When ALMORAN was alone, he immediately
locked the door; and throwing himself upon a sofa
in an agony of vexation and disapointment, of which
he was unwilling there should be any witness, he revolved
in his mind all the pleasures and honours of supreme
dominion which had now suddenly been snatched from
him, with a degree of anguish and regret, not proportioned
to their real, but their imaginary value. Of future
good, that which we obtain is found to be less than
our expectations; but that of which we are disappointed,
we suppose would have been more: thus do the
children of hope extract evil, both from what they
gain, and from what they lose. But ALMORAN, after
the first tumult of his mind had subsided, began to
consider as well what was left him, as what had been
taken away. He was still without a superior, though
he had an equal; he was still a king, though he did
not govern alone: and with respect to every individual
in his dominions, except one, his will would now be
a law; though with respect to the public, the concurrence
of his brother would be necessary to give it force.
‘Let me then,’ says he, ’make the
most of the power that is now put into my hand, and
wait till some favourable opportunity shall offer
to increase it. Let me dissemble my jealousy
and disappointment, that I may not alarm suspicion,
or put the virtues of HAMET upon their guard against
me; and let me contrive to give our joint administration
such a form, as may best favour my design.’
Such were the reflections, with which
ALMORAN soothed the anguish of his mind; while HAMET
was busied in speculations of a very different kind.
If he was pleased at reflecting, that he was raised
from a subject to a prince; he was pleased still more,
when he considered his elevation as a test of his
father’s affection to his person, and approbation
of his conduct: he was also delighted with the
thought, that his brother was associated with him
in the arduous talk which he was now called to perform.
‘If I had been appointed to govern alone,’
said he, ’I should have had no equal; and he
who has no equal, though he may have faithful servants,
can have no friend: there cannot be that union
of interests, that equal participation of good, that
unrestrained intercourse of mind, and that mutual
dependence, which constitutes the pure and exalted
happiness of friendship. With ALMORAN, I shall
share the supreme delight of wresting the innocent
and the helpless from the iron hand of oppression;
of animating merit by reward, and restraining the unworthy
by fear: I shall share, with ALMORAN, the pleasures
of governing a numerous, a powerful, and a happy people;
pleasures which, however great, are, like all others,
increased by participation.’
While HAMET was thus enjoying the
happiness, which his virtue derived from the same
source, from which the vices of ALMORAN had filled
his breast with anguish and discontent; Omar
was contriving in what manner their joint government
could best be carried into execution.
He knew that Solyman, having considered
the dispositions of his sons, was of opinion, that
if they had been blended in one person, they would
have produced a character more fit to govern in his
stead, than either of them alone: ALMORAN, he
thought, was too volatile and warm; but he suspected,
that HAMET would sink into inactivity for want of spirit:
he feared alike ALMORAN’S love of enterprize,
and HAMET’S fondness for retirement: he
observed, in HAMET, a placid easiness of temper, which
might suffer the reins of government to lie too loose;
and, in ALMORAN, a quickness of resentment, and jealousy
of command, which might hold them too tight:
he hoped, therefore, that by leaving them a joint
dominion, he should blend their dispositions, at least
in their effects, in every act of government that
should take place; or that, however they should agree
to administer their government, the public would derive
benefit from the virtues of both, without danger of
suffering from their imperfections, as their imperfections
would only operate against each other, while, in whatever
was right, their minds would naturally concur, as
the coincidence of rectitude with rectitude is necessary
and eternal. But he did not consider, that different
dispositions operating separately upon two different
wills, would appear in effects very unlike those,
which they would concur to produce in one: that
two wills, under the direction of dispositions so
different, would seldom be brought to coincide; and
that more mischiefs would probably arise from the contest,
than from the imperfections of either alone.
But Solyman had so long applauded
himself for his project before he revealed it to Omar,
that Omar found him too much displeased with any
objection, to consider its weight: and knowing
that peculiar notions are more rarely given up, than
opinions received from others, and made our own only
by adoption, he at length acquiesced, lest he should
by farther opposition lose his influence, which on
other occasions he might still employ to the advantage
of the public; and took a solemn oath, that he would,
as far as was in his power, see the will carried into
execution.
To this, indeed, he consented without
much reluctance, as he had little less reason to fear
the sole government of ALMORAN, than a joint administration;
and if a struggle for superiority should happen, he
hoped the virtues HAMET would obtain the suffrages
of the people in his favour, and establish him upon
the throne alone. But as change is itself an
evil, and as changes in government are seldom produced
without great confusion and calamity, he applied himself
to consider in what manner the government of ALMORAN
and HAMET could be administered, so as most effectually
to blend their characters in their administration,
and prevent the conduct of one from exciting jealousy
in the other.
After much thought, he determined
that a system of laws should be prepared, which the
sons of Solyman should examine and alter till they
perfectly approved, and to which they should then give
the sanction of their joint authority: that when
any addition or alteration should be thought necessary,
it should be made in the same manner; and that when
any insuperable difference of sentiment happened, either
in this or in any act of prerogative independent of
the laws for regulating the manners of the people,
the kings should refer it to some person of approved
integrity and wisdom, and abide by his determination.
Omar easily foresaw, that when the opinion of
ALMORAN and HAMET should differ, the opinion of ALMORAN
would be established; for there were many causes that
would render ALMORAN inflexible, and HAMET yielding:
ALMORAN was naturally confident and assuming, HAMET
diffident and modest; ALMORAN was impatient of contradiction,
HAMET was attentive to argument, and felicitous only
for the discovery of truth. ALMORAN also conceived,
that by the will of his father, he had suffered wrong;
HAMET, that he had received a favour: ALMORAN,
therefore, was disposed to resent the first appearance
of opposition; and HAMET, on the contrary, to acquiesce,
as in his share of government, whatever it might be,
he had more than was his right by birth, and his brother
had less. Thus, therefore, the will of ALMORAN
would probably predominate in the state: but
as the same cause which conferred this superiority,
would often prevent contention, Omar considered
it, upon the whole, rather as good than evil.
When he had prepared his plan, therefore,
he sent a copy of it, by different messengers at the
same time, both to ALMORAN and HAMET, inclosed in
a letter, in which he exprest his sense of obligation
to their father, and his zeal and affection for them:
he mentioned the promise he had made, to devote himself
to their service; and the oath he had taken, to propose
whatever he thought might facilitate the accomplishment
of their father’s design, with honour to them
and happiness to their people: these motives,
which he could not resist without impiety, he hoped
would absolve him from presumption; and trusting in
the rectitude of his intentions, he left the issue
to God.