I. When Caesar was setting
out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with
the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against
the Nantuates, the Veragri, and Seduni, who extend
from the territories of the Allobroges, and the lake
of Geneva, and the river Rhone to the top of the Alps.
The reason for sending him was, that he desired that
the pass along the Alps, through which [the Roman]
merchants had been accustomed to travel with great
danger, and under great imposts, should be opened.
He permitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station
the legion in these places, for the purpose of wintering.
Galba having fought some successful battles, and stormed
several of their forts, upon ambassadors being sent
to him from all parts and hostages given and a peace
concluded, determined to station two cohorts among
the Nantuates, and to winter in person with the other
cohorts of that legion in a village of the Veragri,
which is called Octodurus; and this village being situated
in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded
on all sides by very high mountains. As this
village was divided into two parts by a river, he
granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned
the other, which had been left by them unoccupied,
to the cohorts to winter in. He fortified this
[latter] part with a rampart and a ditch.
II. When several days had
elapsed in winter quarters, and he had ordered corn
to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by his scouts
that all the people had gone off in the night from
that part of the town which he had given up to the
Gauls, and that the mountains which hung over
it were occupied by a very large force of the Sedani
and Veragri. It had happened for several reasons
that the Gauls suddenly formed the design of
renewing the war and cutting off that legion.
First, because they despised a single legion, on account
of its small number, and that not quite full (two
cohorts having been detached, and several individuals
being absent, who had been despatched for the purpose
of seeking provision); then, likewise, because they
thought that on account of the disadvantageous character
of the situation, even their first attack could not
be sustained [by us] when they would rush from the
mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons
upon us. To this was added, that they were indignant
that their children were torn from them under the
title of hostages, and they were persuaded that the
Romans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps,
and unite those parts to the neighbouring province
[of Gaul], not only to secure the passes, but also
as a constant possession.
III. Having received these
tidings, Galba, since the works of the winter quarters
and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor
was sufficient preparation made with regard to corn
and other provisions (since, as a surrender had been
made, and hostages received, he had thought he need
entertain no apprehension of a war), speedily summoning
a council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions.
In which council, since so much sudden danger had
happened contrary to the general expectation, and
almost all the higher places were seen already covered
with a multitude of armed men, nor could [either] troops
come to their relief, or provisions be brought in,
as the passes were blocked up [by the enemy]; safety
being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of this
sort were delivered; that, “leaving their baggage,
and making a sally, they should hasten away for safety
by the same routes by which they had come thither.”
To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving
that measure to the last, to await the issue of the
matter, and to defend the camp.
IV. A short time only having
elapsed, so that time was scarcely given for arranging
and executing those things which they had determined
on, the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed
down [upon our men] from all parts, and discharged
stones and darts upon our rampart. Our men at
first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely,
nor did they cast any weapon ineffectually from their
higher station. As soon as any part of the camp,
being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard pressed,
thither they ran, and brought assistance. But
they were over-matched in this, that the enemy when
wearied by the long continuance of the battle, went
out of the action, and others with fresh strength
came in their place; none of which things could be
done by our men, owing to the smallness of their number;
and not only was permission not given to the wearied
[Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the
wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where
he had been stationed, and recover.
V. When they had now been
fighting for more than six hours, without cessation,
and not only strength, but even weapons were failing
our men, and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously,
and had begun to demolish the rampart and to fill
up the trench, while our men were becoming exhausted,
and the matter was now brought to the last extremity,
P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first
rank, whom we have related to have been disabled by
severe wounds in the engagement with the Nervii,
and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a
man of great skill and valour, hasten to Galba, and
assure him that the only hope of safety lay in making
a sally, and trying the last resource. Whereupon,
assembling the centurions, he quickly gives orders
to the soldiers to discontinue the fight a short time,
and only collect the weapons flung [at them], and
recruit themselves after their fatigue, and afterwards,
upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp,
and place in their valour all their hope of safety.
VI. They do what they were
ordered; and, making a sudden sally from all the gates
[of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of
knowing what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves.
Fortune thus taking a turn, [our men] surround on
every side, and slay those who had entertained the
hope of gaining the camp, and having killed more than
the third part of an army of more than 30,000 men (which
number of the barbarians it appeared certain had come
up to our camp), put to flight the rest when panic-stricken,
and do not suffer them to halt even upon the higher
grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus
routed, and stripped of their arms, [our men] betake
themselves to their camp and fortifications.
Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba was
unwilling to tempt fortune again, and remembered that
he had come into winter quarters with one design,
and saw that he had met with a different state of
affairs; chiefly however urged by the want of corn
and provision, having the next day burned all the buildings
of that village, he hastens to return into the province;
and as no enemy opposed or hindered his march, he
brought the legion safe into the [country of the]
Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and
there wintered.
VII. These things being
achieved, while Caesar had every reason to suppose
that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the
Belgae being overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni
among the Alps defeated, and when he had, therefore,
in the beginning of winter, set out for Illyricum,
as he wished to visit those nations, and acquire a
knowledge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up
in Gaul. The occasion of that war was this:
P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up his winter quarters
with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border
upon the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a
scarcity of corn in those parts, sent out some officers
of cavalry and several military tribunes amongst the
neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn
and provision; in which number T. Terrasidius was
sent amongst the Esubii; M. Trebius Gallus amongst
the Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, with T. Silius, amongst
the Veneti.
VIII. The influence of
this state is by far the most considerable of any
of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the
Veneti both have a very great number of ships, with
which they have been accustomed to sail to Britain,
and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and experience
of nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scattered
along that stormy and open sea, of which they are in
possession, they hold as tributaries almost all those
who are accustomed to traffic in that sea. With
them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by their
detaining Silius and Velanius; for they thought that
they should recover by their means the hostages which
they had given to Crassus. The neighbouring people,
led on by their influence (as the measures of the
Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and
Terrasidius for the same motive; and quickly sending
ambassadors, by means of their leading men, they enter
into a mutual compact to do nothing except by general
consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they
solicit the other states to choose rather to continue
in that liberty which they had received from their
ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans.
All the sea coast being quickly brought over to their
sentiments, they send a common embassy to P. Crassus
[to say], “If he wished to receive back his
officers, let him send back to them their hostages.”
IX. Caesar, being informed
of these things by Crassus, since he was so far distant
himself, orders ships of war to be built in the meantime
on the river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers
to be raised from the province; sailors and pilots
to be provided. These matters being quickly executed,
he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits,
hastens to the army. The Veneti, and the other
states also, being informed of Caesar’s arrival,
when they reflected how great a crime they had committed,
in that the ambassadors (a character which had amongst
all nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by
them been detained and thrown into prison, resolve
to prepare for a war in proportion to the greatness
of their danger, and especially to provide those things
which appertain to the service of a navy; with the
greater confidence, inasmuch as they greatly relied
on the nature of their situation. They knew that
the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that
the approach by sea was most difficult, by reason
of our ignorance of the localities, [and] the small
number of the harbours, and they trusted that our
army would not be able to stay very long among them,
on account of the insufficiency of corn; and again,
even if all these things should turn out contrary
to their expectation, yet they were very powerful in
their navy. They, well understood that the Romans
neither had any number of ships, nor were acquainted
with the shallows, the harbours, or the islands of
those parts where they would have to carry on the war;
and that navigation was very different in a narrow
sea from what it was in the vast and open ocean.
Having come to this resolution, they fortify their
towns, convey corn into them from the country parts,
bring together as many ships as possible to Venetia,
where it appeared Caesar would at first carry on the
war. They unite to themselves as allies for that
war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati,
the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii;
and send for auxiliaries from Britain, which is situated
over against those regions.
X. There were these difficulties
which we have mentioned above, in carrying on the
war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to
that war; the open insult offered to the state in
the detention of the Roman knights, the rebellion
raised after surrendering, the revolt after hostages
were given, the confederacy of so many states, but
principally, lest if [the conduct of] this part was
overlooked, the other nations should think that the
same thing was permitted them. Wherefore, since
he reflected that almost all the Gauls were fond
of revolution, and easily and quickly excited to war;
that all men likewise, by nature, love liberty and
hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought
to divide and more widely distribute his army, before
more states should join the confederation.
XI. He therefore sends
T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to the
Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He
charges him to visit the Remi and the other Belgians,
and to keep them in their allegiance and repel the
Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the
Belgae to their aid) if they attempted to cross the
river by force in their ships. He orders P. Crassus
to proceed into Aquitania with twelve legionary
cohorts and a great number of the cavalry, lest auxiliaries
should be sent into Gaul by these states, and such
great nations be united. He sends Q. Titurius
Sabinus, his lieutenant, with three legions, among
the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii, to take
care that their forces should be kept separate from
the rest. He appoints D. Brutus, a young man,
over the fleet and those Gallic vessels which he had
ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni,
and the other provinces which remained at peace; and
commands him to proceed towards the Veneti, as soon
as he could. He himself hastens thither with
the land forces.
