ADMINISTRATION AS PRESIDENT.POLICY.RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS. PRINCIPLES RELATIVE TO OFFICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS.COURSE IN ELECTION CONTESTS.TERMINATION OF HIS PRESIDENCY.

Those sectional, party, and personal influences, which at all times tend to throw a republic out of the path of duty and safety, were singularly active and powerful during the Presidency of Mr. Adams. They were peculiar and unavoidable. His administration, beyond all others, was assailed by an unprincipled and audacious rivalry. Its course and consequences belong to the history of the United States, and will be here no further stated, or made the subject of comment, than as they affect or throw light on his policy and character.

Immediately after his inauguration, Mr. Adams appointed Henry Clay, of Kentucky, Secretary of State; Richard Rush, of Pennsylvania, Secretary of the Treasury; James Barbour, of Virginia, Secretary of War; Samuel L. Southard, of New Jersey, Secretary of the Navy; John McLean, of Ohio, Postmaster-General; and William Wirt, of Virginia, Attorney-General. The election of Mr. Adams to the Presidency depended on the vote of Henry Clay, who recognized and voluntarily assumed the responsibility. By voting for General Jackson, he would have coincided with the majority of popular voices; but, actuated, as he declared, by an irrepressible sense of public duty, in open disregard of instructions from the dominant party in Kentucky, he dared to expose himself to the coming storm, the violence of which he anticipated, and soon experienced. In a letter to Mr. F. Brooke, dated 28th of January, 1825, which was soon published, he thus expressed his views: “As a friend to liberty and the permanence of our institutions, I cannot consent, in this early stage of their existence, by contributing to the election of a military chieftain, to give the strongest guaranty that this republic will march in the fatal road which has conducted every other republic to ruin.” In a letter dated the 26th of March, 1825, addressed to the people of his Congressional district, in Kentucky, Mr. Clay more fully illustrated the motives for his vote: “I did not believe General Jackson so competent to discharge the various intricate and complex duties of the office of chief magistrate as his competitor. If he has exhibited, either in the councils of the Union, or in those of his own state or territory, the qualities of a statesman, the evidence of the fact has escaped my observation.”“It would be as painful as it is unnecessary to recapitulate some of the incidents, which must be fresh in your recollection, of his public life, but I was greatly deceived in my judgment if they proved him to be endowed with that prudence, temper, and discretion, which are necessary for civil administration.”“In his elevation, too, I thought I perceived the establishment of a fearful precedent.”“Undoubtedly there are other and many dangers to public liberty, besides that which proceeds from military idolatry; but I have yet to acquire the knowledge of it, if there be one more pernicious or more frequent. Of Mr. Adams it is but truth and justice to say that he is highly gifted, profoundly learned, and long and greatly experienced in public affairs, at home and abroad. Intimately conversant with the rise and progress of every negotiation with foreign powers, pending or concluded; personally acquainted with the capacity and attainments of most of the public men of this country whom it might be proper to employ in the public service; extensively possessed of much of that valuable kind of information which is to be acquired neither from books nor tradition, but which is the fruit of largely participating in public affairs; discreet and sagacious, he will enter upon the duties of the office with great advantages."

General Jackson was deeply mortified and irritated by Mr. Clay’s preference of Mr. Adams, and still more by his avowal of the motives on which it was founded. In a letter to Samuel Swartwout, dated the 23d of February, 1825, by whom it was immediately published, he complained bitterly of the term “military chieftain,” which Mr. Clay, in his letter to Mr. Brooke, had applied to him; and, utterly disregarding the rights and duties which the provisions of the constitution had conferred and imposed on Mr. Clay, he assumed that he was himself entitled, by the plurality of votes he had received, to be regarded as the object indicated by “the supremacy of the people’s will.” Treating the objections as personal, and as ominously bearing on his future political prospects, after insinuating that there had been “art or management to entice a representative in Congress from a conscientious responsibility to his own or the wishes of his constituents,” he declared his intention “to appeal from this opprobrium and censure to the judgment of an enlightened, patriotic, uncorrupted people.”

Not content with uttering these general insinuations against Mr. Clay and Mr. Adams, he immediately put into circulation among his friends and partisans an unqualified statement to the effect that Mr. Adams had obtained the Presidency by means of a corrupt bargain with Henry Clay, on the condition that he should be elevated to the office of Secretary of State. To this calumny Jackson gave his name and authority, asserting that he possessed evidence of its truth; and, although Mr. Clay and his friends publicly denied the charge, and challenged proof of it, two years elapsed before they could compel him to produce his evidence. This, when adduced, proved utterly groundless, and the charge false; the whole being but the creation of an irritated and disappointed mind. Though detected and exposed, the calumny had the effect for which it was calculated. Jackson’s numerous partisans and friends made it the source of an uninterrupted stream of abuse upon Mr. Adams, through his whole administration.

