in every rivet and cog-wheel, but still his cosmos is smaller than our world.  Somehow his scheme, like the lucid scheme of the madman, seems unconscious of the alien energies and the large indifference of the earth; it is not thinking of the real things of the earth, of fighting peoples or proud mothers, or first love or fear upon the sea.  The earth is so very large, and the cosmos is so very small.  The cosmos is about the smallest hole that a man can hide his head in.

It must be understood that I am not now discussing the relation of these creeds to truth; but, for the present, solely their relation to health.  Later in the argument I hope to attack the question of objective verity; here I speak only of a phenomenon of psychology.  I do not for the present attempt to prove to Haeckel that materialism is untrue, any more than I attempted to prove to the man who thought he was Christ that he was labouring under an error.  I merely remark here on the fact that both cases have the same kind of completeness and the same kind of incompleteness.  You can explain a man’s detention at Hanwell by an indifferent public by saying that it is the crucifixion of a god of whom the world is not worthy.  The explanation does explain.  Similarly you may explain the order in the universe by saying that all things, even the souls of men, are leaves inevitably unfolding on an utterly unconscious tree- the blind destiny of matter.  The explanation does explain, though not, of course, so completely as the madman’s.  But the point here is that the normal human mind not only objects to both, but feels to both the same objection.  Its approximate statement is that if the man in Hanwell is the real God, he is not much of a god.  And, similarly, if the cosmos of the materialist is the real cosmos, it is not much of a cosmos.  The thing has shrunk.  The deity is less divine than many men; and (according to Haeckel) the whole of life is something much more grey, narrow, and trivial than many separate aspects of it.  The parts seem greater than the whole.

For we must remember that the materialist philosophy (whether true or not) is certainly much more limiting than any religion.  In one sense, of course, all intelligent ideas are narrow.  They cannot be broader than themselves.  A Christian is only restricted in the same sense that an atheist is restricted.  He cannot think Christianity false and continue to be a Christian; and the atheist cannot think atheism false and continue to be an atheist.  But as it happens, there is a very special sense in which materialism has more restrictions than spiritualism.  Mr. McCabe thinks me a slave because I am not allowed to believe in determinism.  I think Mr. McCabe a slave because he is not allowed to believe in fairies.  But if we examine the two vetoes we shall see that his is really much more of a pure veto than mine.  The Christian is quite free to believe that there is a considerable amount of settled order and inevitable development in the universe.  But the materialist is not allowed to admit into his spotless machine the slightest speck of spiritualism or miracle.  Poor Mr. McCabe is not allowed to retain even the tiniest imp, though it might be hiding in a pimpernel.  The Christian admits that the universe is manifold and even miscellaneous, just as a sane man knows that he is complex.  The sane man knows that he has a touch of the beast, a touch of the devil, a touch of the saint, a touch of the citizen.  Nay, the really sane man knows that he has a touch of the madman.  But the materialist’s world is quite simple and solid, just as the madman is quite sure he is sane.  The materialist is sure that history has been simply and solely a chain of causation, just as the interesting person before mentioned is quite sure that he is simply and solely a chicken.  Materialists and madmen never have doubts.

Spiritual doctrines do not actually limit the mind as do materialistic denials.  Even if I believe in immortality I need not think about it.  But if I disbelieve in immortality I must not think about it.  In the first case the road is open and I can go as far as I like; in the second the road is shut.  But the case is even stronger, and the parallel with madness is yet more strange.  For it was our case against the exhaustive and logical theory of the lunatic that, right or wrong, it gradually destroyed his humanity.  Now it is the charge against the main deductions of the materialist that, right or wrong, they gradually destroy his humanity; I do not mean only kindness, I mean hope, courage, poetry, initiative, all that is human.  For instance, when materialism leads men to complete fatalism (as it generally does), it is quite idle to pretend that it is in any sense a liberating force.  It is absurd to say that you are especially advancing freedom when you only use free thought to destroy free will.  The determinists come to bind, not to loose.  They may well call their law the “chain” of causation.  It is the worst chain that ever fettered a human being.  You may use the language of liberty, if you like, about materialistic teaching, but it is obvious that this is just as inapplicable to it as a whole as the same language when applied to a man locked up in a mad-house.  You may say, if you like, that the man is free to think himself a poached egg.  But it is surely a more massive and important fact that if he is a poached egg he is not free to eat, drink, sleep, walk, or smoke a cigarette.  Similarly you may say, if you like, that the bold determinist speculator is free to disbelieve in the reality of the will.  But it is a much more massive and important fact that he is not free to raise, to curse, to thank, to justify, to urge, to punish, to resist temptations, to incite mobs, to make New Year resolutions, to pardon sinners, to rebuke tyrants, or even to say “thank you” for the mustard.

