I. While Caesar was in
winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown above,
frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also
informed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae,
who we have said are a third part of Gaul, were entering
into a confederacy against the Roman people, and giving
hostages to one another; that the reasons of the confederacy
were these first, because they feared that,
after all [Celtic] Gaul was subdued, our army would
be led against them; secondly, because they were instigated
by several of the Gauls; some of whom as [on the
one hand] they had been unwilling that the Germans
should remain any longer in Gaul, so [on the other]
they were dissatisfied that the army of the Roman
people should pass the winter in it, and settle there;
and others of them, from a natural instability and
fickleness of disposition, were anxious for a revolution;
[the Belgae were instigated] by several, also, because
the government in Gaul was generally seized upon by
the more powerful persons and by those who had the
means of hiring troops, and they could less easily
effect this object under our dominion.
II. Alarmed by these tidings
and letters, Caesar levied two new legions in Hither
Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius,
his lieutenant, to conduct them further into Gaul.
He himself, as soon as there began to be plenty of
forage, came to the army. He gives a commission
to the Senones and the other Gauls who were
neighbours of the Belgae, to learn what is going on
amongst them [i.e. the Belgae], and inform
him of these matters. These all uniformly reported
that troops were being raised, and that an army was
being collected in one place. Then, indeed, he
thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding
towards them, and having provided supplies, moves his
camp, and in about fifteen days arrives at the territories
of the Belgae.
III. As he arrived there
unexpectedly and sooner than any one anticipated,
the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic]
Gaul, sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius, [two of]
the principal persons of the state, as their ambassadors:
to tell hum that they surrendered themselves and all
their possessions to the protection and disposal of
the Roman people: and that they had neither combined
with the rest of the Belgae, nor entered into any
confederacy against the Roman people: and were
prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to
receive him into their towns, and to aid him with
corn and other things; that all the rest of the Belgae
were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on this
side the Rhine, had joined themselves to them; and
that so great was the infatuation of them all that
they could not restrain even the Suessiones, their
own brethren and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights,
and the same laws, and who have one government and
one magistracy [in common] with themselves, from uniting
with them.
IV. When Caesar inquired
of them what states were in arms, how powerful they
were, and what they could do in war, he received the
following information: that the greater part
of the Belgae were sprung from the Germans, and that
having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had
settled there, on account of the fertility of the country,
and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those
regions; and that they were the only people who, in
the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun,
had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering
their territories; the effect of which was that, from
the recollection of those events, they assumed to
themselves great authority and haughtiness in military
matters. The Remi said that they had known accurately
everything respecting their number, because, being
united to them by neighbourhood and by alliances,
they had learnt what number each state had in the
general council of the Belgae promised for that war.
That the Bellovaci were the most powerful amongst
them in valour, influence, and number of men; that
these could muster 100,000 armed men, [and had] promised
60,000 picked men out of that number, and demanded
for themselves the command of the whole war.
That the Suessiones were their nearest neighbours
and possessed a very extensive and fertile country;
that among them, even in our own memory, Divitiacus,
the most powerful man of all Gaul, had been king;
who had held the government of a great part of these
regions, as well as of Britain; that their king at
present was Galba; that the direction of the whole
war was conferred by the consent of all upon him,
on account of his integrity and prudence; that they
had twelve towns; that they had promised 50,000 armed
men; and that the Nervii, who are reckoned the
most warlike among them, and are situated at a very
great distance, [had promised] as many; the Atrebates,
15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the
Menapu, 9000; the Caleti, 10,000; the Velocasses and
the Veromandui as many; the Aduatuci, 19,000; that
the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the
Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans,
[had promised], they thought, to the number of 40,000.
V. Caesar, having encouraged
the Remi, and addressed them courteously, ordered
the whole senate to assemble before him, and the children
of their chief men to be brought to him as hostages;
all which commands they punctually performed by the
day [appointed]. He, addressing himself to Divitiacus
the Aeduan, with great earnestness, points out how
much it concerns the republic and their common security,
that the forces of the enemy should be divided, so
that it might not be necessary to engage with so large
a number at one time. [He asserts] that this might
be effected if the Aedui would lead their forces
into the territories of the Bellovaci, and begin
to lay waste their country. With these instructions
he dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived
that all the forces of the Belgae, which had been
collected in one place, were approaching towards him,
and learnt from the scouts whom he had sent out, and
[also] from the Remi, that they were not then far distant,
he hastened to lead his army over the Aisne, which
is on the borders of the Remi, and there pitched his
camp. This position fortified one side of his
camp by the banks of the river, rendered the country
which lay in his rear secure from the enemy, and furthermore
ensured that provisions might without danger be brought
to him by the Remi and the rest of the states.
