515
In the sphere of natural science let
us remember that we have always to deal with an insoluble
problem. Let us prove keen and honest in attending
to anything which is in any way brought to our notice,
most of all when it does not fit in with our previous
ideas. For it is only thereby that we perceive
the problem, which does indeed lie in nature, but
still more in man.
516
A man cannot well stand by himself,
and so he is glad to join a party; because if he does
not find rest there, he at any rate finds quiet and
safety.
517
It is a misfortune to pass at once
from observation to conclusion, and to regard both
as of equal value; but it befalls many a student.
518
In the history of science and throughout
the whole course of its progress we see certain epochs
following one another more or less rapidly. Some
important view is expressed, it may be original or
only revived; sooner or later it receives recognition;
fellow workers spring up; the outcome of it finds
its way into the schools; it is taught and handed
down; and we observe, unhappily, that it does not in
the least matter whether the view be true or false.
In either case its course is the same; in either case
it comes in the end to be a mere phrase, a lifeless
word stamped on the memory.
519
First let a man teach himself, and then he will be
taught by others.
520
Theories are usually the over-hasty
efforts of an impatient understanding that would gladly
be rid of phenomena, and so puts in their place pictures,
notions, nay, often mere words. We may surmise,
or even see quite well, that such theories are make-shifts;
but do not passion and party-spirit love a make-shift
at all times? And rightly, too, because they
stand in so much need of it.
521
It is difficult to know how to treat
the errors of the age. If a man oppose them,
he stands alone; if he surrender to them, they bring
him neither joy nor credit.
522
There are some hundred Christian sects,
every one of them acknowledging God and the Lord in
its own way, without troubling themselves further
about one another. In the study of nature, nay,
in every study, things must of necessity come to the
same pass. For what is the meaning of every one
speaking of toleration, and trying to prevent others
from thinking and expressing themselves after their
own fashion?
523
To communicate knowledge by means
of analogy appears to me a process equally useful
and pleasant. The analogous case is not there
to force itself on the attention or prove anything;
it offers a comparison with some other case, but is
not in union with it. Several analogous cases
do not join to form a seried row: they are like
good society, which always suggests more than it grants.
524
To err is to be as though truth did
not exist. To lay bare the error to oneself and
others is retrospective discovery.
525
With the growth of knowledge our ideas
must from time to time be organised afresh. The
change takes place usually in accordance with new
maxims as they arise, but it always remains provisional.
526
When we find facts within our knowledge
exhibited by some new method, or even, it may be,
described in a foreign language, they receive a peculiar
charm of novelty and wear a fresh air.
527
If two masters of the same art differ
in their statement of it, in all likelihood the insoluble
problem lies midway between them.
528
The orbits of certainties touch one
another; but in the interstices there is room enough
for error to go forth and prevail.
529
We more readily confess to errors,
mistakes, and shortcomings in our conduct than in
our thought.
530
And the reason of it is that the conscience
is humble and even takes a pleasure in being ashamed.
But the intellect is proud, and if forced to recant
is driven to despair.
531
This also explains how it is that
truths which have been recognised are at first tacitly
admitted, and then gradually spread, so that the very
thing which was obstinately denied appears at last
as something quite natural.
532
Ignorant people raise questions which
were answered by the wise thousands of years ago.
533
When a man sees a phenomenon before
him, his thoughts often range beyond it; when he hears
it only talked about, he has no thoughts at all.
534
Authority. Man cannot exist without
it, and yet it brings in its train just as much of
error as of truth. It perpetuates one by one things
which should pass away one by one; it rejects that
which should be preserved and allows it to pass away;
and it is chiefly to blame for mankind’s want
of progress.
535
Authority the fact, namely,
that something has already happened or been said or
decided, is of great value; but it is only a pedant
who demands authority for everything.
536
An old foundation is worthy of all
respect, but it must not take from us the right to
build afresh wherever we will.
537
Our advice is that every man should
remain in the path he has struck out for himself,
and refuse to be overawed by authority, hampered by
prevalent opinion, or carried away by fashion.
538
The various branches of knowledge
always tend as a whole to stray away from life, and
return thither only by a roundabout way.
539
For they are, in truth, text-books
of life: they gather outer and inner experiences
into a general and connected whole.
540
An important fact, an ingenious aperçu,
occupies a very great number of men, at first only
to make acquaintance with it; then to understand it;
and afterwards to work it out and carry it further.
541
On the appearance of anything new
the mass of people ask: What is the use of it?
And they are not wrong. For it is only through
the use of anything that they can perceive its value.