XII. The sites of their
towns were generally such that, being placed on extreme
points [of land] and on promontories, they neither
had an approach by land when the tide had rushed in
from the main ocean, which always happens twice in
the space of twelve hours; nor by ships, because,
upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to
be dashed upon the shoals. Thus, by either circumstance,
was the storming of their towns rendered difficult;
and if at any time perchance the Veneti, overpowered
by the greatness of our works (the sea having been
excluded by a mound and large dams, and the latter
being made almost equal in height to the walls of
the town), had begun to despair of their fortunes,
bringing up a large number of ships, of which they
had a very great quantity, they carried off all their
property and betook themselves to the nearest towns;
there they again defended themselves by the same advantages
of situation. They did this the more easily during
a great part of the summer, because our ships were
kept back by storms, and the difficulty of sailing
was very great in that vast and open sea, with its
strong tides and its harbours far apart and exceedingly
few in number.
XIII. For their ships were
built and equipped after this manner. The keels
were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby
they could more easily encounter the shallows and
the ebbing of the tide: the prows were raised
very high, and in like manner the sterns were adapted
to the force of the waves and storms [which they were
formed to sustain]. The ships were built wholly
of oak, and designed to endure any force and violence
whatever; the benches, which were made of planks a
foot in breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the
thickness of a man’s thumb; the anchors were
secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and
for sails they used skins and thin dressed leather.
These [were used] either through their want of canvas
and their ignorance of its application, of for this
reason, which is more probable, that they thought that
such storms of the ocean, and such violent gales of
wind could not be resisted by sails, nor ships of
such great burden be conveniently enough managed by
them. The encounter of our fleet with these ships
was of such a nature that our fleet excelled in speed
alone, and the plying of the oars; other things, considering
the nature of the place [and] the violence of the
storms, were more suitable and better adapted on their
side; for neither could our ships injure theirs with
their beaks (so great was their strength), nor on
account of their height was a weapon easily cast up
to them; and for the same reason they were less readily
locked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever
a storm began to rage and they ran before the wind,
they both could weather the storm more easily and
heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by
the tide feared nothing from rocks and shelves:
the risk of all which things was much to be dreaded
by our ships.
XIV. Caesar, after taking
many of their towns, perceiving that so much labour
was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy
could not be prevented on the capture of their towns,
and that injury could not be done them, he determined
to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up
and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their
ships, fully equipped and appointed with every kind
of [naval] implement, sailed forth from the harbour,
and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appear clear
to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes
of the soldiers and the centurions, to whom the
several ships were assigned, what to do, or what system
of tactics to adopt; for they knew that damage could
not be done by their beaks; and that, although turrets
were built [on their decks], yet the height of the
stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these; so that
weapons could not be cast up from [our] lower position
with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls
fell the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided
by our men was of great service, [viz.] sharp hooks
inserted into and fastened upon poles, of a form not
unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls.
When the ropes which fastened the sail-yards to the
masts were caught by them and pulled, and our vessel
vigorously impelled with the oars, they [the ropes]
were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards
necessarily fell down; so that as all the hope of
the Gallic vessels depended on their sails and rigging,
upon these being cut away, the entire management of
the ships was taken from them at the same time.
The rest of the contest depended on courage; in which
our men decidedly had the advantage; and the more
so because the whole action was carried on in the
sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act,
a little more valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved,
for all the hills and higher grounds, from which there
was a near prospect of the sea, were occupied by our
army.
XV. The sail-yards [of
the enemy], as we have said, being brought down, although
two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded
each one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest
energy to board the ships of the enemy: and,
after the barbarians observed this taking place, as
a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no
relief for that evil could be discovered, they hastened
to seek safety in flight. And, having now turned
their vessels to that quarter in which the wind blew,
so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they
could not move out of their place, which circumstance,
truly, was exceedingly opportune for finishing the
business; for our men gave chase and took them one
by one, so that very few out of all the number, [and
those] by the intervention of night, arrived at the
land, after the battle had lasted almost from the
fourth hour till sunset.
XVI. By this battle the
war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea coast
was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too,
of more advanced age, in whom there was any discretion
or rank, had assembled in that battle; and they had
collected in that one place whatever naval forces
they had anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors
had no place to retreat to, nor means of defending
their towns. They accordingly surrendered themselves
and all their possessions to Caesar, on whom Caesar
thought that punishment should be inflicted the more
severely, in order that for the future the rights of
ambassadors might be more carefully respected, by
barbarians: having, therefore, put to death all
their senate, he sold the rest for slaves.
XVII. While these things
are going on amongst the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus
with those troops which he had received from Caesar,
arrives in the territories of the Unelli. Over
these people Viridovix ruled, and held the chief command
of all those states which had revolted: from
which he had collected a large and powerful army.