Over that river was a bridge: there he places
a guard; and on the other side of the river he leaves
Q. Titurus Sabinus, his lieutenant, with six cohorts.
He orders him to fortify a camp with a rampart twelve
feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth.
VI. There was a town of
the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant
from this camp. This the Belgae on their march
began to attack with great vigour. [The assault] was
with difficulty sustained for that day. The Gauls’
mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae:
when after having drawn a large number of men around
the whole of the fortifications, stones have begun
to be cast against the wall on all sides, and the
wall has been stript of its defenders, [then], forming
a testudo, they advance to the gates and undermine
the wall: which was easily effected on this occasion;
for while so large a number were casting stones and
darts, no one was able to maintain his position upon
the wall. When night had put an end to the assault,
Iccius, who was then in command of the town, one of
the Remi, a man of the highest rank and influence
amongst his people, and one of those who had come to
Caesar as ambassador [to sue] for a peace, sends messengers
to him, [to report] “That, unless assistance
were sent to him, he could not hold out any longer.”
VII. Thither immediately
after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the same persons
who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends
some Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearian
slingers as a relief to the townspeople, by whose
arrival both a desire to resist together with the
hope of [making good their] defence was infused into
the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining
the town abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after
staying a short time before the town, and laying waste
the country of the Remi, when all the villages and
buildings which they could approach had been burnt,
they hastened with all their forces to the camp of
Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of
it]; and their camp, as was indicated by the smoke
and fires, extended more than eight miles in breadth.
VIII. Caesar at first determined
to decline a battle, as well on account of the great
number of the enemy as their distinguished reputation
for valour: daily, however, in cavalry actions,
he strove to ascertain by frequent trials what the
enemy could effect by their prowess and what our men
would dare. When he perceived that our men were
not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally
convenient and suitable for marshalling an army (since
the hill where the camp was pitched, rising gradually
from the plain, extended forward in breadth as far
as the space which the marshalled army could occupy,
and had steep declines of its side in either direction,
and gently sloping in front gradually sank to the
plain), on either side of that hill he drew a cross
trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities
of that trench built forts, and placed there his military
engines, lest, after he had marshalled his army, the
enemy, since they were so powerful in point of number,
should be able to surround his men in the flank, while
fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the
camp the two legions which he had last raised, that,
if there should be any occasion, they might be brought
as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order
of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise,
had drawn up their forces which they had brought out
of the camp.
IX. There was a marsh of
no great extent between our army and that of the enemy.
The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass
this; our men, also, were ready in arms to attack
them while disordered, if the first attempt to pass
should be made by them. In the meantime battle
was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action.
When neither army began to pass the marsh, Caesar,
upon the skirmishes of the horse [proving] favourable
to our men, led back his forces into the camp.
The enemy immediately hastened from that place to
the river Aisne, which it has been stated was behind
our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavoured
to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design,
that, if they could, they might carry by storm the
fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar’s lieutenant,
commanded, and might cut off the bridge; but, if they
could not do that, they should lay waste the lands
of the Remi, which were of great use to us in carrying
on the war, and might hinder our men from foraging.
X. Caesar, being apprised
of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light-armed
Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and
hastens towards them. There was a severe struggle
in that place. Our men, attacking in the river
the disordered enemy, slew a great part of them.
By the immense number of their missiles they drove
back the rest, who in a most courageous manner were
attempting to pass over their bodies, and surrounded
with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who had
first crossed the river. The enemy, when they
perceived that their hopes had deceived them both
with regard to their taking the town by storm and
also their passing the river, and did not see our men
advance to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose
of fighting, and when provisions began to fail them,
having called a council, determined that it was best
for each to return to his country, and resolved to
assemble from all quarters to defend those into whose
territories the Romans should first march an army;
that they might contend in their own rather than in
a foreign country, and might enjoy the stores of provisions
which they possessed at home. Together with other
causes, this consideration also led them to that resolution,
viz.: that they had learnt that Divitiacus
and the Aedui were approaching the territories
of the Bellovaci. And it was impossible
to persuade the latter to stay any longer, or to deter
them from conveying succour to their own people.
