I. When Caesar’s
letter was delivered to the consuls, they were with
great difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes,
prevailed on to suffer it to be read in the senate;
but the tribunes could not prevail, that any question
should be put to the senate on the subject of the
letter. The consuls put the question on the regulation
of the state. Lucius Lentulus the consul
promises that he will not fail the senate and republic,
“if they declared their sentiments boldly and
resolutely, but if they turned their regard to Caesar,
and courted his favour, as they did on former occasions,
he would adopt a plan for himself, and not submit
to the authority of the senate: that he too had
a means of regaining Caesar’s favour and friendship.”
Scipio spoke to the same purport, “that it was
Pompey’s intention not to abandon the republic,
if the senate would support him; but if they should
hesitate and act without energy, they would in vain
implore his aid, if they should require it hereafter.”
II. This speech of Scipio’s,
as the senate was convened in the city, and Pompey
was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips
of Pompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments
with more moderation, as Marcellus first, who in the
beginning of his speech, said, “that the question
ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till
levies were made throughout all Italy, and armies
raised under whose protection the senate might freely
and safely pass such resolutions as they thought proper”:
as Marcus Calidius afterwards, who was of opinion,
“that Pompey should set out for his province,
that there might be no cause for arms: that Caesar
was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced
from him, that Pompey was retaining those troops,
and keeping them near the city to do him injury”:
as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almost word
for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus,
who peremptorily refused to propose Calidius’s
motion. Marcellus, overawed by his reproofs,
retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate,
intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the
fears of a present army, and the threats of Pompey’s
friends, unwillingly and reluctantly adopted Scipio’s
opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by a
certain day, and should he not do so, he should be
considered as acting against the state. Marcus
Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of the people,
interposed. The question was immediately put on
their interposition. Violent opinions were expressed:
whoever spoke with the greatest acrimony and cruelty,
was most highly commended by Caesar’s enemies.
III. The senate having
broken up in the evening, all who belonged to that
order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the
forward, and secured their votes for the next day;
the more moderate he reproved and excited against
Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had
served in Pompey’s armies, were invited to his
standard by the hopes of rewards and promotions.
Several officers belonging to the two legions, which
had been delivered up by Caesar, were sent for.
The city and the Comitium were crowded with tribunes,
centurions, and veterans. All the consuls’
friends, all Pompey’s connections, all those
who bore any ancient enmity to Caesar, were forced
into the senate house. By their concourse and
declarations the timid were awed, the irresolute confirmed,
and the greater part deprived of the power of speaking
their sentiments with freedom. Lucius Piso, the
censor, offered to go to Caesar: as did likewise
Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these
affairs, and require only six days’ time to
finish the business. Opinions were expressed
by some to the effect that commissioners should be
sent to Caesar to acquaint him with the senate’s
pleasure.
IV. All these proposals
were rejected, and opposition made to them all, in
the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato.
An old grudge against Caesar and chagrin at a defeat
actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon
by the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having
the government of an army and provinces, and by the
presents which he expected from such princes as should
receive the title of friends of the Roman people, and
boasted amongst his friends, that he would be a second
Sylla, to whom the supreme authority should return.
Similar hopes of a province and armies, which he expected
to share with Pompey on account of his connection
with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover, [he was influenced
by] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation
and an ostentatious display of himself and his friends
in power, who at that time had great influence in
the republic, and courts of judicature. Pompey
himself, incited by Caesar’s enemies, because
he was unwilling that any person should bear an equal
degree of dignity, had wholly alienated himself from
Caesar’s friendship, and procured a reconciliation
with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom
he had himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity
with him. At the same time, chagrined at the
disgrace which he had incurred by converting the two
legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria,
to [augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious
to bring matters to a war.
V. For these reasons everything
was done in a hasty and disorderly manner, and neither
was time given to Caesar’s relations to inform
him [of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes
of the people to deprecate their own danger, nor even
to retain the last privilege, which Sylla had left
them, the interposing their authority; but on the seventh
day they were obliged to think of their own safety,
which the most turbulent tribunes of the people were
not accustomed to attend to, nor to fear being called
to an account for their actions, till the eighth month.
Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of
the senate (which was never resorted to even by daring
proposers except when the city was in danger of being
set on fire, or when the public safety was despaired
of). “That the consuls, praetors, tribunes
of the people, and proconsuls in the city should
take care that the state received no injury.”
These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides
of January; therefore, in the first five days, on
which the senate could meet, from the day on which
Lentulus entered into his consulate, the two
days of election excepted, the severest and most virulent
decrees were passed against Caesar’s government,
and against those most illustrious characters, the
tribunes of the people. The latter immediately
made their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar,
who was then at Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his
moderate demands; [to see] if matters could be brought
to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the
part of the enemies.
VI. During the succeeding
days the senate is convened outside the city.
Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared
through Scipio. He applauded the courage and
firmness of the senate, acquainted them with his force,
and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he
was moreover informed and assured that Caesar’s
soldiers were disaffected, and that he could not persuade
them to defend or even follow him. Motions were
made in the senate concerning other matters; that levies
should be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla
should be sent as propraetor into Mauritania; that
money should be granted to Pompey from the public
treasury. It was also put to the vote that king
Juba should be [honoured with the title of] friend
and ally. But Marcellus said that he would not
allow this motion for the present. Philip, one
of the tribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla;
the resolutions respecting the other matters passed.
The provinces, two of which were consular, the remainder
praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio
got Syria, Lucius Domitius Gaul:
Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a private
motive, and their lots were not even admitted.
To the other provinces praetors were sent, nor was
time granted as in former years, to refer to the people
on their appointment, nor to make them take the usual
oath, and march out of the city in a public manner,
robed in the military habit, after offering their
vows; a circumstance which had never before happened.
Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had
lictors in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents
of former times. Levies were made throughout
Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from the municipal
towns, and violently taken from the temples. All
distinctions between things human and divine are confounded.
VII. These things being
made known to Caesar, he harangued his soldiers; he
reminded them “of the wrongs done to him at all
times by his enemies, and complained that Pompey had
been alienated from him and led astray by them through
envy and a malicious opposition to his glory, though
he had always favoured and promoted Pompey’s
honour and dignity. He complained that an innovation
had been introduced into the republic, that the intercession
of the tribunes, which had been restored a few years
before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and suppressed
by force of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the
tribunes of every other power, had, nevertheless,
left the privilege of intercession unrestrained; that
Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost,
had taken away the privileges which they formerly
had; that whenever the senate decreed, “that
the magistrates should take care that the republic
sustained no injury” (by which words and decree
the Roman people were obliged to repair to arms),
it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when
the tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people
seceded, and possessed themselves of the temples and
éminences of the city; (and these instances of
former times, he showed them were expiated by the
fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that nothing
of this kind was attempted now, nor even thought of:
that no law was promulgated, no intrigue with the
people going forward, no secession made; he exhorted
them to defend from the malice of his enemies, the
reputation and honour of that general, under whose
command they had for nine years most successfully
supported the state; fought many successful battles,
and subdued all Gaul and Germany.” The
soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which was present
(for in the beginning of the disturbances he had called
it out, his other legions not having yet arrived),
all cry out that they are ready to defend their general,
and the tribunes of the commons, from all injuries.
VIII. Having made himself
acquainted with the disposition of his soldiers, Caesar
set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met
the tribunes, who had fled to him for protection;
he called his other legions from winter quarters,
and ordered them to follow him. Thither came
Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a lieutenant
general under Caesar. He, after concluding the
rest of his speech, and stating for what purpose he
had come, told Caesar that he had commands of a private
nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear
himself to Caesar, lest he should impute those actions
which he did for the republic, to a design of affronting
him; that he had ever preferred the interest of the
state to his own private connections; that Caesar,
too, for his own honour, ought to sacrifice his desires
and resentment to the public good, and not vent his
anger so violently against his enemies, lest in his
hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic.
He spoke a few words to the same purport from himself,
in addition to Pompey’s apology. Roscius,
the praetor, conferred with Caesar almost in the same
words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey
had empowered him to do so.
IX. Though these things
seemed to have no tendency towards redressing his
injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he
could communicate his wishes to Pompey; he required
of them both, that as they had conveyed Pompey’s
demands to him, they should not refuse to convey his
demands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could
terminate a great dispute, and liberate all Italy
from her fears.
“That the honour of the republic
had ever been his first object, and dearer to him
than life; that he was chagrined, that the favour of
the Roman people was wrested from him by the injurious
reports of his enemies; that he was deprived of a
half-year’s command, and dragged back to the
city, though the people had ordered that regard should
be paid to his suit for the consulate at the next
election, though he was not present; that, however,
he had patiently submitted to this loss of honour
for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters
to the senate, requiring that all persons should resign
the command of their armies, he did not obtain even
that request; that levies were made throughout Italy;
that the two legions which had been taken from him,
under the pretence of the Parthian war, were kept at
home, and that the state was in arms. To what
did all these things tend, unless to his ruin?
