I. All Gaul is divided
into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit,
the Aquitani another, those who in their own language
are called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third.
All these differ from each other in language, customs
and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gauls
from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate
them from the Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae
are the bravest, because they are farthest from the
civilisation and refinement of [our] Province, and
merchants least frequently resort to them and import
those things which tend to effeminate the mind; and
they are the nearest to the Germans, who dwell beyond
the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war;
for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest
of the Gauls in valour, as they contend with
the Germans in almost daily battles, when they either
repel them from their own territories, or themselves
wage war on their frontiers. One part of these,
which it has been said that the Gauls occupy,
takes its beginning at the river Rhone: it is
bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories
of the Belgae: it borders, too, on the side of
the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the river
Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgae
rise from the extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to
the lower part of the river Rhine; and look towards
the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends
from the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains
and to that part of the ocean which is near Spain:
it looks between the setting of the sun and the north
star.
II. Among the Helvetii,
Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and
wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and
Marcus Piso were consuls, incited by lust of sovereignty,
formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and persuaded
the people to go forth from their territories with
all their possessions, [saying] that it would be very
easy, since they excelled all in valour, to acquire
the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he
the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii
are confined on every side by the nature of their
situation; on one side by the Rhine, a very broad
and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory
from the Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a
very high mountain which is [situated] between the
Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake
of Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates
our Province from the Helvetii. From these circumstances
it resulted that they could range less widely, and
could less easily make war upon their neighbours; for
which reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected
with great regret. They thought, that considering
the extent of their population, and their renown for
warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits, although
they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman]
miles.
III. Induced by these considerations,
and influenced by the authority of Orgetorix,
they determined to provide such things as were necessary
for their expedition to buy up as great
a number as possible of beasts of burden and waggons to
make their sowings as large as possible, so that on
their march plenty of corn might be in store and
to establish peace and friendship with the neighbouring
states. They reckoned that a term of two years
would be sufficient for them to execute their designs;
they fix by decree their departure for the third year.
Orgetorix is chosen to complete these arrangements.
He took upon himself the office of ambassador to the
states: on this journey he persuades Casticus,
the son of Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani,
whose father had possessed the sovereignty among the
people for many years, and had been styled “friend”
by the senate of the Roman people), to seize upon the
sovereignty in his own state, which his father had
held before him, and he likewise persuades Dumnorix,
an Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who at that
time possessed the chief authority in the state, and
was exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt
the same, and gives him his daughter in marriage.
He proves to them that to accomplish their attempts
was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself
would obtain the government of his own state; that
there was no doubt that the Helvetii were the most
powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them that
he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire
the sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech,
they give a pledge and oath to one another, and hope
that, when they have seized the sovereignty, they
will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant
nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole
of Gaul.
IV. When this scheme was
disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they, according
to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead
his cause in chains; it was the law that the penalty
of being burned by fire should await him if condemned.
On the day appointed for the pleading of his cause,
Orgetorix drew together from all quarters to the
court all his vassals to the number of ten thousand
persons; and led together to the same place, and all
his dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had
a great number; by means of these he rescued himself
from [the necessity of] pleading his cause. While
the state, incensed at this act, was endeavouring
to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were
mustering a large body of men from the country, Orgetorix
died; and there is not wanting a suspicion, as the
Helvetii think, of his having committed suicide.
V. After his death, the
Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which they
had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories.
When they thought that they were at length prepared
for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns,
in number about twelve to their villages
about four hundred and to the private dwellings
that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what
they intend to carry with them; that after destroying
the hope of a return home, they might be the more
ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every
one to carry forth from home for himself provisions
for three months, ready ground. They persuade
the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi,
their neighbours, to adopt the same plan, and after
burning down their towns and villages, to set out
with them: and they admit to their party and
unite to themselves as confederates the Boii,
who had dwelt on the other side of the Rhine, and
had crossed over into the Norican territory, and assaulted
Noreia.
VI. There were in all two
routes by which they could go forth from their country one
through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between
Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one
waggon at a time could be led; there was, moreover,
a very high mountain overhanging, so that a very few
might easily intercept them); the other, through our
Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because
the Rhone flows between the boundaries of the Helvetii
and those of the Allobroges, who had lately been subdued,
and is in some places crossed by a ford. The
furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to
the territories of the Helvetii, is Geneva. From
this town a bridge extends to the Helvetii. They
thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges,
because they did not seem as yet well-affected towards
the Roman people, or compel them by force to allow
them to pass through their territories. Having
provided everything for the expedition, they appoint
a day on which they should all meet on the bank of
the Rhone. This day was the fifth before the
kalends of April [i.e. the 28th of March], in
the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius
[B.C. 58].
VII. When it was reported
to Caesar that they were attempting to make their
route through our Province, he hastens to set out from
the city, and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds
to Further Gaul, and arrives at Geneva. He orders
the whole Province [to furnish] as great a number
of soldiers as possible, as there was in all only one
legion in Further Gaul: he orders the bridge
at Geneva to be broken down. When the Helvetii
are apprised of his arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors,
the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy
Numeius and Verudoctius held the chief place), to
say “that it was their intention to march through
the Province without doing any harm, because they had”
[according to their own representations] “no
other route: that they requested they might
be allowed to do so with his consent.” Caesar,
inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius,
the consul, had been slain, and his army routed and
made to pass under the yoke by the Helvetii, did not
think that [their request] ought to be granted; nor
was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition,
if an opportunity of marching through the Province
were given them, would abstain from outrage and mischief.
Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until
the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished]
should assemble, he replied to the ambassadors, that
he would take time to deliberate; if they wanted anything,
they might return on the day before the ides of April
[on April 12th].
VIII. Meanwhile, with the
legion which he had with him and the soldiers who
had assembled from the Province, he carries along for
nineteen [Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles
a wall, to the height of sixteen feet, and a trench,
from the lake of Geneva, which flows into the river
Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories
of the Sequani from those of the Helvetii.
