A sociologist wrote
to the Vali of Aleppo, asking: What are the
imports of Aleppo?
What is the nature of the water-supply? What is
the birth-rate, and
the death-rate?
The Vali replied: It is impossible
for anyone to number the camels that kneel in
the markets of Aleppo. The water is sufficient;
no one ever dies of thirst in Aleppo. How
many children shall be born in this great city
is known only to Allah the compassionate, the merciful.
And who would venture to inquire the tale of the dead?
For it is revealed only to the Angels of death
who shall be taken and who shall be left.
O idle Frank, cease from your presumptuous questioning,
and know that these things are not revealed to the
children of men.
The Bustan of Mahmud Aga el-Arnauty.
Sec 1
The Armament Ring
What, in short, are the forces that
make for the anachronistic survival of war apart
of course from the defect that it is always with us,
the habit of inertia, sometimes called Conservatism?
The obvious answer is not, I think,
the correct one. At least it is correct as far
as it goes, but leaves us very far from a complete
explanation of this unpleasant survival. So scandalous
is the interrelation of the armament firms which
has developed the world’s trade in munitions
and explosives into one obscene cartel; so cynical
is the avidity with which their agents exchange their
trade secrets, sell ships and guns, often by means
of diplomatic blackmail, to friend or foe alike, and
follow those pioneers of civilisation the missionary,
the gin merchant and the procurer, into the wildest
part of the earth; so absurd on the face of it is
the practice of allowing the manufacture of armaments
to remain in the hands of private companies; that it
is very tempting to see in the great Armament Firms
the principal if not the only cause of modern war.
Examiners of German militarism, most of them stupid
enough to quote Nietzsche, may be pardoned for emphasising
the political influence of Krupp; and since every
great Power has a more or less efficiently organised
Krupp of its own, it would be permissible to suggest
that war would be already obsolete but for the intensive
cultivation it receives for the benefit of Krupp, Creusot,
Elswick and the rest. But it would be wrong;
our syllogism would have a badly undistributed middle.
It is true that Krupp in particular, who is the actual
owner of more than one popular German newspaper, and
other armament firms in a smaller degree, exercise
an enormous influence on national opinion, create
their own markets by the threat of war, and would
go bankrupt if wars should cease. You may also
say that their shareholders live by prostituting the
patriotism of their fellow-citizens: in short,
you may denounce them with the most expensive rhetoric
to be had without doing them any injustice. But
the fact remains that their position with regard to
war is exactly analogous to that of the great breweries
with regard to drunkenness. They live by taking
advantage of human weakness. It is quite accurate,
therefore, to describe their earnings as immoral,
but they are no more the cause of the immorality they
exploit and undoubtedly encourage, than makers of
seismological instruments are responsible for the occurrence
of earthquakes. The interests of one trade alone,
however powerful in itself, would never be strong
enough to plunge a nation into war. They are,
of course, accessories to the crime; but the militarism
they are guilty of fostering has other primary explanations.
Sec 2
Eugenics?
In this brief investigation of the
possible causes of war, it must be understood that
what we want to find is what is called a “sufficient
reason” for its continued existence. The
armament trades may supply the means, the occasion,
the stimulant, but their relation to it is not essentially
causal. Many writers of another school have attempted
to prove that the sufficient reason of war is a beneficent
function of which they believe it to be capable.
This imaginary function is none other than that of
improving the race, and we may admit at once that,
if there were the slightest scientific basis for such
a belief, the bloodiest war would be morally justified,
and it would be the religious duty of every individual
to kill as many as possible of his fellows for the
benefit of their descendants. But of course modern
warfare so far from improving the race must sensibly
exhaust it. In ancient Sparta, and generally
whenever the conditions of warfare approximated to
those of personal combat, courage and the allied characteristics
of mental as well as of physical nobility must have
had a survival value; whereas in modern warfare which
makes for the indiscriminate extermination of all
combatants, the result is exactly reversed. Our
semi-scientific militarists forget that the “survival
of the fittest" is in nature essentially a process
of selective elimination; and modern war is a process
of inverted selection which eliminates the brave, the
adventurous and the healthy; precisely those members
of the community who are best fitted to survive, that
is to propagate their kind, in the ordinary environment
of political life. Conscription, indeed, spreading
a wider net than the voluntary system, may be described
as an institution for exposing the best citizens of
a state to abnormal risks of annihilation. As
a matter of historic fact we are told, though I don’t
know on what authority, that the Napoleonic wars, how
much less deadly than our own, reduced by an inch
the average height of the French nation.
