Constitution of United States

The most important subject that claims the attention of the traveller in any country that pretends to education or civilization, is undoubtedly its Constitution. The reader cannot expect and most probably would not wish to find, in a work like this, any elaborate account of the government of so vast and varied a republic as that of the United States. Those who wish thoroughly to grasp so very extensive a topic must study the history of each individual State from its foundation; must watch the changes each has undergone, noting the effect produced; and must carefully pore over the writings of the great men who originally planned if I may so express myself the Republic, and must dive deep into the learned and valuable tomes of Story, Kent, &c. Those who are content with more moderate information, will find a great deal, very ably condensed, in a volume by Mr. Tremenheere. To the reader, I pretend to offer nothing but a glance at such elements as appear to me most useful and interesting; and in so doing, I shall freely borrow such quotations from Mr. Tremenheere’s references to Story and Kent as I conceive may help to elucidate my subject, not having those authors at hand to refer to.

The Government of the United States consists of three departments, the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial; or the President, the House of Representatives and Senate, and the Judicial Courts. The President and Vice-President are chosen by an elective body from all the States, the said body being selected by popular vote in each State. The Vice-President is ex officio Speaker or President of the Senate, and in case of the chief dying, he becomes for the remainder of the term the President of the United States. They are elected for 4 years, but may be re-elected indefinitely. Should the votes be equal, the House of Representatives selects the President from the three on the list who have most votes, and the Senate selects the Vice in the same way. The qualifications for President and Vice are native born, 35 years of age, and 14 years’ residence in the States. The salary of the President is about 5100l. a year, and a residence at Washington, called “The White House.” The salary of the Vice-President is 1680l. a year. There are five Secretaries, State, Interior, Treasury, War, Navy, and a Postmaster-General; the Attorney-General also forms part of the Cabinet. These officials also receive the same salary. The Senate is composed of two members from each State, irrespective of population, so as not to swamp the small States. The election is by the Legislature of each State, and for 6 years; one-third of their number go out every 2 years. The qualification for a senator is that he should be 30 years of age, have been 9 years a citizen, and living in the State for which he is elected. The House of Representatives originally consisted of one member for a certain amount of population, and as the increase in population was very rapid, the number of Representatives increased as a matter of course. In 1843, it was one member for every 70,000 of population, but, to prevent the body from becoming unmanageable owing to numbers, in 1853 the House was limited to 234 Representatives, elected pro rata to the several States. Slaves are reckoned in the proportion of three-fifths of their number. The preliminary steps are, that every 10 years a census is taken, after which a bill is passed by Congress, apportioning number of representatives to each State, according to its population. This done, each State passes a law, districting the State according to the number of members assigned it, and each district elects its own representative for Congress. The election is for 2 years, and the qualification is 7 years a citizen, 25 years of age, and living in the State. The salary is the same as that of a senator. The names of members composing a division on any question in either house, are not printed unless they are demanded by one-fifth of the members present. One of the clauses of their Constitution is very original, and runs thus: “Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.”

All impeachments are tried in the Senate, and a majority of two-thirds is requisite for a conviction. If the President be on trial, the Chief Justice, or head of the Supreme Court, presides. While power of trial rests with the Senate, the power of impeachment rests solely with the House of Representatives. In addition to the ordinary functions of an Upper House, the Senate has also what is called “an Executive Session,” which is held with closed doors; at this Session all treaties and high appointments are discussed, and the appointments are not held to be valid till ratified by them. Whenever fresh land becomes sufficiently populous, the general Government admit it as territory, and appoint an administration. This was the case with Nebraska and Kansas in 1853; and the “Missouri Compromise” (which confined slavery south of the 36 3’ parallel of latitude) having been repealed, it became optional with them to adopt slavery or not. Kansas fought barbarously for the dishonourable privilege, and with temporary success: Nebraska has declined the honour as yet. The interests of territories are watched over at Washington by delegates in the House of Representatives, who have a seat, but no vote. This sensible arrangement might, in my humble opinion, be adopted in this country with reference to our colonies, whose wants at present have no interpreter intimately acquainted with colonial affairs in either branch of the Legislature.

Each State in the Union has its own Governor, House of Representatives, Senate, and Judiciary, and is in every respect a sovereign State they like the word as much as they pretend to dislike the reality acting perfectly independently within its limits, except in such cases as were mutually agreed upon by the terms of the Union, and to some of which we shall refer by and by. This sovereignty of individual States renders the elective franchise different in different States.

At the date of the first elections after the Declaration of Independence, no State admitted mere citizenship as a qualification for the elective franchise. The great men who appeared upon the stage at that period, profiting by the experience of past ages, threw certain guards around the franchise in every State in the Union, varying in different States, but all bearing unmistakeable testimony to the fact, that a perfect democracy was not the basis on which they ever contemplated building up the Republic. A few short years have rolled by; the 13 States are increased to 33, and according to Mr. Tremenheere, “a grave departure from the theory of the Constitution, as it existed in the eyes and expectations of its careful and prudent founders, has taken place, in the gradual lowering throughout nearly all the States of the Union, and the entire abandonment in two-thirds of them, of those qualifications for the exercise of the franchise which existed when the Constitution was adopted.” In one State Illinois aliens being residents are entitled to vote. Now, if the great men of 1776 thought safeguards around the franchise wise and prudent in their day, before the great tide of emigration had set in to the westward, and when the population was only 4,000,000, what would they say, could they but rise from their graves and see how their successors have thrown down the prudent barriers they had raised, and laid the franchise bare to citizenship, now that the Union numbers 23,000,000 souls, and that the tide of emigration is daily flooding them with hordes of the discontented and turbulent from every country in the Old World?