When that work was finished, he distributes garrisons,
and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he may
the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt
to cross over against his will. When the day
which he had appointed with the ambassadors came,
and they returned to him, he says that he cannot,
consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman
people, grant any one a passage through the Province;
and he gives them to understand that, if they should
attempt to use violence, he would oppose them.
The Helvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried if
they could force a passage (some by means of a bridge
of boats and numerous rafts constructed for the purpose;
others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth
of the river was least, sometimes by day, but more
frequently by night), but being kept at bay by the
strength of our works, and by the concourse of the
soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this
attempt.
IX. There was left one
way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on
account of its narrowness, they could not pass without
the consent of the Sequani. As they could
not of themselves prevail on them, they send ambassadors
to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession
they might obtain their request from the Sequani.
Dumnorix, by his popularity and liberality, had
great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly
to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married
the daughter of Orgetorix; and, incited by lust
of sovereignty, was anxious for a revolution, and
wished to have as many states as possible attached
to him by his kindness towards them. He, therefore,
undertakes the affair, and prevails upon the Sequani
to allow the Helvetii to march through their territories,
and arranges that they should give hostages to each
other the Sequani not to obstruct the
Helvetii in their march the Helvetii, to
pass without mischief and outrage.
X. It-is again told Caesar
that the Helvetii intend to march through the country
of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories
of the Santoñés, which are not far distant from
those boundaries of the Tolosates, which [viz.
Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province.
If this took place, he saw that it would be attended
with great danger to the Province to have warlike
men, enemies of the Roman people, bordering upon an
open and very fertile tract of country. For these
reasons he appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant,
to the command of the fortification which he had made.
He himself proceeds to Italy by forced marches, and
there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quarters
three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with
these five legions marches rapidly by the nearest
route across the Alps into Further Gaul. Here
the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges,
having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt
to obstruct the army in their march. After having
routed these in several battles, he arrives in the
territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province
on the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the
most remote town of the Hither Province; thence he
leads his army into the country of the Allobroges,
and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These
people are the first beyond the Province on the opposite
side of the Rhone.
XI. The Helvetii had by
this time led their forces over through the narrow
defile and the territories of the Sequani, and
had arrived at the territories of the Aedui,
and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui,
as they could not defend themselves and their possessions
against them, send ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance,
[pleading] that they had at all times so well deserved
of the Roman people, that their fields ought not to
have been laid waste their children carried
off into slavery their towns stormed, almost
within sight of our army. At the same time the
Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui,
apprise Caesar that it was not easy for them, now
that their fields had been devastated, to ward off
the violence of the enemy from their towns: the
Allobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions
on the other side of the Rhone, betake themselves
in flight to Caesar and assure him that they had nothing
remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar,
induced by these circumstances, decides that he ought
not to wait until the Helvetii, after destroying all
the property of his allies, should arrive among the
Santoñés.
XII. There is a river [called]
the Saône, which flows through the territories of
the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with
such incredible slowness, that it cannot be determined
by the eye in which direction it flows. This
the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined
together. When Caesar was informed by spies that
the Helvetii had already conveyed three parts of their
forces across that river, but that the fourth part
was left behind on this side of the Saône, he set out
from the camp with three legions during the third watch,
and came up with that division which had not yet crossed
the river. Attacking them, encumbered with baggage,
and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great part
of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and
concealed themselves in the nearest woods. That
canton [which was cut down] was called the Tigurine;
for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four
cantons. This single canton having left their
country, within the recollection of our fathers, had
slain Lucius Cassius the consul, and had made his
army pass under the yoke [B.C. 107]. Thus, whether
by chance, or by the design of the immortal gods,
that part of the Helvetian state which had brought
a signal calamity upon the Roman people was the first
to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not
only the public, but also his own personal wrongs,
because the Tigurini had slain Lucius Piso the
lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius
Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar’s] father-in-law,
in the same battle as Cassius himself.
XIII. This battle ended,
that he might be able to come up with the remaining
forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be
made across the Saône, and thus leads his army over.
The Helvetii, confused by his sudden arrival, when
they found that he had effected in one day what they
themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished
in twenty, namely, the crossing of the river, send
ambassadors to him; at the head of which embassy was
Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in
the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar: that,
“if the Roman people would make peace with the
Helvetii they would go to that part and there remain,
where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be;
but if he should persist in persecuting them with war,
that he ought to remember both the ancient disgrace
of the Roman people and the characteristic valour
of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one
canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had
crossed the river could not bring assistance to their
friends, that he ought not on that account to ascribe
very much to his own valour, or despise them; that
they had so learned from their sires and ancestors,
as to rely more on valour than on artifice or stratagem.
Wherefore let him not bring it to pass that the place,
where they were standing, should acquire a name, from
the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction
of their army or transmit the remembrance [of such
an event to posterity].”
XIV. To these words Caesar
thus replied: that “on that very account
he felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance
those circumstances which the Helvetian ambassadors
had mentioned, and that he felt the more indignant
at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly
to the Roman people: for if they had been conscious
of having done any wrong it would not have been difficult
to be on their guard, but for that very reason had
they been deceived, because neither were they aware
that any offence had been given by them, on account
of which they should be afraid, nor did they think
that they ought to be afraid without cause. But
even if he were willing to forget their former outrage,
could he also lay aside the remembrance of the late
wrongs, in that they had against his will attempted
a route through the Province by force, in that they
had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges?
That as to their so insolently boasting of their victory,
and as to their being astonished that they had so
long committed their outrages with impunity, [both
these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal
gods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish
to punish for their guilt sometimes a greater prosperity
and longer impunity, in order that they may suffer
the more severely from a reverse of circumstances.
Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were
to be given him by them in order that he may be assured
they will do what they promise, and provided they
will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages
which they had committed against them and their allies,
and likewise to the Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make
peace with them.” Divico replied, that
“the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors
that they were accustomed to receive, not to give,
hostages; of that fact the Roman people were witness.”
Having given this reply, he withdrew.