So much, in brief, for the “scientific”
justification of war. It is evident that by the
eugenic argument war could be defended only if we
agreed to send into battle precisely those men whom
our recruiting officers disqualify. A good deal
might be said, from the sociologist’s point
of view, in favour of a system of cathartic conscription
which would rejuvenate England with a watchword of
“The Unfit to the Trenches.”
Sec 3
Patriotism
If again there were any evidence to
show that war and war alone kept alive the spirit
of true patriotism, it would be less easy to denounce
its manifold wickedness. For true patriotism,
although like all passionate emotion it involves a
certain mental distortion, a slight disturbance of
the rational orbit, is yet one of those happy diseases
which relieve the colourlessness of strict normality.
It is a magic, a glamour, of the nature of personal
affection, which only great poetry can fully express,
and volumes of bad poetry cannot quite destroy.
It has besides a real political value, binding the
State together, and giving it a stronger moral coherence
than can be attained by any legal or constitutional
authority; a fact that is illustrated by those distressful
countries in which its limits are not conterminous
with the political boundaries of the State. I
am inclined to think that just because true patriotism
is of the nature of a personal affection, it is an
emotion that cannot be inspired by an empire, any more
than personal affection can be inspired by a corporation
or a joint-stock company. Certainly Imperialism
more often gives rise to a sentimental worship of
force and a certain promiscuous lust for mere extension
of territory which are quite alien to the steady devotion
of the patriot to the land he knows.
Unless one be a poet, it is difficult,
as may perhaps be gathered from the preceding paragraph,
sufficiently to praise genuine patriotism without
falling into vague rhetoric. But I submit that
there is nothing to show that this political emotion
is created, stimulated, or even discovered by war.
Actually it seems that the reverse is the case, if
one may judge by the fact that war is invariably accompanied
by an overwhelming outbreak of every spurious form
of patriotism that was ever invented by the devil
to make an honest man ashamed of his country.
True patriotism is a calm and lovely orientation of
the spirit towards the vital beauty of England.
It has no noisy manifestations and consequently one
may not be able to find it among the crowds who shout
most loudly for war.
One finds instead a sort of violent
fever and calenture which not merely deflects, as
any emotion may, but totally inhibits the rational
operations of the mind. The newspapers supply
a legion of witnesses.
Thus the Evening Standard perorates
against some pacificist lecturer (who had attempted
to clear his views from all sorts of misrepresentations)
with the magnificent comment that he had not “repudiated
his remarks as to the pleasure which the tune of the
Austrian National Anthem gave him." But I should
weary you were I to transcribe a tithe of the stupid
remarks made by persons in authority under the influence
of war. The record, I believe, in England is held
at present by Mr. Bodkin, K.C.
It may be said of course that men,
and newspapers, are equally stupid in time of peace;
and I fear that fundamentally this is true. War
does not change their nature, but only brings to the
bubbling surface the dregs and vileness and scum.
War does not change any one’s nature; and that
is why it is vain to expect that under its influence
those crowds will love their country who never loved
anything before. But if war cannot create it
may at least be supposed to discover and test the existent
patriotism of the nation. And this supposition
is corroborated at first sight by the realisation
that hundreds of thousands, that actually millions
of previously ordinary young men have implied by enlisting
their willingness to die for England. One might,
of course, reason that no individual recruit really
believes he is going to be killed, that each boy thinks
he will be one of the lucky ones who escape all the
bullets unhurt to enjoy an honoured return, that recruiting
would have failed entirely if the barracks were explicitly
a grave and enlistment the certainty of violent death
or mutilation. But somehow I don’t think
that would be a fair argument. It is more pertinent
if less easy to remember that a readiness to die for
one’s country is not the highest form of political
virtue. If it be, as it is, a solemn and wonderful
thing to be willing to die for the salvation (ex
hypothesi) of England, it must be much more wonderful
and solemn to be willing to die in order slightly to
increase the income of one’s family. And
every schoolboy knows that the Chinaman of the old
regime was willing to have his head cut off for the
payment of a few dollars to his next of kin. Let
no one ever deny our soldiers the honour of their
courage and nobility; but the fact remains that the
readiness to die for England is a less adequate test
of patriotism than a readiness to live for England;
and if the readiness to live for the State rather
than for private interests had been for a hundred
years a social virtue whose votaries could be numbered
by the million, then indeed England would be to-day
a nation worth dying for.