The Legislature of Tennessee immediately responded to General Jackson’s appeal to the people, by nominating him as their candidate for the office of President, at the next election; a distinction which he joyfully accepted, and on that account immediately resigned his seat in the Senate of the United States.

Thus, before Mr. Adams had made any development of his policy as President, an opposition to him and his administration was publicly organized by his chief competitor, under the authority of one of the states of the Union, which manifested itself in party bitterness, and animosity to every act and proposition having any bearing on his political prospects. The appointment of Henry Clay to the office of Secretary of State was seized upon as unequivocal proof of Jackson’s allegation; yet it was impossible to designate any leading politician who had such just, unequivocal, and high pretensions to that station, or one more popular, especially at the South and the West. Mr. Clay had been a prominent candidate for the Presidency in opposition to Mr. Adams. His talents were unquestionable, and a long career in public life rendered him more conspicuous and suitable for the office than any other statesman of the period. These qualifications weighed nothing in the scale of popular opinion and prejudice. The strength of opposition, based on the calumny circulated by Jackson, became apparent on every question which could be construed to affect the popularity of Mr. Adams; especially with regard to those measures which were obviously near his heart, and which tended to give a permanent and effective character to his administration.

In his inaugural address, on the 4th of March, 1825, after enumerating the duties of the people and their rulers, he proceeded to intimate the views which characterized his policy: “There remains one effort of magnanimity, one sacrifice of prejudice and passion, to be made by individuals, throughout the nation, who have heretofore followed the standard of political party. It is that of discarding every remnant of rancor against each other, of embracing as countrymen and friends, and of yielding to talents and virtue alone that confidence which, in times of contention for principle, was bestowed only on those who bore the badge of party communion.”

His thoughts on this subject were again expressed in May, 1825: “The custom-house officers throughout the Union, in all probability, were opposed to my election. They are all now in my power; and I have been urged very earnestly, and from various quarters, to sweep away my opponents, and provide for my friends with their places. I can justify the refusal to adopt this policy only by the steadiness and consistency of my adhesion to my own. If I depart from this in any one instance, I shall be called upon by my friends to do the same in many. An invidious and inquisitorial scrutiny into the personal disposition of public officers will creep through the whole Union, and the most sordid and selfish passions will be kindled into activity, to distort the conduct and misrepresent the feelings of men, whose places may become the prize of slander upon them.”

He made but two removals, both from unquestionable causes; and, in his new appointments, he was scrupulous in selecting candidates whose talents were adapted to the public service. It was averred, in the spirit of complaint or disappointment, that he often conferred offices on men who immediately coincided with the opponents and became calumniators of his administration. He was soon made to realize the impracticability of disregarding the old lines of party. On being informed, by some of his friends in the Southern States, that the objections to the appointment of Federalists were insuperable, and would everywhere affect the popularity of his administration, he observed: “On such appointments all the wormwood and gall of the old party hatred ooze out. Not a vacancy to any office occurs but there is a distinguished Federalist started and pushed home as a candidate to fill it, always well qualified, sometimes in an eminent degree, and yet so obnoxious to the Republican party, that they cannot be appointed without exciting a vehement clamor against him and the administration. It becomes thus impossible to fill any vacancy in appointment without offending one half of the communitythe Federalists, if their associate is overlooked; the Republicans, if he be preferred. To this disposition justice must sometimes make resistance, and policy must often yield.”

The intention of Mr. Adams, avowed and invariably pursued, to make integrity and qualification the only criterions of appointment to office,to remove no incumbent on account of political hostility, and to appoint no one from the sole consideration of political adherence,diminished the power of the administration. The most active members of party, who follow for reward, either of place or station, were discouraged, and preferred to continue their allegiance to those from whom pay was certain, rather than to transfer it to an administration whose continuance, from the well-known influences on which political power in this country depends, was dubious, and probably short-lived. These consequences were familiar to the mind of Mr. Adams; but his spirit was of a temper which chose rather to fall in upholding the constitution of his country on its true and pure principles, than to become the abettor of corruption, and participator in its wages, for the sake of power. The firmness of these principles was put to frequent trial during his Presidency, but his resolution never wavered.

The confiding spirit in which he conducted his intercourse with his cabinet was thus stated by himself in November, 1825: “I have given the draft of my annual message to the members of the administration, who are to meet and examine it by themselves, and then discuss the result with me. I have adopted this mode of scrutinizing the message because I wish to have the benefit of every objection that can be made by every member of the administration. But it has never been practised before, and I am not sure that it will be a safe precedent to follow. In England the message or speech is delivered by a person under no responsibility for its contents; but here, where he who delivers it is alone responsible, and those who advise have no responsibility at all, there may be some danger in placing the composition of it under the control of cabinet members, by giving it up to discussion entirely among themselves.”