XV. On the following day
they move their camp from that place; Caesar does
the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the
number of four thousand (which he had drawn together
from all parts of the Province and from the Aedui
and their allies), to observe towards what parts the
enemy are directing their march. These, having
too eagerly pursued the enemy’s rear, come to
a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous
place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii,
elated with this battle because they had with five
hundred horse repulsed so large a body of horse, began
to face us more boldly, sometimes too from their rear
to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however]
restrained his men from battle, deeming it sufficient
for the present to prevent the enemy from rapine,
forage, and depredation. They marched for about
fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more
than five or six miles between the enemy’s rear
and our van.
XVI. Meanwhile, Caesar
kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn
which they had promised in the name of their state;
for, in consequence of the coldness (Gaul being, as
before said, situated towards the north), not only
was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was
not in store a sufficiently large quantity even of
fodder: besides he was unable to use the corn
which he had conveyed in ships up the river Saône,
because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to
retire, had diverted their march from the Saône.
The Aedui kept deferring from day to day, and
saying that it was being “collected brought
in on the road.” When he saw
that he was put off too long, and that the day was
close at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn
to his soldiers, having called together
their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his
camp, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was invested
with the chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style
the Vergobretus, and who is elected annually,
and has power of life and death over his countrymen),
he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted
by them on so urgent an occasion, when the enemy were
so close at hand, and when [corn] could neither be
bought nor taken from the fields, particularly as,
in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken
the war; much more bitterly, therefore, does he complain
of his being forsaken.
XVII. Then at length Liscus,
moved by Caesar’s speech, discloses what he
had hitherto kept secret: that “there
are some whose influence with the people is very great,
who, though private men, have more power than the
magistrates themselves: that these by seditious
and violent language are deterring the populace from
contributing the corn which they ought to supply;
[by telling them] that, if they cannot any longer retain
the supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to
the government of Gauls than of Romans, nor ought
they to doubt that, if the Romans should overpower
the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the
Aedui together with the remainder of Gaul.
By these very men [said he] are our plans, and whatever
is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that
they could not be restrained by him: nay
more, he was well aware that, though compelled by
necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at
how great a risk he had done it; and for that reason,
he had been silent as long as he could.”
XVIII. Caesar perceived
that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the
brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was
unwilling that these matters should be discussed while
so many were present, he speedily dismisses the council,
but detains Liscus: he inquires from him when
alone, about those things which he had said in the
meeting. He [Liscus] speaks more unreservedly
and boldly. He [Caesar] makes inquiries on the
same points privately of others, and discovers that
it is all true; that “Dumnorix is the person,
a man of the highest daring, in great favour with
the people on account of his liberality, a man eager
for a revolution: that for a great many years
he has been in the habit of contracting for the customs
and all the other taxes of the Aedui at a small
cost, because when he bids, no one dares to
bid against him. By these means he has both increased
his own private property and amassed great means for
giving largesses; that he maintains constantly
at his own expense and keeps about his own person a
great number of cavalry, and that not only at home,
but even among the neighbouring states, he has great
influence, and for the sake of strengthening this
influence has given his mother in marriage among the
Bituriges to a man the most noble and most influential
there; that he has himself taken a wife from among
the Helvetii, and has given his sister by the mother’s
side and his female relations in marriage into other
states; that he favours and wishes well to the Helvetii
on account of this connection; and that he hates Caesar
and the Romans, on his own account, because by their
arrival his power was weakened, and his brother, Divitiacus,
restored to his former position of influence and dignity:
that, if anything should happen to the Romans, he entertains
the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means
of the Helvetii, but that under the government of
the Roman people he despairs not only of royalty but
even of that influence which he already has.”
Caesar discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful
cavalry engagement which had taken place a few days
before, that the commencement of that flight had been
made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix
was in command of the cavalry which the Aedui
had sent for aid to Caesar); that by their flight
the rest of the cavalry was dismayed.
XIX. After learning these
circumstances, since to these suspicions the most
unequivocal facts were added, viz., that he had
led the Helvetii through the territories of the Sequani;
that he had provided that hostages should be mutually
given; that he had done all these things, not only
without any orders of his [Caesar’s] and of his
own state’s, but even without their [the Aedui]
knowing anything of it themselves; that he [Dumnorix]
was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the Aedui;
he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason
why he should either punish him himself, or order
the state to do so. One thing [however] stood
in the way of all this that he had learned
by experience his brother Divitiacus’s very
high regard for the Roman people, his great affection
towards him, his distinguished faithfulness, justice,
and moderation; for he was afraid lest by the punishment
of this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus.
Therefore, before he attempted anything, he orders
Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and when the ordinary
interpreters had been withdrawn, converses with him
through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province
of Gaul, an intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed
the highest confidence in everything; at the same
time he reminds him of what was said about Dumnorix
in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was
present, and shows what each had said of him privately
in his [Caesar’s] own presence; he begs and
exhorts him, that, without offence to his feelings,
he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix]
after trying the case, or else order the [Aeduan]
state to do so.
XX.-Divitiacus, embracing Caesar,
begins to implore him, with many tears, that “he
would not pass any very severe sentence upon his brother;
saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true,
and that nobody suffered more pain on that account
than he himself did; for when he himself could effect
a very great deal by his influence at home and in
the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little
on account of his youth, the latter had become powerful
through his means, which power and strength he used
not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus] popularity,
but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced
both by fraternal affection and by public opinion.
But if anything very severe from Caesar should befall
him [Dumnorix], no one would think that it had
been done without his consent, since he himself held
such a place in Caesar’s friendship; from which
circumstance it would arise that the affections of
the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him.”
As he was with tears begging these things of Caesar
in many words, Caesar takes his right hand, and, comforting
him, begs him to make an end of entreating, and assures
him that his regard for him is so great that he forgives
both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs,
at his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix
to him; he brings in his brother; he points out what
he censures in him; he lays before him what he of
himself perceives, and what the state complains of;
he warns him for the future to avoid all grounds of
suspicion; he says that he pardons the past, for the
sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies
over Dumnorix that he may be able to know what
he does, and with whom he communicates.