And in those few days, the Aulerci and the Sexovii,
having slain their senate because they would not consent
to be promoters of the war, shut their gates [against
us] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude
besides of desperate men and robbers assembled out
of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of plundering
and the love of fighting had called away from husbandry
and their daily labour. Sabinus kept himself within
his camp, which was in a position convenient for everything;
while Viridovix encamped over against him at a distance
of two miles, and daily bringing out his forces, gave
him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus had
now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but
also was somewhat taunted by the speeches of our soldiers;
and furnished so great a suspicion of his cowardice
that the enemy presumed to approach even to the very
rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for
the following reason: because he did not think
that a lieutenant ought to engage in battle with so
great a force, especially while he who held the chief
command was absent, except on advantageous ground or
some favourable circumstance presented itself.
XVIII. After having established
this suspicion of his cowardice, he selected a certain
suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom
he had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him
by great gifts and promises to go over to the enemy;
and informs [him] of what he wished to be done.
Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays
before them the fears of the Romans; and informs them
by what difficulties Caesar himself was harassed,
and that the matter was not far removed from this that
Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his
army out of the camp and set forth to Caesar, for
the purpose of carrying [him] assistance, which, when
they heard, they all cry out together that an opportunity
of successfully conducting their enterprise ought not
to be thrown away; that they ought to go to the [Roman]
camp. Many things persuaded the Gauls to
this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the previous
days; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter;
want of provisions, for a supply of which they had
not taken the requisite precautions; the hope springing
from the Venetic war; and [also] because in most cases
men willingly believe what they wish. Influenced
by these things, they do not discharge Viridovix and
the other leaders from the council, before they gained
permission from them to take up arms and hasten to
[our] camp; which being granted, rejoicing as if victory
were fully certain, they collected faggots and brushwood,
with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hasten
to the camp.
XIX. The situation of the
camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from the
bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded
with great speed (in order that as little time as
possible might be given to the Romans to collect and
arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath.
Sabinus having encouraged his men, gives them the
signal, which they earnestly desired. While the
enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which
they were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly
made from two gates [of the camp]. It happened,
by the advantage of situation, by the unskilfulness
and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valour of our
soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that
they could not stand one attack of our men, and immediately
turned their backs: and our men with full vigour
followed them while disordered, and slew a great number
of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few,
who escaped by flight. Thus at the same time,
Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar
of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the states immediately
surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the
temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to
undertake wars, so their mind is weak, and by no means
resolute in enduring calamities.
XX. About the same time,
P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania
(which, as has been before said, both from its extent
of territory and the great number of its people, is
to be reckoned a third part of Gaul), understanding
that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few
years before L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant,
had been killed, and his army routed, and from which
L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss
of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care
must be used by him. Wherefore, having provided
corn, procured auxiliaries and cavalry, [and] having
summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso,
and Narbo, which are the states of the province of
Gaul, that border on these regions [Aquitania],
he led his army into the territories of the Sotiates.
On his arrival being known, the Sotiates having brought
together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which
their strength principally lay, and assailing our
army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry action,
then when their cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing,
they suddenly display their infantry forces, which
they had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These
attacked our men [while] disordered, and renewed the
fight.
XXI. The battle was long
and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates, relying
on their former victories, imagined that the safety
of the whole of Aquitania rested on their valour;
[and] our men, on the other hand, desired it might
be seen what they could accomplish without their general
and without the other legions, under a very young commander;
at length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to
turn their backs, and a great number of them being
slain, Crassus began to besiege the [principal] town
of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly
resisting, he raised vineae and turrets.
They at one time attempting a sally, at another forming
mines to our rampart and vineae (at which the
Aquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places
amongst them there are copper mines); when they perceived
that nothing could be gained by these operations through
the perseverance of our men, they send ambassadors
to Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a surrender.
Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver
up their arms, comply.
XXII. And while the attention
of our men is engaged in that matter, in another part
Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600
devoted followers, whom they call soldurii (the
conditions of whose association are these, that
they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those
to whose friendship they have devoted themselves:
if anything calamitous happen to them, either they
endure the same destiny together with them, or commit
suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has
there been found any one who, upon his being slain
to whose friendship he had devoted himself, refused
to die); Adcantuannus, [I say] endeavouring to make
a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together
to arms, upon a shout being raised at that part of
the fortification, and a fierce battle had been fought
there, was driven back into the town, yet he obtained
from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy
the same terms of surrender [as the other inhabitants].
XXIII. Crassus, having
received their arms and hostages, marched into the
territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates.