Sec 4
The “Moral Test”
The theory that war is beneficial
as a moral test, a furnace in which character is proved ut
fulvum spectatur in ignibus aurum is
that generally adopted by the Christian Churches,
who may be said without disrespect to have taken every
advantage of their founder’s unique reference
to the sword. I cannot help thinking that there
is something fundamental in this ecclesiastical advocacy
of war; that some psychological theory could be outlined
to correlate this almost uniform advocacy with the
facts that such religious men as Tennyson and Ruskin
were among the loudest in their support of the Crimean
War, that such a militarist as Rudyard Kipling in
his best work (in Kim, in Puck of Pook’s
Hill and the intercalated poems, in the most successful
of his short stories) shows himself to be at heart
a deeply religious mystic; and that in France the
very active Clerical party, one consequence of a disestablished
Church, is always closely supported by the Chauvinists.
In many cases, however, I have no doubt that the pious
Christian, finding himself confronted with war, and
not having the moral courage or the political detachment
to condemn it, only applies automatically to its justification
the arguments which he habitually uses to explain the
existence of evil and pain. It is certain at least
that the theories of war as a Moral Test or a School
of Character bear a strong resemblance to the commonplaces
of religious consolation which almost any good Christian
will offer to the bereaved and afflicted. Any
one who has seen an innocent friend slowly tortured
to death by some vile disease will know the futility
of the Christian defence (for these religious consolations
amount theologically to a defence) that pain ennobles
the character and “proves” the moral courage
of the sufferer. The leading fallacy of the defence
that war, or pain, is valuable as a moral test is
akin to the common misunderstanding of the word “prove”
in the saying that “the exception proves the
rule”; the truth being that a strong and noble
character, one of whose corollary qualities is a capacity
to bear pain, is not less strong and noble if it is
never called upon to exercise that capacity.
The San Francisco earthquake was not a blessing in
disguise because it happened to “test”
and “prove” the strength and flexibility
of modern American architecture.
Sec 5
Trade
I shall never forget the tones of
hoarse satisfaction with which a vendor of the Evening
News disturbed the twilight of a May evening in
London, triumphantly proclaiming a “Great Troop
Train Disaster.” I had often noticed with
what apparent joy the newspapers announced the sinking
of a British cruiser; with what entirely neutral delight
they welcomed or invented the report of Terrible Slaughter
on either side. But somehow that hoarse and rufous
man with the loose lip remained in my memory and became
for me a type of one element in the population to
which war was not unwelcome; the journalistic element
that lives by exploiting the sadistic curiosity, the
craving for mean excitements, and all the gladiatorial
instinct of the modern world. It soon became clear
that the newspapers were not alone in the commercial
exploitation of war. They were not even the worst
offenders. The publishers were hurriedly producing
volume after volume of faked memoirs badly written
by imaginary governesses. The production of spurious
memoirs and “autobiographies,” even if
they are skilfully composed, is always grossly immoral;
and of the specimens occasioned by this war one may
say that if they had been genuine it would have been
possible to attribute the low morality of some Germanic
princes to the literary style of the English governesses
who had had a share in their education. The catchpenny
manoeuvres of publishers are really only a branch of
journalism, and such trivial offences were not,
after all, unexpected, because the very profession
of journalism is to take advantage. But the journalist
is a man of straw who shows which way the wind blows,
and his raucous exultation over disaster was the manifest
symbol of a commercial exploitation of war by tradesmen
and speculators which soon became sensible from one
end of belligerent Europe to the other. Like
the Vali of Aleppo, I am not good at statistics.
It is well known however without the assistance of
a mathematician that in England during the winter
of 1915, when the cost of living had already risen
by nearly 50 per cent, wholesale dealers often kept
provisions of all sorts rotting in their stores rather
than break the artificial scarcity they had created;
farmers would not sell fresh eggs when the price was
twopence-halfpenny, because they knew that in a week
or two the price for the same eggs would have risen
to threepence. Here is a cartoon from a Hungarian
paper showing the bloated profiteer of The Sugar
Trust laughing at the women who feebly attack his
barricade of sugar loaves. I mention it here
because it is sufficiently remote from English affairs,
and because it happens to come to hand, and because
it is a good fragment of evidence, there being no
reason why sugar should be scarce in Hungary as an
immediate result of the war. And from every country
between England and Hungary, from every country in
Europe, can be heard the same complaint, unmistakable
but how much too feeble, the cry of the people who
discover that one of the horrors of war is Trade.
Sec 6
Trade in Time of Peace
It would not however be correct to
infer that the sacrifice of national welfare to commercial
manoeuvres is a condition peculiar to war. Modern
commerce is essentially an art; the art of making people
pay more than they are worth for things which they
do not require. And it is with all the selfishness
of the artist that it performs its usual operations.