His first message to Congress contained the following special recommendations: “The maturing into a permanent and regular system the application of all the superfluous revenues of the Union to internal improvement.” “The establishment of a uniform standard of weights and measures, which had been a duty expressly enjoined on Congress by the constitution of the United States.” “The establishment of a naval school of instruction for the formation of scientific and accomplished officers; the want of which is felt with a daily and increasing aggravation.” “The establishment of a national university, which had been more than once earnestly recommended to Congress by Washington, and for which he had made express provision in his will.” “Connected with a university, or separated from it, the erection of an astronomical observatory, with provision for the support of an astronomer.” Every one of these recommendations was obviously intimately associated with the progress and character of the nation, and independent of all personal or party influences. Yet they were treated with utter neglect, or, after having been permitted to pass through the forms of commitment and report, were suffered to lie unnoticed on the tables of both houses, or to be lost by indefinite postponement.

The firmness of Mr. Adams, and his independence of personal considerations, were constantly manifested. Thus, in November, 1825, when he was urged by some of his influential friends to put into his message something soothing to South Carolina, he replied: “South Carolina has put it out of my power. She persists in a law which a judge of the United States has declared to be in direct violation of the constitution of the United States, and which the Attorney-General of the United States has also declared to be an infringement of the rights of foreign nations; against which the British government has repeatedly remonstrated, and upon which we have promised them that the cause of complaint should be removed;a promise which the obstinate adherence of the government of South Carolina to their law has disenabled us from fulfilling. The Governor of South Carolina has not even answered the letter from the Department of State, transmitting to them the complaint of the British government against this law. In this state of things, for me to say anything gratifying to the feelings of the South Carolinians on this subject, would be to abandon the ground taken by the administration of Mr. Monroe, and disable us from taking hereafter measures concerning the law, which we may be compelled to take. To be silent is not to interfere with any state rights, and renounces no right of ourselves or others.”

The same trait of character is evidenced by his persisting in recommending the application of the superfluous revenue to internal improvements, notwithstanding he well knew its unpopularity in Virginia, where it was denounced as realizing the prophecy of Patrick Henry, that “the Federal government would be a magnificent government.” After delivering his first message, he was told, by a leading and influential member of Congress from Virginia, that “excitement against the general government was great and universal in that state; that opinions there had been before divided, but that now the whole state would move in one solid column.” And the same member read to him letters from Jefferson and Madison, denouncing the doctrines of the message in the most emphatic terms.

A letter from distinguished friends of De Witt Clinton, stating that his adherents predominated in the Legislature of New York, and recommending a course to conciliate their influence, was shown to Mr. Adams in 1826. On this suggestion he remarked: “A conciliatory course, so far as may be compatible with self-respect, is proper and necessary towards all; but, in the protracted agony of character and reputation which it is the will of a superior power I should pass through, it is my duty to link myself to the fortunes of no man. In the balance of politics it is seldom wise to make one scale preponderate by weights taken from another. Neutrality towards parties is the proper policy of a President in office.”

When officially informed that a senator from Georgia threatened that, unless the lands of the Creek Indians, claimed by that state as within its boundaries, were ceded, her weight would be thrown for General Jackson, Mr. Adams replied, “that we ought not to yield to Georgia, because we could not do so without gross injustice; and that, as to her being driven to support General Jackson, he felt little care about that. He had no more confidence in the one party than the other.”

A similar reply was made to an influential New York politician, who told him that the friends of De Witt Clinton would probably support the administration, but that Van Buren and his bucktails would be inveterate in their opposition. “I consider it,” said he, “a lottery-ticket whether either of those parties would support the administration.”

The opposition to the election, and subsequently to the administration of Mr. Adams, in the South, had its origin and support, as we have seen, first, in the fact that he was (with the exception of his father) the only President who had not been a slaveholder; and, next, in the fixed determination, in that section of the Union, to keep the Presidency, if possible, in the hands of an individual belonging to that class. If, from circumstances, this should be no longer practicable, then their policy would be to select a candidate who had no sympathy for the slave, and whose subserviency to the supremacy of Southern interests was unquestionable. The attempt to extinguish slavery in Missouri, although it had resulted in what was called the Missouri compromise, had created towards all who were not slaveholders a feverish jealousy in the South, which descended on Mr. Adams with double violence because his free spirit was known. This was not diminished by the fact that he had, neither in act nor language, ever transcended the provisions of the constitution, but had, in every instance, fully recognized its obligations.