XXI. Being on the same
day informed by his scouts that the enemy had encamped
at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own
camp, he sent persons to ascertain what the nature
of the mountain was, and of what kind the ascent on
every side. Word was brought back that it was
easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus,
his lieutenant with praetorian powers, to ascend to
the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions,
and with those as guides who had examined the road;
he explains what his plan is. He himself during
the fourth watch, hastens to them by the same route
by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the
cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who
was reputed to be very experienced in military affairs,
and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterwards
in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the
scouts.
XXII. At day-break, when
the summit of the mountain was in the possession of
Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off
than a mile and half from the enemy’s camp,
nor, as he afterwards ascertained from the captives,
had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered;
Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up
to him says that the mountain which he
[Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in
possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this
by the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads
off his forces to the next hill: [and] draws
them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been
ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless
[Caesar’s] own forces were seen near the enemy’s
camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made
on every side at the same time, was, after having taken
possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and
refraining from battle. When, at length, the
day was far advanced, Caesar learned through spies
that the mountain was in possession of his own men,
and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that
Considius, struck with fear, had reported to him,
as seen, that which he had not seen. On that
day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and
pitches his camp three miles from theirs.
XXIII. The next day (as
there remained in all only two days’ space [to
the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army,
and as he was not more than eighteen miles from Bibracte,
by far the largest and best-stored town of the Aedui)
he thought that he ought to provide for a supply of
corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and
advanced rapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance
is reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius
Aemilius, a captain of the Gallic horse. The
Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans,
struck with terror, were retreating from them, the
more so, as the day before, though they had seized
on the higher grounds, they had not joined battle;
or because they flattered themselves that they might
be cut off from the provisions, altering their plan
and changing their route, began to pursue and to annoy
our men in the rear.
XXIV. Caesar, when he observes
this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and sent
the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy.
He himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the
hill a triple line of his four veteran legions in
such a manner that he placed above him on the very
summit the two legions which he had lately levied in
Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered
that the whole mountain should be covered with men,
and that meanwhile the baggage should be brought together
into one place, and the position be protected by those
who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii,
having followed with all their waggons, collected
their baggage into one place: they themselves,
after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx,
advanced up to our front line in very close order.
XXV. Caesar, having removed
out of sight first his own horse, then those of all,
that he might make the danger of all equal, and do
away with the hope of flight, after encouraging his
men, joined battle. His soldiers, hurling their
javelins from the higher ground, easily broke the
enemy’s phalanx. That being dispersed, they
made a charge on them with drawn swords. It was
a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting, that,
when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke
of the (Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned
fast together, as the point of the iron had bent itself,
they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left
hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that
many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose
rather to cast away the buckler from their hand, and
to fight with their person unprotected. At length,
worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and as
there was in the neighbourhood a mountain about a
mile off, to betake themselves thither. When
the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing
up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about
15,000 men closed the enemy’s line of march
and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed
our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared]
to surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii,
who had betaken themselves to the mountain, began
to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans
having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions;
the first and second line to withstand those who had
been defeated and driven off the field; the third
to receive those who were just arriving.
XXVI. Thus was the contest
long and vigorously carried on with doubtful success.
When they could no longer withstand the attacks of
our men, the one division, as they had begun to do,
betook themselves to the mountain; the other repaired
to their baggage and waggons. For during the
whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from
the seventh hour [i.e. 12 (noon) 1
P.M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy with
his back turned. The fight was carried on also
at the baggage till late in the night, for they had
set waggons in the way as a rampart, and from the
higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as
they came on, and some from between the waggons and
the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins
from beneath, and wounding our men. After the
fight had lasted some time, our men gained possession
of their baggage and camp. There the daughter
and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken.
After that battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy]
remained alive, who marched incessantly during the
whole of that night; and after a march discontinued
for no part of the night, arrived in the territories
of the Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our men,
having stopped for three days, both on account of
the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of the slain,
had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent
letters and messengers to the Lingones [with orders]
that they should not assist them with corn or with
anything else; for that if they should assist them,
he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii.
After the three days’ interval he began to follow
them himself with all his forces.
XXVII. The Helvetii, compelled
by the want of everything, sent ambassadors to him
about a surrender. When these had met him in the
way and had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking
in suppliant tone had with tears sued for peace, and
[when] he had ordered them to await his arrival, in
the place where they then were, they obeyed his commands.
When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages,
their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them.
Whilst those things are being sought for and got together,
after a night’s interval, about 6000 men of
that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether
terrified by fear, lest, after delivering up their
arms, they should suffer punishment, or else induced
by the hope of safety, because they supposed that,
amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered
themselves, their flight might either be concealed
or entirely overlooked, having at night-fall departed
out of the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to the Rhine
and the territories of the Germans.
XXVIII. But when Caesar
discovered this, he commanded those through whose
territories they had gone, to seek them, out and to
bring them back again, if they meant to be acquitted
before him; and considered them, when brought back,
in the light of enemies; he admitted all the rest
to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages,
arms, and deserters. He ordered the Helvetii,
the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi to return to their
territories from which they had come, and as there
was at home nothing whereby they might support their
hunger, all the productions of the earth having been
destroyed, he commanded the Allobroges to let them
have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them
to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt.
This he did, chiefly on this account, because he was
unwilling that the country, from which the Helvetii
had departed, should be untenanted, lest the Germans,
who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should, on
account of the excellence of the lands, cross over
from their own territories into those of the Helvetii,
and become borderers upon the province of Gaul and
the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the
Aedui, that they might settle the Boii,
in their own (i.e. in the Aeduan) territories,
as these were known to be of distinguished valour to
whom they gave lands, and whom they afterwards admitted
to the same state of rights and freedom as themselves.
