I. Whilst these things
were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius, Caesar’s
lieutenant, who had been left to conduct the assault
of Massilia, began to raise a mound, vineae,
and turrets against the town, on two sides: one
of which was next the harbour and docks, the other
on that part where there is a passage from Gaul and
Spain to that sea which forces itself up the mouth
of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed almost on
three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is
the only side which has access by land. A part
even of this space, which reaches to the fortress,
being fortified by the nature of the country, and a
very deep valley, required a long and difficult siege.
To accomplish these works, Caius Trebonius sends for
a great quantity of carriages and men from the whole
Province, and orders hurdles and materials to be furnished.
These things being provided, he raised a mound eighty
feet in height.
II. But so great a store
of everything necessary for a war had been a long
time before laid up in the town, and so great a number
of engines, that no vineae made of hurdles could
withstand their force. For poles twelve feet
in length, pointed with iron, and these too shot from
very large engines, sank into the ground through four
rows of hurdles. Therefore the arches of the
vineae were covered over with beams a foot thick,
fastened together, and under this the materials of
the agger were handed from one to another.
Before this was carried a testudo sixty feet long,
for levelling the ground, made also of very strong
timber, and covered over with every thing that was
capable of protecting it against the fire and stones
thrown by the enemy. But the greatness of the
works, the height of the wall and towers, and the
multitude of engines retarded the progress of our
works. Besides, frequent sallies were made from
the town by the Albici, and fire was thrown on our
mound and turrets. These our men easily repulsed,
and, doing considerable damage to those who sallied,
beat them back into the town.
III. In the meantime, Lucius
Nasidius, being sent by Cneius Pompey with a fleet
of sixteen sail, a few of which had beaks of brass,
to the assistance of Lucius Domitius and
the Massilians, passed the straits of Sicily without
the knowledge or expectation of Curio, and, putting
with his fleet into Messana, and making the nobles
and senate take flight with the sudden terror, carried
off one of their ships out of dock. Having joined
this to his other ships, he made good his voyage to
Massilia, and, having sent in a galley privately, acquaints
Domitius and the Massilians of his arrival, and
earnestly encourages them to hazard another battle
with Brutus’s fleet with the addition of his
aid.
IV. The Massilians, since
their former loss, had brought the same number of
old ships from the docks, and had repaired and fitted
them out with great industry: they had a large
supply of seamen and pilots. They had got several
fishing-smacks, and covered them over, that the seamen
might be secure against darts: these they filled
with archers and engines. With a fleet thus appointed,
encouraged by the entreaties and tears of all the
old men, matrons, and virgins to succour the state
in this hour of distress, they went on board with
no less spirit and confidence than they had fought
before. For it happens, from a common infirmity
of human nature, that we are more flushed with confidence,
or more vehemently alarmed at things unseen, concealed,
and unknown, as was the case then. For the arrival
of Lucius Nasidius had filled the state with the most
sanguine hopes and wishes. Having got a fair wind,
they sailed out of port and went to Nasidius to Taurois,
which is a fort belonging to the Massilians, and there
ranged their fleet and again encouraged each other
to engage, and communicated their plan of operation.
The command of the right division was given to the
Massilians, that of the left to Nasidius.
V. Brutus sailed to the
same place with an augmented fleet: for to those
made by Caesar at Arelas were added six ships taken
from the Massilians, which he had refitted since the
last battle and had furnished with every necessary.
Accordingly, having encouraged his men to despise
a vanquished people whom they had conquered when yet
unbroken, he advanced against them full of confidence
and spirit. From Trebonius’s camp and all
the higher grounds it was easy to see into the town how
all the youth which remained in it, and all persons
of more advanced years, with their wives and children,
and the public guards, were either extending their
hands from the wall to the heavens, or were repairing
to the temples of the immortal gods, and, prostrating
themselves before their images, were entreating them
to grant them victory. Nor was there a single
person who did not imagine that his future fortune
depended on the issue of that day; for the choice of
their youth and the most respectable of every age,
being expressly invited and solicited, had gone on
board the fleet, that if any adverse fate should befall
them they might see that nothing was left for them
to attempt, and, if they proved victorious, they might
have hopes of preserving the city, either by their
internal resources or by foreign assistance.
VI-.-When the battle was begun, no
effort of valour was wanting to the Massilians, but,
mindful of the instructions which they had a little
before received from their friends, they fought with
such spirit as if they supposed that they would never
have another opportunity to attempt a defence, and
as if they believed that those whose lives should be
endangered in the battle would not long precede the
fate of the rest of the citizens, who, if the city
was taken, must undergo the same fortune of war.
Our ships being at some distance from each other, room
was allowed both for the skill of their pilots and
the manoeuvring of their ships; and if at any time
ours, gaining an advantage by casting the iron hooks
on board their ships, grappled with them, from all
parts they assisted those who were distressed.
Nor, after being joined by the Albici, did they decline
coming to close engagement, nor were they much inferior
to our men in valour. At the same time, showers
of darts, thrown from a distance from the lesser ships,
suddenly inflicted several wounds on our men when
off their guard and otherwise engaged; and two of
their three-decked galleys, having descried the ship
of Decimus Brutus, which could be easily
distinguished by its flag, rowed up against him with
great violence from opposite sides: but Brutus,
seeing into their designs, by the swiftness of his
ship extricated himself with such address as to get
clear, though only by a moment. From the velocity
of their motion they struck against each other with
such violence that they were both excessively injured
by the shock; the beak, indeed, of one of them being
broken off, the whole ship was ready to founder, which
circumstance being observed, the ships of Brutus’s
fleet, which were nearest that station, attack them
when in this disorder and sink them both.