In February, 1826, two resolutions, which had been adopted in executive session, were brought to Mr. Adams. The first declared “that the expediency of the Panama mission ought to be debated in Senate with open doors, unless the publication of the documents, to which it would be necessary to refer in debate, would prejudice existing negotiations. The second was a respectful request to the President of the United States to inform the Senate whether such objection exists to the publication of all or any part of those documents; and, if so, to specify to what part it applies.”

“These resolutions,” said Mr. Adams, “are the fruit of the ingenuity of Martin Van Buren, and bear the impress of his character. The resolution to debate an executive nomination with open doors is without example; and the thirty-sixth rule of the Senate is explicit and unqualified, that all documents communicated in confidence by the President to the Senate shall be kept secret by the members. The request to me to specify the particular documents the publication of which would affect negotiations was delicate and ensnaring. The limitation was not of papers the publication of which might be injurious, but merely of such as would affect existing negotiations; and, this being necessarily a matter of opinion, if I should specify passages in the document as of such a character, any senator might make it a question for discussion in the Senate, and they might finally publish the whole, under color of entertaining an opinion different from mine upon the probable effect of the publication. Besides, should the precedent once be established of opening the doors of the Senate in the midst of a debate upon executive business, there would be no prospect of ever keeping them shut again. I answered the resolution of the Senate by a message stating that all the communications I had made on this subject had been confidential; and that, believing it important to the public interest that the confidence between the Executive and the Senate should continue unimpaired, I should leave to themselves the determination of a question, upon the motives of which, not being informed, I was not competent to decide.”

When the intrigues which embarrassed and disturbed the Presidency of Mr. Adams were in full vigor, his spirit and strength of character were conspicuously manifested. In April, 1827, whilst the state elections were pending, letters were shown to him complaining that the administration did not support its friends, and intimating that time and money must be sacrificed to his success. Mr. Adams remarked: “I have observed the tendency of our elections to venality, and shall not encourage it. There is much money expended by the adversaries of the administration, and it runs chiefly in the channels of the press. They work by slander to vitiate the public spirit, and pay for defamation, to receive their reward in votes.”

At the beginning of the third year of his term of office the currents of party began to run strongly towards the approaching struggle for the Presidency. Mr. Adams, writing concerning the aspects of the time, remarked. “General politics and electioneering topics appear to be the only material of interest and of discourse to men in the public service. There are in several states, at this time, and Maryland is one of them, meetings and counter meetings, committees of correspondence, delegations, and addresses, for and against the administration; and thousands of persons are occupied with little else than to work up the passions of the people preparatory to the presidential election, still more than eighteen months distant.”

Complaints were constantly made that the administration neglected its friends, and gave offices to its enemies. Applications for appointments, especially for clerkships, in the departments, were continual, and were often made to Mr. Adams himself. He always refused to interfere directly, or by influence, unless his opinion was sought by the heads of the departments themselves, saying that to them the selection and responsibility properly belonged. “One of the heaviest burdens of my station,” he observed, “is to hear applications for office, often urged, accompanied with the cry of distress, almost every day in the year, sometimes several times in the day, and having it scarcely ever in my power to administer the desired relief.”

In May, 1827, Mr. Adams wrote to a friend: “Mr. Van Buren paid me a visit this morning. He is on his return from a tour through Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, with C. C. Cambreling, since the close of the last session of Congress. They are generally understood to be electioneering; and Van Buren is now the great manager for Jackson, as he was, before the last election, for Mr. Crawford. He is now acting over the part in the Union which Aaron Burr performed in 1799. Van Buren, however, has improved, in the art of electioneering, upon Burr, as the State of New York has grown in relative strength and importance in the Union. Van Buren has now every prospect of success in his present movements, and he will avoid the rock on which Burr afterwards split.” These general conclusions, formed on observation and knowledge of character, projects, and movements, time has proved to be just. At this day there can be no doubt that, during a tour through the Southern section of the Union, in April and May, 1827, by Van Buren and Cambreling, one a senator, the other a representative in Congress from New York, an alliance was formed between the former and Jackson, having for its object to supersede Mr. Adams and to elevate themselves in succession to the Presidency. The result is illustrative of the means and the arts by which ambition shapes the destinies of republics, by pampering the passions and prejudices of the multitude, by casting malign suggestions on laborious merit, effective talent, and faithful services.

In June, 1827, some of the friends of Mr. Adams urged him to attend the celebration at the opening of the Pennsylvania Canal, to meet the German farmers, and speak to them in their own language. He replied: “I am highly obliged to my friends for their good opinion; but this mode of electioneering is suited neither to my taste nor my principles. I think it equally unsuitable to my personal character, and to the station in which I am placed.”