XXIX. In the camp of the
Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek characters,
and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had
been drawn up, name by name, of the number which had
gone forth from their country of those who were able
to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old men,
and the women, separately. Of all which items
the total was:-
Of the Helvetii [lit. of the
heads of the Helvetii] 263,000 Of the Tulingi
36,000 Of the
Latobrigi
14,000 Of the Rauraci
23,000 Of the Boii
32,
-------
The sum of all amounted to
368,000
Out of these, such as could bear arms
[amounted] to about 92,000. When the census
of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had
commanded, the number was found to be 110,000.
XXX. When the war with
the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from almost
all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled
to congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well
aware, that, although he had taken vengeance on the
Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs done by them to
the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened
no less to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of
the Roman people, because the Helvetii, while their
affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their country
with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul,
and seizing the government of it, and selecting, out
of a great abundance, that spot for an abode which
they should judge to be the most convenient and most
productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states
as tributaries. They requested that they might
be allowed to proclaim an assembly of the whole of
Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with Caesar’s
permission, [stating] that they had some things which,
with the general consent, they wished to ask of him.
This request having been granted, they appointed a
day for the assembly, and ordained by an oath with
each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations]
except those to whom this [office] should be assigned
by the general assembly.
XXXI. When that assembly
was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who had
before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they
might be allowed to treat with him privately (in secret)
concerning the safety of themselves and of all.
That request having been obtained, they all threw
themselves in tears at Caesar’s feet, [saying]
that they no less begged and earnestly desired that
what they might say should not be disclosed than that
they might obtain those things which they wished for;
inasmuch as they saw that, if a disclosure were made,
they should be put to the greatest tortures.
For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him:
“That there were two parties in the whole of
Gaul: that the Aedui stood at the head of
one of these, the Arverni of the other. After
these had been violently struggling with one another
for the superiority for many years, it came to pass
that the Germans were called in for hire by the Arverni
and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them
[i.e. of the Germans] had at first crossed
the Rhine: but after that these wild and savage
men had become enamoured of the lands and the refinement
and the abundance of the Gauls, more were brought
over, that there were now as many as 120,000 of them
in Gaul: that with these the Aedui and their
dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms, that they
had been routed and had sustained a great calamity had
lost all their nobility, all their senate, all their
cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and
calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful
in Gaul, both from their own valour and from the Roman
people’s hospitality and friendship, they were
now compelled to give the chief nobles of their state
as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their
state by an oath, that they would neither demand hostages
in return, nor supplicate aid from the Roman people,
nor refuse to be for ever under their sway and empire.
That he was the only one out of all the state of the
Aedui who could not be prevailed upon to take
the oath or to give his children as hostages.
On that account he had fled from his state and had
gone to the senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone
was bound neither by oath nor hostages. But a
worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani
than the vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus, the
king of the Germans, had settled in their territories,
and had seized upon a third of their land, which was
the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering
them to depart from another third part, because a
few months previously 24,000 men of the Harudes had
come to him, for whom room and settlements must be
provided. The consequence would be, that in a
few years they would all be driven from the territories
of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine;
for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with
the land of the Germans, nor must the habit of living
of the latter be put on a level with that of the former.
Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner did he defeat
the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which took
place at Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily
and cruelly, to demand as hostages the children of
all the principal nobles, and wreak on them every
kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his
nod or pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate,
and reckless man, and that his commands could no longer
be borne. Unless there was some aid in Caesar
and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the
same thing that the Helvetii had done, [viz.] emigrate
from their country, and seek another dwelling place,
other settlements remote from the Germans, and try
whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these
things were to be disclosed to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus
adds] that he doubts not that he would inflict the
most severe punishment on all the hostages who are
in his possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either
by his own influence and by that of his army, or by
his late victory, or by name of the Roman people,
intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number of
Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect
all Gaul from the outrages of Ariovistus.”
XXXII. When this speech
had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were present
began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of
Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani
were the only people of all who did none of those
things which the others did, but, with their heads
bowed down, gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering
what was the reason of this conduct, he inquired of
themselves. No reply did the Sequani make,
but silently continued in the same sadness. When
he had repeatedly inquired of them and could not elicit
any answer at all, the same Divitiacus the Aeduan
answered, that “the lot of the Sequani
was more wretched and grievous than that of the rest,
on this account, because they alone durst not even
in secret complain or supplicate aid; and shuddered
at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just
as if he were present; for, to the rest, despite of
everything, there was an opportunity of flight given;
but all tortures must be endured by the Sequani,
who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories,
and whose towns were all in his power.”
XXXIII. Caesar, on being
informed of these things, cheered the minds of the
Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair
should be an object of his concern, [saying] that
he had great hopes that Ariovistus, induced both by
his kindness and his power, would put an end to his
oppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed
the assembly; and, besides those statements, many
circumstances induced him to think that this affair
ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially
as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had
been] repeatedly by the senate “brethren”
and “kinsmen,” were held in the thraldom
and dominion of the Germans, and understood that their
hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani,
which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman
people he considered very disgraceful to himself and
the republic. That, moreover, the Germans should
by degrees become accustomed to cross the Rhine, and
that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he
saw [would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and
judged that wild and savage men would not be likely
to restrain themselves, after they had possessed themselves
of all Gaul, from going forth into the province and
thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and Teutones
had done before them), particularly as the Rhone [was
the sole barrier that] separated the Sequani
from our province. Against which events he thought
he ought to provide as speedily as possible.
Moreover, Ariovistus, for his part, had assumed to
himself such pride and arrogance that he was felt to
be quite insufferable.
XXXIV. He therefore determined
to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to demand of him
to name some intermediate spot for a conference between
the two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him
on state-business and matters of the highest importance
to both of them. To this embassy Ariovistus replied,
that if he himself had had need of anything from Caesar,
he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted
anything from him he ought to come to him. That,
besides, neither dare he go without an army into those
parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of, nor
could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his
army together to one place; that to him, moreover,
it appeared strange what business either Caesar or
the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which
he had conquered in war.