VII. But Nasidius’s
ships were of no use, and soon left the fight; for
the sight of their country, or the entreaties of their
relations, did not urge them to run a desperate risk
of their lives. Therefore, of the number of the
ships not one was lost: of the fleet of the Massilians
five were sunk, four taken, and one ran off with Nasidius:
all that escaped made the best of their way to Hither
Spain, but one of the rest was sent forward to Massilia
for the purpose of bearing this intelligence, and
when it came near the city, the whole people crowded
out to hear the tidings, and on being informed of the
event, were so oppressed with grief, that one would
have imagined that the city had been taken by an enemy
at the same moment. The Massilians, however,
began to make the necessary preparations for the defence
of their city with unwearied energy.
VIII. The legionary soldiers
who had the management of the works on the right side
observed, from the frequent sallies of the enemy, that
it might prove a great protection to them to build
a turret of brick under the wall for a fort and place
of refuge, which they at first built low and small,
[to guard them] against sudden attacks. To it
they retreated, and from it they made defence if any
superior force attacked them; and from it they sallied
out either to repel or pursue the enemy. It extended
thirty feet on every side, and the thickness of the
walls was five feet. But afterwards, as experience
is the best master in everything on which the wit
of man is employed, it was found that it might be
of considerable service if it was raised to the usual
height of turrets, which was effected in the following
manner.
IX.-When the turret was raised to
the height for flooring, they laid it on the walls
in such a manner that the ends of the joists were covered
by the outer face of the wall, that nothing should
project to which the enemy’s fire might adhere.
They, moreover, built over the joists with small bricks
as high as the protection of the plutei and vineae
permitted them; and on that place they laid two beams
across, angle-ways, at a small distance from the outer
walls, to support the rafters which were to cover
the turret, and on the beams they laid joists across
in a direct line, and on these they fastened down planks.
These joists they made somewhat longer, to project
beyond the outside of the wall, that they might serve
to hang a curtain on them to defend and repel all
blows whilst they were building the walls between that
and the next floor, and the floor of this story they
faced with bricks and mortar, that the enemy’s
fire might do them no damage; and on this they spread
mattresses, lest the weapons thrown from engines should
break through the flooring, or stones from catapults
should batter the brickwork. They, moreover,
made three mats of cable ropes, each of them the length
of the turret walls, and four feet broad, and, hanging
them round the turret on the three sides which faced
the enemy, fastened them to the projecting joists.
For this was the only sort of defence which, they had
learned by experience in other places, could not be
pierced by darts or engines. But when that part
of the turret which was completed was protected and
secured against every attempt of the enemy, they removed
the plutei to other works. They began to
suspend gradually, and raise by screws from the first-floor,
the entire roof of the turret, and then they elevated
it as high as the length of the mats allowed.
Hid and secured within these coverings, they built
up the walls with bricks, and again, by another turn
of the screw, cleared a place for themselves to proceed
with the building; and, when they thought it time to
lay another floor, they laid the ends of the beams,
covered in by the outer bricks in like manner as in
the first story, and from that story they again raised
the uppermost floor and the mat-work. In this
manner, securely and without a blow or danger, they
raised it six stories high, and in laying the materials
left loop-holes in such places as they thought proper
for working their engines.
X. When they were confident
that they could protect the works which lay around
from this turret, they resolved to build a musculus,
sixty feet long, of timber, two feet square, and to
extend it from the brick tower to the enemy’s
tower and wall. This was the form of it:
two beams of equal length were laid on the ground,
at the distance of four feet from each other; and
in them were fastened small pillars, five feet high,
which were joined together by braces, with a gentle
slope, on which the timber which they must place to
support the roof of the musculus should be laid:
upon this were laid beams, two feet square, bound with
iron plates and nails. To the upper covering
of the musculus and the upper beams, they fastened
laths, four fingers square, to support the tiles which
were to cover the musculus. The roof being
thus sloped and laid over in rows in the same manner
as the joists were laid on the braces, the musculus
was covered with tiles and mortar, to secure it against
fire, which might be thrown from the wall. Over
the tiles hides are spread, to prevent the water let
in on them by spouts from dissolving the cement of
the bricks. Again, the hides were covered over
with mattresses, that they might not be destroyed
by fire or stones. The soldiers under the protection
of the vineae, finish this whole work to the
very tower, and suddenly, before the enemy were aware
of it, moved it forward by naval machinery, by putting
rollers under it, close up to the enemy’s turret,
so that it even touched the building.
XI. The townsmen, affrighted
at this unexpected stroke, bring forward with levers
the largest stones they can procure; and pitching them
from the wall, roll them down on the musculus.
The strength of the timber withstood the shock; and
whatever fell on it slid off, on account of the sloping
roof. When they perceived this, they altered their
plan and set fire to barrels, filled with resin and
tar, and rolled them down from the wall on the musculus.
As soon as they fell on it, they slid off again, and
were removed from its side by long poles and forks.
In the meantime, the soldiers, under cover of the
musculus, were looting out with crowbars the
lowest stones of the enemy’s turret, with which
the foundation was laid. The musculus was
defended by darts, thrown from engines by our men
from the brick tower, and the enemy were beaten off
from the wall and turrets; nor was a fair opportunity
of defending the walls given them. At length
several stones being picked away from the foundation
of that turret next the musculus, part of it fell
down suddenly, and the rest, as if following it, leaned
forward.
XII. Hereupon, the enemy,
distressed at the sudden fall of the turret, surprised
at the unforeseen calamity, awed by the wrath of the
gods, and dreading the pillage of their city, rush
all together out of the gate unarmed, with their temples
bound with fillets, and suppliantly stretch out their
hands to the officers and the army. At this uncommon
occurrence, the whole progress of the war was stopped,
and the soldiers, turning away from the battle, ran
eagerly to hear and listen to them. When the
enemy came up to the commanders and the army, they
all fell down at their feet, and besought them “to
wait till Caesar’s arrival; they saw that their
city was taken, our works completed, and their tower
undermined, therefore they desisted from a defence;
that no obstacle could arise, to prevent their being
instantly plundered at a beck, as soon as he arrived,
if they refused to submit to his orders.”