But perhaps it may be said that I, as an Englishman, am prejudiced against republican institutions in any shape; let me, then, quote you an authority which every educated American will respect. Mr. Justice Kent says, “The progress and impulse of popular opinion, is rapidly destroying every constitutional check, every conservative element, intended by the sages who framed the earliest American Constitutions as safeguards against the abuses of popular suffrage.” Let us turn to another equally eminent American authority, Mr. Justice Story. “It might be urged, that it is far from being clear, upon reasoning or experience, that uniformity in the composition of a representative body is either desirable or expedient, founded in sounder policy, or more promotive of the general good, than a mixed system, embracing, representing, and combining distinct interests, classes, and opinions. In England, the House of Commons, as a representative body, is founded upon no uniform principle, either of numbers, or classes, or places; ... and in every system of reform which has found public favour in that country, many of these diversities have been embodied from choice, as important checks upon undue legislation, as facilitating the representation of different interests and different opinions, and as thus securing, by a well-balanced and intelligent representation of all the various classes of society, a permanent protection of the public liberties of the people, and a firm security of the private rights of persons and property.”

Thus far I have quoted the opinions of the highest American authorities upon the franchise. And, as far as the lowering it in England affords us any light, I would wish some unbiased and competent person to inform the public, whether whatever other benefit it may have procured to the community it has increased or decreased bribery and corruption; and how the balance between advantage and disadvantage will stand, in reference to the community at large, by a further lowering of the franchise in this country; and also to what extent if any it can be lowered, without throwing all but unlimited power into the hands of the masses, and thus destroying that balance of the different interests of the community which are thank God still represented, and which, if once lost, would reduce our beloved Sovereign to the position of a gaudy puppet, and the House of Lords to a mere cypher, and be as certainly followed by all the horrors of a revolution, and all the evils of a corrupt democracy. How easy is it to find politicians ever ready to sniff the incense of popularity at the plausible shrine of a descending franchise! how difficult to find those who, while granting what is just and prudent, have the wisdom to plan, and the courage to dare, measures to arrest a mobular avalanche!

With regard to the frequency of elections, I will only insert the following sentence from Mr. Justice Story, as, I believe, public opinion in this country is all but universal in its condemnation: “Men, to act with vigour and effect, ... must not be hurried on to their conclusions by the passions of elections has a tendency to create agitation and dissensions in the public mind, to nourish factions and encourage restlessness, to favour rash innovations in domestic legislation and public policy, and to produce violent and sudden changes in the administration of public affairs, founded upon temporary excitements and prejudices: ... it operates also as a great discouragement upon suitable candidates offering themselves for the public service ... the period of service ought, therefore, to bear some proportion to the variety of knowledge and practical skill which the duties of the station demand.” If any annual-parliament maniac still exist, let him profit by these words of wisdom from the pen of a republican, dipped in the ink of Prudence and Patriotism; and in the marked difference between the House of Representatives and the Senate Chamber the former of whom are elected for two, the latter for six years let him behold the most incontrovertible living proof’s of their truth. John Jay, one of the most able men of America, writing to Washington, expresses his wish that the Upper House, or Senate, should be elected for life.

I will now turn to a topic which probably interests the British public more than any other except the franchise I mean the Ballot. So much has been said about the coercion of voters by those on whom they are dependent, and so much disgraceful jobbery at elections in this country has been laid bare, that if the Ballot were really a panacea for the evil, every patriot should exert his utmost energies to forward the introduction of so essential a measure. In reading any American document where the word “ballot” is used, it must be remembered that, unless the word “secret” precede it, the meaning is merely voting by an open piece of paper on which the name of the candidate is printed, and which he may enclose in an envelope or not, as he chooses. It is, therefore, only with the secret ballot we have to deal at present; for although the power to vote secretly exists, it is obvious, that unless secret voting is made compulsory, it affords no protection to those who are in a position to be bribed or coerced, inasmuch as those who did bribe or coerce would insist upon the vote so obtained being given openly.

It will perhaps astonish an Englishman to be told that “secret” ballot is all but unknown in the United States. Nevertheless, such is the case. An act was passed some four years ago in Massachusetts requiring secrecy; and what was the effect of this act? A large body of the electors met together to denounce with indignation any attempt at enforcing that which they repudiated as unworthy of freemen. So strong was this feeling that in 1853, the act which enforced it was repealed, and in the convention called to discuss the revision of their Constitution according to Mr. Tremenheere although the democratic party were in a great majority, the effort to impose secrecy was thrown out by a majority of 5000.

A friend of mine, who took considerable interest in this question, was present at the elections for the State of Massachusetts, and when, at the same time, a popular vote was to be taken on the proposed revision of the Constitution; this latter was by special enactment made compulsorily secret. How far this object was attained, the following statement will show. As the voters came up to the polling-place, tickets were offered them by the agents of the opposite parties, in a large room full of people. The voters selected whichever ticket they preferred, in the presence of the whole room, and then, in compliance with the terms of the enactment, they sealed it up in an envelope before depositing it in the voting-box. So much for compulsory secrecy. Of course on this occasion, as on all electioneering occasions, the voters might have concealed their votes, had they chosen so to do.