But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any
terms, and to endure everything for the sake of the
republic. Let Pompey go to his own province;
let them both disband their armies; let all persons
in Italy lay down their arms; let all fears be removed
from the city; let free elections, and the whole republic
be resigned to the direction of the senate and Roman
people. That these things might be the more easily
performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by
oath, either let Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar
to go to him; it might be that all their disputes
would be settled by an interview.”
X. Roscius and Lucius Caesar,
having received this message, went to Capua, where
they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to them
Caesar’s terms. Having deliberated on the
matter, they replied, and sent written proposals to
him by the same persons, the purport of which was,
that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum,
and disband his army: if he complied with this,
that Pompey would go to Spain. In the meantime,
until security was given that Caesar would perform
his promises, that the consuls and Pompey would not
give over their levies.
XI. It was not an equitable
proposal, to require that Caesar should quit Ariminum
and return to his province; but that he [Pompey] should
himself retain his province and the legions that belonged
to another, and desire that Caesar’s army should
be disbanded, whilst he himself was making new levies:
and that he should merely promise to go to his province,
without naming the day on which he would set out; so
that if he should not set out till after Caesar’s
consulate expired, yet he would not appear bound by
any religious scruples about asserting a falsehood.
But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising
to set out to meet him, made the expectation of peace
appear very hopeless. Caesar, therefore, sent
Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminum to
Arretium; he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions,
with the intention of raising levies there. He
secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and Ancona, with a cohort
each.
XII. In the meantime, being
informed that Thermus the praetor was in possession
of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the
town, but that the affections of all the inhabitants
were very well inclined towards himself; he detached
Curio with three cohorts, which he had at Ariminum
and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus,
distrusting the affections of the townsmen, drew his
cohorts out of it, and made his escape; his soldiers
deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio
recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of
all the inhabitants. Caesar, having received
an account of this, and relying on the affections
of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of
the thirteenth legion from the garrisons, and set
out for Auximum, a town into which Attius had brought
his cohorts, and of which he had taken possession,
and from which he had sent senators round about the
country of Picenum, to raise new levies.
XIII. Upon news of Caesar’s
approach, the senate of Auximum went in a body to
Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject
for them to determine upon: yet neither they,
nor the rest of the freemen would suffer Caius Caesar,
a general, who had merited so well of the republic,
after performing such great achievements, to be excluded
from their town and walls; wherefore he ought to pay
some regard to the opinion of posterity, and his own
danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varus
drew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced,
and fled. A few of Caesar’s front rank
having pursued him, obliged him to halt, and when
the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops:
some of them disperse to their homes, the rest come
over to Caesar; and along with them, Lucius Pupius,
the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and brought
to Caesar. He had held the same rank before in
Cneius Pompey’s army. But Caesar applauded
the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returned
thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be
grateful for their conduct.
XIV. Intelligence of this
being brought to Rome, so great a panic spread on
a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came
to open the treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by
the senate’s decree, immediately on opening
the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it
was falsely rumoured that Caesar was approaching,
and that his cavalry were already at the gates.
Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did
most of the magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left
the city the day before, and was on his march to those
legions which he had received from Caesar, and had
disposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies
were stopped within the city. No place on this
side of Capua was thought secure. At Capua they
first began to take courage and to rally, and determined
to raise levies in the colonies, which had been sent
thither by the Julian law: and Lentulus
brought into the public market-place the gladiators
which Caesar maintained there for the entertainment
of the people, and confirmed them in their liberty,
and gave them horses and ordered them to attend him;
but afterwards, being warned by his friends that this
action was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed
them among the slaves of the districts of Campania,
to keep guard there.
XV. Caesar, having moved
forward from Auximum, traversed the whole country
of Picenum. All the governors in these countries
most cheerfully received him, and aided his army with
every necessary. Ambassadors came to him even
from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and
built at his own expense, and offered most earnestly
to comply with his orders. He demanded soldiers:
they sent them. In the meantime, the twelfth
legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched
to Asculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus
Spinther occupied that town with ten cohorts; but,
on being informed of Caesar’s approach, he fled
from the town, and, in attempting to bring off his
cohorts with him, was deserted by a great part of
his men. Being left on the road with a small
number, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent
by Pompey into Picenum to confirm the people [in their
allegiance]. Vibullius, being informed by him
of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers
from him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise,
from the neighbouring countries, as many cohorts as
he can from Pompey’s new levies. Amongst
them he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum,
with six cohorts, which he had in the garrison there;
by a junction with which he made up thirteen cohorts.
With them he marched by hasty journeys to Corfinium,
to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that
Caesar was advancing with two legions. Domitius
had collected about twenty cohorts from Alba, and
the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighbouring states.
XVI. Caesar, having recovered
Asculum and driven out Lentulus, ordered the
soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out
and a muster to be made; and, having delayed for one
day there to provide corn, he marched to Corfinium.
On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitius
from the town, were breaking down a bridge which was
over the river, at three miles’ distance from
it. An engagement taking place there with Caesar’s
advanced-guard, Domitius’s men were quickly beaten
off from the bridge and retreated precipitately into
the town. Caesar, having marched his legions
over, halted before the town and encamped close by
the walls.
XVII. Domitius, upon
observing this, sent messengers well acquainted with
the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply
rewarded, with despatches to Pompey to Apulia, to
beg and entreat him to come to his assistance.
That Caesar could be easily enclosed by the two armies,
through the narrowness of the country, and prevented
from obtaining supplies: unless he did so, that
he and upwards of thirty cohorts, and a great number
of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme
danger. In the meantime he encouraged his troops,
disposed engines on the walls, and assigned to each
man a particular part of the city to defend. In
a speech to the soldiers he promised them lands out
of his own estate; to every private soldier four acres,
and a corresponding share to the centurions and
veterans.
XVIII. In the meantime,
word was brought to Caesar that the people of Sulmo,
a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were
ready to obey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus
Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who
were in possession of the town with a garrison of
seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither,
with five cohorts of the eighth legion. The inhabitants,
as soon as they saw our standards, threw open their
gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers,
went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius
and Attius leaped off the walls. Attius, being
brought before Antonius, begged that he might be sent
to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which
he had set out with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar
added these cohorts to his own army, and sent Attius
away in safety. The three first days Caesar employed
in fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing
in corn from the neighbouring free towns, and waiting
for the rest of his forces. Within the three
days the eighth legion came to him, and twenty-two
cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three
hundred horse from the king of Noricum. On their
arrival he made a second camp on another part of the
town, and gave the command of it to Curio. He
determined to surround the town with a rampart and
turrets during the remainder of the time. Nearly
at the time when the greatest part of the work was
completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned.
XIX. Having read Pompey’s
letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gave
out in council that Pompey would speedily come to their
assistance; and encouraged them not to despond, but
to provide everything necessary for the defence of
the town. He held private conferences with a few
of his most intimate friends, and determined on the
design of fleeing. As Domitius’s countenance
did not agree with his words, and he did everything
with more confusion and fear than he had shown on the
preceding days, and as he had several private meetings
with his friends, contrary to his usual practice,
in order to take their advice, and as he avoided all
public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth
could be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had
written back in answer, “That he would not put
matters to the last hazard; that Domitius had
retreated into the town of Corfinium, without either
his advice or consent. Therefore, if any opportunity
should offer, he [Domitius] should come to him
with the whole force.” But the blockade
and works round the town prevented his escape.
XX. Domitius’s design
being noised abroad, the soldiers in Confinium
[error in original: should be CORFINIUM] early
in the evening began to mutiny, and held a conference
with each other by their tribunes and centurions,
and the most respectable amongst themselves: “that
they were besieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications
were almost finished; that their general, Domitius,
on whose hopes and expectations they had confided,
had thrown them off, and was meditating his own escape;
that they ought to provide for their own safety.”
At first the Marsians differed in opinion, and possessed
themselves of that part of the town which they thought
the strongest. And so violent a dispute arose
between them, that they attempted to fight and decide
it by arms. However, in a little time, by messengers
sent from one side to the other, they were informed
of Domitius’s meditated flight, of which they
were previously ignorant. Therefore they all with
one consent brought Domitius into public view,
gathered round him, and guarded him; and sent deputies
out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were
ready to throw open their gates, to do whatever he
should order, and to deliver up Domitius alive
into his hands.
XXI. Upon intelligence
of these matters, though Caesar thought it of great
consequence to become master of the town as soon as
possible, and to transfer the cohorts to his own camp,
lest any change should be wrought on their inclinations
by bribes, encouragement, or fictitious messages,
because in war great events are often brought about
by trifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the
town should be plundered by the soldiers entering
into it, and taking advantage of the darkness of the
night, he commended the persons who came to him, and
sent them back to the town, and ordered the gates
and walls to be secured. He disposed his soldiers
on the works, which he had begun, not at certain intervals,
as was his practice before, but in one continued range
of sentinels and stations, so that they touched each
other, and formed a circle round the whole fortification;
he ordered the tribunes and general officers to ride
round; and exhorted them not only to be on their guard
against sallies from the town, but also to watch that
no single person should get out privately. Nor
was any man so negligent or drowsy as to sleep that
night. To so great height was their expectation
raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul,
each to different objects, what would become of the
Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of Lentulus,
what of the rest; what event would be the consequence
of another.