They inform them that, “if the turret had entirely
fallen down, the soldiers could not be withheld from
forcing into the town and sacking it, in hopes of
getting spoil.” These and several other
arguments to the same effect were delivered, as they
were a people of great learning, with great pathos
and lamentations.
XIII. The lieutenants,
moved with compassion, draw off the soldiers from
the work, desist from the assault, and leave sentinels
on the works. A sort of a truce having been made
through compassion for the besieged, the arrival of
Caesar is anxiously awaited; not a dart was thrown
from the walls or by our men, but all remit their care
and diligence, as if the business was at an end.
For Caesar had given Trebonius strict charge not to
suffer the town to be taken by storm, lest the soldiers,
too much irritated both by abhorrence of their revolt,
by the contempt shown to them, and by their long labour,
should put to the sword all the grown-up inhabitants,
as they threatened to do. And it was with difficulty
that they were then restrained from breaking into
the town, and they were much displeased, because they
imagined that they were prevented by Trebonius from
taking possession of it.
XIV. But the enemy, destitute
of all honour, only waited a time and opportunity
for fraud and treachery. And after an interval
of some days, when our men were careless and negligent,
on a sudden, at noon, when some were dispersed, and
others indulging themselves in rest on the very works,
after the fatigue of the day, and their arms were all
laid by and covered up, they sallied out from the
gates, and, the wind being high and favourable to
them, they set fire to our works; and the wind spread
it in such a manner that, in the same instant, the
agger, plutei, testudo, tower, and engines
all caught the flames and were consumed before we
could conceive how it had occurred. Our men, alarmed
at such an unexpected turn of fortune, lay hold on
such arms as they could find. Some rush from
the camp; an attack is made on the enemy: but
they were prevented, by arrows and engines from the
walls, from pursuing them when they fled. They
retired to their walls, and there, without fear, set
the musculus and brick tower on fire. Thus,
by the perfidy of the enemy and the violence of the
storm, the labour of many months was destroyed in a
moment. The Massilians made the same attempt the
next day, having got such another storm. They
sallied out against the other tower and agger,
and fought with more confidence. But as our men
had on the former occasion given up all thoughts of
a contest, so, warned by the event of the preceding
day, they had made every preparation for a defence.
Accordingly, they slew several, and forced the rest
to retreat into the town without effecting their design.
XV. Trebonius began to
provide and repair what had been destroyed, with much
greater zeal on the part of the soldiers; for when
they saw that their extraordinary pains and preparations
had an unfortunate issue, they were fired with indignation
that, in consequence of the impious violation of the
truce, their valour should be held in derision.
There was no place left them from which the materials
for their mound could be fetched, in consequence of
all the timber, far and wide, in the territories of
the Massilians, having been cut down and carried away;
they began therefore to make an agger of a new
construction, never heard of before, of two walls
of brick, each six feet thick, and to lay floors over
them of almost the same breadth with the agger,
made of timber. But wherever the space between
the walls, or the weakness of the timber, seemed to
require it, pillars were placed underneath and traversed
beams laid on to strengthen the work, and the space
which was floored was covered over with hurdles, and
the hurdles plastered over with mortar. The soldiers,
covered overhead by the floor, on the right and left
by the wall, and in the front by the mantlets, carried
whatever materials were necessary for the building
without danger: the business was soon finished the
loss of their laborious work was soon repaired by the
dexterity and fortitude of the soldiers. Gates
for making sallies were left in the wall in such places
as they thought proper.
XVI. But when the enemy
perceived that those works, which they had hoped could
not be replaced without a great length of time, were
put into so thorough repair by a few days’ labour
and diligence, that there was no room for perfidy
or sallies, and that no means were left them by which
they could either hurt the men by resistance or the
works by fire, and when they found by former examples
that their town could be surrounded with a wall and
turrets on every part by which it was accessible by
land, in such a manner that they could not have room
to stand on their own fortifications, because our
works were built almost on the top of their walls
by our army, and darts could be thrown from our hands,
and when they perceived that all advantage arising
from their engines, on which they had built great
hopes, was totally lost, and that though they had
an opportunity of fighting with us on equal terms from
walls and turrets, they could perceive that they were
not equal to our men in bravery, they had recourse
to the same proposals of surrender as before.
XVII. In Further Spain,
Marcus Varro, in the beginning of the disturbances,
when he heard of the circumstances which took place
in Italy, being diffident of Pompey’s success,
used to speak in a very friendly manner of Caesar.
That though, being pre-engaged to Cneius Pompey in
quality of lieutenant, he was bound in honour to him,
that, nevertheless, there existed a very intimate
tie between him and Caesar; that he was not ignorant
of what was the duty of a lieutenant, who bore an
office of trust; nor of his own strength, nor of the
disposition of the whole province to Caesar.
These sentiments he constantly expressed in his ordinary
conversation, and did not attach himself to either
party. But afterwards, when he found that Caesar
was detained before Massilia, that the forces of Petreius
had effected a junction with the army of Afranius,
that considerable reinforcements had come to their
assistance, that there were great hopes and expectations,
and heard that the whole Hither province had entered
into a confederacy, and of the difficulties to which
Caesar was reduced afterwards at Ilerda for want of
provisions, and Afranius wrote to him a fuller
and more exaggerated account of these matters, he
began to regulate his movements by those of fortune.
XVIII. He made levies throughout
the province; and, having completed his two legions,
he added to them about thirty auxiliary cohorts:
he collected a large quantity of corn to send partly
to the Massilians, partly to Afranius and Petreius.