XXXV. When these answers
were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadors to him
a second time with this message “Since, after
having been treated with so much kindness by himself
and the Roman people (as he had in his consulship
[B.C. 59] been styled ‘king and friend’
by the senate), he makes this recompense to [Caesar]
himself and the Roman people, [viz.] that when invited
to a conference he demurs, and does not think that
it concerns him to advise and inform himself about
an object of mutual interest, these are the things
which he requires of him; first, that he do not any
more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into
Gaul; in the next place, that he restore the hostages
which he has from the Aedui, and grant the Sequani
permission to restore to them with his consent those
hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke
the Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or
their allies; if he would accordingly do this,”
[Caesar says] that “he himself and the Roman
people will entertain a perpetual feeling of favour
and friendship towards him; but that if he [Caesar]
does not obtain [his desires], that he (forasmuch
as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and
Marcus Piso [B.C. 61] the senate had decreed that,
whoever should have the administration of the province
of Gaul should, as far as he could do so consistently
with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui
and the other friends of the Roman people) will not
overlook the wrongs of the Aedui.”
XXXVI. To this Ariovistus
replied, that “the right of war was, that they
who had conquered should govern those whom they had
conquered, in what manner they pleased; that in that
way the Roman people were wont to govern the nations
which they had conquered, not according to the dictation
of any other, but according to their own discretion.
If he for his part did not dictate to the Roman people
as to the manner in which they were to exercise their
right, he ought not to be obstructed by the Roman
people in his right; that the Aedui, inasmuch
as they had tried the fortune of war and had engaged
in arms and been conquered, had become tributaries
to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, in
that by his arrival he was making his revenues less
valuable to him; that he should not restore their
hostages to the Aedui, but should not make war
wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they
abided by that which had been agreed on, and paid
their tribute annually: if they did not
continue to do that, the Roman people’s name
of ‘brothers’ would avail them nought.
As to Caesar’s threatening him that be would
not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said]
that no one had ever entered into a contest with him
[Ariovistus] without utter ruin to himself. That
Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would
feel what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as
they were] beyond all others to arms, who for fourteen
years had not been beneath a roof, could achieve by
their valour.”
XXXVII. At the same time
that this message was delivered to Caesar, ambassadors
came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the
Aedui to complain that the Harudes, who had lately
been brought over into Gaul, were ravaging their territories;
that they had not been able to purchase peace from
Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from
the Treviri, [to state] that a hundred cantons of
the Suevi had encamped on the banks of the Rhine,
and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers,
Nasuas and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly
alarmed at these things, Caesar thought that he ought
to use all despatch, lest, if thus new band of Suevi
should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he
[Ariovistus] might be less easily withstood.
Having, therefore, as quickly as he could, provided
a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced
marches.
XXXVIII. When he had proceeded
three days’ journey, word was brought to him
that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to
seize on Vesontio, which is the largest town of the
Sequani, and had advanced three days’ journey
from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought
to take the greatest precautions lest this should happen,
for there was in that town a most ample supply of
everything which was serviceable for war; and so fortified
was it by the nature of the ground as to afford a
great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as
the river Doubs almost surrounds the whole town, as
though it were traced round it with a pair of compasses.
A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining
space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river
leaves a gap, in such a manner that the roots of that
mountain extend to the river’s bank on either
side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel
of this [mountain], and connects it with the town.
Hither Caesar hastens by forced marches by night and
day, and, after having seized the town, stations a
garrison there.
XXXIX. Whilst he is tarrying
a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and provisions;
from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the
Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans
were men of huge stature, of incredible valour and
practice in arms, that ofttimes they, on encountering
them, could not bear even their countenance, and the
fierceness of their eyes) so great a panic
on a sudden seized the whole army, as to discompose
the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree.
This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers,
the prefects and the rest, who, having followed Caesar
from the city [Rome] from motives of friendship, had
no great experience in military affairs. And alleging,
some of them one reason, some another, which they said
made it necessary for them to depart, they requested
that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw;
some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order
that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice.
These could neither compose their countenance, nor
even sometimes check their tears: but hidden
in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored
with their comrades the general danger. Wills
were sealed universally throughout the whole camp.
By the expressions and cowardice of these men, even
those who possessed great experience in the camp, both
soldiers and centurions, and those [the décurions]
who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually
disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered
less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy,
but feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness
of the forests which lay between them and Ariovistus,
or else that the supplies could not be brought up
readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar that
when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the
troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient
to the command, nor advance in consequence of their
fear.
XL. When Caesar observed
these things, having called a council, and summoned
to it the centurions of all the companies, he
severely reprimanded them, “particularly for
supposing that it belonged to them to inquire or conjecture,
either in what direction they were marching, or with
what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar’s]
consulship, had most anxiously sought after the friendship
of the Roman people; why should any one judge that
he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for
his part was persuaded that, when his demands were
known and the fairness of the terms considered, he
would reject neither his nor the Roman people’s
favour. But even if, driven on by rage and madness,
he should make war upon them, what after all were
they afraid of? or why should they despair
either of their own valour or of his zeal? Of
that enemy a trial had been made within our fathers’
recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and
Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as
having deserved no less praise than their commander
himself. It had been made lately, too, in Italy;
during the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however,
the experience and training which they had received
from us, assisted in some respect. From which
a judgment might be formed of the advantages which
resolution carries with it, inasmuch as
those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded
when unarmed, they had afterwards vanquished, when
well armed and flushed with success. In short,
that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in
frequent encounters, not only in their own territories,
but also in theirs [the German], have generally vanquished,
and yet cannot have been a match for our army.
If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls
disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might
discover that, when the Gauls had been tired
out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after
he had many months kept himself in his camp and in
the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement,
fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of
a battle and scattered in all directions, and was
victorious more through stratagem and cunning than
valour. But though there had been room for such
stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even
[Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies
could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their
fear to a pretence about the [deficiency of] supplies
and the narrowness of the roads, acted presumptuously,
as they seemed either to distrust their general’s
discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That
these things were his concern; that the Sequani,
the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn;
and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as
to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves.