XI. That matter being determined
on, marching out of their camp at the second watch,
with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order,
nor under any command, since each sought for himself
the foremost place in the journey, and hastened to
reach home, they made their departure appear very
like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this
through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambuscade, because
he had not yet discovered for what reason they were
departing, kept his army and cavalry within the camp.
At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed
by the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass
their rear; and gave the command of it to two of his
lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta.
He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants,
to follow them closely with three legions. These,
attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles,
slew a great number of them as they were fleeing;
while those in the rear with whom they had come up,
halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our soldiers;
the van, because they appeared to be removed from
danger, and were not restrained by any necessity or
command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their
ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight.
Thus without any risk [to themselves] our men killed
as great a number of them as the length of the day
allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and
betook themselves into the camp, as they had been
commanded.
XII. On the day following,
before the enemy could recover from their terror and
flight, Caesar led his army into the territories of
the Suessiones, which are next to the Remi, and having
accomplished a long march, hastens to the town named
Noviodunum. Having attempted to take it by storm
on his march, because he heard that it was destitute
of [sufficient] defenders, he was not able to carry
it by assault, on account of the breadth of the ditch
and the height of the wall, though few were defending
it. Therefore, having fortified the camp, he began
to bring up the vineae, and to provide whatever
things were necessary for the storm. In the meantime,
the whole body of the Suessiones, after their flight,
came the next night into the town. The vineae
having been quickly brought up against the town, a
mound thrown up, and towers built, the Gauls,
amazed by the greatness of the works, such as they
had neither seen nor heard of before, and struck,
also, by the despatch of the Romans, send ambassadors
to Caesar respecting a surrender, and succeed in consequence
of the Remi requesting that they [the Suessiones]
might be spared.
XIII. Caesar, having received
as hostages the first men of the state, and even the
two sons of king Galba himself; and all the arms in
the town having been delivered up, admitted the Suessiones
to a surrender, and led his army against the Bellovaci.
Who, when they had conveyed themselves and all their
possessions into the town called Bratuspantium, and
Caesar with his army was about five miles distant from
that town, all the old men, going out of the town,
began to stretch out their hands to Caesar, and to
intimate by their voice that they would throw themselves
on his protection and power, nor would contend in arms
against the Roman people. In like manner, when
he had come up to the town, and there pitched his
camp, the boys and the women from the wall, with outstretched
hands, after their custom, begged peace from the Romans.
XIV. For these Divitiacus
pleads (for after the departure of the Belgae, having
dismissed the troops of the Aedui, he had returned
to Caesar). “The Bellovaci had at
all times been in the alliance and friendship of the
Aeduan state; that they had revolted from the Aedui
and made war upon the Roman people, being urged thereto
by their nobles, who said that the Aedui, reduced
to slavery by Caesar, were suffering every indignity
and insult. That they who had been the leaders
of that plot, because they perceived how great a calamity
they had brought upon the state, had fled into Britain.
That not only the Bellovaci, but also the Aedui,
entreated him to use his [accustomed] clemency and
lenity towards them [the Bellovaci]: which
if he did, he would increase the influence of the
Aedui among all the Belgae, by whose succour and
resources they had been accustomed to support themselves
whenever any wars occurred.”
XV. Caesar said that on
account of his respect for Divitiacus and the Aeduans,
he would receive them into his protection, and would
spare them; but, because the state was of great influence
among the Belgae, and pre-eminent in the number of
its population, he demanded 600 hostages. When
these were delivered, and all the arms in the town
collected, he went from that place into the territories
of the Ambiani, who, without delay, surrendered themselves
and all their possessions. Upon their territories
bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character
and customs when Caesar inquired he received the following
information: That “there was
no access for merchants to them; that they suffered
no wine and other things tending to luxury to be imported;
because they thought that by their use the mind is
enervated and the courage impaired: that they
were a savage people and of great bravery: that
they upbraided and condemned the rest of the Belgae
who had surrendered themselves to the Roman people
and thrown aside their national courage: that
they openly declared they would neither send ambassadors,
nor accept any condition of peace.”