He commanded the inhabitants of Gades to build ten
ships of war; besides, he took care that several others
should be built in Spain. He removed all the money
and ornaments from the temple of Hercules to the town
of Gades, and sent six cohorts thither from the province
to guard them, and gave the command of the town of
Gades to Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, and friend
of Domitius, who had come thither sent by Domitius
to recover an estate for him; and he deposited all
the arms, both public and private, in Gallonius’s
house. He himself [Varro] made severe harangues
against Caesar. He often pronounced from his
tribunal that Caesar had fought several unsuccessful
battles, and that a great number of his men had deserted
to Afranius. That he had these accounts from
undoubted messengers, and authority on which he could
rely. By these means he terrified the Roman citizens
of that province, and obliged them to promise him
for the service of the state one hundred and ninety
thousand sesterces, twenty thousand pounds weight
of silver, and a hundred and twenty thousand bushels
of wheat. He laid heavier burdens on those states
which he thought were friendly disposed to Caesar,
and billeted troops on them; he passed judgment against
some private persons, and condemned to confiscation
the properties of those who had spoken or made orations
against the republic, and forced the whole province
to take an oath of allegiance to him and Pompey.
Being informed of all that happened in Hither Spain,
he prepared for war. This was his plan of operations.
He was to retire with his two legions to Gades, and
to lay up all the shipping and provisions there.
For he had been informed that the whole province was
inclined to favour Caesar’s party. He thought
that the war might be easily protracted in an island,
if he was provided with corn and shipping. Caesar,
although called back to Italy by many and important
matters, yet had determined to leave no dregs of war
behind him in Spain, because he knew that Pompey had
many dependants and clients in the Hither province.
XIX. Having therefore sent
two legions into Further Spain under the command of
Quintus Cassius, tribune of the people; he himself
advances with six hundred horse by forced marches,
and issues a proclamation, appointing a day on which
the magistrates and nobility of all the states should
attend him at Corduba. This proclamation
being published through the whole province, there
was not a state that did not send a part of their
senate to Corduba, at the appointed time; and
not a Roman citizen of any note but appeared that
day. At the same time the senate at Corduba
shut the gates of their own accord against Varro, and
posted guards and sentinels on the wall and in the
turrets, and detained two cohorts (called Colonicae,
which had come there accidentally), for the defence
of the town. About the same time the people of
Carmona, which is by far the strongest state in the
whole province, of themselves drove out of the town
the cohorts, and shut the gates against them, although
three cohorts had been detached by Varro to garrison
the citadel.
XX. But Varro was in greater
haste on this account to reach Gades with his legion
as soon as possible, lest he should be stopped either
on his march or on crossing over to the island.
The affection of the province to Caesar proved so
great and so favourable, that he received a letter
from Gades, before he was far advanced on his march:
that as soon as the nobility of Gades heard of Caesar’s
proclamation, they had combined with the tribune of
the cohorts, which were in garrison there, to drive
Gallonius out of the town, and to secure the city and
island for Caesar. That having agreed on the
design they had sent notice to Gallonius, to quit
Gades of his own accord whilst he could do it with
safety; if he did not, they would take measures for
themselves; that for fear of this Gallonius had been
induced to quit the town. When this was known,
one of Varro’s two legions, which was called
Vernacula, carried off the colours from Varro’s
camp, he himself standing by and looking on, and retired
to Hispalis, and took post in the market and public
places without doing any injury, and the Roman citizens
residing there approved so highly of this act, that
every one most earnestly offered to entertain them
in their houses. When Varro, terrified at these
things, having altered his route, proposed going to
Italica, he was informed by his friends that
the gates were shut against him. Then indeed,
when intercepted from every road, he sends word to
Caesar that he was ready to deliver up the legion
which he commanded. He sends to him Sextus
Caesar, and orders him to deliver it up to him.
Varro, having delivered up the legion, went to Caesar
to Corduba, and having laid before him the public
accounts, handed over to him most faithfully whatever
money he had, and told him what quantity of corn and
shipping he had, and where.
XXI. Caesar made a public
oration at Corduba, in which he returned thanks
to all severally: to the Roman citizens, because
they had been zealous to keep the town in their own
power; to the Spaniards, for having driven out the
garrison; to the Gaditani, for having defeated the
attempts of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty;
to the Tribunes and Centurions who had gone there
as a guard, for having by their valour confirmed them
in their purpose. He remitted the tax which the
Roman citizens had promised to Varro for the public
use: he restored their goods to those who he
was informed had incurred that penalty by speaking
too freely, having given public and private rewards
to some: he filled the rest with flattering hopes
of his future intentions; and having stayed two days
at Corduba, he set out for Gades: he ordered
the money and ornaments which had been carried away
from the temple of Hercules, and lodged in the houses
of private persons, to be replaced in the temple.
He made Quintus Cassius governor of the province, and
assigned him four legions. He himself, with those
ships which Marcus Varro had built, and others which
the Gaditani had built by Varro’s orders, arrived
in a few days at Tarraco, where ambassadors from the
greatest part of the nearer province waited his arrival.
Having in the same manner conferred marks of honour
both publicly and privately on some states, he left
Tarraco, and went thence by land to Narbo, and thence
to Massilia. There he was informed that a law
was passed for creating a dictator, and that he had
been nominated dictator by Marcus Lepidus the praetor.
XXII. The Massilians, wearied
out by misfortunes of every sort, reduced to the lowest
ebb for want of corn, conquered in two engagements
at sea, defeated in their frequent sallies, and struggling
moreover with a fatal pestilence, from their long
confinement and change of victuals (for they all subsisted
on old millet and damaged barley, which they had formerly
provided and laid up in the public stores against an
emergency of this kind), their turret being demolished,
a great part of their wall having given way, and despairing
of any aid, either from the provinces or their armies,
for these they had heard had fallen into Caesar’s
power, resolved to surrender now without dissimulation.
But a few days before, Lucius Domitius,
having discovered the intention of the Massilians,
and having procured three ships, two of which he gave
up to his friends, went on board the third himself,
having got a brisk wind, put out to sea. Some
ships, which by Brutus’s orders were constantly
cruising near the port, having espied him, weighed
anchor, and pursued him. But of these, the ship
on board of which he was, persevered itself, and continuing
its flight, and by the aid of the wind got out of sight:
the other two, affrighted by the approach of our galleys,
put back again into the harbour. The Massilians
conveyed their arms and engines out of the town, as
they were ordered: brought their ships out of
the port and docks, and delivered up the money in
their treasury. When these affairs were despatched,
Caesar, sparing the town more out of regard to their
renown and antiquity than to any claim they could lay
to his favour, left two legions in garrison there,
sent the rest to Italy, and set out himself for Rome.