As to its being reported that the soldiers would not
be obedient to command, or advance, he was not at
all disturbed at that; for he knew that in the case
of all those whose army had not been obedient to command,
either upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune
had deserted them, or, that upon some crime being
discovered, covetousness had been clearly proved [against
them]. His integrity had been seen throughout
his whole life, his good fortune in the war with the
Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly set
about what he had intended to put off till a more
distant day, and would break up his camp the next night,
in the fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon
as possible, whether a sense of honour and duty, or
whether fear had more influence with them. But
that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go
with only the tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings,
and it should be his praetorian cohort.” This
legion Caesar had both greatly favoured, and in it,
on account of its valour, placed the greatest confidence.
XLI.-Upon the delivery of this speech,
the minds of all were changed in a surprising, manner,
and the highest ardour and eagerness for prosecuting
the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the
first to return thanks to him, through their military
tribunes, for his having expressed this most favourable
opinion of them; and assured him that they were quite
ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions
endeavoured, through their military tribunes and the
centurions of the principal companies, to excuse
themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they had never
either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination
of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their
general’s. Having accepted their excuse,
and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by
Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the
greatest faith, [he found] that by a circuitous route
of more than fifty miles he might lead his army through
open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as
he had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as
he did not discontinue his march, he was informed
by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only
four and twenty miles distant from ours.
XLII. Upon being apprised
of Caesar’s arrival, Ariovistus sends ambassadors
to him, [saying] that what he had before requested
as to a conference, might now, as far as his permission
went, take place, since he [Caesar] had approached
nearer, and he considered that he might now do it
without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal
and began to think that he was now returning to a
rational state of mind, as he spontaneously proffered
that which he had previously refused to him when requesting
it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of
his own and the Roman people’s great favours
towards him, the issue would be that he would desist
from his obstinacy upon his demands being made known.
The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of
conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being
often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded
that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with
him to the conference, [saying] that “he was
afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery;
that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that
he would not come on any other condition.”
Caesar, as he neither wished that the conference should,
by an excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor
durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls,
decided that it would be most expedient to take away
from the Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon
to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth legion,
in which he placed the greatest confidence; in order
that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy as
possible, should there be any need for action.
And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the
tenth legion said, not without a touch of humour, “that
Caesar did more for them than he had promised; he
had promised to have the tenth legion in place of
his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into
horse.”
XLIII. There was a large
plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable
size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance
from both camps. Thither, as had been appointed,
they came for the conference. Caesar stationed
the legion, which he had brought [with him] on horseback,
200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus
also took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus
then demanded that they should confer on horseback,
and that, besides themselves, they should bring with
them ten men each to the conference. When they
were come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of
his speech, detailed his own and the senate’s
favours towards him [Ariovistus], “in that he
had been styled king, in that [he had been styled]
friend, by the senate in that very considerable
presents had been sent him; which circumstance he
informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and
had usually been bestowed in consideration of important
personal services; that he, although he had neither
an introduction, nor a just ground for the request,
had obtained these honours through the kindness and
munificence of himself [Caesar] and the senate.
He informed him too, how old and how just were the
grounds of connexion that existed between themselves
[the Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the
senate had been passed in their favour, and how frequent
and how honourable; how from time immemorial the Aedui
had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even
[said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship;
that it was the custom of the Roman people to desire
not only that its allies and friends should lose none
of their property, but be advanced in influence, dignity,
and honour: who then could endure that what they
had brought with them to the friendship of the Roman
people, should be torn from them?” He then made
the same demands which he had commissioned the ambassadors
to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either
upon the Aedui or their allies, that he should
restore the hostages; that, if he could not send back
to their country any part of the Germans, he should
at all events suffer none of them any more to cross
the Rhine.
XLIV. Ariovistus replied
briefly to the demands of Caesar; but expatiated largely
on his own virtues, “that he had crossed the
Rhine not of his own accord, but on being invited
and sent for by the Gauls; that he had not left
home and kindred without great expectations and great
rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by
the Gauls themselves; that the hostages had been
given by their own good-will; that he took by right
of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed
to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war
upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him;
that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and
had encamped against him; that all their forces had
been routed and beaten by him in a single battle;
that if they chose to make a second trial, he was
ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to
enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute,
which of their own free-will they had paid up to that
time. That the friendship of the Roman people
ought to prove to him an ornament and a safeguard,
not a detriment; and that he sought it with that expectation.
But if through the Roman people the tribute was to
be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be seduced
from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman
people no less heartily than he had sought it.
As to his leading over a host of Germans into Gaul,
that he was doing this with a view of securing himself,
not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence
of this, in that he did not come without being invited,
and in that he did not make war, but merely warded
it off. That he had come into Gaul before the
Roman people. That never before this time did
a Roman army go beyond the frontiers of the province
of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?
why come into his [Ariovistus’s]
domains? that this was his province of
Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to
be pardoned in him, if he were to make an attack upon
our territories; so, likewise, that we were unjust
to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar’s
saying that the Aedui had been styled ‘brethren’
by the senate, he was not so uncivilized nor so ignorant
of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in
the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered
assistance to the Romans, nor received any from the
Roman people in the struggles which the Aedui
had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani.
He must feel suspicious that Caesar, though feigning
friendship as the reason for his keeping an army in
Gaul; was keeping it with the view of crushing him.
And that unless he depart, and withdraw his army from
these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but
as a foe; and that, even if he should put him to death,
he should do what would please many of the nobles
and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance
of that from themselves through their messengers, and
could purchase the favour and the friendship of them
all by his [Caesar’s] death. But if he
would depart and resign to him the free possession
of Gaul, he would recompense him with a great reward,
and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished
to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him.”