XVI. After he had made
three days’ march through their territories,
he discovered from some prisoners, that the river
Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp:
that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on
the other side of that river, and together with the
Atrebates and the Veromandui, their neighbours, were
there awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they
had persuaded both these nations to try the same fortune
of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the
Aduatuci were also expected by them, and were on their
march; that they had put their women, and those who
through age appeared useless for war, in a place to
which there was no approach for an army, on account
of the marshes.
XVII. Having learnt these
things, he sends forward scouts and centurions
to choose a convenient place for the camp. And
as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other
Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some
of these, as was afterwards learnt from the prisoners,
having accurately observed, during those days, the
army’s method of marching, went by night to
the Nervii, and informed them that a great number
of baggage-trains passed between the several legions,
and that there would be no difficulty, when the first
legion had come into the camp, and the other legions
were at a great distance, to attack that legion while
under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train
seized, it would come to pass that the other legions
would not dare to stand their ground. It added
weight also to the advice of those who reported that
circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times,
because they were weak in cavalry (for not even at
this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by
their infantry whatever they can), in order that they
might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their
neighbours if they came upon them for the purpose
of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them,
by means of their numerous branches [extending] on
to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing
up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification
like a wall, through which it was not only impossible
to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye.
Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed
by these things, the Nervii thought that the
advice ought not to be neglected by them.
XVIII. The nature of the
ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this:
A hill, declining evenly from the top, extended to
the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above:
from this river there arose a [second] hill of like
ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former,
and open from about 200 paces at the lowest part; but
in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was
not easy to see through it into the interior.
Within those woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment;
a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open
ground, along the river. The depth of the river
was about three feet.
XIX. Caesar, having sent
his cavalry on before, followed close after them with
all his forces; but the plan and order of the march
was different from that which the Belgae had reported
to the Nervii. For as he was approaching
the enemy Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as
the van] six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind
them he had placed the baggage-trains of the whole
army; then the two legions which had been last raised
closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train.
Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed
the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the
enemy. While they from time to time betook themselves
into the woods to their companions, and again made
an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not
dare to follow them in their retreat further than
the limit to which the plain and open parts extended,
in the meantime the six legions which had arrived
first, having measured out the work, began to fortify
the camp. When the first part of the baggage-train
of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods,
which had been agreed on among them as the time for
commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their
line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods,
and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly
with all their forces and made an attack upon our
horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown
into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river
with such incredible speed that they seemed to be
in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost
at the same time. And with the same speed they
hastened up the hill to our camp and to those who
were employed in the works.
XX. Caesar had everything
to do at one time: the standard to be displayed,
which was the sign when it was necessary to run to
arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers
to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded
some distance for the purpose of seeking materials
for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle
to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword
to be given. A great part of these arrangements
was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden
approach and charge of the enemy. Under these
difficulties two things proved of advantage; [first]
the skill and experience of the soldiers, because,
having been trained by former engagements, they could
suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently
as receive information from others; and [secondly]
that Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants
to depart from the works and their respective legions,
before the camp was fortified. These, on account
of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did
not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of
themselves executed whatever appeared proper.
XXI. Caesar, having given
the necessary orders, hastened to and fro into whatever
quarter fortune carried him to animate the troops,
and came to the tenth legion. Having encouraged
the soldiers with no further speech than that “they
should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valour,
and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain
the assault of the enemy”; as the latter were
not farther from them than the distance to which a
dart could be cast, he gave the signal for commencing
battle. And having gone to another quarter for
the purpose of encouraging [the soldiers], he finds
them fighting. Such was the shortness of the
time, and so determined was the mind of the enemy on
fighting, that time was wanting not only for affixing
the military insignia, but even for putting on the
helmets and drawing off the covers from the shields.
To whatever part any one by chance came from the works
(in which he had been employed), and whatever standards
he saw first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his
own company he should lose the time for fighting.
XXII. The army having been
marshalled, rather as the nature of the ground and
the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time,
than as the method and order of military matters required;
whilst the legions in the different places were withstanding
the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and
the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening,
as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves
be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken
in each part, nor could all the commands be issued
by one person. Therefore, in such an unfavourable
state of affairs, various events of fortune followed.
XXIII. The soldiers of
the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed
on the left part of the army, casting their weapons,
speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had
been opposed to them), who were breathless with running
and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher
ground into the river; and following them as they were
endeavouring to pass it, slew with their swords a great
part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves
did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced
to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed,
they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy,
who had returned and were opposing them. In like
manner, in another quarter two different legions,
the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Veromandui,
with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the
higher ground upon the very banks of the river.