The only States, that I am aware of, where secrecy is enjoined by law are New York and Indiana; and in the former of these I can most certainly testify, from personal observation, that in many instances, if not in most, it is a dead letter. I never met a soul who, in talking about politics, ever thought of concealing his sentiments. I am therefore forced to the conclusion that secrecy only exists among the very lowest; and here it may be as well to introduce the opinions of the Governor of this important State. Mr. Washington Hunt, in his Message of January 7, 1851, says, “The alarming increase of bribery in our popular elections demands your serious attention. The preservation of our liberties depends on the purity of the elective franchise, and its independent exercise by the citizen, and I trust you will adopt such measures as shall effectually protect the ballot-box from all corrupting influences.”

If any efforts were made to stay the tide of corruption, the message of the same Governor the following year will enable you to judge of their success. In his address on the 6th of January, 1852, this paragraph occurs: “The increase of corrupt practices in our elections has become a subject of general and just complaint: it is represented that in some localities the suffrages of considerable numbers of voters have been openly purchased with money. We owe it to ourselves and to posterity, and to the free institutions which we have inherited, to crush this hateful evil in its infancy, before it attains sufficient growth to endanger our political system. The honest and independent exercise of the right of suffrage is a vital principle in the theory of representative government. It is the only enduring foundation for a republic. Not only should the law punish every violation of this principle as a crime against the integrity of the State, but any person concerned in giving or receiving any pecuniary consideration for a vote should, upon challenge, be deprived of the privilege of voting. I submit the subject to your consideration, in the hope that additional remedies may be prescribed and enforced.” The two foregoing extracts do equal credit to the head and heart of Governor Hunt; but what a picture do they portray of the effects of secret voting!

Let us now turn from Governor Hunt, and see what the Press says on the subject. The New York Herald, which if not highly esteemed is at least widely circulated, thus writes in the month of May, 1852: “Look at the proceedings on Thursday last in the 19th Ward. Voters carried to the ballot-boxes in scores of waggons from, various localities; and, in other wards, hundreds of democrats voting for Scott and for Fillmore, men ignorant and steeped in crime, picked up in all the purlieus of the city and purchased at a dollar a head; and some, it is said, so low as half a dollar, to deposit in the ballot-box a vote they had never seen.” The article then goes on to explain the methods employed at elections viz., a lazy fellow who wont work, brawls, and drinks, and spouts, and defames every honest man in the ward, till he becomes a semi-deity among the riff-raff, then “his position is found out by those who want to use him. He is for sale to the highest bidder, either to defeat his own party by treachery, or to procure a nomination for any scoundrel who will pay for it. He has no politics of any kind. He has rascality to sell, and there are those who are willing to purchase it, in order that they may traffic in it, and sell it to themselves again at a very high profit.... We have heard of a case in one of the Lower Wards of the city, in which one man got, at the time of the late democratic conventions, the enormous sum of two thousand dollars, out of which it is said he bribed the majority of the electors and kept the balance for himself.”

A few paragraphs further on he suggests remedies for the evil; and what do you suppose they are? First, that honest people should not leave politics to the riff-raff. Secondly, “there ought to be a registration established, by which no man could sail under false colours, or deposit a vote at a primary election, unless he belonged to the ward, and belonged to the party to which he professed to belong.” Conceive the state to which secret voting has reduced the wealthy and intelligent city of New York; absolutely, a return to open voting is considered insufficient to reach the vitals of the evil which secrecy has brought about. Here we have proposed as a remedy the compulsory register of political sentiments; and to prove that things are not mending, in the “Retrospect of the year 1852,” which forms a leading article in the same journal at the commencement of 1853, after a lengthy panegyric upon the state of America, &c., during 1852, he winds up with these most serious drawbacks to the previous eulogy: “if we are bound to admit with crimson blush that crime is sadly on the increase, and that our municipal institutions have reached the lowest depths of inefficiency and infamy, these but remind us that the work which 1852 has bravely carried on is not yet achieved.” I would wish carefully to guard against being understood to endorse the violent language employed by the New York Herald. I am aware how unsafe a guide the Press ever is in times of political excitement; but after making every reasonable allowance, enough remains to prove the tendency of the secret ballot, corroborated as it is by the authoritative message of the Governor of the State.

Let us now turn for a moment to that most witty and amusing writer, Sydney Smith. In speaking of Mr. Grote’s proposal for the ballot, the author says, “He tells us that the bold cannot be free, and bids us seek for liberty by clothing ourselves in the mask of falsehood, and trampling on the cross of truth;” and further on, towards the end of the pamphlet, he quotes an authority that Americans must respect “Old John Randolph, the American orator, was asked one day, at a dinner-party in London, whether the ballot prevailed in his State of Virginia? ’I scarcely believe,’ he said, ’we have such a fool in all Virginia as to mention even the vote by ballot; and I do not hesitate to say that the adoption of the ballot would make any nation a set of scoundrels if it did not find them so.’” John Randolph was right; he felt that it was not necessary that a people should be false in order to be free. Universal hypocrisy would be the consequence of ballot. We should soon say, on deliberation, what David only asserted in his haste, that “all men are liars." How strangely prophetic the opinion of John Randolph appears, when read by the light of the New York Herald of 1852.