XXII. About the fourth
watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinels
and guards from the walls, that he desired to have
an interview with Caesar, if permission were given
him. Having obtained it, he was escorted out
of town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave
him till they brought him into Caesar’s presence.
He pleaded with Caesar for his life, and entreated
him to spare him, and reminded him of their former
friendship; and acknowledged that Caesar’s favours
to him were very great; in that through his interest
he had been admitted into the college of priests;
in that after his praetorship he had been appointed
to the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted
by him in his suit for the consulate. Caesar
interrupted him in his speech, and told him, “that
he had not left his province to do mischief [to any
man], but to protect himself from the injuries of
his enemies; to restore to their dignity the tribunes
of the people who had been driven out of the city
on his account, and to assert his own liberty, and
that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by a
few factious men.” Encouraged by this address,
Lentulus begged leave to return to the town, that
the security which he had obtained for himself might
be an encouragement to the rest to hope for theirs;
saying that some were so terrified that they were
induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives.
Leave being granted him, he departed.
XXIII. When day appeared
Caesar ordered all the senators and their children,
the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights,
to be brought before him. Among the persons of
senatorial rank were Lucius Domitius, Publius
Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus,
Sextus Quintilius Varus, the quaestor,
and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son of Domitius,
and several other young men, and a great number of
Roman knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had
summoned from the municipal towns. When they
were brought before him he protected them from the
insolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in
few words that they had not made him a grateful return,
on their part, for his very extraordinary kindness
to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty
sestertia, which Domitius had brought with
him and lodged in the public treasury, being brought
to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, he gave
them back to Domitius, that he might not appear
more moderate with respect to the life of men than
in money matters, though he knew that it was public
money, and had been given by Pompey to pay his army.
He ordered Domitius’s soldiers to take the oath
to himself, and that day decamped and performed the
regular march. He stayed only seven days before
Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country
of the Marrucinians, Frentanians, and Larinates.
XXIV. Pompey, being informed
of what had passed at Corfinium, marches from Luceria
to Canusium, and thence to Brundusium. He orders
all the forces raised everywhere by the new levies
to repair to him. He gives arms to the slaves
that attended the flocks, and appoints horses for
them. Of these he made up about three hundred
horse. Lucius, the praetor, fled from Alba, with
six cohorts: Rutilus Lupus, the praetor,
from Tarracina, with three. These having descried
Caesar’s cavalry at a distance, which were commanded
by Bivius Curius, and having deserted the
praetor, carried their colours to Curius and went
over to him. In like manner during the rest of
his march, several cohorts fell in with the main body
of Caesar’s army, others with his horse.
Cneius Magius, from Cremona, engineer-general to Pompey,
was taken prisoner on the road and brought to Caesar,
but sent back by him to Pompey with this message:
“As hitherto he had not been allowed an interview,
and was now on his march to him at Brundusium, that
it deeply concerned the commonwealth and general safety
that he should have an interview with Pompey; and that
the same advantage could not be gained at a great distance
when the proposals were conveyed to them by others,
as if terms were argued by them both in person.”
XXV. Having delivered this
message he marched to Brundusium with six legions,
four of them veterans: the rest those which he
had raised in the late levy and completed on his march,
for he had sent all Domitius’s cohorts immediately
from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the
consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable
part of the army, and that Pompey remained at Brundusium
with twenty cohorts; but could not find out, for a
certainty, whether Pompey stayed behind to keep possession
of Brundusium, that he might the more easily command
the whole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of Italy
and the coast of Greece, and be able to conduct the
war on either side of it, or whether he remained there
for want of shipping; and, being afraid that Pompey
would come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish
Italy, he determined to deprive him of the means of
communication afforded by the harbour of Brundusium.
The plan of his work was as follows: Where
the mouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a
mole of earth on either side, because in these places
the sea was shallow. Having gone out so far that
the mole could not be continued in the deep water,
he fixed double floats, thirty feet on either side,
before the mole. These he fastened with four
anchors at the four corners, that they might not be
carried away by the waves. Having completed and
secured them, he then joined to them other floats
of equal size. These he covered over with earth
and mould, that he might not be prevented from access
to them to defend them, and in the front and on both
sides he protected them with a parapet of wicker work;
and on every fourth one raised a turret, two stories
high, to secure them the better from being attacked
by the shipping and set on fire.
XXVI. To counteract this,
Pompey fitted out large merchant ships, which he found
in the harbour of Brundusium: on them he erected
turrets three stories high, and, having furnished
them with several engines and all sorts of weapons,
drove them amongst Caesar’s works, to break through
the floats and interrupt the works; thus there happened
skirmishes every day at a distance with slings, arrows,
and other weapons. Caesar conducted matters as
if he thought that the hopes of peace were not yet
to be given up. And though he was very much surprised
that Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with a message,
was not sent back to him; and though his attempting
a reconciliation often retarded the vigorous prosecution
of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means
to persevere in the same line of conduct. He
therefore sent Caninius Rebilus to have an interview
with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend and
relation. He charges him to exhort Libo to
effect a peace, but, above all things, requires that
he should be admitted to an interview with Pompey.
He declared that he had great hopes, if that were allowed
him, that the consequence would be that both parties
would lay down their arms on equal terms; that a great
share of the glory and reputation of that event would
redound to Libo, if, through his advice and agency,
hostilities should be ended. Libo, having
parted from the conference with Caninius, went to
Pompey, and, shortly after, returns with answer that,
as the consuls were absent, no treaty of compositions
could be engaged in without them. Caesar therefore
thought it time at length to give over the attempt
which he had often made in vain, and act with energy
in the war.
XXVII. When Caesar’s
works were nearly half finished, and after nine days
were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the
first division of the army to Dyrrachium being sent
back by the consuls, returned to Brundusium.
Pompey, either frightened at Caesar’s works or
determined from the beginning to quit Italy, began
to prepare for his departure on the arrival of the
ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar’s
attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into
the town at the moment of his departure, he stopped
up the gates, built walls across the streets and avenues,
sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixed palisadoes
and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground
by means of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded
with large beams fastened in the ground and sharpened
at the ends two passages and roads without the walls,
which led to the port. After making these arrangements,
he ordered his soldiers to go on board without noise,
and disposed here and there, on the wall and turrets,
some light-armed veterans, archers and slingers.
These he designed to call off by a certain signal,
when all the soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys
for them in a secure place.
XXVIII. The people of Brundusium,
irritated by the insolence of Pompey’s soldiers,
and the insults received from Pompey himself, were
in favour of Caesar’s party. Therefore,
as soon as they were aware of Pompey’s departure,
whilst his men were running up and down, and busied
about their voyage, they made signs from the tops of
the houses: Caesar, being apprized of the design
by them, ordered scaling ladders to be got ready,
and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any
opportunity of coming to an action. Pompey weighed
anchor at nightfall. The soldiers who had been
posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by
the signal which had been agreed on, and knowing the
roads, ran down to the ships. Caesar’s
soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls:
but being cautioned by the people to beware of the
hidden stakes and covered trenches, they halted, and
being conducted by the inhabitants by a long circuit,
they reached the port, and captured with their long
boats and small craft two of Pompey’s ships,
full of soldiers, which had struck against Caesar’s
moles.
XXIX.-Though Caesar highly approved
of collecting a fleet, and crossing the sea, and pursuing
Pompey before he could strengthen himself with his
transmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing
the war to a conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay
and length of time necessary to effect it: because
Pompey, by collecting all his ships, had deprived him
of the means of pursuing him at present. The only
resource left to Caesar, was to wait for a fleet from
the distant regions of Gaul, Picenum, and the straits
of Gibraltar. But this, on account of the season
of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome.
He was unwilling that, in the meantime, the veteran
army, and the two Spains, one of which was bound to
Pompey by the strongest obligations, should be confirmed
in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should
be provided and Gaul and Italy reduced in his absence.
XXX. Therefore, for the
present, he relinquished all intention of pursuing
Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded
the magistrates of the free towns to procure him ships,
and to have them conveyed to Brundusium. He detached
Valerius, his lieutenant, with one legion to Sardinia;
Curio, the proprietor, to Sicily with three legions;
and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately
transport his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was
at this time governor of Sardinia: Marcus Cato,
of Sicily: and Tuberò, by the lots, should
have had the government of Africa. The Caralitani,
as soon as they heard that Valerius was sent against
them, even before he left Italy, of their own accord
drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because
he understood that the whole province was combined
[against him], fled from Sardinia to Africa.
Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war,
and demanding new ones from the states, and these
things he performed with great zeal. He was raising
levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucani and Brutii,
by his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of
horse and foot from the states of Sicily. When
these things were nearly completed, being informed
of Curio’s approach, he made a complaint that
he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken
an unnecessary war, without making any preparation,
and when questioned by him and other members in the
senate, had assured them that every thing was ready
and provided for the war. After having made these
complaints in a public assembly, he fled from his
province.
XXXI. Valerius found Sardinia,
and Curio, Sicily, deserted by their governors when
they arrived there with their armies. When Tuberò
arrived in Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government
of the province, who, having lost his cohorts, as
already related, at Auximum, had straightway fled
to Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized
it of his own accord, and making levies, had raised
two legions. From his acquaintance with the people
and country, and his knowledge of that province, he
found the means of effecting this; because a few years
before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had
obtained that province. He, when Tuberò
came to Utica with his fleet, prevented his entering
the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though
labouring under sickness, to set foot on shore; but
obliged him to weigh anchor and quit the place.
XXXIL. When these affairs
were despatched, Caesar, that there might be an intermission
from labour for the rest of the season, drew off his
soldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off
in person for Rome. Having assembled the senate,
he reminded them of the injustice of his enemies;
and told them, “That he aimed at no extraordinary
honour, but had waited for the time appointed by law,
for standing candidate for the consulate, being contented
with what was allowed to every citizen. That
a bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the
people (notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies,
and a very violent opposition from Cato, who in his
usual manner, consumed the day by a tedious harangue)
that he should be allowed to stand candidate, though
absent, even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the
latter disapproved of the bill, why did he allow it
to pass? if he approved of it, why should he debar
him [Caesar] from the people’s favour? He
made mention of his own patience, in that he had freely
proposed that all armies should be disbanded, by which
he himself would suffer the loss both of dignity and
honour. He urged the virulence of his enemies,
who refused to comply with what they required from
others, and had rather that all things should be thrown
into confusion, than that they should lose their power
and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice,
in taking away his legions: their cruelty and
insolence in abridging the privileges of the tribunes;
the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of an
interview, which had been refused him: For which
reasons, he begged and desired that they would undertake
the management of the republic, and unite with him
in the administration of it. But if through fear
they declined it, he would not be a burden to them,
but take the management of it on himself. That
deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose a
reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had
lately asserted in the senate, that authority was
acknowledged to be vested in those persons to whom
ambassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that
sent them. That these were the sentiments of low,
weak minds: that for his part, as he had made
it his study to surpass others in glory, so he was
desirous of excelling them in justice and equity.”
XXXIII. The senate approved
of sending deputies, but none could be found fit to
execute the commission: for every person, from
his own private fears, declined the office. For
Pompey, on leaving the city, had declared in the open
senate, that he would hold in the same degree of estimation,
those who stayed in Rome and those in Caesar’s
camp. Thus three days were wasted in disputes
and excuses. Besides, Lucius Metellus, one of
the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar’s enemies,
to prevent this, and to embarrass everything else
which Caesar should propose. Caesar having discovered
his intention, after spending several days to no purpose,
left the city, in order that he might not lose any
more time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting
what he had intended.
XXXIV. On his arrival there,
he was informed that, Vibullius Rufus, whom he had
taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at liberty,
was sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius
also was gone to seize Massilia with seven row-galleys,
which were fitted up by some private persons at Igilium
and Cosa, and which he had manned with his own slaves,
freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noblemen
of Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey,
when leaving Rome had exhorted, that the late services
of Caesar should not erase from their minds the memory
of his former favours. On receiving this message,
the Massilians had shut their gates against Caesar,
and invited over to them the Albici, who had formerly
been in alliance with them, and who inhabited the
mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewise
conveyed the corn from the surrounding country, and
from all the forts into the city; had opened armouries
in the city: and were repairing the walls, the
fleet, and the gates.
XXXV. Caesar sent for fifteen
of the principal persons of Massilia to attend him.
To prevent the war commencing among them, he remonstrates
[in the following language]; “that they ought
to follow the precedent set by all Italy, rather than
submit to the will of any one man.” He
made use of such arguments as he thought would tend
to bring them to reason. The deputies reported
his speech to their countrymen, and by the authority
of the state bring him back this answer: “That
they understood that the Roman people was divided
into two factions: that they had neither judgment
nor abilities to decide which had the juster cause;
but that the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey
and Caius Caesar, the two patrons of the state:
the former of whom had granted to their state the
lands of the Volcae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter
had assigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul,
and had augmented their revenue. Wherefore, having
received equal favours from both, they ought to show
equal affection to both, and assist neither against
the other, nor admit either into their city or harbours.”
XXXVI. Whilst this treaty
was going forward, Domitius arrived at Massilia
with his fleet, and was received into the city, and
made governor of it. The chief management of
the war was entrusted to him. At his command
they send the fleet to all parts; they seize all the
merchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into
the harbour; they apply the nails, timber, and rigging,
with which they were furnished to rig and refit their
other vessels. They lay up in the public stores,
all the corn that was found in the ships, and reserve
the rest of their lading and convoy for the siege
of the town, should such an event take place.
Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions
against Massilia, and resolved to provide turrets,
and vinae to assault the town, and to build twelve
ships at Arelas, which being completed and rigged
in thirty days (from the time the timber was cut down),
and being brought to Massilia, he put under the command
of Decimus Brutus; and left Caius Trebonius
his lieutenant, to invest the city.
XXXVII. Whilst he was preparing
and getting these things in readiness, he sent Caius
Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with three
legions, which he had disposed in winter quarters in
Narbo, and the neighbouring country; and ordered him
immediately to seize the passes of the Pyrénées, which
were at that time occupied by detachments from Lucius
Afranius, one of Pompey’s lieutenants.
He desired the other legions, which were passing the
winter at a great distance, to follow close after
him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using
expedition, dislodged the party from the hills, and
by hasty marches came up with the army of Afranius.
XXXVIII. On the arrival
of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have already mentioned,
Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius,
and Varro, his lieutenants (one of whom had the command
of Hither Spain, with three legions; the second of
the country from the forest of Castulo to the river
Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river
Guadiana to the country of the Vettones and Lusitania,
with the like number of legions), divided amongst
themselves their respective departments. Petreius
was to march from Lusitania through the Vettones, and
join Afranius with all his forces; Varro was
to guard all Further Spain with what legions he had.
These matters being settled, reinforcements of horse
and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius;
from the Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous
nations which border on the ocean, by Afranius.
When they were raised, Petreius immediately marched
through the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved
by joint consent to carry on the war in the vicinity
of Ilerda, on account of the advantages of its situation.
XXXIX. Afranius, as
above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two.
There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither
and Further Spain (of which, the troops belonging
to the former province had shields, those of the latter
targets), and about five thousand horse raised in
both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into
Spain, with about six thousand auxiliary foot, and
three thousand horse, which had served under him in
all his former wars, and the same number from Gaul,
which he himself had provided, having expressly called
out all the most noble and valiant men of each state.
The bravest of these were from the Aquitani and the
mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul.
He had been informed that Pompey was marching through
Mauritania with his legions to Spain, and would shortly
arrive. He at the same time borrowed money from
the tribunes and centurions, which he distributed
amongst his soldiers. By this proceeding he gained
two points; he secured the interest of the centurions
by this pledge in his hands, and by his liberality
he purchased the affections of his army.
XL. Fabius sounded the
inclinations of the neighbouring states by letters
and messengers. He had made two bridges over the
river Segre, at the distance of four miles from each
other. He sent foraging parties over these bridges,
because he had already consumed all the forage that
was on his side of the river. The generals of
Pompey’s army did almost the same thing, and
for the same reason: and the horse had frequent
skirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius’s
legions had, as was their constant practice, gone
forth as the usual protection to the foragers, and
had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the
horse were following them, on a sudden, from the weight
of the cattle, and the mass of water, the bridge fell,
and all the horse were cut off from the main army,
which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from
the timber and hurdles that were carried down the
river, Afranius immediately crossed his own bridge,
which communicated between his camp and the town,
with four legions and all the cavalry, and marched
against Fabius’s two legions. When his
approach was announced, Lucius Plancus, who had the
command of those legions, compelled by the emergency,
took post on a rising ground; and drew up his army
with two fronts, that it might not be surrounded by
the cavalry. Thus, though engaged with superior
numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions
and the horse. When the battle was begun by the
horse, there were observed at a distance by both sides
the colours of two legions, which Caius Fabius had
sent round by the further bridge to reinforce our men,
suspecting, as the event verified, that the enemy’s
generals would take advantage of the opportunity which
fortune had put in their way, to attack our men.
Their approach put an end to the battle, and each general
led back his legions to their respective camps.
XLI. In two days after
Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse, which
he had retained for a bodyguard. The bridge which
had been broken down by the storm was almost repaired,
and he ordered it to be finished in the night.
Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he
left behind him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the
camp, and all his baggage, and the next day set off
in person for Ilerda, with all his forces drawn up
in three lines, and halted just before the camp of
Afranius, and having remained there a short time
under arms, he offered him battle on equal terms.
When this offer was made, Afranius drew out his
forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill, near
his camp. When Caesar perceived that Afranius
declined coming to an engagement, he resolved to encamp
at somewhat less than half a mile’s distance
from the very foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers
whilst engaged in their works, might not be terrified
by any sudden attack of the enemy, or disturbed in
their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with
a wall, which must rise high, and be seen at a distance,
but draw, on the front opposite the enemy, a trench
fifteen feet broad. The first and second lines
continued under arms as was from the first appointed.
Behind them the third line was carrying on the work
without being seen; so that the whole was completed
before Afranius discovered that the camp was being
fortified.
XLII. In the evening Caesar
drew his legions within this trench, and rested them
under arms the next night. The day following he
kept his whole army within it, and as it was necessary
to bring materials from a considerable distance, he
for the present pursued the same plan in his work;
and to each legion, one after the other, he assigned
one side of the camp to fortify, and ordered trenches
of the same magnitude to be cut: he kept the
rest of the legions under arms without baggage to
oppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius,
to frighten us and obstruct the work, drew out their
forces at the very foot of the mountain, and challenged
us to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt
his work, relying on the protection of the three legions,
and the strength of the fosse. After staying
for a short time, and advancing no great distance
from the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces
to their camp. The third day Caesar fortified
his camp with a rampart, and ordered the other cohorts
which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage
to be removed to it.
XLIIL-Between the town of Ilerda and
the next hill, on which Afranius and Petreius
were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred
paces broad, and near the middle of it an eminence
somewhat raised above the level: Caesar hoped
that if he could get possession of this and fortify
it, he should be able to cut off the enemy from the
town, the bridge, and all the stores which they had
laid up in the town. In expectation of this he
led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up
his army in an advantageous position, he ordered the
advanced men of one legion to hasten forward and seize
the eminence. Upon intelligence of this the cohorts
which were on guard before Afranius’s camp were
instantly sent a nearer way to occupy the same post.
The two parties engage, and as Afranius’s men
had reached the eminence first, our men were repulsed,
and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged
to turn their backs and retreat to the standards of
legions.
XLIV. The manner of fighting
of those soldiers was to run forward with great impetuosity
and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranks
strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties:
if hard pressed they thought it no disgrace to retire
and give up the post, being accustomed to this manner
of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous
nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are
strongly influenced by the customs of those countries
in which they have spent much time. This method,
however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such
a description of warfare. For they imagined that
they were about to be surrounded on their exposed
flank by the single men who ran forward from their
ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their
ranks, and not to quit their colours, nor, without
good reason, to give up the post which they had taken.
Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the
legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep
its ground, but retreated to the next hill.
XLV. Almost the whole army
being daunted at this, because it had occurred contrary
to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged
his men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and
checked the insolent and eager pursuit of the enemy,
and obliged them, in their turn, to show their backs
and retreat to Ilerda, and take post under the walls.
But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over zealous
to repair the dishonour which had been sustained,
having rashly pursued the fleeing enemy, advanced
into disadvantageous ground and went up to the foot
of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built.
And when they wished to retire they were again attacked
by the enemy from the rising ground. The place
was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and
was so narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in
order of battle, would fill it; but no relief could
be sent on the flanks, and the horse could be of no
service to them when hard pressed. From the town,
indeed, the precipice inclined with a gentle slope
for near four hundred paces. Our men had to retreat
this way, as they had, through their eagerness, advanced
too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was
in this place, which was much to the disadvantage
of our troops, both on account of its narrowness,
and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain,
so that no weapon was thrown at them without effect:
yet they exerted their valour and patience, and bore
every wound. The enemy’s forces were increasing,
and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from
the camp through the town, that fresh men might relieve
the weary. Caesar was obliged to do the same,
and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts to that
post.
XLVI. After the battle
had in this manner continued incessantly for five
hours, and our men had suffered much from superior
numbers, having spent all their javelins, they drew
their swords and charged the enemy up the hill, and,
having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly.
The cohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some
being driven by their fears into the town, an easy
retreat was afforded to our men. Our cavalry
also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping
or low ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top
of the hill, and, riding between the two armies, made
our retreat more easy and secure. Such were the
various turns of fortune in the battle. In the
first encounter about seventy of our men fell:
amongst them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion of
the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for
his extraordinary valour, had been promoted from the
lower ranks to that post. About six hundred were
wounded. Of Afranius’s party there were
killed Titus Caecilius, principal centurion, and four
other centurions, and above two hundred men.
XLVII. But this opinion
is spread abroad concerning this day, that each party
thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius’s
soldiers, because, though they were esteemed inferior
in the opinion of all, yet they had stood our attack
and sustained our charge, and, at first, had kept
the post and the hill which had been the occasion of
the dispute; and, in the first encounter, had obliged
our men to fly: but ours, because, notwithstanding
the disadvantage of the ground and the disparity of
numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours,
had advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced
the enemy to fly from the higher ground and driven
them into the town. The enemy fortified the hill,
about which the contest had been, with strong works,
and posted a garrison on it.
XLVIII. In two days after
this transaction, there happened an unexpected misfortune.
For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed that
there were never seen higher floods in those countries;
it swept down the snow from all the mountains, and
broke over the banks of the river, and in one day
carried away both the bridges which Fabius had built, a
circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar’s
army. For as our camp, as already mentioned,
was pitched between two rivers, the Segre and Cinca,
and as neither of these could be forded for the space
of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined
within these narrow limits. Neither could the
states, which had espoused Caesar’s cause, furnish
him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to
forage, return, as they were stopped by the waters:
nor could the convoys, coming from Italy and Gaul,
make their way to the camp. Besides, it was the
most distressing season of the year, when there was
no corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe:
and the states were exhausted, because Afranius
had conveyed almost all the corn, before Caesar’s
arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had
been already consumed by Caesar. The cattle,
which might have served as a secondary resource against
want, had been removed by the states to a great distance
on account of the war. They who had gone out to
get forage or corn, were chased by the light troops
of the Lusitanians, and the targeteers of Hither Spain,
who were well acquainted with the country, and could
readily swim across the river, because it is the custom
of all those people not to join their armies without
bladders.
XLIX. But Afranius’s
army had abundance of everything; a great stock of
corn had been provided and laid in long before, a large
quantity was coming in from the whole province:
they had a good store of forage. The bridge of
Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these
without any danger, and the places beyond the bridge,
to which Caesar had no access, were as yet untouched.
L. Those floods continued
several days. Caesar endeavoured to repair the
bridges, but the height of the water did not allow
him: and the cohorts disposed along the banks
did not suffer them to be completed; and it was easy
for them to prevent it, both from the nature of the
river and the height of the water, but especially because
their darts were thrown from the whole course of the
bank on one confined spot; and it was no easy matter
at one and the same time to execute a work in a very
rapid flood, and to avoid the darts.
LI. Intelligence was brought
to Afranius that the great convoys, which were
on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river.
Archers from the Rutheni, and horse from the Gauls,
with a long train of baggage, according to the Gallic
custom of travelling, had arrived there; there were
besides about six thousand people of all descriptions,
with slaves and freed men. But there was no order,
or regular discipline, as every one followed his own
humour, and all travelled without apprehension, taking
the same liberty as on former marches. There were
several young noblemen, sons of senators, and of equestrian
rank; there were ambassadors from several states;
there were lieutenants of Caesar’s. The
river stopped them all. To attack them by surprise,
Afranius set out in the beginning of the
night, with all his cavalry and three legions, and
sent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares;
but the Gallic horse soon got themselves in readiness,
and attacked them. Though but few, they withstood
the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought
on equal terms: but when the legions began to
approach, having lost a few men, they retreated to
the next mountains. The delay occasioned by this
battle was of great importance to the security of our
men; for having gained time, they retired to the higher
grounds. There were missing that day about two
hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable
number of servants and baggage.
LII. However, by all these
things, the price of provisions was raised, which
is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time
of present scarcity, but on the apprehension of future
want. Provisions had now reached fifty denarii
each bushel; and the want of corn had diminished the
strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were
increasing every day: and so great an alteration
was wrought in a few days, and fortune had so changed
sides, that our men had to struggle with the want
of every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant
supply of all things, and were considered to have
the advantage. Caesar demanded from those states
which had acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle,
as they had but little corn. He sent away the
camp followers to the more distant states, and endeavoured
to remedy the present scarcity by every resource in
his power.
LIII. Afranius and
Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and more
circumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to
their acquaintances. Report exaggerated them
so that the war appeared to be almost at an end.