As the year drew towards the close, Van Buren, who had increased his influence by union with De Witt Clinton, triumphed throughout the State of New York. “The consequences,” said Mr. Adams, “are decisive on the next presidential election; but the principles on which my administration has been conducted cannot be overthrown. A session of Congress of unexampled violence and fury is anticipated by its friends. My own mind is made up for it. I have only to ask that as my day is so may my strength be.”

A letter from Thomas Mann Randolph, on the opinions of Mr. Jefferson relative to the last presidential election, which had been recently published in Ohio, was at this time shown to Mr. Adams, and it was proposed to him to publish a letter to his father from Mr. Jefferson, on that subject; which he declined, saying: “The letter is not here, but if it were I would not publish it. I possess it only as executor to my father; and, it having been confidential, the executors of Mr. Jefferson have undoubtedly a copy of it, and, as depositaries of his confidence, are the only persons who can, with propriety, authorize its publication.” He added: “The divulging private and confidential letters is one of the worst features of electioneering practised among us. Though often tempted and provoked to it, I have constantly refrained from it.”

At this period Mr. Rush read to Mr. Adams his report on the finances, in which he largely discussed the policy of encouraging and protecting domestic manufactures. “It will, of course,” said Mr. Adams, “be roughly handled in Congress and out of it; but the policy it recommends will outlive the blast of faction, and abide the test of time.”

At the opening of the Twentieth Congress, in December, 1827, the election of Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, a man decidedly hostile to the administration, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, manifested that the opposition had now gained a majority in both houses of Congress; a state of affairs which had never before occurred under the government of the United States.

Mr. Adams, being informed that it was Mr. Clay’s intention to issue another pamphlet in refutation of the charge of bargaining and corruption, which General Jackson and his partisans under his authority had brought against them both, remarked: “They have been already amply refuted; but, in the excitement of contested elections, and of party spirit, judgment becomes the slave of the will. Men of intelligence, talent, and even of integrity upon other occasions, surrender themselves to their passions, believe anything, with and without, and even against evidence, according as it suits their own wishes.”

Mr. Clay and his friends were not disposed to permit a calumny so opprobrious to pass without disproof; yet during two years they could only oppose to it a general denial; but, in March, 1827, a letter from Mr. Carter Beverly, a friend of General Jackson, came into their possession, by which it appeared that Jackson, before a large company, in Beverly’s presence, had declared that, “concerning the election of Mr. Adams to the Presidency, Mr. Clay’s friends made a proposition to his friends, that if they would promise for him not to put Mr. Adams into the seat of Secretary of State, Mr. Clay and his friends would in one hour make him the President;"a proposition which, Jackson said, he indignantly rejected. No sooner was this statement made known to Mr. Clay, than he pronounced it “a gross fabrication, of a calumnious character, put forth for the double purpose of injuring his public character and propping up the cause of General Jackson; and that, for himself and his friends, he defied the substantiation of the charge before any fair tribunal whatever.” This compelled General Jackson, in self-defence, to come before the public; and in a letter to Carter Beverly, dated the 5th of June, 1827, he made specific charges against Mr. Clay and Mr. Adams. He stated that early in January, 1825, a member of Congress, of high respectability, informed him that there was a great intrigue going on, which it was right he should know; that the friends of Mr. Adams had made overtures to the friends of Mr. Clay, that if they would unite in the election of Mr. Adams, Mr. Clay should be Secretary of State; that the friends of Mr. Adams were urging, as a reason to induce the friends of Mr. Clay to accede to their proposition, that if he (Gen. Jackson) was elected President, Mr. Adams would be continued Secretary of State [Innuendo, there would be no room for Kentucky]; that the friends of Mr. Clay stated, that the West did not wish to separate from the West, and if he would say, or permit any of his confidential friends to say, that, in case he was elected President, Mr. Adams should not be continued Secretary of State, by a complete union of Mr. Clay and his friends they would put an end to the presidential contest in one hour; and that this respectable member of Congress declared that he was of opinion it was right to fight such intriguers with their own weapons. To which General Jackson replied, that he would never step into the presidential chair by such means of bargain and corruption; and added, that the second day after this communication and reply, it was announced in the newspapers that Mr. Clay had come out openly and avowedly in favor of Mr. Adams.