It has always appeared to me that the argument in favour of ballot which is drawn from its use in clubs, if it prove anything at all, is rather against than for it; its value there arises from the fact of the independence of the members, which enables any member if asked by the rejected candidate how he had voted, to decline giving any answer without fear of consequences. Were he dependent, he must either deny the black-ball he gave, had he so voted, or, confessing the fact, he must suffer for it, and silence would be sure to be construed into a black-ball: therefore, before ballot could be of any value to a constituency, they must be independent; and if independent, there would be no need of the ballot. Of course secrecy could be obtained by falsehood. Moreover, the object of it in a club is to keep out of a select society not only those who are considered absolutely offensive, but many with whom, though you might like to meet them in general society, you do not think it desirable to be on more intimate terms; and even in a club, who will deny that it is often used to gratify private malice, and frequently, when candidates are numerous, are black-balls put in to hasten forward the election of friends? While freely confessing and deeply regretting the disgraceful jobbery and bribery which an inquiry into our own elections too often reveals, we ought to be thankful for the light of experience which a contemplation of the elective system of the United States affords, warning us as it does that an imprudent lowering of the franchise and a recourse to the secret ballot do but aggravate the evils they were intended to cure. Before we proceed to lower our franchise, should we not do wisely to try and devise some means for obtaining the votes of those already entitled to vote? Many an honest and industrious artisan at present entitled to a vote will not come to the poll on account of the violence which if not of the mobular party he may be subject to; his family depend on his exertions for their daily bread a broken limb, or any such accident happening to him, may bring the whole family to deep distress, if not to the workhouse. It appears by the Edinburgh Review of October, 1852, that at a previous general election, 40 per cent, of those possessing the privilege did not poll their votes. A hasty lowering of the franchise would certainly increase that number, and thus while losing more votes of the peaceful and industrious citizens, we should be increasing those of the more turbulent, and of those who are excited by designing demagogues.

But to return to the United States. In the former edition I omitted to explain that “a Congress” meant a Parliament for two years the term for which the representatives are elected. One of the sessions is from the first Monday in December to about the end of August, and is called the long session; the other commences the same day, and sits till the 4th March, and is called the short session; but, besides these regular sittings, there may be extra sessions as often as the President thinks fit to assemble Congress. At the time I was in the States, by a fiction very agreeable to the members, if Congress closed the session on Monday, and the President ordered its reassembling on Tuesday, the members were supposed to be at their respective homes, and received mileage payment accordingly. This snug little bonus was called “constructive mileage.”

In the year 1856 an act was passed fixing the payment of members at 1260l. each for their services in each Congress of two years, and abolishing the constructive mileage job. The only deduction from the above is that made for non-attendance of members. The payment is thus arranged: Each member receives 1d. for every day he attends in Congress; the whole number of days a session lasts are calculated at the above rate, and the difference between that amount and 630l. (the half of 1260l.) is a bonus given, at the end of the first year’s session, and is in lieu of all further payments for any extra sessions which the President may think it advisable to call during the year. It will thus be seen that each member receives the same sum, minus 1d. for every day’s non-attendance.

Mileage is allowed at the rate of 1d.. for every twenty miles distance to and fro, but only for one session each; year. The advantage Texas and Californian members obtain from this liberal allowance is obvious, and its injustice is felt by those who live in the neighbouring States to Washington.

Now, as travelling, in most parts of the Union, is at the rate of less than 2d. a mile, and living at the rate of two and a half dollars (10d.) a day, it is obvious that the situation of a representative is advantageous in a pecuniary point of view to those who wish to make a trade of politics. A member coming from a distance, say of 200 miles, and attending 120 days, would have a clear balance of about 150l. left for the rest of the year; and a member from Texas would clear about 500l. How far such a measure is wise, and brings the most desirable men into the public service, let their own countrymen tell. Mr. Venables, of North Carolina, in a speech at Richmond, Virginia (quoted by Mr. Tremenheere) says, “With money enough, any bill can be carried through Congress.” No nation and, least of all, so very sensitive a nation as the United States would pass an act which could possibly throw a cloud of doubt over the integrity of its representatives were there not some imperative necessity; the act referred to below will be found in page 363 of Appendix to Tremenheere’s Constitution of the United States, one clause of which runs thus: “That any senator or representative in Congress who, after the passage of this act ... shall receive any gratuity, or any share of, or interest in, any claim from any claimant against the United States, &c., on conviction shall pay a fine not exceeding 5000 dollars (1000l.), suffer imprisonment in the Penitentiary, not exceeding one year, or both, as the court in its discretion shall adjudge.” Another clause follows, against the knowing and wilful destruction of public documents; another, against any individual who shall tempt any member of the Senate or House of Representatives with bribe of any kind to influence his vote, and against members accepting the same. This act bears date Fe, 1853, and certainly proves that Mr. Venables’ assertion had some solid foundation in truth.

It will be remembered by some that Collins, finding the Cunard line of steamers, when supported by Government, too strong for him to contend against, applied to Congress for a Government grant. In obtaining that grant, I do not pretend to say that he, or any one on his behalf, used bribery or corruption, when he took round one of his magnificent vessels to Washington, and feasted Congress on board in a most champagnely style; but this I know, that many Americans were most indignant at the proceeding, for, coupled with the act above referred to, it could not but excite suspicion; and I feel sure, if Cunard had brought round one of his splendid steamers to the Thames, and there feasted the Legislature while his obtaining a Government grant was under discussion, he could not have taken a more effectual method to mar his object. La femme de Cesar ne doit pas être suspecte. Thus, then, as far as we can judge of any advantage to be derived from payment of members, we can see nothing to induce us to adopt such a system; and, if I mistake not, the American himself feels disposed to give it up, believing that the standard of the representative will be raised thereby.