542
The truly wise ask what the thing
is in itself and in relation to other things, and
do not trouble themselves about the use of it, in
other words, about the way in which it may be applied
to the necessities of existence and what is already
known. This will soon be discovered by minds
of a very different order minds that feel
the joy of living, and are keen, adroit, and practical.
543
Every investigator must before all
things look upon himself as one who is summoned to
serve on a jury. He has only to consider how far
the statement of the case is complete and clearly
set forth by the evidence. Then he draws his
conclusion and gives his vote, whether it be that his
opinion coincides with that of the foreman or not.
544
And in acting thus he remains equally
at ease whether the majority agree with him or he
finds himself in a minority. For he has done what
he could: he has expressed his convictions; and
he is not master of the minds or hearts of others.
545
In the world of science, however,
these sentiments have never been of much account.
There everything depends on making opinion prevail
and dominate; few men are really independent; the
majority draws the individual after it.
546
The history of philosophy, of science,
of religion, all shows that opinions spread in masses,
but that that always comes to the front which is more
easily grasped, that is to say, is most suited and
agreeable to the human mind in its ordinary condition.
Nay, he who has practised self-culture in the higher
sense may always reckon upon meeting an adverse majority.
547
There is much that is true which does
not admit of being calculated; just as there are a
great many things that cannot be brought to the test
of a decisive experiment.
548
It is just for this that man stands
so high, that what could not otherwise be brought
to light should be brought to light in him.
What is a musical string, and all
its mechanical division, in comparison with the musician’s
ear? May we not also say, what are the elementary
phenomena of nature itself compared with man, who must
control and modify them all before he can in any way
assimilate them to himself?
549
To a new truth there is nothing more hurtful than
an old error.
550
The ultimate origin of things is completely
beyond our faculties; hence when we see anything come
into being, we look upon it as having been already
there. This is why we find the theory of emboîtement
intelligible.
551
There are many problems in natural
science on which we cannot fittingly speak unless
we call metaphysics to our aid; but not the wisdom
of the schools, which consists in mere verbiage.
It is that which was before physics, exists with it,
and will be after it.
552
Since men are really interested in
nothing but their own opinions, every one who puts
forward an opinion looks about him right and left for
means of strengthening himself and others in it.
A man avails himself of the truth so long as it is
serviceable; but he seizes on what is false with a
passionate eloquence as soon as he can make a momentary
use of it; whether it be to dazzle others with it
as a kind of half-truth, or to employ it as a stopgap
for effecting an apparent union between things that
have been disjointed. This experience at first
caused me annoyance, and then sorrow; and now it is
a source of mischievous satisfaction. I have
pledged myself never again to expose a proceeding of
this kind.
553
Everything that we call Invention
or Discovery in the higher sense of the word is the
serious exercise and activity of an original feeling
for truth, which, after a long course of silent cultivation,
suddenly flashes out into fruitful knowledge.
It is a revelation working from within on the outer
world, and lets a man feel that he is made in the
image of God. It is a synthesis of World and Mind,
giving the most blessed assurance of the eternal harmony
of things.
554
A man must cling to the belief that
the incomprehensible is comprehensible; otherwise
he would not try to fathom it.
555
There are pedants who are also rascals, and they are
the worst of all.
556
A man does not need to have seen or
experienced everything himself. But if he is
to commit himself to another’s experiences and
his way of putting them, let him consider that he
has to do with three things the object
in question and two subjects.
557
The supreme achievement would be to
see that stating a fact is starting a theory.
558
If I acquiesce at last in some ultimate
fact of nature, it is, no doubt, only resignation;
but it makes a great difference whether the resignation
takes place at the limits of human faculty, or within
the hypothetical boundaries of my own narrow individuality.
559
If we look at the problems raised
by Aristotle, we are astonished at his gift of observation.
What wonderful eyes the Greeks had for many things!
Only they committed the mistake of being over-hasty,
of passing straightway from the phenomenon to the
explanation of it, and thereby produced certain theories
that are quite inadequate. But this is the mistake
of all times, and still made in our own day.
560
Hypotheses are cradle-songs by which
the teacher lulls his scholars to sleep. The
thoughtful and honest observer is always learning more
and more of his limitations; he sees that the further
knowledge spreads, the more numerous are the problems
that make their appearance.
561
Our mistake is that we doubt what
is certain and want to establish what is uncertain.
My maxim in the study of Nature is this: hold
fast what is certain and keep a watch on what is uncertain.
562
What a master a man would be in his
own subject if he taught nothing useless!
563
The greatest piece of folly is that
every man thinks himself compelled to hand down what
people think they have known.