In passing from this subject I may note that there is a queer fallacy to the effect that materialistic fatalism is in some way favourable to mercy, to the abolition of cruel punishments or punishments of any kind.  This is startlingly the reverse of the truth.  It is quite tenable that the doctrine of necessity makes no difference at all; that it leaves the flogger flogging and the kind friend exhorting as before.  But obviously if it stops either of them it stops the kind exhortation.  That the sins are inevitable does not prevent punishment; if it prevents anything it prevents persuasion.  Determinism is quite as likely to lead to cruelty as it is certain to lead to cowardice.  Determinism is not inconsistent with the cruel treatment of criminals.  What it is (perhaps) inconsistent with is the generous treatment of criminals; with any appeal to their better feelings or encouragement in their moral struggle.  The determinist does not believe in appealing to the will, but he does believe in changing the environment.  He must not say to the sinner, “Go and sin no more,” because the sinner cannot help it.  But he can put him in boiling oil; for boiling oil is an environment.  Considered as a figure, therefore, the materialist has the fantastic outline of the figure of the madman.  Both take up a position at once unanswerable and intolerable.

Of course it is not only of the materialist that all this is true.  The same would apply to the other extreme of speculative logic.  There is a sceptic far more terrible than he who believes that everything began in matter.  It is possible to meet the sceptic who believes that everything began in himself.  He doubts not the existence of angels or devils, but the existence of men and cows.  For him his own friends are a mythology made up by himself.  He created his own father and his own mother.  This horrible fancy has in it something decidedly attractive to the somewhat mystical egoism of our day.  That publisher who thought that men would get on if they believed in themselves, those seekers after the Superman who are always looking for him in the looking-glass, those writers who talk about impressing their personalities instead of creating life for the world, all these people have really only an inch between them and this awful emptiness.  Then when this kindly world all round the man has been blackened out like a lie; when friends fade into ghosts, and the foundations of the world fail; then when the man, believing in nothing and in no man, is alone in his own nightmare, then the great individualistic motto shall be written over him in avenging irony.  The stars will be only dots in the blackness of his own brain; his mother’s face will be only a sketch from his own insane pencil on the walls of his cell.  But over his cell shall be written, with dreadful truth, “He believes in himself.”

All that concerns us here, however, is to note that this panegoistic extreme of thought exhibits the same paradox as the other extreme of materialism.  It is equally complete in theory and equally crippling in practice.  For the sake of simplicity, it is easier to state the notion by saying that a man can believe that he is always in a dream.  Now, obviously there can be no positive proof given to him that he is not in a dream, for the simple reason that no proof can be offered that might not be offered in a dream.  But if the man began to burn down London and say that his housekeeper would soon call him to breakfast, we should take him and put him with other logicians in a place which has often been alluded to in the course of this chapter.  The man who cannot believe his senses, and the man who cannot believe anything else, are both insane, but their insanity is proved not by any error in their argument, but by the manifest mistake of their whole lives.  They have both locked themselves up in two boxes, painted inside with the sun and stars; they are both unable to get out, the one into the health and happiness of heaven, the other even into the health and happiness of the earth.  Their position is quite reasonable; nay, in a sense it is infinitely reasonable, just as a threepenny bit is infinitely circular.  But there is such a thing as a mean infinity, a base and slavish eternity.  It is amusing to notice that many of the moderns, whether sceptics or mystics, have taken as their sign a certain eastern symbol, which is the very symbol of this ultimate nullity.  When they wish to represent eternity, they represent it by a serpent with his tail in his mouth.  There is a startling sarcasm in the image of that very unsatisfactory meal.  The eternity of the material fatalists, the eternity of the eastern pessimists, the eternity of the supercilious theosophists and higher scientists of to-day is, indeed, very well presented by a serpent eating his tail, a degraded animal who destroys even himself.