We will now make a few remarks upon a body peculiar to America, and known as “the Lobby.” But, first, I would observe that, by a rule in both Houses, changeable at pleasure, ex-members of Congress, ministers, secretaries of legation, &c., are allowed the privilege of coming within the bar to hear debates; and of the people so privileged the Lobby is chiefly composed. They have no counterpart in this country, but may perhaps be said to have a faint and distant resemblance to our Parliamentary agents, and they are in no way recognised by Congress. Their work consists in endeavouring to force all members who purpose presenting public or private bills to employ them, which, of course, involves a “consideration;” and, as their name is “Legion,” and their motto on this point “unanimity,” they are enabled, owing to their influence with the members, to throw the greatest possible obstruction in the way of most bills which are not passed through their “greased palms.” The result need not be described. The correspondent of the Times, who, if report he correct, has held the highest situations a citizen of the United States can hold, states, in a letter to be found in that journal, on the 27th January 1857, that the Minnesota Land Bill had been said, in the House of Representatives, to be supported by bribery, and that one member openly avowed in his seat that he had been offered 1500 dollars for his vote in favour of the bill. The consequence was an inquiry into the alleged charge, and doubtless it will affect the weight of the Lobby. He adds “The Lobby has, no doubt, great influence on the Legislature, but it is not yet all-powerful.” In estimating the effect of a vote, it must be remembered that there are only 234 members in the House of Representatives, and 62 in the Senate; and, to give some idea of the interests concerned, the correspondent states “It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Federal Congress at Washington has a disposing power over twice the amount of national property subject to the votes of the Parliament at Westminster.” Those who feel an interest in this subject I would strongly urge to read the whole of the very able letter alluded to.

I have before spoken of the very great readiness with which any stranger gains admittance to Congress to listen to the debates. As a broad feature, I believe their discussions are carried on in a sober, practical, business-like manner; nevertheless, most outrageous scenes have occurred. I subjoin the following extract, not from any one sentence it contains, but from its continuity, as a proof that the tone of the House is not worthy of the dignity of so great a country. A member of any community may get up and use the most gross and offensive language; but if the offender be immediately called to order, and made to retract the offensive expressions, the community thus vindicates its character. Should, however, the most gross and offensive language be used by two members for any length of time without any interference, reprobation, retraction, or punishment, the community as a body must fairly be considered, by their silence, as endorsing such conduct.

The extract is taken from that widely circulating journal, “the Illustrated London News:

“In the House of Representatives at Washington, on the 11th ult., the following amusing but disgraceful scene occurred between two of the members Messrs. Stanly and Giddings. The former having charged the latter with uttering a falsehood, the following conversation ensued:

“Mr. Stanly: ’It is usual for one who has no regard for the decencies of life to relieve himself from responsibility by pronouncing statements false, and it is characteristic of the man who sneaked away from this House, and took his pay for work which he did not do.

“Mr. Giddings: ’When the gentleman descends to low vulgarity, I cannot follow him, I protest against Dough-faces prompting the gentleman from South Carolina.

“Mr. Stanly: ’It is the business of a scavenger to have anything to do with him, and I will have to wash my hands after handling him; but the thing has to be done, as he has thrust himself on us as a kind of censor. It is a small business for me, and I don’t know how I can descend any lower than to take hold of the hon. member for Ohio. (Cry of ‘Good.’)

“Mr. Giddings: ’Will you hear me?

“Mr. Stanly: ’Nobody wants to hear you, but I will indulge you.

“Mr. Giddings: ’The gentleman is barking up the wrong tree.

“Mr. Stanly: ’The galled jade winces again.

“Mr. Giddings: ’The gentleman sha’n’t crack the overseer’s lash to put me down.

“Mr. Stanly: ’I hope that the gentleman will not gnash his teeth so hard; he might hurt himself. Who is here playing the overseer over white men who but he, who is throwing his filthy gall and assailing everybody as Northern Whig Dough-faces, and what he calls the vile slave-holders? He is the only man who acts in that way. We don’t raise the overseer’s lash over our slaves in North Carolina. If that member was in the southern country, nobody would own him as a black man with a white skin (laughter) but he would be suffered to run wild as a free negro, and in the course of three weeks he would be brought up to the whipping-post and lashed, for stealing or slandering his neighbours. (Laughter.) If I say that he is a gentleman, I tell a falsehood.

“The Speaker (to Mr. Stanly) ’Will the gentleman suspend for a moment?

“Mr. Stanly: ’We ought to suspend that fellow (pointing to Mr. Giddings) by the neck. (Laughter.)

“Mr. Giddings: ’The gentleman from North Carolina reminds me of the boy who turned round so fast that the hind part of his breeches was on both sides. (Laughter.) The gentleman says that I was at Norristown, too; but where was he and the members of the House? Why, drinking their grog. (Laughter.)