To this accusation Mr. Clay, in a letter to the public, dated the 4th of July, 1827, made “a direct, unqualified, and indignant denial,” and called on General Jackson “to substantiate his charges by satisfactory evidence.” General Jackson immediately gave to the public the name of James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, as “the respectable member of Congress” who made to him this communication and proposition. This declaration compelled Mr. Buchanan to come before the public; who accordingly, in a letter dated the 8th of August, 1827, published to the world what he declared to be “the only conversation which he ever held with General Jackson,” in which he stated to him that, having heard a rumor that he intended, in case of his election, to appoint Mr. Adams Secretary of State, and thinking such an appointment would “cool the ardor of his friends,” he called on him, and informed him of the rumor, and asked him whether he had ever intimated such intention; that Jackson replied he had not, and that, if elected President, he would enter upon the office untrammelled; and that this was substantially the whole conversation. Mr. Buchanan added, that he did not call upon General Jackson as the agent of Mr. Clay, or his friends, which he was not; and that he was incapable of entertaining the opinion Jackson had charged him with, that “it was right to fight such intriguers with their own weapons;” and that he thought that Jackson “could not have received this impression until after Mr. Clay and his friends had actually elected Mr. Adams President, and Mr. Adams had appointed Mr. Clay Secretary of State.”

A more full, direct, and conclusive contradiction of every fact asserted by General Jackson is impossible. Yet it had no effect upon his prospects or policy. His partisans continued to propagate the calumny, and profess their belief in it; and he gave encouragement to this course by maintaining a scrupulous silence on Mr. Buchanan’s contradiction. Mr. Clay, speaking on this point, observed: “After Mr. Buchanan’s statement appeared, there were many persons who believed that General Jackson’s magnanimity would immediately prompt him to retract his charge. I did not participate in that just expectation, and therefore felt no disappointment that it was not realized."

The calumny had done its work. It had been, for more than two years, cankering the public mind. General Jackson realized that it was an efficient means of victory, and was not disposed to diminish its power. His partisans, as Mr. Adams anticipated, had “surrendered themselves to their passions, and believed, without evidence and against evidence, as suited their own wishes.”

The inveteracy of opposition to the administration of Mr. Adams was systematic, violent, and unprincipled. Party spirit determined that it should be prostrated. It was stated publicly that “a highly-respected member of Congress, of General Jackson’s party, had declared that it was to be put down though it be as pure as the angels which stand at the right hand of the throne of God.” No respect was paid, no regard had, for either faithful services or acknowledged integrity. An administration conducted on the most elevated and consistent principles, as far above party and selfish motives as it is possible for human beings to attain, was destined to be sacrificed. General Jackson entered upon his civil career in the spirit of a military chieftain. He knew well how to collect round his standard those intriguers in the free states who were content to adopt his badge, and ride into power in his train. Of the slave states he was sure, from both affinity and policy.

Mr. Clay, in his address to the public in December, 1827, thus represents the spirit of General Jackson’s party at that period: “The rancor of party spirit spares nothing. It penetrates and pervades everywhere. It does not scruple to violate the sanctity of social and private intercourse. It substitutes for facts dark surmises and malevolent insinuations. It misrepresents, and holds up in false and insidious lights, incidents perfectly harmless in themselves, of ordinary occurrence, or of mere common civility.”

During these agitations Mr. Adams was diligently watching over the great interests of the country, and assiduously fulfilling the duties of his station, and no further interesting himself in the struggles of party than when compelled to notice them by their virulence, or by the earnestness of political friends. A member of the Senate having asked him how the interdiction of commerce by our vessels with the British colonies could be counteracted, “My opinion is,” he replied, “that there should be an act of Congress totally interdicting the trade with all her colonies, both in the West Indies and North America; but the same act should provide for reopening the trade, upon terms of reciprocity, whenever Great Britain should be disposed to assent to them.”

Early in 1828 Mr. Adams was informed that the question of Free-masonry was the conclusive criterion on which the elections in the western parts of the State of New York would turn; and that it was industriously circulated that he was a Free-mason. If the assertion was denied, offers had been made to produce extracts from the books of the lodge to which he belonged. He was, therefore, requested publicly to deny being a Mason. He replied, that he was not, and never had been, a Free-mason; but that, if he should publicly deny it, he would not be surprised if a forged extract from some imaginary lodge should be produced to counteract his statement. Such are the morals of electioneering!

On the subject of the Indians in the State of Georgia Mr. Adams said: “Our engagements with them and among ourselves, in relation to the lands lying within that state, are inconsistent. We have contracted with the State of Georgia to extinguish the title to the Indian lands lying within that state, and at the same time have stipulated with the Creeks and Cherokees that they should hold their lands forever. We have talked about benevolence and humanity, and preached them into civilization; but none of this benevolence is felt when the rights of the Indians come into collision with the interests of the white man. The Cherokees have now been making a written constitution; but this imperium in imperio is impracticable; and, in the instance of the New York Indians removed to Green Bay, and of the Cherokees removed to the Territory of Arkansas, we have scarce given them time to build their wigwams before we are called upon by our own people to drive them out again. My own opinion is that the most benevolent course towards them would be to give them the rights and subject them to the duties of citizens, as a part of our own people. But even this the people of the states within which they are situated would not permit.”