564
If many a man did not feel obliged
to repeat what is untrue, because he has said it once,
the world would have been quite different.
565
Every man looks at the world lying
ready before him, ordered and fashioned into a complete
whole, as after all but an element out of which his
endeavour is to create a special world suited to himself.
Capable men lay hold of the world without hesitation
and try to shape their course as best they can; others
dally over it, and some doubt even of their own existence.
The man who felt the full force of
this fundamental truth would dispute with no one,
but look upon another’s mode of thought equally
with his own, as merely a phenomenon. For we
find almost daily that one man can think with ease
what another cannot possibly think at all; and that,
too, not in matters which might have some sort of effect
upon their common weal or woe, but in things which
cannot touch them at all.
566
There is nothing more odious than
the majority; it consists of a few powerful men to
lead the way; of accommodating rascals and submissive
weaklings; and of a mass of men who trot after them,
without in the least knowing their own mind.
567
When I observe the luminous progress
and expansion of natural science in modern times,
I seem to myself like a traveller going eastwards at
dawn, and gazing at the growing light with joy, but
also with impatience; looking forward with longing
to the advent of the full and final light, but, nevertheless,
having to turn away his eyes when the sun appeared,
unable to bear the splendour he had awaited with so
much desire.
568
We praise the eighteenth century for
concerning itself chiefly with analysis. The
task remaining to the nineteenth is to discover the
false syntheses which prevail, and to analyse their
contents anew.
569
A school may be regarded as a single
individual who talks to himself for a hundred years,
and takes an extraordinary pleasure in his own being,
however foolish and silly it may be.
570
In science it is a service of the
highest merit to seek out those fragmentary truths
attained by the ancients, and to develop them further.
571
If a man devotes himself to the promotion
of science, he is firstly opposed, and then he is
informed that his ground is already occupied.
At first men will allow no value to what we tell them,
and then they behave as if they knew it all themselves.
572
Nature fills all space with her limitless
productivity. If we observe merely our own earth,
everything that we call evil and unfortunate is so
because Nature cannot provide room for everything that
comes into existence, and still less endow it with
permanence.
573
Everything that comes into being seeks
room for itself and desires duration: hence it
drives something else from its place and shortens its
duration.
574
There is so much of cryptogamy in
phanerogamy that centuries will not decipher it.
575
What a true saying it is that he who
wants to deceive mankind must before all things make
absurdity plausible.
576
The further knowledge advances, the
nearer we come to the unfathomable: the more
we know how to use our knowledge, the better we see
that the unfathomable is of no practical use.
577
The finest achievement for a man of
thought is to have fathomed what may be fathomed,
and quietly to revere the unfathomable.
578
The discerning man who acknowledges
his limitations is not far off perfection.
579
There are two things of which a man
cannot be careful enough: of obstinacy if he
confines himself to his own line of thought; of incompetency,
if he goes beyond it.
580
Incompetency is a greater obstacle to perfection than
one would think.
581
The century advances; but every individual begins
anew.
582
What friends do with us and for us
is a real part of our life; for it strengthens and
advances our personality. The assault of our enemies
is not part of our life; it is only part of our experience;
we throw it off and guard ourselves against it as
against frost, storm, rain, hail, or any other of
the external evils which may be expected to happen.
583
A man cannot live with every one,
and therefore he cannot live for every one. To
see this truth aright is to place a high value upon
one’s friends, and not to hate or persecute
one’s enemies. Nay, there is hardly any
greater advantage for a man to gain than to find out,
if he can, the merits of his opponents: it gives
him a decided ascendency over them.
584
Every one knows how to value what
he has attained in life; most of all the man who thinks
and reflects in his old age. He has a comfortable
feeling that it is something of which no one can rob
him.
585
The best metempsychosis is for us to appear again
in others.
586
It is very seldom that we satisfy
ourselves; all the more consoling is it to have satisfied
others.
587
We look back upon our life only as
on a thing of broken pieces, because our misses and
failures are always the first to strike us, and outweigh
in our imagination what we have done, and attained.
588
The sympathetic youth sees nothing
of this; he reads, enjoys, and uses the youth of one
who has gone before him, and rejoices in it with all
his heart, as though he had once been what he now is.
589
Science helps us before all things
in this, that it somewhat lightens the feeling of
wonder with which Nature fills us; then, however, as
life becomes more and more complex, it creates new
facilities for the avoidance of what would do us harm
and the promotion of what will do us good.
590
It is always our eyes alone, our way
of looking at things. Nature alone knows what
she means now, and what she had meant in the past.