“Mr. Stanly: ’I charge the official reporters not to let his (Mr. Giddings’) felonious hand touch one word of what I say, for we know how he on a former occasion misrepresented my colleague from the Orange district, and his own colleague from the Chillicothe district, having altered his own speech after he got to his room with his coloured friends. (Laughter.) He talks about my associates: but has anybody ever seen him in private decent company? Free negroes may call to see him. He does not let his right hand know what his left doeth. He alludes to my absence; but I have not set myself up as a standard. I don’t say I’m always in the house as I ought to be. He says we were here drinking our grog during Christmas times. Where was he? In Philadelphia, drinking beer and eating oysters with free negroes. (Laughter.) Which was the best off? Judge ye. (Laughter.) He thinks he was better off than we were. I quit this subject in disgust. I find that I have been in a dissecting-room, cutting up a dead dog. I will treat him as an insane man, who was never taught the decencies of life, proprieties of conduct whose associations show that he never mingled with gentlemen. Let him rave on till doomsday.’

“The conversation then ceased.”

Any one who has seen much of American gentlemen, must know that such language as the above contains would be reprobated by them fully as strongly as by any gentleman in this country. To doubt that would be to do them a gross injustice. Does not, therefore, the recurrence of such scenes go far to prove, that the advance of ultra-democratic principles has the effect of lowering the tone of the Representative Chamber, and that men of liberal education and gentlemanly bearing do not constitute the majority in that House? In the days of Washington, would any member have dared to use, or would any other member have for a moment tolerated, such language? It is but justice to say, that the tone of the Senate Chamber is far more dignified; and many who have been members of that body have established a world-wide reputation both as orators and statesmen.

Let us now turn for a few minutes to that important subject, the Judiciary of the States, one peculiar feature of which is, its being a co-ordinate branch of the Legislature. The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest tribunal in the country; it consists of a Chief Justice and eight associate Justices, the Attorney-General, a reporter, and a clerk. All questions affecting foreign ambassadors, consuls, &c., are tried before this court; and it is a final court of appeal in cases involving constitutional questions, and various others, too long to enumerate here. It has even the power of annulling the acts of the Federal Congress at Washington, if such acts are contrary to the Constitution.

The following article in the Constitution regulates the terms upon which alone any change may be made, and which is of so peculiar and conservative a character that I insert it in full:

“ARTICLE V. Power of Amendment.

“The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”

The foregoing article is a remarkable instance of prudence and forethought, and acts as the strongest safeguard against hasty measures, which in times of great excitement may sometimes obtain a majority that would afterwards be regretted by all parties. If the principle involved in any question is really felt to be of vital importance, the majority can dissolve the Union if they consider the object in view worth the sacrifice.

The salary of the Chief Justice is about 1050l. a-year. This court is, I believe, invariably composed of men of the highest talent and integrity; their appointment is from the President, and endorsed by the Senate, and their tenure of office is during good behaviour." There has, fortunately, been no change in the manner or term of these appointments; but, in the different States, the democratic mania has removed the old landmarks of prudence bequeathed to them by their fathers. Mr. Tremenheere tells, that in 1833 only 5 States out of the 24 had adopted the principle of electing Judges, and appointing them for a term of years; in 1844, 12 States out of the 29 had adopted the principle; and in 1853, 22 out of the 31 States had come to the same resolution. We surely have in these facts a most important warning of the danger of introducing too much of the democratic element into the constitution of any country. Reflect, if but for a moment, on the danger to the community, where the selection of the Judges of the land may be guided by political rancour or public clamour; the bare knowledge that such may be the case, even if the purity of the masses be so great as not to admit of such sinister influence, the bare possibility, I say, is calculated to lower the respect in which it is most desirable the judiciary should ever be held, and to deter the most pure and high-minded citizens from offering their services. The salaries of the Judges range from 250l. to 400l. a-year.

The next point to which I would call attention, is to be found in Art. I., sec, of the Constitution of the United States, the last clause of which runs thus: “No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.” This was probably one of the most extraordinary blunders such an able body of men as the framers of the Constitution ever made; and if their object was to guard against corruption, and the undue influence of the leading men of the country, it has most signally failed, as the Act before referred to, of February, 1853, fully testifies. Only conceive the effect of excluding all the Cabinet and high functionaries from seats in the Lords and Commons; conceive the great statesmen of this country being obliged to hand over the introduction of most important measures, and the defence and explanation of them, to other hands. On this point, Mr. Justice Story remarks: “Thus, that open and public responsibility for measures, which properly belongs to the executive in all governments, especially in a republican government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away. The executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influence, to private interviews and private arrangements, to accomplish its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives. One consequence of this state of things is, that there never can be traced home to the executive any responsibility for the measures which are planned and carried at its suggestion. Another consequence will be if it has not yet been that measures will be adopted or defeated by private intrigues, political combinations, irresponsible recommendations, by all the blandishments of office, and all the deadening weight of silent patronage; ... ministers may conceal or evade any expression of their opinions.”

In charity it should be presumed that in all nations which possess anything worthy of the name of free institutions, the ablest men of the political majority constitute the Cabinet; and, by the enactment we are considering, all this talent is excluded from the councils of the nation, whereas all the talent of the Opposition may be there arrayed against their measures. I confess it is beyond my penetration, to see how this can be reconciled to justice or common sense; in no one principle of their Government did they more completely ignore the wisdom and experience of the mother country, and in the object they had in view they appear to have most completely failed. It is but fair to the democrats to say it is no act of theirs; they inherited the misfortune, and are likely to keep it, as it is one of the fundamental principles of their Constitution, and they have a salutary dread much to their praise of tinkering up any flaw they find in that document, lest in mending one hole they make two. They have, as a nation, so greatly prospered under its combined enactments, and possess such an unlimited independence in their individual States, that although the exclusion of the Cabinet is now very generally admitted to be an error, I saw no inclination to moot the question; probably, lest other questions affecting the slave and non-slave-holding States might be brought on the boards, and again disturb the bonds of union.