XXIII. About the same time
Caius Curio, having sailed from Sicily to Africa,
and from the first despising the forces of Publius
Attius Varus, transported only two of the four legions
which he had received from Caesar, and five hundred
horse, and having spent two days and three nights
on the voyage, arrived at a place called Aquilaria,
which is about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea,
and in the summer season has a convenient harbour,
and is enclosed by two projecting promontories.
Lucius Caesar, the son, who was waiting his arrival
near Clupea with ten ships which had been taken
near Utica in a war with the pirates, and which Publius
Attius had had repaired for this war, frightened at
the number of our ships, fled the sea, and running
his three-decked covered galley on the nearest shore,
left her there and made his escape by land to Adrumetum.
Caius Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion,
guarded this town. The rest of Caesar’s
fleet, after his flight, retired to Adrumetum.
Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, pursued him with twelve
ships, which Curio had brought from Sicily as convoy
to the merchantmen, and seeing a ship left on the
shore, he brought her off by a towing rope, and returned
with his fleet to Curio.
XXIV. Curio detached Marcus
before with the fleet to Utica, and marched thither
with his army. Having advanced two days, he came
to the river Bagrada, and there left Caius Caninius
Rebilus, the lieutenant, with the legions; and went
forward himself with the horse to view the Cornelian
camp, because that was reckoned a very eligible position
for encamping. It is a straight ridge, projecting
into the sea, steep and rough on both sides, but the
ascent is more gentle on that part which lies opposite
Utica. It is not more than a mile distant from
Utica in a direct line. But on this road there
is a spring, to which the sea comes up, and overflows;
an extensive morass is thereby formed; and if a person
would avoid it, he must make a circuit of six miles
to reach the town.
XXV. Having examined this
place, Curio got a view of Varus’s camp, joining
the wall and town, at the gate called Bellica,
well fortified by its natural situation, on one side
by the town itself, on the other by a theatre which
is before the town, the approaches to the town being
rendered difficult and narrow by the very extensive
out-buildings of that structure. At the same
time he observed the roads very full of carriages
and cattle which they were conveying from the country
into the town on the sudden alarm. He sent his
cavalry after them to plunder them and get the spoil.
And at the same time Varus had detached as a guard
for them six hundred Numidian horse, and four hundred
foot, which king Juba had sent to Utica as auxiliaries
a few days before. There was a friendship subsisting
between his [Juba’s] father and Pompey, and a
feud between him and Curio, because he, when a tribune
of the people, had proposed a law, in which he endeavoured
to make public property of the kingdom of Juba.
The horse engaged; but the Numidians were not able
to stand our first charge; but a hundred and twenty
being killed, the rest retreated into their camp near
the town. In the meantime, on the arrival of
his men-of-war, Curio ordered proclamation to be made
to the merchant ships, which lay at anchor before
Utica, in number about two hundred, that he would
treat as enemies all that did not set sail immediately
for the Cornelian camp. As soon as the proclamation
was made, in an instant they all weighed anchor and
left Utica, and repaired to the place commanded them.
This circumstance furnished the army with plenty of
everything.
XXVI. After these transactions,
Curio returned to his camp at Bagrada; and by a general
shout of the whole army was saluted imperator.
The next day he led his army to Utica, and encamped
near the town. Before the works of the camp were
finished, the horse upon guard brought him word that
a large supply of horse and foot sent by king Juba
were on their march to Utica, and at the same time
a cloud of dust was observed, and in a moment the
front of the line was in sight. Curio, surprised
at the suddenness of the affair, sent on the horse
to receive their first charge, and detain them.
He immediately called off his legions from the work,
and put them in battle array. The horse began
the battle: and before the legions could be completely
marshalled and take their ground, the king’s
entire forces being thrown into disorder and confusion,
because they had marched without any order, and were
under no apprehensions, betake themselves to flight:
almost all the enemy’s horse being safe, because
they made a speedy retreat into the town along the
shore, Caesar’s soldiers slay a great number
of their infantry.
XXVII. The next night two
Marsian centurions, with twenty-two men belonging
to the companies, deserted from Curio’s camp
to Attius Varus. They, whether they uttered the
sentiments which they really entertained, or wished
to gratify Varus (for what we wish we readily give
credit to, and what we think ourselves, we hope is
the opinion of other men), assured him, that the minds
of the whole army were disaffected to Curio, that
it was very expedient that the armies should be brought
in view of each other, and an opportunity of a conference
be given. Induced by their opinion, Varus the
next day led his troops out of the camp: Curio
did so in like manner, and with only one small valley
between them, each drew up his forces.
XXVIII. In Varus’s
army there was one Sextus Quintilius Varus
who, as we have mentioned before, was at Corfinium.
When Caesar gave him his liberty, he went over to
Africa; now, Curio had transported to Africa those
legions which Caesar had received under his command
a short time before at Corfinium: so that the
officers and companies were still the same, excepting
the change of a few centurions. Quintilius,
making this a pretext for addressing them, began to
go round Curio’s lines, and to entreat the soldiers
“not to lose all recollection of the oath which
they took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor,
nor bear arms against those who had shared the same
fortune, and endured the same hardships in a siege,
nor fight for those by whom they had been opprobriously
called deserters.” To this he added a few
words by way of encouragement, what they might expect
from his own liberality, if they should follow him
and Attius. On the delivery of this speech, no
intimation of their future conduct is given by Curio’s
army, and thus both generals led back their troops
to their camp.