This chapter is purely practical and is concerned with what actually is the chief mark and element of insanity; we may say in summary that it is reason used without root, reason in the void.  The man who begins to think without the proper first principles goes mad; he begins to think at the wrong end.  And for the rest of these pages we have to try and discover what is the right end.  But we may ask in conclusion, if this be what drives men mad, what is it that keeps them sane?  By the end of this book I hope to give a definite, some will think a far too definite, answer.  But for the moment it is possible in the same solely practical manner to give a general answer touching what in actual human history keeps men sane.  Mysticism keeps men sane.  As long as you have mystery you have health; when you destroy mystery you create morbidity.  The ordinary man has always been sane because the ordinary man has always been a mystic.  He has permitted the twilight.  He has always had one foot in earth and the other in fairyland.  He has always left himself free to doubt his gods; but (unlike the agnostic of to-day) free also to believe in them.  He has always cared more for truth than for consistency.  If he saw two truths that seemed to contradict each other, he would take the two truths and the contradiction along with them.  His spiritual sight is stereoscopic, like his physical sight:  he sees two different pictures at once and yet sees all the better for that.  Thus he has always believed that there was such a thing as fate, but such a thing as free will also.  Thus he believed that children were indeed the kingdom of heaven, but nevertheless ought to be obedient to the kingdom of earth.  He admired youth because it was young and age because it was not.  It is exactly this balance of apparent contradictions that has been the whole buoyancy of the healthy man.  The whole secret of mysticism is this:  that man can understand everything by the help of what he does not understand.  The morbid logician seeks to make everything lucid, and succeeds in making everything mysterious.  The mystic allows one thing to be mysterious, and everything else becomes lucid.  The determinist makes the theory of causation quite clear, and then finds that he cannot say “if you please” to the housemaid.  The Christian permits free will to remain a sacred mystery; but because of this his relations with the housemaid become of a sparkling and crystal clearness.  He puts the seed of dogma in a central darkness; but it branches forth in all directions with abounding natural health.  As we have taken the circle as the symbol of reason and madness, we may very well take the cross as the symbol at once of mystery and of health.  Buddhism is centripetal, but Christianity is centrifugal:  it breaks out.  For the circle is perfect and infinite in its nature; but it is fixed for ever in its size; it can never be larger or smaller.  But the cross, though it has at its heart a collision and a contradiction, can extend its four arms for ever without altering its shape.  Because it has a paradox in its centre it can grow without changing.  The circle returns upon itself and is bound.  The cross opens its arms to the four winds; it is a signpost for free travellers.

Symbols alone are of even a cloudy value in speaking of this deep matter; and another symbol from physical nature will express sufficiently well the real place of mysticism before mankind.  The one created thing which we cannot look at is the one thing in the light of which we look at everything.  Like the sun at noonday, mysticism explains everything else by the blaze of its own victorious invisibility.  Detached intellectualism is (in the exact sense of a popular phrase) all moonshine; for it is light without heat, and it is secondary light, reflected from a dead world.  But the Greeks were right when they made Apollo the god both of imagination and of sanity; for he was both the patron of poetry and the patron of healing.  Of necessary dogmas and a special creed I shall speak later.  But that transcendentalism by which all men live has primarily much the position of the sun in the sky.  We are conscious of it as of a kind of splendid confusion; it is something both shining and shapeless, at once a blaze and a blur.  But the circle of the moon is as clear and unmistakable, as recurrent and inevitable, as the circle of Euclid on a blackboard.  For the moon is utterly reasonable; and the moon is the mother of lunatics and has given to them all her name.