When these letters and despatches were received at
Rome, a great concourse of people resorted to the
house of Afranius, and congratulations ran high:
several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey; some of
them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence;
others, that they might not be thought to have waited
the issue of the war, and to have come last of all.
LIV. When Caesar’s
affairs were in this unfavourable position, and all
the passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of
Afranius, and the bridges could not be prepared,
Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships of the kind
that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had
taught him. First, the keels and ribs were made
of light timber, then, the rest of the hulk of the
ships was wrought with wicker-work, and covered over
with hides. When these were finished, he drew
them down to the river in waggons in one night, a
distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, and transported
in them some soldiers across the river, and on a sudden
took possession of a hill adjoining the bank.
This he immediately fortified, before he was perceived
by the enemy. To this he afterwards transported
a legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides,
he finished it in two days. By this means, he
brought safe to his camp the convoys, and those who
had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance
for the provisions.
LV. The same day he made
a great part of his horse pass the river, who, falling
on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed
without any suspicions, intercepted an incredible
number of cattle and people; and when some Spanish
light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy,
our men judiciously divided themselves into two parts,
the one to protect the spoil, the other to resist
the advancing foe, and to beat them back, and they
cut off from the rest and surrounded one cohort, which
had rashly ventured out of the line before the others,
and after putting it to the sword, returned safe with
considerable booty to the camp over the same bridge.
LVI. Whilst these affairs
are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians, adopting
the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships
of war, of which eleven were decked. To these
they add several smaller vessels, that our fleet might
be terrified by numbers: they man them with a
great number of archers and of the Albici, of whom
mention has been already made, and these they incited
by rewards and promises. Domitius required
certain ships for his own use, which he manned with
colonists and shepherds, whom he had brought along
with him. A fleet being thus furnished with every
necessary, he advanced with great confidence against
our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus.
It was stationed at an island opposite to Massilia.
LVII. Brutus was much inferior
in number of ships; but Caesar had appointed to that
fleet the bravest men selected from all his legions,
antesignani and centurions, who had requested
to be employed in that service. They had provided
iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnished themselves
with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles.
Thus prepared, and being apprised of the enemy’s
approach, they put out from the harbour, and engaged
the Massilians. Both sides fought with great
courage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy
people, bred on the highlands and inured to arms,
fall much short of our men in valour: and being
lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their
minds their recent promises: and the wild shepherds,
encouraged by the hope of liberty, were eager to prove
their zeal in the presence of their masters.
LVIII. The Massilians themselves,
confiding in the quickness of their ships, and the
skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the
shock, and as long as they were permitted by clear
space, lengthening their line they endeavoured to
surround us, or to attack single ships with several
of theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away
our oars, if possible; but when necessity obliged
them to come nearer, they had recourse, from the skill
and art of the pilots, to the valour of the mountaineers.
But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skilful
pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the
merchant ships, and were not yet acquainted even with
the names of the rigging, were moreover impeded by
the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which having
been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not
so easily manoeuvred. Therefore, when Caesar’s
men had an opportunity of a close engagement, they
cheerfully opposed two of the enemy’s ships with
one of theirs. And throwing in the grappling
irons, and holding both ships fast, they fought on
both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy’s;
and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds,
they sank some of their ships, took others with the
men on board, and drove the rest into the harbour.
That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including
those that were taken.
LIX. When news of this
battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, the bridge
being completed at the same time, fortune soon took
a turn. The enemy, daunted by the courage of
our horse, did not scour the country as freely or
as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a
small distance from the camp, that they might have
a ready retreat, they foraged within narrower bounds:
at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid
our outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained
some loss, or descried our horse at a distance, they
fled in the midst of their expedition, leaving their
baggage behind them; at length they resolved to leave
off foraging for several days, and, contrary to the
practice of all nations, to go out at night.
LX. In the meantime the
Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were under
the government of the Oscenses, send ambassadors
to Caesar, and offer to submit to his orders.
They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani,
and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses,
who dwell near the river Ebro. He requires of
them all to assist him with corn, to which they agreed,
and having collected all the cattle in the country,
they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort
of the Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of their
state, came over to Caesar, from the place where they
were stationed, and carried their colours with them.
A great change is shortly made in the face of affairs.
The bridge being finished, five powerful states being
joined to Caesar, a way opened for the receiving of
corn, and the rumours of the assistance of legions
which were said to be on their march, with Pompey at
their head, through Mauritania, having died away,
several of the more distant states revolt from Afranius,
and enter into league with Caesar.
LXI. Whilst the spirits
of the enemy were dismayed at these things, Caesar,
that he might not be always obliged to send his horse
a long circuit round by the bridge, having found a
convenient place, began to sink several drains, thirty
feet deep, by which he might draw off a part of the
river Segre, and make a ford over it. When these
were almost finished, Afranius and Petreius began
to be greatly alarmed, lest they should be altogether
cut off from corn and forage, because Caesar was very
strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to
quit their posts, and to transfer the war to Celtiberia.
There was, moreover, a circumstance that confirmed
them in this resolution: for of the two adverse
parties, that which had stood by Sertorius in the
late war, being conquered by Pompey, still trembled
at his name and sway, though absent: the other
which had remained firm in Pompey’s interest,
loved him for the favours which they had received:
but Caesar’s name was not known to the barbarians.
From these they expected considerable aid, both of
horse and foot, and hoped to protract the war till
winter, in a friendly country. Having come to
this resolution, they gave orders to collect all the
ships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa,
a town situated on the river Ebro, about twenty miles
distant from their camp. At this part of the
river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastened
together, and transported two legions over the river
Segre, and fortified their camp with a rampart, twelve
feet high.
LXII. Notice of this being
given by the scouts, Caesar continued his work day
and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers,
to drain the river, and so far effected his purpose,
that the horse were both able and bold enough, though
with some difficulty and danger, to pass the river;
but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part
of their breast above the water, so that their fording
it was retarded, not only by the depth of the water,
but also by the rapidity of the current. However,
almost at the same instant, news was received of the
bridge being nearly completed over the Ebro, and a
ford was found in the Segre.
LXIII. Now indeed the enemy
began to think that they ought to hasten their march.
Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrison
at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole
force, and formed one camp with the two legions which
they had led across a few days before. Caesar
had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear;
since with his cavalry to go by the bridge, required
him to take a long circuit; so that they would arrive
at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse,
which he had detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius
and Petreius had broken up their camp about the third
watch, they suddenly appeared on their rear, and spreading
round them in great numbers, began to retard and impede
their march.
LXIV. At break of day,
it was perceived from the rising grounds which joined
Caesar’s camp, that their rear was vigorously
pressed by our horse; that the last line sometimes
halted and was broken; at other times, that they joined
battle and that our men were beaten back by a general
charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued
them when they wheeled about: but through the
whole camp the soldiers gathered in parties, and declared
their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to
escape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarily
protracted. They applied to their tribunes and
centurions, and entreated them to inform Caesar
that he need not spare their labour or consider their
danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture
to ford the river where the horse had crossed.
Caesar, encouraged by their zeal and importunity,
though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a river
so exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt
it and make a trial. Accordingly, he ordered
all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit or strength
seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from
each century, and left them, with one legion besides,
to guard the camp: the rest of the legions he
drew out without any baggage, and, having disposed
a great number of horses in the river, above and below
the ford, he led his army over. A few of his
soldiers being carried away by the force of the current,
were stopped by the horse and taken up, and not a
man perished. His army being safe on the opposite
bank, he drew out his forces and resolved to lead
them forward in three battalions: and so great
was the ardour of the soldiers that, notwithstanding
the addition of a circuit of six miles and a considerable
delay in fording the river, before the ninth hour
of the day they came up with those who had set out
at the third watch.
LXV. When Afranius,
who was in company with Petreius, saw them at a distance,
being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted
on a rising ground and drew up his army. Caesar
refreshed his army on the plain that he might not
expose them to battle whilst fatigued; and when the
enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued and
stopped them. They were obliged to pitch their
camp sooner than they had intended, for there were
mountains at a small distance; and difficult and narrow
roads awaited them about five miles off. They
retired behind these mountains that they might avoid
Caesar’s cavalry, and, placing parties in the
narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead
their own forces across the Ebro without danger or
apprehension. This it was their interest to attempt
and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued
by the skirmishes all day, and by the labour of their
march, they deferred it till the following day:
Caesar likewise encamped on the next hill.
LXVI. About midnight a
few of their men who had gone some distance from the
camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar
is informed by them that the generals of the enemy
were drawing their troops out of the camp without
noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the
signal to be given and the military shout to be raised
for packing up the baggage. When they heard the
shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped in
the night and obliged to engage under their baggage,
or lest they should be confined in the narrow roads
by Caesar’s horse, they put a stop to their
march and kept their forces in their camp. The
next day Petreius went out privately with a few horse
to reconnoitre the country. A similar movement
was made from Caesar’s camp. Lucius Decidius
Saxa was detached with a small party to explore the
nature of the country. Each returned with the
same account to his camp, that there was a level road
for the next five miles, that there then succeeded
a rough and mountainous country. Whichever should
first obtain possession of the defiles would have
no trouble in preventing the other’s progress.