XXIX. However, a great
and general fear spread through Curio’s camp,
for it is soon increased by the various discourses
of men. For every one formed an opinion of his
own; and to what he had heard from others, added his
own apprehensions. When this had spread from a
single author to several persons, and was handed from
one another, there appeared to be many authors for
such sentiments as these: ["That it was a civil
war; that they were men; and therefore that it was
lawful for them to act freely, and follow which party
they pleased.” These were the legions which
a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for
the custom of offering free towns to those who joined
the opposite party had changed Caesar’s kindness.
For the harshest expressions of the soldiers in general
did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those
which passed in the tents the night before; and some
of their fellow soldiers heard them with displeasure.
Some additions were also made to them by those who
wished to be thought more zealous in their duty.]
XXX. For these reasons,
having called a council, Curio began to deliberate
on the general welfare. There were some opinions,
which advised by all means an attempt to be made,
and an attack on Varus’s camp; for when such
sentiments prevailed among the soldiers, they thought
idleness was improper. In short, they said, “that
it was better bravely to try the hazard of war in
a battle, than to be deserted and surrounded by their
own troops, and forced to submit to the greatest cruelties.”
There were some who gave their opinion, that they ought
to withdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp;
that by a longer interval of time the soldiers might
be brought to a proper way of thinking; and also,
that if any misfortune should befall them, they might
have a safer and readier retreat to Sicily, from the
great number of their ships.
XXXI. Curio, censuring
both measures, said, “that the one was as deficient
in spirit, as the other exceeded in it: that the
latter advised a shameful flight, and the former recommended
us to engage at a great disadvantage. For on
what, says he, can we rely that we can storm a camp,
fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed,
what advantage do we gain if we give over the assault,
after having suffered considerable loss; as if success
did not acquire for a general the affection of his
army, and misfortune their hatred? But what does
a change of camp imply but a shameful flight, and
universal despair, and the alienation of the army?
For neither ought the obedient to suspect that they
are distrusted, nor the insolent to know that we fear
them; because our fears augment the licentiousness
of the latter, and diminish the zeal of the former.
But if, says he, we were convinced of the truth of
the reports of the disaffection of the army (which
I indeed am confident are either altogether groundless,
or at least less than they are supposed to be), how
much better to conceal and hide our suspicions of it,
than by our conduct confirm it? Ought not the
defects of an army to be as carefully concealed as
the wounds in our bodies, lest we should increase
the enemy’s hopes? but they moreover advise us
to set out at midnight, in order, I suppose, that
those who attempt to do wrong may have a fairer opportunity;
for conduct of this kind is restrained either by shame
or fear, to the display of which the night is most
adverse. Wherefore, I am neither so rash as to
give my opinion that we ought to attack their camp
without hopes of succeeding; nor so influenced by fear
as to despond: and I imagine that every expedient
ought first to be tried; and I am in a great degree
confident that I shall form the same opinion as yourselves
on this matter.”
XXXII. Having broken up
the council he called the soldiers together, and reminded
them “what advantage Caesar had derived from
their zeal at Corfinium; how by their good offices
and influence he had brought over a great part of
Italy to his interest. For, says he, all the municipal
towns afterwards imitated you and your conduct; nor
was it without reason that Caesar judged so favourably,
and the enemy so harshly of you. For Pompey,
though beaten in no engagement, yet was obliged to
shift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent
established by your conduct. Caesar committed
me, whom he considered his dearest friend, and the
provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was
not able to protect Rome or Italy, to your protection.
There are some here present who encourage you to revolt
from us; for what can they wish for more, than at
once to ruin us, and to involve you in a heinous crime?
or what baser opinions could they in their resentment
entertain of you, than that you would betray those
who acknowledged themselves indebted to you for everything,
and put yourselves in the power of those who think
they have been ruined by you? Have you not heard
of Caesar’s exploits in Spain? that he routed
two armies, conquered two generals, recovered two
provinces, and effected all this within forty days
after he came in sight of the enemy? Can those
who were not able to stand against him whilst they
were uninjured resist him when they are ruined?
Will you, who took part with Caesar whilst victory
was uncertain, take part with the conquered enemy
when the fortune of the war is decided, and when you
ought to reap the reward of your services? For
they say that they have been deserted and betrayed
by you, and remind you of a former oath. But
did you desert Lucius Domitius, or did Lucius
Domitius desert you? Did he not, when you
were ready to submit to the greatest difficulties,
cast you off? Did he not, without your privacy,
endeavour to effect his own escape? When you
were betrayed by him, were you not preserved by Caesar’s
generosity? And how could he think you bound by
your oath to him, when, after having thrown up the
ensigns of power, and abdicated his government, he
became a private person, and a captive in another’s
power? A new obligation is left upon you, that
you should disregard the oath, by which you are at
present bound; and have respect only to that which
was invalidated by the surrender of your general, and
his diminution of rank. But I suppose, although
you are pleased with Caesar, you are offended with
me; however I shall not boast of my services to you,
which still are inferior to my own wishes or your expectations.
But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the rewards
of labour at the conclusion of a war; and what the
issue of it is likely to be, not even you can doubt.
But why should I omit to mention my own diligence and
good fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are
now arrived? Are you sorry that I transported
the army safe and entire, without the loss of a single
ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack,
I routed the enemy’s fleet? That twice
in two days I defeated the enemy’s horse?
That I carried out of the very harbour and bay, two
hundred of the enemy’s victuallers, and reduced
them to that situation that they can receive no supplies
either by land or sea? Will you divorce yourselves
from this fortune and these generals; and prefer the
disgrace of Corfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender
of both Spains, and the prestige of the African war?
I, for my part, wished to be called a soldier of Caesar’s;
you honoured me with the title of Imperator. If
you repent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore
to me my former name that you may not appear to have
conferred the honour on me as a reproach.”