Among all the unpublished detail of modern life hardly
any class of facts is more disquieting than that of
commercial procedure and achievement. The subject
is too large to be reviewed in less than a volume;
and I can do no more here than suggest a few instances
that might be acquired by anyone who devotes his time
to not reading the daily papers.
The distribution and exchange of commodities
are necessary to the existence of the State; so necessary
that it might be supposed that their regulation would
be one of the primary functions of government.
Proper systems of distribution and exchange correspond
to the digestive processes of the body, on which depend
the proper nutrition of all the parts and the real
prosperity of the State as a whole; yet any comprehensive
plan for their control is still regarded as the most
unattainable dream of Utopia, and they are left to
carry on as best they can in the interstices of private
acquisitiveness. National well-being is not to
be measured by mere volume of trade, which is the means
and not the essence of prosperity; and prosperity
can certainly never exist when equitable distribution
is hindered by a sort of fatty degeneration of capitalism.
But trade in itself is a necessary aliment of the
State, and its abuses ought not to be beyond remedy.
A few of these abuses are fairly obvious
without a full inquiry, and may be illustrated here
because their existence in time of peace may throw
light on the operations of trade in belligerent states,
and indirectly, by suggesting a few of the results
of war, may lead us to some of its motives and occasions.
Such abuses may be most easily identified in opposition
to the national rights which they infringe.
Sec 7
Duties of Commerce to the State
The State has a primary right to be
fairly served. Prices should not be arbitrarily
raised by any wholesale merchant who happens to be
in a position to do so, or by any cartel of dealers
in league for that purpose. Prices should be
regulated by the cost of production, and should not
be an indication of demand; they should rise beyond
the cost of production augmented by a fair profit
only when the supply is insufficient (production not
being artificially restrained) to meet some abnormal
demand, and only as a means of checking and regulating
the excessive demand. We find instead that any
dealer or group of dealers will raise their prices
almost absent-mindedly as soon as they are in a position
to meet a demand which cannot be postponed. Thus
it is that governments are habitually overcharged
in all their contracts and purchases; because governments
have neither the time nor the opportunity for casual
dealings, and because they do not undertake such transactions
at all unless their absolute necessity has already
been decided. So at the beginning of the war English
warehouses were full of all sorts of commodities required
by the governments of the Allies; but the urgency
of war prevented any sort of bargaining; and the private
merchants took advantage of the situation to the amount
of about two hundred per cent. At present however
I am dealing with trade in time of peace and I must
not flavour the ordinary facts with any consideration
of War Office contracts. It is enough to state
the fact that in ordinary times the private tradesman
regards a special demand as an opportunity for raising
prices rather than as the stimulus of supply; a rule
which is most easily detected in the experience of
Government departments.
The State, through its individual
citizens, has a primary right to obtain the particular
commodity which it happens to prefer, without restrictions
imposed for the benefit of any particular tradesman.
We find instead that the ordinary purchaser no longer
has any effective, or selective, demand. He has
to buy what he is given. The informal organisation
of the Trust system, primarily a financial operation,
has involved the whole market in a network of interdependent
industries. The sale of the finished product
is controlled and restricted by the vendors of the
raw material. Corn is imported by shipbuilders;
ships are built by iron merchants; iron furnaces are
controlled by coal owners, and coal mines are secured
by money-lenders.
The system of the tied house, originally
an indigenous corruption of the liquor trade, is being
extended to every industry in the land. We can
no longer buy the bread we like, but have to eat whatever
by-product least interferes with the miller’s
profits.
The consumer’s loss of any power
of effective demand would not necessarily be of national
importance, if at least there were any guarantee that
the unique commodity offered by the average trust system
were genuine and of good quality. One of the State’s
most elementary rights is that of ensuring to its
citizens a pure supply of elementary commodities.
Yet Commerce has taken no steps, even in its own interests,
to suppress the horrid arts of adulteration, in which
the motives of the thief usurp the methods of the
poisoner, with results which may be inferred from
the meagre chronicles of the analyst.
Education is the life of the State.
It is therefore of the gravest importance that Commerce
should in no circumstances whatever be allowed to
interfere with the education of the future citizens.
Yet, before the war, in spite of the legislation of
the last fifty years, no less than a quarter of
a million children of school age were exempted from
school attendance for employment in various occupations.
Even apart from such improper exemptions the “School
Age” fixed by law in itself gives quite insufficient
protection. The brain of a girl hardly begins
to wake up, or take any natural interest in the acquisition
of general ideas, before she comes to puberty.
But all over London girls of thirteen or fourteen
leave school and are sent by their mothers to earn
half a crown a week matching patterns or sewing on
sequins.