Another very remarkable and in a Republic anomalous feature in the government, is the power of the President, who, by the Constitution, is enabled during his four years’ tenure of office to rule in total opposition to the majority, obstructing all the measures they may bring forward, unless the majority amounts to two-thirds in both Houses of Congress.

Article I., section 7, clause 2, runs thus: “Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to re-consider it. If after such re-consideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be re-considered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law,” &c.

This power of the President has been used by Washington, Jackson, Tyler, and Polk; particularly by Tyler, who opposed the wishes of the majority even when those wishes were backed by his own ministry. During the discussions on the Constitution, many of the wisest heads at that eventful period desired to establish the Presidency for life, but eventually the term of four years was agreed upon; and if such powers of obstructing the wishes of a majority were to accompany the office, it certainly was a prudent conclusion they arrived at. In a densely populated community like Great Britain, such powers, whether in the hands of the sovereign or the ministers, would produce a revolution in much less time than four years. It may, however, be questioned, whether these powers are not productive of evil, by rendering necessary such frequent elections for the Presidency. On this point, Mr. Justice Story states: “The inconvenience of such frequently recurring elections of the chief magistrate, by generating factions, combining intrigues, and agitating the public mind, seems not hitherto to have attracted as much attention, as it deserves.” And Chancellor Kent remarks, that “the election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular passions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue, and even hazardous to public tranquillity.”

There is another evil which attends these frequent elections of the chief magistrate namely, the enormous patronage at his disposal, and the mass of jobbery and corruption to which the exercise of it almost invariably leads. Besides the appointment of nearly ever military, naval, civil, judicial, and revenue-collecting official some of these subject, it is true to the approval of the Senate Mr. Justice Story remarks, that with regard to inferior offices “his patronage probably includes ninety-nine out of every hundred of the lucrative offices of the government.” His great rival in patronage is the Postmaster-General, who has power to appoint and remove all deputy-postmasters, which, as the number of post-offices is 22,688, amounts to something considerable.

This power was doubtless intended for the public good, and in order that incompetent or inefficient persons should be removed. To the honour of Washington, it is recorded that during his eight years’ Presidency only nine removals took place. To President Jackson they are indebted, as I have before remarked, for the introduction of the present corrupt system. According to Justice Story, on his entering office he removed 233 employes; since then, the snowball has been steadily increasing till the present moment; it has now reached an amount which it would require Mr. Babbage’s machine to calculate. Who can doubt that such vast patronage, has far more influence in the selection of a President, than any personal qualification for the high and important post? Nothing could prove more clearly that such influences are paramount to all others than the last election. There were eight candidates on the democratic side, of whom General Pierce was not one; all the eight had their special friends, and each party was loth to lose the chance of patronage which their friend’s election might reasonably lead them to hope for. Thus they fought so vigorously that there was no chance of any one having the requisite number of votes, i.e., a majority of the whole number polled.

The Convention being deputed by the different States to select from the candidates already in the field, how do they get out of the difficulty at the eleventh hour? They take upon themselves to nominate a candidate for the Presidential chair, who was not fettered by any particular followers, and from whom all parties hoped they would receive some share of the loaves and fishes as a reward for their support. The electors endorsed the new selection of the Convention, and General Pierce, lately commanding a brigade in the Mexican war, was elected by a most astounding majority. Scarcely any President was ever elected with such all-but unanimity, and the Press was equally undivided in its praises. Every paper I read, in every place I passed through, was full of the most unbounded eulogy. But mark the change a few months made. Before the end of the year, one-half of that Press, which had bespattered him with such fulsome adulation during the honeymoon of which his inauguration was the centre, were filling their columns with long and loud complaints, if not abuse. And what was the chief burden of their invective? It was the manner in which he distributed his patronage. In short, they were discontented with the share they received of the loaves and fishes, and thus the target of their adulation during the summer of hope, became the butt for their abuse in the winter of disappointment.

There is another subject connected with these elections, which speaks with warning voice against the presumable advantage of democracy. I would not be misunderstood as casting the slightest reflection upon the amiable qualities, intellectual powers, or administrative talents of any American citizen who has been raised to the Presidency during later years. Let any candid reader, however, whether English or American, look at the following lists of Presidents since the Constitution, and he cannot fail to observe that while the franchise was restricted in nearly every State, those called to that high post were the marked men of the highest talent in the country men whose reputation and abilities were patent to the whole community; while, with the increase of democracy, those selected during later years are men who, whatever their virtues and capabilities, were comparatively unknown. In the case of General Franklin Pierce, he was never even named by the community; but, as we have shown, was selected by the Convention at the eleventh hour, as a compromise of political partisanship. Let us not forget, that while some of the later Presidents were elected, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster whose names are the just pride of the Republic, and household words in every family were passed over. Surely these simple facts may afford us subject for profitable reflection.