XXXIII. The soldiers, being
affected by this oration, frequently attempted to
interrupt him whilst he was speaking, so that they
appeared to bear with excessive anguish the suspicion
of treachery, and when he was leaving the assembly
they unanimously besought him to be of good spirits,
and not hesitate to engage the enemy and put their
fidelity and courage to a trial. As the wishes
and opinions of all were changed by this act, Curio,
with the general consent, determined, whenever opportunity
offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led
out his forces and ranged them in order of battle
on the same ground where they had been posted the
preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to draw
out his men, that, if any occasion should offer, either
to tamper with our men or to engage on equal terms,
he might not miss the opportunity.
XXXIV.-There lay between the two armies
a valley, as already mentioned, not very deep, but
of a difficult and steep ascent. Each was waiting
till the enemy’s forces should to attempt to
pass it, that they might engage with the advantage
of the ground. At the same time, on the left
wing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and
several light-armed infantry intermixed with them,
were perceived descending into the valley. Against
them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of
the Marrucini, whose first charge the enemy’s
horse were unable to stand, but, setting spurs to
their horses, fled back to their friends: the
light-infantry being deserted by those who had come
out along with them, were surrounded and cut to pieces
by our men. Varus’s whole army, facing
that way, saw their men flee and cut down. Upon
which Rebilus, one of Caesar’s lieutenants,
whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily knowing
that he had great experience in military matters, cried
out, “You see the enemy are daunted, Curio!
why do you hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity?”
Curio, having merely “expressed this, that the
soldiers should keep in mind the professions which
they had made to him the day before,” then ordered
them to follow him, and ran far before them all.
The valley was so difficult of ascent that the foremost
men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those
behind. But the minds of Attius’s soldiers
being prepossessed with fear and the flight and slaughter
of their men, never thought of opposing us; and they
all imagined that they were already surrounded by our
horse, and, therefore, before a dart could be thrown
or our men come near them, Varus’s whole army
turned their backs and retreated to their camp.
XXXV.-In this flight one Fabius, a
Pelignian and common soldier in Curio’s army,
pursuing the enemy’s rear, with a loud voice
shouted to Varus by his name, and often called him,
so that he seemed to be one of his soldiers, who wished
to speak to him and give him advice. When Varus,
after being repeatedly called, stopped and looked at
him, and inquired who he was and what he wanted, he
made a blow with his sword at his naked shoulder and
was very near killing Varus, but he escaped the danger
by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius
was surrounded by the soldiers near him and cut to
pieces; and by the multitude and crowds of those that
fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and the
passage stopped, and a greater number perished in that
place without a stroke than in the battle and flight.
Nor were we far from driving them from this camp;
and some of them ran straightway to the town without
halting. But both the nature of the ground and
the strength of the fortifications prevented our access
to the camp; for Curio’s soldiers, marching
out to battle, were without those things which were
requisite for storming a camp. Curio, therefore,
led his army back to the camp, with all his troops
safe except Fabius. Of the enemy about six hundred
were killed and a thousand wounded, all of whom, after
Curio’s return, and several more under pretext
of their wounds, but in fact through fear, withdrew
from the camp into the town, which Varus perceiving
and knowing the terror of his army, leaving a trumpeter
in his camp and a few tents for show, at the third
watch led back his army quietly into the town.
XXXVI. The next day Curio
resolved to besiege Utica, and to draw lines about
it. In the town there was a multitude of people,
ignorant of war, owing to the length of the peace;
some of them Uticans, very well inclined to Caesar,
for his favours to them; the Roman population was
composed of persons differing widely in their sentiments.
The terror occasioned by former battles was very great;
and therefore they openly talked of surrendering,
and argued with Attius that he should not suffer the
fortune of them all to be ruined by his obstinacy.
Whilst these things were in agitation, couriers, who
had been sent forward, arrived from king Juba, with
the intelligence that he was on his march, with considerable
forces, and encouraged them to protect and defend their
city, a circumstance which greatly comforted their
desponding hearts.
XXXVII. The same intelligence
was brought to Curio; but for some time he could not
give credit to it, because he had so great confidence
in his own good fortune. And at this time Caesar’s
success in Spain was announced in Africa by messages
and letters. Being elated by all these things,
he imagined that the king would not dare to attempt
anything against him. But when he found out,
from undoubted authority, that his forces were less
than twenty miles distant from Utica, abandoning his
works, he retired to the Cornelian camp. Here
he began to lay in corn and wood, and to fortify his
camp, and immediately despatched orders to Sicily,
that his two legions and the remainder of his cavalry
should be sent to him. His camp was well adapted
for protracting a war, from the nature and strength
of the situation, from its proximity to the sea, and
the abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity
had been stored up from the neighbouring salt-pits.
Timber could not fail him from the number of trees,
nor corn, with which the lands abounded. Wherefore,
with the general consent, Curio determined to wait
for the rest of his forces, and protract the war.
XXXVIII. This plan being
settled, and his conduct approved of, he is informed
by some deserters from the town that Juba had stayed
behind in his own kingdom, being called home by a
neighbouring war, and a dispute with the people of
Leptis; and that Sabura, his commander-in-chief, who
had been sent with a small force, was drawing near
to Utica. Curio rashly believing this information,
altered his design, and resolved to hazard a battle.
His youth, his spirits, his former good fortune and
confidence of success, contributed much to confirm
this resolution. Induced by these motives, early
in the night he sent all his cavalry to the enemy’s
camp near the river Bagrada, of which Sabura, of whom
we have already spoken, was the commander. But
the king was coming after them with all his forces,
and was posted at a distance of six miles behind Sabura.
The horse that were sent perform their march that night,
and attack the enemy unawares and unexpectedly; for
the Numidians, after the usual barbarous custom, encamped
here and there without any regularity. The cavalry
having attacked them, when sunk in sleep and dispersed,
killed a great number of them; many were frightened
and ran away. After which the horse returned
to Curio, and brought some prisoners with them.