But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the
left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion
was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no
great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a
very close body, with Boduognatus, who held the chief
command, as their leader, hastened towards that place;
and part of them began to surround the legions on
their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest
point of the encampment.
XXIV. At the same time
our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had been
with those who, as I have related, were routed by the
first assault of the enemy, as they were betaking
themselves into the camp, met the enemy face to face,
and again sought flight into another quarter; and
the camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate and from
the highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass
the river as victors, when, after going out for the
purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the
enemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately
to flight; at the same time there arose the cry and
shout of those who came with the baggage-train; and
they (affrighted) were carried some one way, some
another. By all these circumstances the cavalry
of the Treviri were much alarmed (whose reputation
for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls,
and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state
as auxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp filled
with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard
pressed and almost held surrounded, the camp-retainers,
horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sides
divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs,
hastened home, and related to their state that the
Romans were routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy
were in possession of their camp and baggage-train.
XXV. Caesar proceeded,
after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing;
where he perceived that his men were hard pressed,
and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth
legion being collected together in one place, the
crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in
the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth
cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed,
the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions
of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and
among them the chief centurion of the legion, P. Sextius
Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted
by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable
to support himself; he likewise perceived that the
rest were slackening their efforts, and that some,
deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from
the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy
[on the other hand], though advancing from the lower
ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the
same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived
that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was
not any reserve which could be brought up; having therefore
snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear
(for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced
to the front of the line, and addressing the centurions
by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers,
he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and
extend the companies, that they might the more easily
use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was
brought to the soldiers and their courage restored,
whilst every one for his own part, in the sight of
his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the
impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked.
XXVI. Caesar, when he perceived
that the seventh legion, which stood close by him,
was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes
of the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions
gradually, and make their charge upon the enemy with
a double front; which having been done, since they
brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared
lest their rear should be surrounded by the enemy,
they began to stand their ground more boldly, and
to fight more courageously. In the meantime, the
soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear
of the army, as a guard for the baggage-train, upon
the battle being reported to them, quickened their
pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the
hill; and Titus Labienus, having gained possession
of the camp of the enemy, and observed from the higher
ground what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth
legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learnt
from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in what
position the affair was, and in how great danger the
camp and the legion and the commander were involved,
left undone nothing [which tended] to despatch.
XXVI. By their arrival,
so great a change of matters was made, that our men,
even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds,
leant on their shields, and renewed the fight:
then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the
enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though]
armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valour
blot out the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves
before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the
battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope
of safety, displayed such great courage that when the
foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them
prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these
were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together,
those who survived cast their weapons against our men
[thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which
had fallen between [the armies]; so that it ought
not to be concluded, that men of such great courage
had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river,
ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous
place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered
these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult.
XXVIII. This battle being
ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii
being almost reduced to annihilation, their old men,
whom together with the boys and women we have stated
to have been collected together in the fenny places
and marshes, on this battle having been reported to
them, since they were convinced that nothing was an
obstacle to the conquerors, and nothing safe to the
conquered, sent ambassadors to Caesar by the consent
of all who remained, and surrendered themselves to
him; and in recounting the calamity of their state,
said that their senators were reduced from 600 to
three; that from 60,000 men they [were reduced] to
scarcely 500 who could bear arms; whom Caesar, that
he might appear to use compassion towards the wretched
and the suppliant, most carefully spared; and ordered
them to enjoy their own territories and towns, and
commanded their neighbours that they should restrain
themselves and their dependants from offering injury
or outrage [to them].
XXIX. When the Aduatuci,
of whom we have written above, were coming with all
their forces to the assistance of the Nervii,
upon this battle being reported to them, they returned
home after they were on the march; deserting all their
towns and forts, they conveyed together all their
possessions into one town, eminently fortified by nature.
While this town had on all sides around it very high
rocks and precipices, there was left on one side a
gently ascending approach, of not more than 200 feet
in width; which place they had fortified with a very
lofty double wall: besides, they had placed stones
of great weight and sharpened stakes upon the walls.
They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones,
who, when they were marching into our province and
Italy, having deposited on this side the river Rhine
such of their baggage-trains as they could not drive
or convey with them, left 6000 of their men as a guard
and defence for them. These having, after the
destruction of their countrymen, been harassed for
many years by their neighbours, while one time they
waged war offensively, and at another resisted it when
waged against them, concluded a peace with the consent
of all, and chose this place as their settlement.