But then, the barbarians being alarmed, because they
had heard that a town fortified by the nature of the
place and by art had been taken by us in a few days
after our arrival there, began to send ambassadors
into all quarters, to combine, to give hostages one
to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors also
are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are
nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders
are summoned from them; on whose arrival they proceed
to carry on the war with great confidence, and with
a great host of men. They who had been with Q.
Sertorius the whole period [of his war in Spain] and
were supposed to have very great skill in military
matters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the
practice of the Roman people, begin to select [advantageous]
places, to fortify their camp, to cut off our men
from provisions, which, when Crassus observes, [and
likewise] that his forces, on account of their small
number, could not safely be separated; that the enemy
both made excursions and beset the passes, and [yet]
left sufficient guard for their camp; that on that
account, corn and provision could not very conveniently
be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy
was daily increased, he thought that he ought not
to delay in giving battle. This matter being
brought to a council, when he discovered that all
thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for
the fight.
XXIV. Having drawn out
all his forces at the break of day, and marshalled
them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in
the centre, and waited to see what measures the enemy
would take. They, although on account of their
great number and their ancient renown in war, and
the small number of our men, they supposed they might
safely fight, nevertheless considered it safer to
gain the victory without any wound, by besetting the
passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if
the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should
begin to retreat, they intended to attack them while
encumbered in their march and depressed in spirit
[as being assailed while] under baggage. This
measure being approved of by the leaders and the forces
of the Romans drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves
in their camp. Crassus having remarked this circumstance,
since the enemy, intimidated by their own delay, and
by the reputation [i.e. for cowardice arising
thence] had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting,
and the remarks of all were heard [declaring] that
no longer ought delay to be made in going to the camp,
after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp of
the enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops.
XXV. There, while some
were filling up the ditch, and others, by throwing
a large number of darts, were driving the defenders
from the rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries,
on whom Crassus did not much rely in the battle, by
supplying stones and weapons [to the soldiers], and
by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance
and character of men engaged in fighting; while also
the enemy were fighting resolutely and boldly, and
their weapons, discharged from their higher position,
fell with great effect; the horse, having gone round
the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the
camp was not fortified with equal care on the side
of the Decuman gate, and had an easy approach.
XXVI. Crassus, having exhorted
the commanders of the horse to animate their men by
great rewards and promises, points out to them what
he wished to have done. They, as they had been
commanded, having brought out the four cohorts, which,
as they had been left as a guard for the camp, were
not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round
by a somewhat longer way, lest they could be seen
from the camp of the enemy, when the eyes and minds
of all were intent upon the battle, quickly arrived
at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and,
having demolished these, stood in the camp of the
enemy before they were seen by them, or it was known
what was going on. And then, a shout being heard
in that quarter, our men, their strength having been
recruited (which usually occurs on the hope of victory),
began to fight more vigorously. The enemy, surrounded
on all sides, [and] all their affairs being despaired
of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over
the ramparts and to seek safety in flight. These
the cavalry pursued over the very open plains, and
after leaving scarcely a fourth part out of the number
of 50,000, which it was certain had assembled out of
Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned
late at night to the camp.
XXVII. Having heard of
this battle, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered
itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages,
in which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones,
the Preciani, the Vocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates,
the Garites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates,
the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remote
nations, relying on the time of the year, because winter
was at hand, neglected to do this.
XXVIII. About the same
time Caesar, although the summer was nearly past,
yet since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the
Menapii alone remained in arms, and had never
sent ambassadors to him [to make a treaty] of peace,
speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war
might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct
the war on a very different method from the rest of
the Gauls; for as they perceived that the greatest
nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been
routed and overcome, and as they possessed continuous
ranges of forests and morasses, they removed themselves
and all their property thither. When Caesar had
arrived at the opening of these forests, and had begun
to fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the meantime
seen, while our men were dispersed on their respective
duties, they suddenly rushed out from all parts of
the forest, and made an attack on our men. The
latter quickly took up arms and drove them back again
to their forests; and having killed a great many,
lost a few of their own men while pursuing them too
far through those intricate places.
XXIX. During the remaining
days after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests;
and that no attack might be made on the flank of the
soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed
together (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which
was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on either
flank. When a great space had been, with incredible
speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the
enemy] and the rear of their baggage-train were already
seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking
for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such
a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended,
and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers
could not any longer remain in their tents. Therefore,
having laid waste all their country, [and] having
burnt their villages and houses, Caesar led back his
army and stationed them in winter-quarters among the
Aulerci and Lexovii, and the other states which had
made war upon him last.