XLV. Many things were stated
by Caesar to the effect [to show]: “why
he could not waive the business, and that neither
his nor the Roman people’s practice would suffer
him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he
deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to
the Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni
had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus,
and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had
not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute
upon them. And if the most ancient period was
to be regarded then was the sovereignty
of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the
decree of the senate was to be observed, then ought
Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had conquered
in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws.”
XLVI. While these things
are being transacted in the conference, it was announced
to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching
nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and
casting stones and weapons at them. Caesar made
an end of his speech and betook himself to his men;
and commanded them that they should by no means return
a weapon upon the enemy. For though he saw that
an engagement with the cavalry would be without any
danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think
proper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed,
it might be said that they had been ensnared by him
under the sanction of a conference. When it was
spread abroad among the common soldiery with what
haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference,
and how he had ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and
how his cavalry had made an attack upon our men, and
how this had broken off the conference, a much greater
alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into
our army.
XLVII. Two days after,
Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state “that
he wished to treat with him about those things which
had been begun to be treated of between them, but
had not been concluded”; [and to beg] that “he
would either again appoint a day for a conference;
or, if he were not willing to do that, that he would
send one of his [officers] as an ambassador to him.”
There did not appear to Caesar any good reason for
holding a conference; and the more so as the day before
the Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons
at our men. He thought he should not without
great danger send to him as ambassador one of his
[Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men.
It seemed [therefore] most proper to send to him C.
Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus,
a young man of the highest courage and accomplishments
(whose father had been presented with the freedom of
the city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on
account of his fidelity and on account of his knowledge
of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long
practice, now spoke fluently; and because in his case
the Germans would have no motive for committing violence;
and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared
the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned
them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report
to him. But when Ariovistus saw them before him
in his camp, he cried out in the presence of his army,
“Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose
of acting as spies?” He stopped them when attempting
to speak, and cast them into chains.
XLVIII. The same day he
moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill six
miles from Caesar’s camp. The day following
he led his forces past Caesar’s camp, and encamped
two miles beyond him; with this design that
he might cut off Caesar from, the corn and provisions
which might be conveyed to him from the Sequani
and the Aedui. For five successive days
from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the
camp, and put them in battle order, that, if Ariovistus
should be willing to engage in battle, an opportunity
might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this
time kept his army in camp: but engaged daily
in cavalry skirmishes. The method of battle in
which the Germans had practised themselves was this.
There were 6000 horse, and as many very active and
courageous foot, one of whom each of the horse selected
out of the whole army for his own protection.
By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in
their engagements; to these the horse retired; these
on any emergency rushed forward; if any one, upon
receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from his
horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary
to advance farther: than usual, or to retreat
more rapidly, so great, from practice, was their swiftness,
that, supported by the manes of the horses, they could
keep pace with their speed.
XLIX. Perceiving that Ariovistus
kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he might not any
longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient
position for a camp beyond that place in which the
Germans had encamped, at about 600 paces from them,
and having drawn up his army in three lines, marched
to that place. He ordered the first and second
lines to be under arms; the third to fortify the camp.
This place was distant from the enemy about 600 paces,
as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus sent light
troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry;
which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder
them in their fortification. Caesar nevertheless,
as he had before arranged, ordered two lines to drive
off the enemy: the third to execute the work.
The camp being fortified, he left there two legions
and a portion of the auxiliaries; and led back the
other four legions into the larger camp.
L. The next day, according
to his custom, Caesar led out his forces from both
camps, and having advanced a little from the larger
one, drew up his line of battle, and gave the enemy
an opportunity of fighting. When he found that
they did not even then come out [from their entrenchments],
he led back his army into camp about noon. Then
at last Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack
the lesser camp. The battle was vigorously maintained
on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after
many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus
led back his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired
of his prisoners, wherefore Ariovistus did not come
to an engagement, he discovered this to be the reason that
among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons
to pronounce from lots and divination whether it were
expedient that the battle should be engaged in or
not; that they had said, “that it was not the
will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if
they engaged in battle before the new moon.”
LI. The day following,
Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for
both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries
in sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because
he was not very powerful in the number of legionary
soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that
[thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for
appearance. He himself, having drawn up his army
in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy.
Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces
out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at
equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci,
Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded
their whole army with their chariots and waggons, that
no hope might be left in flight. On these they
placed their women, who, with dishevelled hair and
in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward
to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the
Romans.
LII. Caesar appointed over
each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every
one might have them as witnesses of his valour.
He himself began the battle at the head of the right
wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy
to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon
the signal being given, vigorously made an attack
upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly
rushed forward, that there was no time for casting
the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore]
their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand.
But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly
forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords.
There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped
upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the
shields, and wounded the enemy from above. Although
the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing
and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on
our men from the right wing, by the great number of
their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus,
a young man, who commanded the cavalry as
he was more disengaged than those who were employed
in the fight sent the third line as a relief
to our men who were in distress.
LIII. Thereupon the engagement
was renewed, and all the enemy turned their backs,
nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the
river Rhine, about fifty miles from that place.
There some few, either relying on their strength,
endeavoured to swim over, or, finding boats, procured
their safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus,
who meeting with a small vessel tied to the bank,
escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all
the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one
a Suevan by nation, whom he had brought with him from
home; the other a Norican, the sister of king Vocion,
whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither
for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished
in that flight. Of their two daughters, one was
slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus,
as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight,
bound with a triple chain, fell into the hands of
Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy with
his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded
Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself; because
he saw a man of the first rank in the province of
Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued
from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and
that fortune had not diminished aught of the joy and
exultation [of that day] by his destruction.
He [Procillus] said that in his own presence the lots
had been thrice consulted respecting him, whether
he should immediately be put to death by fire, or
be reserved for another time: that by the favour
of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also,
was found and brought back to him [Caesar].
LIV. This battle having
been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who
had come to the banks of that river, began to return
home, when the Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the
Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed, slew a great
number of them. Caesar having concluded two very
important wars in one campaign, conducted his army
into winter quarters among the Sequani, a little
earlier than the season of the year required.
He appointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and
set out in person for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.