XXX. And on the first arrival
of our army they made frequent sallies from the town,
and contended with our men in trifling skirmishes:
afterwards, when hemmed in by a rampart of twelve feet
[in height], and fifteen miles in circuit, they kept
themselves within the town. When, vineae
having been brought up and a mound raised, they observed
that a tower also was being built at a distance, they
at first began to mock the Romans from their wall,
and to taunt them with the following speeches.
“For what purpose was so vast a machine constructed
at so great a distance?” “With what hands,”
or “with what strength did they, especially
[as they were] men of such very small stature”
(for our shortness of stature, in comparison with
the great size of their bodies, is generally a subject
of much contempt to the men of Gaul), “trust
to place against their walls a tower of such great
weight.”
XXXI. But when they saw
that it was being moved, and was approaching their
walls, startled by the new and unaccustomed sight,
they sent ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about peace;
who spoke in the following manner: “That
they did not believe the Romans waged war without divine
aid, since they were able to move forward machines
of such a height with so great speed, and thus fight
from close quarters: that they resigned themselves
and all their possessions to [Caesar’s] disposal:
that they begged and earnestly entreated one thing,
viz., that if perchance, agreeably to his clemency
and humanity, which they had heard of from others,
he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared,
he would not deprive them of their arms; that all
their neighbours were enemies to them and envied their
courage, from whom they could not defend themselves
if their arms were delivered up: that it was better
for them, if they should be reduced to that state,
to suffer any fate from the Roman people, than to
be tortured to death by those among whom they had
been accustomed to rule.”
XXXII. To these things
Caesar replied, “That he, in accordance with
his custom, rather than owing to their desert, should
spare the state, if they should surrender themselves
before the battering-ram should touch the wall; but
that there was no condition of surrender, except upon
their arms being delivered up; that he should do to
them that which he had done in the case of the Nervii,
and would command their neighbours not to offer any
injury to those who had surrendered to the Roman people.”
The matter being reported to their countrymen, they
said that they would execute his commands. Having
cast a very large quantity of their arms from the
wall into the trench which was before the town, so
that the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of the
wall and the rampart, and nevertheless having retained
and concealed, as we afterwards discovered, about
a third part in the town, the gates were opened, and
they enjoyed peace for that day.
XXXIII. Towards evening
Caesar ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers
to go out of the town, lest the townspeople should
receive any injury from them by night. They [the
Aduatuci], by a design before entered into, as we
afterwards understood, because they believed that,
as a surrender had been made, our men would dismiss
their guards, or at least would keep watch less carefully,
partly with those arms which they had retained and
concealed, partly with shields made of bark or interwoven
wickers, which they had hastily covered over with skins
(as the shortness of time required) in the third watch,
suddenly made a sally from the town with all their
forces [in that direction] in which the ascent to
our fortifications seemed the least difficult.
The signal having been immediately given by fires,
as Caesar had previously commanded, a rush was made
thither [i.e. by the Roman soldiers] from the
nearest fort; and the battle was fought by the enemy
as vigorously as it ought to be fought by brave men,
in the last hope of safety, in a disadvantageous place,
and against those who were throwing their weapons
from a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety
depended on their courage alone. About 4000 of
the men having been slain, the rest were forced back
into the town. The day after, Caesar, after breaking
open the gates, which there was no one then to defend,
and sending in our soldiers, sold the whole spoil
of that town. The number of 53,000 persons was
reported to him by those who had bought them.
XXXIV. At the same time
he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sent with
one legion against the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii,
the Curiosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the
Rhedones, which are maritime states, and touch upon
the [Atlantic] ocean, that all these nations were
brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people.
XXXV. These things being
achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so high an
opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians,
that ambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations
who dwelt beyond the Rhine, to promise that they would
give hostages and execute his commands. Which
embassies Caesar, because he was hastening into Italy
and Illyricum, ordered to return to him at the beginning
of the following summer. He himself, having led
his legions into winter-quarters among the Carnutes,
the Andes, and the Turones, which states were close
to those regions in which he had waged war, set out
for Italy; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was
decreed for those achievements, upon receiving Caesar’s
letter; [an honour] which before that time had been
conferred on none.