More generally, the State is entitled
to demand from Commerce that it should co-operate
sincerely with the other elements in the State in
pursuing the real objects of civilisation, inspired
by an altruistic regard for the whole of which it
is a part, that is by what is really “enlightened
self-interest”; by what Plato has called Temperance
and Mr. H. G. Wells “a sense of the State."
We find instead that the trader has “day and
night held on indignantly” in his disastrous
hunt for markets, destroying by accident or design
whatever amenity in the world does not contribute
to his “one aim, one business, one desire.”
After all, in our present pre-occupation
with the horrors of war, we must not exaggerate their
extent. War at its maddest rivals but cannot,
at present, surpass the mortality caused by tuberculosis,
alcoholism and syphilis, which peaceful Commerce,
hand in hand with Christianity, carries into the remotest
parts of the earth. Some reader may have noticed
by this time that I am not a collector of statistics,
but gather my illustrations as I go from any scrap
of paper that comes to hand. It is a lazy trick;
but at any rate one escapes the fallacy of over-elaborated
evidence, by calling as witness the man who happens
to be in the street at the moment. So at this
point I happen to notice in the Manchester Guardian
an extract from the report of the Resident Commissioner
in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate.
This is what it says of the natives:
The cotton smock for women and the
cotton trousers and shirts for men, which in
the mind of the people seem now so indispensable to
professed Christianity, while reducing the endurance
of the skin, render it the more susceptible to
the chills which wet clothing engenders.
The result is colds, pneumonia, influenza eventually
tuberculosis.
We may notice a not unexpected coincidence
which the Resident Commissioner apparently omits to
mention. It is that “professed Christianity,”
by insisting on the propriety of cotton garments for
the islanders hitherto well clad in a film of coco-nut
oil and a “riri or kilt of finely worked
leaves,” is conferring a very appreciable benefit
on the Manchester trade in “cotton goods.”
“Our colonial markets have steadily grown,”
says the Encyclopædia, “and will yearly become
of greater value.” ...
On the same day as the issue of the
Manchester Guardian just quoted there appeared
in the Times Literary Supplement a review of
Canon C. H. Robinson’s History of Christian
Missions, “a very sound introduction to
a vast and fascinating study.” From this
I gather that
there are few stories more romantic
than the founding of the Uganda Christian Church
in British East Africa. At first progress was
very slow, and ... in 1890 there were scarcely
200 baptized Christians in the country; yet by
1913 those associated with the Christian Churches
were little short of half a million.
So before Europe has shown many signs
of convalescence, Africa is already virulently infected.
And “our markets will yearly become of greater
value.”
Sec 8
Restricted Sphere of Government corresponding to Restricted Sphere of
Morality
But to return to our sheep, or rather
to those who fleece them, there is one
cardinal proof that trade, in so far as it depends
on private enterprise, is a danger to the State, and
is recognised as such. It is that as soon as
war comes, the nation in danger instinctively adopts
whatever measure of Socialism can be introduced during
the temporary inhibition of capitalistic methods.
The actual coming of war induces a brief panic in
the marketplace, and during this momentary paralysis
of private acquisitors the State makes a desperate
attempt to subdue their activities to its own needs.
By the mere instinct of self-preservation it clutches
at some rudiment of Socialism, and makes a diffident
gesture in the direction of nationalisation (of
the railways, for instance). But the capitalists
of England can point with pride to the fact that they
very soon pulled themselves together. I hope to
show in the following chapter that by the time the
war was in full swing they had made it their own,
and had banished every trace of socialism, with the
relics of sanity and truth, to the confines of the
Labour press.
But still the danger was for the moment
realised, and the attempt was made, the desperate
and unsuccessful attempt to pull and squeeze and bind
the institutions of capitalism into an organised system
of political obligations. It failed because the
very abuses and intempérances of our commercial
system are a sign that the sphere of government has
not expanded with the growing complications of the
modern community. Nevertheless the attempt was
made: but no corresponding effort is being made
to extend the system of moral obligations in which
we live.
For it is just as the sphere of morality
is unduly restricted and fails to correspond to the
needs of humanity, that, on the political plane, the
unduly restricted sphere of government has never been
extended to include all the interrelations of industrial
citizenship. Capitalism is a survival of the
penultimate stage of political development, as war
is a survival of the penultimate stage of morality.
The attempts both spasmodic and continuous
to extend the sphere of government, which now begin
to affect nearly all serious legislation, must remain
incomplete without an analogous and indeed corollary
expansion of the moral system which will involve the
obsolescence of war.