We will now pass on from the Governor of the Republic to the Governors of individual States. Their salaries vary in different States, and range from 300l. to 2000l. a-year. Their election is in some States by the people, in others by the legislature: their term of office varies; in some States the election is annual, and in all for a very limited period; and under them each separate State has its own House of Representatives and its Senate. The chief power, which resides in the Governor alone, is that of pardon; and here we may observe, that it is only reasonable to suppose that so enlightened a community as the United States would not for any considerable number of years have tolerated the most flagrant abuse of such a power as that of pardon; and consequently that if it be found that such abuse do now exist, it must have grown with the ever-growing democratic element.

Mr. Tremenheere quotes largely from a work by Dr. Lieber, Professor of Political Philosophy in the State College of South Carolina. Among others of a similar character, the following passage occurs: “I consider the indiscriminate pardoning so frequent in many parts of the United States, one of the most hostile things, now at work in our country, to a perfect government of law.” He elsewhere states “that the New York Committee had ascertained that there are men who make a regular trade of procuring pardons for convicts by which they support themselves.” Further on he says, “To this statement we have now to add the still more appalling fact, which we would pass over in silence if our duty permitted it, that but a short time ago the Governor of a large State a State among the foremost in prison discipline was openly and widely accused of taking money for his pardons. We have it not in our power to state whether this be true or not, but it is obvious that a state of things which allows suspicions and charges so degrading and so ruinous to a healthy condition, ought not to be borne with.” He then subjoins this note: “While these sheets are going through the press, the papers report that the Governor of a large State has pardoned thirty criminals, among whom were some of the worst characters, at one stroke, on leaving the gubernatorial chair.” Among the conclusions Dr. Lieber draws on this point, is the following astounding one “That the executive in our country is so situated that, in the ordinary course of things, it cannot be expected of him that he will resist the abuse; at least, that he will not resist it in many cases.”

The foregoing extracts are certainly entitled to no small weight when it is remembered they come from the pen of a republican professor, writing upon “Civil Liberty and Self-government.” I do not pretend to say that such gross cases as those referred to by him came within my cognizance during my travels, but I most certainly did hear charges made against governors, in more than one instance, of granting pardons through corrupt influence.

I have now given a cursory review of the leading features in the executive of the United States; and I have endeavoured, while doing so, to point out the effects which the gradual inroads of the democratic element have produced. The subject is one of the deepest interest to us as Englishmen, inasmuch as it is the duty of every government to enlarge, as far as is consistent with the welfare of the nation, the liberty of the subject. The foregoing remarks on the constitution of the United States appear to me conclusive as to one fact viz., that the democratic element may be introduced so largely as that, despite a high standard of national education and worldly prosperity, its influence will produce the most pernicious effect upon the government of the country.

This truth cannot be too strongly brought forward, for undoubtedly change is the mania of the day; and as, in a free country, all constitutional changes must have a liberal tendency, it behoves our legislators to study deeply and patiently the effect produced upon any country whose constitution is more democratic than our own, so as to enable them, while steadily advancing with the age, to know when the well-being of their country requires them, as true patriots, to resist those measures which threaten injury to the social fabric committed to their guidance. No field can afford them more profitable subjects for reflection than the United States. Independent of the fact that her institutions are more democratic than our own, she possesses natural advantages that enable her to carry them out, such as we do not; and, therefore, the British statesman may always study her career with profit when any great liberal movement is being agitated in his own country.

Lest any one should be disposed to imagine that the statements I have made, or the deductions I have drawn, are merely the prejudices of a traveller brought up under a constitutional monarchy, I will add a passage showing the conclusions at which one of the ablest men in America has arrived.

Bishop Hopkins, in an address delivered before the House of Convocation of Trinity College, Hartford, after eulogizing the wisdom and patriotism, of the founders of his country, as being “the wise master builders of the noblest republic in the world,” asks what is its present state after seventy years’ brief experience? Behold the reply: “First, then, we hear on every side the charge of political corruption. Bribery is practised in all our elections. The spoils of office are expected as a matter of course by the victorious party. The President of the United States dares not be impartial; for, if he were, he would lose the confidence of his friends without gaining the confidence of his enemies. The oldest statesmen, and the most prominent, cannot follow the dictates of their own judgment and conscience without being reproached as though they were laying a trap for the presidential chair. The very laws of Congress are set down as the results of personal venality or ambition. The House of Representatives, or even the Senate Chamber, are disgraced every year by fierce passion and violent denunciation. The barbarous and unchristian duel is anticipated as quite inevitable unless it be averted by explanations which may satisfy worldly honour, in utter contempt of all religious principle. And no member of either House can go to the performance of his public duties with any security that he may not be insulted by coarse invective before the day is closed. Yet our rulers are never weary of lauding the character of Washington, as if they were quite convinced that the time had passed by when they might be expected to verify the language of praise by the act of imitation. When we look into the other classes of the community, the same charge of venality and corruption meets us again. Our merchants are accused of all sorts of dishonest management; our brokers, of stock-jobbing; our city aldermen, of bribery; our lawyers, of knavery; our justices, of complicity with the guilty. The same worship of Mammon seems to govern the whole, and the current phrase, ‘the almighty dollar,’ is a sad but powerful exponent of the universal sin which involves the mass of our population.”

Being perfectly aware what a “glass house” of corruption we ourselves are living in, I do not quote the foregoing by way of “throwing a stone,” but insert it merely as a warning of the direction in which we should not seek for an advance in purification.