LXVII. There was a debate
in the council between Afranius and Petreius,
and the time of marching was the subject. The
majority were of opinion that they should begin their
march at night, “for they might reach the defiles
before they should be discovered.” Others,
because a shout had been raised the night before in
Caesar’s camp, used this as an argument that
they could not leave the camp unnoticed: “that
Caesar’s cavalry were patrolling the whole night,
and that all the ways and roads were beset; that battles
at night ought to be avoided, because in civil dissension,
a soldier once daunted is more apt to consult his fears
than his oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense
of shame in the eyes of all, and that the presence
of the tribunes and centurions had the same effect:
by these things the soldiers would be re strained and
awed to their duty. Wherefore they should, by
all means, attempt to force their way by day; for,
though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet the
post which they desired might be secured with safety
to the main body of the army.” This opinion
prevailed in the council, and the next day, at the
dawn, they resolved to set forward.
LXVIII. Caesar, having
taken a view of the country, the moment the sky began
to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched
at the head of his army by a long circuit, keeping
to no regular road; for the road which led to the
Ebro and Octogesa was occupied by the enemy’s
camp, which lay in Caesar’s way. His soldiers
were obliged to cross extensive and difficult valleys.
Craggy cliffs, in several places, interrupted their
march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to
one another, and the soldiers were forced to perform
a great part of their march unarmed, and were lifted
up the rocks by each other. But not a man murmured
at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would
be a period to all their toils if they could cut off
the enemy from the Ebro and intercept their convoys.
LXIX. At first, Afranius’s
soldiers ran in high spirits from their camp to look
at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, “that
we were forced, for want of necessary subsistence,
to run away, and return to Ilerda.” For
our route was different from what we proposed, and
we appeared to be going a contrary way. But their
generals applauded their own prudence in keeping within
their camp, and it was a strong confirmation of their
opinion, that they saw we marched without waggons
or baggage, which made them confident that we could
not long endure want. But when they saw our army
gradually wheel to the right, and observed our van
was already passing the line of their camp, there was
nobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think
it necessary to march from the camp immediately, and
oppose us. The cry to arms was raised, and all
the army, except a few which were left to guard the
camp, set out and marched the direct road to the Ebro.
LXX. The contest depended
entirely on despatch, which should first get possession
of the defile and the mountain. The difficulty
of the roads delayed Caesar’s army, but his
cavalry pursuing Afranius’s forces, retarded
their march. However, the affair was necessarily
reduced to this point, with respect to Afranius’s
men, that if they first gained the mountains, which
they desired, they would themselves avoid all danger,
but could not save the baggage of their whole army,
nor the cohorts which they had left behind in the
camps, to which, being intercepted by Caesar’s
army, by no means could assistance be given.
Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found
a plain behind large rocks, drew up his army there
in order of battle and facing the enemy. Afranius,
perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry,
and seeing the enemy before him, having come to a
hill, made a halt on it. Thence he detached four
cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highest mountain
which was in view: to this he ordered them to
hasten with all expedition, and to take possession
of it, with the intention of going to the same place
with all his forces, then altering his route, and
crossing the hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards
were making towards it in an oblique direction, Caesar’s
horse espied them and attacked them, nor were they
able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for
a moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces
in the sight of the two armies.
LXXI. There was now an
opportunity for managing affairs successfully, nor
did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering
such a loss before their eyes, could not stand, especially
as they were surrounded by our horse, and the engagement
would take place on even and open ground. To
this he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants,
centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him,
and begged “that he would not hesitate to begin
the battle: that the hearts of all the soldiers
were very anxious for it: that Afranius’s
men had by several circumstances betrayed signs of
fear; in that they had not assisted their party; in
that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did
not sustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding
their standards into one place, did not observe either
rank or order. But if he had any apprehensions
from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity
would be given him of coming to battle in some other
place: for that Afranius must certainly
come down, and would not be able to remain there for
want of water.”
LXXII. Caesar had conceived
hopes of ending the affair without an engagement,
or without striking a blow, because he had cut off
the enemy’s supplies. Why should he hazard
the loss of any of his men, even in a successful battle?
Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded; who had
deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should
he tempt fortune? especially when it was as much a
general’s duty to conquer by tactics, as by
the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion
for those citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall:
and he had rather gain his object without any loss
or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was
not generally approved of; but the soldiers openly
declared to each other, that since such an opportunity
of victory was let pass, they would not come to an
engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He
persevered however in his resolution, and retired
a little from that place to abate the enemy’s
fears. Petreius and Afranius, having got
this opportunity, retired to their camp. Caesar,
having disposed parties on the mountains, and cut
off all access to the Ebro, fortified his camp as close
to the enemy as he could.
LXXIII. The day following,
the generals of his opponents, being alarmed that
they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access
to the Ebro, consulted as to what other course they
should take. There were two roads, one to Ilerda,
if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, if
they should march to it. Whilst they were deliberating
on these matters, intelligence was brought them that
their watering parties were attacked by our horse:
upon which information, they dispose several parties
of horse and auxiliary foot along the road, and intermix
some legionary cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart
from the camp to the water, that they might be able
to procure water within their lines, both without
fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius
divided this task between themselves, and went in
person to some distance from their camp for the purpose
of seeing it accomplished.
LXXIV. The soldiers having
obtained by their absence a free opportunity of conversing
with each other, came out in great numbers, and inquired
each for whatever acquaintance or fellow citizen he
had in our camp, and invited him to him. First
they returned them general thanks for sparing them
the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and
acknowledged that they were alive through their kindness;
then they inquired about the honour of our general,
and whether they could with safety entrust themselves
to him; and declared their sorrow that they had not
done so in the beginning, and that they had taken
up arms against their relations and kinsmen.
Encouraged by these conferences, they desired the
general’s parole for the lives of Petreius and
Afranius, that they might not appear guilty of
a crime, in having betrayed their generals. When
they were assured of obtaining their demands, they
promised that they would immediately remove their
standards, and sent centurions of the first rank
as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace.
In the meantime some of them invite their acquaintances,
and bring them to their camp, others are brought away
by their friends, so that the two camps seemed to
be united into one, and several of the tribunes and
centurions came to Caesar, and paid their
respects to him. The same was done by some of
the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to their
assistance, and kept in their camp as hostages.
They inquired after their acquaintance and friends,
by whom each might have the means of being recommended
to Caesar. Even Afranius’s son, a young
man, endeavoured by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant,
to make terms for his own and his father’s life.
Every place was filled with mirth and congratulations;
in the one army, because they thought they had escaped
so impending danger; in the other, because they thought
they had completed so important a matter without blows;
and Caesar, in every man’s judgment, reaped
the advantage of his former lenity, and his conduct
was applauded by all.
LXXV. When these circumstances
were announced to Afranius, he left the work
which he had begun, and returned to his camp determined,
as it appeared, whatever should be the event to bear
it with an even and steady mind. Petreius did
not neglect himself; he armed his domestics; with
them and the praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a
few foreign horse, his dependants, whom he commonly
kept near him to guard his person, he suddenly flew
to the rampart, interrupted the conferences of the
soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death
as many as he caught. The rest formed into a
body, and, being alarmed by the unexpected danger,
wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drew
their swords, and in this manner, depending on the
nearness of their camp, defended themselves against
the Spaniards, and the horse, and made good their
retreat to the camp, where they were protected by the
cohorts, which were on guard.
LXXVI. Petreius, after
accomplishing this, went round every maniple, calling
the soldiers by their names and entreating with tears,
that they would not give up him and their absent general
Pompey, as a sacrifice to the vengeance of their enemies.
Immediately they ran in crowds to the general’s
pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath
that they would not desert nor betray the army nor
the generals, nor form any design distinct from the
general interest. He himself swore first to the
tenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to
take the same oath. The tribunes and centurions
followed their example; the soldiers were brought
out by centuries, and took the same oath. They
gave orders, that whoever had any of Caesar’s
soldiers should produce them; as soon as they were
produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium,
but most of them concealed those that they had entertained,
and let them out at night over the rampart. Thus
the terror raised by the generals, the cruelty of
the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed
all hopes of surrender for the present, changed the
soldiers’ minds, and reduced matters to the
former state of war.
LXXVII. Caesar ordered
the enemy’s soldiers, who had come into his camp
to hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest
diligence, and sent back. But of the tribunes
and centurions, several voluntarily remained
with him, and he afterwards treated them with great
respect. The centurions he promoted to higher
ranks, and conferred on the Roman knights the honour
of tribunes.