XXXIX. Curio had set out
at the fourth watch with all his forces, except five
cohorts which he left to guard the camp. Having
advanced six miles, he met the horse, heard what had
happened, and inquired from the captives who commanded
the camp at Bagrada. They replied Sabura.
Through eagerness to perform his journey, he neglected
to make further inquiries, but looking back to the
company next him, “Don’t you see, soldiers,”
says he, “that the answer of the prisoners corresponds
with the account of the deserters, that the king is
not with him, and that he sent only a small force
which was not able to withstand a few horse?
Hasten then to spoil, to glory; that we may now begin
to think of rewarding you, and returning you thanks.”
The achievements of the horse were great in themselves,
especially if their small number be compared with
the vast host of Numidians. However, the account
was enlarged by themselves, as men are naturally inclined
to boast of their own merit. Besides, many spoils
were produced; the men and horses that were taken
were brought into their sight, that they might imagine
that every moment of time which intervened was a delay
to their conquest. By this means the hopes of
Curio were seconded by the ardour of the soldiers.
He ordered the horse to follow him, and hastened his
march, that he might attack them as soon as possible,
while in consternation after their flight. But
the horse, fatigued by the expedition of the preceding
night, were not able to keep up with him, but fell
behind in different places. Even this did not
abate Curio’s hopes.
XL. Juba, being informed
by Sabura of the battle in the night, sent to his
relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, which
he was accustomed to keep near him to guard his person,
and that part of his infantry on which he had the
greatest dependence, and he himself followed slowly
after with the rest of his forces and forty elephants,
suspecting that as Curio had sent his horse before,
he himself would follow them. Sabura drew up
his army, both horse and foot, and commanded them
to give way gradually and retreat through the pretence
of fear; that when it was necessary he would give
them the signal for battle, and such orders as he
found circumstances required. Curio, as his idea
of their present behaviour was calculated to confirm
his former hopes, imagined that the enemy were running
away, and led his army from the rising grounds down
to the plain.
XLI. And when he had advanced
from this place about sixteen miles, his army being
exhausted with the fatigue, he halted. Sabura
gave his men the signal, marshalled his army, and
began to go around his ranks and encourage them.
But he made use of the foot only for show; and sent
the horse to the charge: Curio was not deficient
in skill, and encouraged his men to rest all their
hopes in their valour. Neither were the soldiers,
though wearied, nor the horse, though few and exhausted
with fatigue, deficient in ardour to engage, and courage:
but the latter were in number but two hundred:
the rest had dropped behind on the march. Wherever
they charged they forced the enemy to give ground,
but they were not able to pursue them far when they
fled, or to press their horses too severely.
Besides, the enemy’s cavalry began to surround
us on both wings and to trample down our rear.
When any cohorts ran forward out of the line, the
Numidians, being fresh, by their speed avoided our
charge, and surrounded ours when they attempted to
return to their post, and cut them off from the main
body. So that it did not appear safe either to
keep their ground and maintain their ranks, or to issue
from the line, and run the risk. The enemy’s
troops were frequently reinforced by assistance sent
from Juba; strength began to fail our men through
fatigue; and those who had been wounded could neither
quit the field nor retire to a place of safety, because
the whole field was surrounded by the enemy’s
cavalry. Therefore, despairing of their own safety,
as men usually do in the last moment of their lives,
they either lamented their unhappy deaths, or recommended
their parents to the survivors, if fortune should
save any from the impending danger. All were
full of fear and grief.
XLII. When Curio perceived
that in the general consternation neither his exhortations
nor entreaties were attended to, imagining that the
only hope of escaping in their deplorable situation
was to gain the nearest hills, he ordered the colours
to be borne that way. But a party of horse, that
had been sent by Sabura, had already got possession
of them. Now indeed our men were reduced to extreme
despair: and some of them were killed by the
cavalry in attempting to escape: some fell to
the ground unhurt. Cneius Domitius, commander
of the cavalry, standing round Curio with a small
party of horse, urged Curio to endeavour to escape
by flight, and to hasten to his camp; and assured him
that he would not forsake him. But Curio declared
that he would never more appear in Caesar’s
sight, after losing the army which had been committed
by Caesar to his charge, and accordingly fought till
he was killed. Very few of the horse escaped
from that battle, but those who had stayed behind
to refresh their horses having perceived at a distance
the defeat of the whole army, retired in safety to
their camp.
XLIII. The soldiers were
all killed to a man. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor,
who was left behind in the camp by Curio, having got
intelligence of these things, encouraged his men not
to be disheartened. They beg and entreat to be
transported to Sicily. He consented, and ordered
the masters of the ships to have all the boats brought
close to the shore early in the evening. But
so great was the terror in general that some said
that Juba’s forces were marching up, others that
Varus was hastening with his legions, and that they
already saw the dust raised by their coming; of which
not one circumstance had happened: others suspected
that the enemy’s fleet would immediately be upon
them. Therefore, in the general consternation,
every man consulted his own safety. Those who
were on board of the fleet, were in a hurry to set
sail, and their flight hastened the masters of the
ships of burden. A few small fishing boats attended
their duty and his orders. But as the shores
were crowded, so great was the struggle to determine
who of such a vast number should first get on board,
that some of the vessels sank with the weight of the
multitude, and the fears of the rest delayed them
from coming to the shore.
XLIV. From which circumstances
it happened that a few foot and aged men, that could
prevail either through interest or pity, or who were
able to swim to the ships, were taken on board, and
landed safe in Sicily. The rest of the troops
sent their centurions as deputies to Varus at
night, and surrendered themselves to him. But
Juba, the next day having spied their cohorts before
the town, claimed them as his booty, and ordered a
great part of them to be put to the sword; a few he
selected and sent home to his own realm. Although
Varus complained that his honour was insulted by Juba,
yet he dare not oppose him: Juba rode on horseback
into the town, attended by several senators, amongst
whom were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus,
and in a few days arranged and ordered what he would
have done in Utica, and in a few days more returned
to his own kingdom, with all his forces.