In January, 1828, Mr. Adams received a letter from his friends in Pennsylvania, proposing a subscription for the purchase and setting up a German newspaper in support of the administration, and inquiring if he would permit his son, John Adams, to contribute to that object. He replied that, on full consideration of the transaction, he deemed it his duty to decline; that how far the employment of money to promote the success of the election might be proper in others, it was not for him to determine; he could only lament the necessity, if it existed; but to apply money himself for the promotion of his own election he thought incorrect in principle, and had invariably avoided it. He knew that others were less scrupulous, and that it had been done by one individual to the pecuniary embarrassment of his whole life. He had been solicited to adopt a like course, but had uniformly declined, not from pecuniary considerations, but because he could not approve of the thing.

In January, 1828, Mr. Floyd, of Virginia, who had taken upon himself the inglorious office of hunting up and disseminating malign aspersions against President Adams, brought before the House of Representatives statements concerning his accounts, which had been long before settled at the treasury of the United States; and, after recapitulating the number of the public offices he had held, and swelling to the utmost the amount he had received out of the public treasury, terminated his censorious attack with the mean sneer that he did not complain, since every man should make his own living, if he can. To this, Mr. Everett, of Massachusetts, replied, with truth and dignity, that whatever Mr. Adams had received, be it great or small, was sanctioned by other administrations, with which Mr. Adams had nothing to do, either in establishing the office fixing the compensations, or seeking the employment. For a third of a century passed in the service of his country, neither he, nor his friends for him, with his knowledge nor without his knowledge, ever solicited any public office or employment; and that, taking into consideration the number of years passed by him in the public service, and the variety and importance of the missions with which he had been intrusted in whole or in part, no foreign minister had ever received less than Mr. Adams, while many have received more. These statements he supported by many minute, accurate, and unanswerable details. In a like spirit Mr. Sargent, of Philadelphia, reprobated and refuted the calumnies uttered against the administration relative to these accounts.

In January, 1828, Mr. Chilton, of Kentucky, introduced a resolution into the House of Representatives, declaring the necessity of retrenchments, to save money and pay off the national debt; and proposing reductions not only in executive contingencies, but also in those of the two houses. This movement disconcerted the party to which Mr. Chilton belonged. They were disposed to point the battery against the administration, but charges of abusive applications of the public moneys by the past as well as the present administration, and both houses of Congress, did not suit party purposes. Randolph, of Virginia, Ingham, of Pennsylvania, and McDuffie, of South Carolina, accordingly strove, by amendments, to narrow down the discussion so as to make it bear upon Mr. Adams or Mr. Clay, and to give countenance to every slander with which the newspapers were teeming against them, but deprecating all general investigations.

Being repeatedly asked concerning his rule of conduct relative to appointments to office, Mr. Adams answered: “My system has been, and continues to be, to nominate for reaeppointment all officers, for a term of years, whose commissions expire, unless official or moral misconduct is charged and substantiated against them. This does not suit the Falstaff friends ‘who follow for the reward;’ and I am importuned to serve my friends, and reproached for neglecting them, because I will not dismiss, or drop from executive favor, officers faithful and able, because they are my political opponents, to provide for my own partisans. This I will not do.”

In February, 1828, Mr. Wright, of Ohio, defended Mr. Adams and his administration, on the subject of his votes in the Senate on the acquisition of Louisiana, on the Mississippi and fishery question at Ghent, on an expression in his message to Congress in December, 1825, and other charges and falsehoods which the friends of General Jackson were publishing against him in newspapers, handbills, and stump speeches, throughout the Union.

Mr. Adams was earnestly entreated by his friends to reply to a pamphlet by Samuel D. Ingham, of which many thousands had been franked by members of Congress to their constituents. He refused to do it, saying, “The slanders and falsehoods of that pamphlet have already been abundantly refuted in the speeches of Jonathan Roberts, Edward Everett, and John C. Wright.”

In the committee on retrenchments, Mr. Wickliffe and Mr. Ingham were extremely busy in search of charges against the administration, and asserted that there was a large item of secret services, vouched only by the certificate of Mr. Adams. A member of Congress informed him of their proceedings, and asked, if there should be any clamorers on that subject, whether he would have any objection to make a communication with regard to it. Mr. Adams replied: “Certainly. The secret was enjoined on me by the constitution and the law, and I shall not divulge it. It might be alleged as probableand such was the factthat, although the accounts had been but lately settled, the expenditures had been incurred and the payment authorized by the direction of the late President Monroe.”