LXXVIII. Afranius’s
men were distressed in foraging, and procured water
with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a
tolerable supply of corn, because they had been ordered
to bring from Ilerda sufficient to last twenty-two
days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for
they had but few opportunities of procuring any, and
their bodies were not accustomed to bear burdens;
and therefore a great number of them came over to
Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these
difficulties; but of the two schemes proposed, the
most expedient seemed to be to return to Ilerda, because
they had left some corn there; and there they hoped
to decide on a plan for their future conduct.
Tarraco lay at a greater distance; and in such a space
they knew affairs might admit of many changes.
Their design having met with approbation, they set
out from their camp. Caesar having sent forward
his cavalry, to annoy and retard their rear, followed
close after with his legions. Not a moment passed
in which their rear was not engaged with our horse.
LXXIX. Their manner of
fighting was this: the light cohorts closed their
rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds.
If they had a mountain to ascend, the very nature
of the place readily secured them from any danger;
for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds,
protected the rest in their ascent. When they
approached a valley or declivity, and the advanced
men could not impart assistance to the tardy, our
horse threw their darts at them from the rising grounds
with advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous
situation; the only plan left was, that whenever they
came near such places, they should give orders to
the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse
our horse; and these being forced to give way, they
should suddenly, with the utmost speed, run all together
down to the valley, and having passed it, should face
about again on the next hill. For so far were
they from deriving any assistance from their horse
(of which they had a large number), that they were
obliged to receive them into the centre of their army,
and themselves protect them, as they were daunted by
former battles. And on their march no one could
quit the line without being taken by Caesar’s
horse.
LXXX. Whilst skirmishes
were fought in this manner, they advanced but slowly
and gradually, and frequently halted to help their
rear, as then happened. For having advanced four
miles, and being very much harassed by our horse,
they took post on a high mountain, and there entrenched
themselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and
did not take their baggage off their cattle.
When they perceived that Caesar’s camp was pitched,
and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage,
they suddenly rushed out about twelve o’clock
the same day, and, having hopes that we should be
delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to
march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with
the legions that remained. He left a few cohorts
to guard his baggage, and ordered the foragers to
be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to
follow him. The horse shortly returned to their
daily duty on march, and charged the rear so vigorously,
that they almost forced them to fly; and several privates
and some centurions were killed. The main
body of Caesar’s army was at hand, and universal
ruin threatened them.
LXXXI. Then indeed, not
having opportunity either to choose a convenient position
for their camp, or to march forward, they were obliged
to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and
on ground naturally unfavourable. But for the
reasons already given, Caesar did not attack them,
nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his
men might be the readier to pursue them whether they
attempted to run off by night or by day. Observing
the defect in their position, they spent the whole
night in extending their works, and turn their camp
to ours. The next day, at dawn, they do the same,
and spend the whole day in that manner, but in proportion
as they advanced their works, and extended their camp,
they were farther distant from the water; and one evil
was remedied by another. The first night, no
one went out for water. The next day, they left
a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to
water: but not a person was sent to look for forage.
Caesar was more desirous that they should be humbled
by these means, and forced to come to terms, than
decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavoured
to surround them with a wall and trench, that he might
be able to check their most sudden sally, to which
he imagined that they must have recourse. Hereupon,
urged by want of fodder, that they might be the readier
for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.
LXXXII. In this work, and
the deliberations on it, two days were spent.
By the third day a considerable part of Caesar’s
works was finished. To interrupt his progress,
they drew out their legions about the eighth hour,
by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle
before their camp. Caesar calling his legions
off from their work, and ordering the horse to hold
themselves in readiness, marshalled his army:
for to appear to decline an engagement contrary to
the opinion of the soldiers and the general voice,
would have been attended with great disadvantage.
But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded
from wishing to engage, and the more especially, because
the short space between the camps, even if the enemy
were put to flight, would not contribute much to a
decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant
from each other above two thousand feet. Two
parts of this were occupied by the armies, and one
third left for the soldiers to charge and make their
attack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness
of the camps would afford a ready retreat to the conquered
party in the flight. For this reason Caesar had
resolved to make resistance, if they attacked him,
but not to be the first to provoke the battle.
LXXXIII. Afranius’s
five legions were drawn up in two lines, the auxiliary
cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves.
Caesar had three lines, four cohorts out of each of
the five legions formed the first line. Three
more from each legion followed them, as reserves:
and three others were behind these. The slingers
and archers were stationed in the centre of the line;
the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile armies
being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined
to adhere to his first intention: Caesar not
to hazard a battle, unless forced to it; Afranius
to interrupt Caesar’s works. However, the
matter was deferred, and both armies kept under arms
till sunset; when they both returned to their camp.
The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works which
he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the
river Segre by a ford. Caesar, having perceived
this, sent some light-armed Germans and a party of
horse across the river, and disposed several parties
along the banks to guard them.
LXXXIV. At length, beset
on all sides, their cattle having been four days without
fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg
a conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote
from the soldiers. When this was refused by Caesar,
but a public interview offered if they chose it, Afranius’s
son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met
in the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing
of both armies, Afranius spoke thus: “That
Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him or
his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment
to their general, Cneius Pompey. That they had
now sufficiently discharged their duty to him, and
had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the
want of every necessary: but now, pent up almost
like wild beasts, they were prevented from procuring
water, and prevented from walking abroad; and were
not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace:
but confessed themselves vanquished: and begged
and entreated, if there was any room left for mercy,
that they should not be necessitated to suffer the
most severe penalties.” These sentiments
were delivered in the most submissive and humble language.
LXXXV. Caesar replied,
“That either to complain or sue for mercy became
no man less than him: for that every other person
had done their duty: himself, in having declined
to engage on favourable terms, in an advantageous
situation and time, that all things tending to a peace
might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having
preserved and protected the men whom they had in their
power, notwithstanding the injuries which they had
received, and the murder of their comrades; and even
Afranius’s soldiers, who of themselves treated
about concluding a peace, by which they thought that
they would secure the lives of all. Thus, that
the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that
the generals only were averse to peace: that
they paid no regard to the laws either of conference
or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death ignorant
persons, who were deceived by a conference: that
therefore, they had met that fate which usually befalls
men from excessive obstinacy and arrogance; and were
obliged to have recourse, and most earnestly desire
that which they had shortly before disdained.
That for his part, he would not avail himself of their
present humiliation, or his present advantage, to
require terms by which his power might be increased,
but only that those armies, which they had maintained
for so many years to oppose him, should be disbanded:
for six legions had been sent into Spain, and a seventh
raised there, and many and powerful fleets provided,
and generals of great military experience sent to
command them, for no other purpose than to oppose him;
that none of these measures were adopted to keep the
Spains in peace, or for the use of the province, which,
from the length of the peace, stood in need of no
such aid; that all these things were long since designed
against him: that against him a new sort of government
was established, that the same person should be at
the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of the city;
and though absent, have the government of two most
warlike provinces for so many years: that against
him the laws of the magistrates had been altered;
that the late praetors and consuls should not be sent
to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom,
but persons approved of and chosen by a faction.
That against him the excuse of age was not admitted:
but persons of tried experience in former wars were
called up to take the command of the armies, that with
respect to him only, the routine was not observed
which had been allowed to all generals, that, after
a successful war, they should return home and disband
their armies, if not with some mark of honour, at least
without disgrace: that he had submitted to all
these things patiently, and would still submit to
them: nor did he now desire to take their army
from them and keep it to himself (which, however,
would not be a difficult matter), but only that they
should not have it to employ against him: and
therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces,
and disband their army. If this was complied
with, he would injure no person; that these were the
last and only conditions of peace.”
LXXXVI. It was very acceptable
and agreeable to Afranius’s soldiers, as might
be easily known from their signs of joy, that they
who expected some injury after this defeat, should
obtain without solicitation the reward of a dismissal.
For when a debate was introduced about the place and
time of their dismissal, they all began to express,
both by words and signs, from the rampart where they
stood, that they should be discharged immediately:
for although every security might be given that they
would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain,
if it was deferred to a future day. After a short
debate on either side, it was brought to this issue:
that those who had any settlement or possession in
Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest
at the river Var. Caesar gave security that they
should receive no damage, and that no person should
be obliged against his inclination to take the military
oath under him.
LXXXVII. Caesar promised
to supply them with corn from the present time, till
they arrived at the river Var. He further adds,
that whatever any of them lost in the war, which was
in the possession of his soldiers, should be restored
to those that lost them. To his soldiers he made
a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation
being made. Whatever disputes Afranius’s
soldiers had afterwards amongst themselves, they voluntarily
submitted to Caesar’s decision. Afranius
and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions,
a sedition almost breaking out, asserted that the
time had not yet come, and required that Caesar should
take cognizance of it: and both parties were content
with his decision. About a third part of their
army being dismissed in two days, Caesar ordered two
of his legions to go before, the rest to follow the
vanquished enemy: that they should encamp at a
small distance from each other. The execution
of this business he gave in charge to Quintus Fufius
Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to
his directions, they marched from Spain to the river
Var, and there the rest of the army was disbanded.