As the electioneering struggle was progressing, Mr. Adams, being asked to advance money in aid of his own election, replied: “The Presidency of the United States is not an office to be either sought or declined. To pay money for securing it is, in my opinion, incorrect in principle. The practices of all parties are tending to render elections altogether venal, and I am not disposed to countenance them.”

On the subject of personal interviews with the President, he thus expressed himself: “I have never denied access to me as President to any one, of any color; and, in my opinion of the duties of that office, it never ought to be denied. Place-hunters are not pleasant visitors, or correspondents, and they consume an enormous disproportion of time. To this personal importunity the President ought not to be subjected; but it is, perhaps, not possible to relieve him from it, without excluding him from interviews with the people more, perhaps, than comports with the nature of our institutions.”

In Kentucky the Senate of the state constituted itself into an inquisition on a charge against Mr. Adams of corruption, sent for persons and papers, and invited ex parte depositions and garbled statements, where the parties inculpated had no opportunity of being heard, and where the testimony given and the testimony suppressed were alike adapted to promote groundless slanders.

In South Carolina movements were made towards civil war and the dissolution of the Union, for the purpose of carrying the election by intimidation, or, if they should fail in that, of laying the foundation of a future forcible resistance, to break down or overawe the administration after the event.

Evidences of the vehement party war stimulated and personally waged by General Jackson against Mr. Adams might be easily multiplied; but enough has been stated to vindicate the character of his administration and the judgment of Henry Clay. By daring to exercise his constitutional rights, by taking the responsibility of preferring Mr. Adams to General Jackson, Mr. Clay postponed for four years an administration characteristic of its leader, violent, intriguing, headstrong, and corrupt. After the passions and interests of the present day have passed away, his vote on that occasion will be regarded by posterity as his choicest and purest title to their remembrance.

To aid the adversaries of Mr. Adams, and to awaken against him in the Northern States, where his strength lay, the dormant passions of former times, the name and influence of Mr. Jefferson were brought into the field. In December, 1825, a letter had been drawn from him, by William B. Giles, a devoted partisan of Jackson, and given to the public with appropriate commentaries and asperities. In this letter Mr. Jefferson, after acknowledging that “his memory was so broken, or gone, as to be almost a blank,” undertook to relate a conversation he had with Mr. Adams in 1808, and connected it with facts with which it had no relation, and which occurred several years afterwards, while Mr. Adams was in Europe. These mistakes, in the opinion of Mr. Adams, required explanations. He, therefore, gave a full statement of the facts, so far as he was concerned, and of the communications he had made in 1808 to Mr. Jefferson. These explanations had the tendency which Mr. Giles and the authors of the scheme intended; but the controversies which ensued are not within the scope of this memoir. Feelings and passions, which had slept for almost twenty years, were awakened. Correspondences ensued, in which the policy and events of a former period were discussed with earnestness and warmth. But the ultimate object, for which the broken and incoherent recollections of Mr. Jefferson’s old age were brought before the public, was not attained. Those who differed from the opinions of Mr. Adams, and had condemned his political course in former times, although their sentiments remained unchanged, were satisfied with the principles and ability he evinced in his present high station, and indicated no inclination to aid the projects of his opponents. The embers of former animosity were indeed uncovered, but in the Eastern States, where the friends of Mr. Adams were most numerous, no disposition was evinced to favor the elevation of General Jackson to the Presidency.

In other sections of the Union a combination of influences tended to defeat the reelection of Mr. Adams. In Virginia William B. Giles engaged in giving publicity to violent and inflammatory papers against his administration; Thomas H. Benton, of Missouri, strenuously endeavored to destroy his popularity in the West; while Martin Van Buren, the leader of the party which then controlled New York, also devoted his efforts to secure Jackson’s ascendency.

When Mr. Adams was informed that Mr. Clay’s final and full vindication of himself against the aspersions of General Jackson had appeared from the press, he said: “It is unnecessary. Enough has already been said to put down that infamous slander, which has been more than once publicly branded as falsehood. The conspiracy will, however, probably succeed. When suspicions have been kindled into popular delusion, truth, reason, and justice, speak to the ears of adders. The sacrifice must be consummated. There will then be a reaection in public opinion. It may not be rapid, but it will be certain.”

By one of those party arrangements which ever have shaped, and to human view forever will decide, the destinies of this republic,a coalition being effected between the leading influences of the slave states and those of New York and Pennsylvania,Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun, both slaveholders, were respectively elected President and Vice-President of the United States.