The National Assembly reconvened in
the middle of October. On November 1, Bonaparte
surprised it with a message, in which he announced
the dismissal of the Barrot-Falloux Ministry,
and the framing of a new. Never have lackeys
been chased from service with less ceremony than Bonaparte
did his ministers. The kicks, that were eventually
destined for the National Assembly, Barrot &
Company received in the meantime.
The Barrot Ministry was, as we
have seen, composed of Legitimists and Orleanists;
it was a Ministry of the party of Order. Bonaparte
needed that Ministry in order to dissolve the republican
constituent assembly, to effect the expedition against
Rome, and to break up the democratic party. He
had seemingly eclipsed himself behind this Ministry,
yielded the reins to the hands of the party of Order,
and assumed the modest mask, which, under Louis Philippe,
had been worn by the responsible overseer of the newspapers the
mask of “homme de paille.”
[#1 Man of straw] Now he threw off the mask, it being
no longer the light curtain behind which he could
conceal, but the Iron Mask, which prevented him from
revealing his own physiognomy. He had instituted
the Barrot Ministry in order to break up the
republican National Assembly in the name of the party
of Order; he now dismissed it in order to declare his
own name independent of the parliament of the party
of Order.
There was no want of plausible pretexts
for this dismissal. The Barrot Ministry
had neglected even the forms of decency that would
have allowed the president of the republic to appear
as a power along with the National Assembly.
For instance, during the vacation of the National
Assembly, Bonaparte published a letter to Edgar Ney,
in which he seemed to disapprove the liberal attitude
of the Pope, just as, in opposition to the constitutive
assembly, he had published a letter, in which he praised
Oudinot for his attack upon the Roman republic; when
the National Assembly came to vote on the budget for
the Roman expedition, Victor Hugo, out of pretended
liberalism, brought up that letter for discussion;
the party of Order drowned this notion of Bonaparte’s
under exclamations of contempt and incredulity as
though notions of Bonaparte could not possibly have
any political weight; and none of the Ministers
took up the gauntlet for him. On another occasion,
Barrot, with his well-known hollow pathos, dropped,
from the speakers’ tribune in the Assembly,
words of indignation upon the “abominable machinations,”
which, according to him, went on in the immediate vicinity
of the President. Finally, while the Ministry
obtained from the National Assembly a widow’s
pension for the Duchess of Orleans, it denied every
motion to raise the Presidential civil list; and,
in Bonaparte, be it always remembered, the Imperial
Pretender was so closely blended with the impecunious
adventurer, that the great idea of his being destined
to restore the Empire was ever supplemented by that
other, to-wit, that the French people was destined
to pay his debts.
The Barrot-Falloux Ministry was
the first and last parliamentary Ministry that Bonaparte
called into life. Its dismissal marks, accordingly,
a decisive period. With the Ministry, the party
of Order lost, never to regain, an indispensable post
to the maintenance of the parliamentary regime, the
handle to the Executive power. It is readily
understood that, in a country like France, where the
Executive disposes over an army of more than half
a million office-holders, and, consequently, keeps
permanently a large mass of interests and existences
in the completest dependence upon itself; where the
Government surrounds, controls, regulates, supervises
and guards society, from its mightiest acts of national
life, down to its most insignificant motions; from
its common life, down to the private life of each individual;
where, due to such extraordinary centralization, this
body of parasites acquires a ubiquity and omniscience,
a quickened capacity for motion and rapidity that
finds an analogue only in the helpless lack of self-reliance,
in the unstrung weakness of the body social itself; that
in such a country the National Assembly lost, with
the control of the ministerial posts, all real influence;
unless it simultaneously simplified the administration;
if possible, reduced the army of office-holders; and,
finally, allowed society and public opinion to establish
its own organs, independent of government censorship.
But the Material Interest of the French bourgeoisie
is most intimately bound up in maintenance of just
such a large and extensively ramified governmental
machine. There the bourgeoisie provides for its
own superfluous membership; and supplies, in the shape
of government salaries, what it can not pocket in
the form of profit, interest, rent and fees.
On the other hand, its Political Interests daily compel
it to increase the power of repression, i.e.,
the means and the personnel of the government; it
is at the same time forced to conduct an uninterrupted
warfare against public opinion, and, full of suspicion,
to hamstring and lame the independent organs of society whenever
it does not succeed in amputating them wholly.
Thus the bourgeoisie of France was forced by its own
class attitude, on the one hand, to destroy the conditions
for all parliamentary power, its own included, and,
on the other, to render irresistible the Executive
power that stood hostile to it.
The new Ministry was called the d’Hautpoul
Ministry. Not that General d’Hautpoul had
gained the rank of Ministerial President. Along
with Barrot, Bonaparte abolished this dignity,
which, it must be granted, condemned the President
of the republic to the legal nothingness of a constitutional
kind, of a constitutional king at that, without throne
and crown, without sceptre and without sword, without
irresponsibility, without the imperishable possession
of the highest dignity in the State, and, what was
most untoward of all without a civil list.
The d’Hautpoul Ministry numbered only one man
of parliamentary reputation, the Jew Fould, one of
the most notorious members of the high finance.
To him fell the portfolio of finance. Turn to
the Paris stock quotations, and it will be found that
from November 1, 1849, French stocks fall and rise
with the falling and rising of the Bonapartist shares.
While Bonaparte had thus found his ally in the Bourse,
he at the same time took possession of the Police
through the appointment of Carlier as Prefect of Police.
But the consequences of the change
of Ministry could reveal themselves only in the course
of events. So far, Bonaparte had taken only one
step forward, to be all the more glaringly driven back.
Upon his harsh message, followed the most servile
declarations of submissiveness to the National Assembly.
As often as the Ministers made timid attempts to introduce
his own personal hobbies as bills, they themselves
seemed unwilling and compelled only by their position
to run the comic errands, of whose futility they were
convinced in advance. As often as Bonaparte blabbed
out his plans behind the backs of his Ministers, and
sported his “idées napoleoniennes,”
[#2 Napoleonic ideas.] his own Ministers disavowed
him from the speakers’ tribune in the National
Assembly. His aspirations after usurpation seemed
to become audible only to the end that the ironical
laughter of his adversaries should not die out.
He deported himself like an unappreciated genius,
whom the world takes for a simpleton. Never did
lie enjoy in fuller measure the contempt of all classes
than at this period. Never did the bourgeoisie
rule more absolutely; never did it more boastfully
display the insignia of sovereignty.
It is not here my purpose to write
the history of its legislative activity, which is
summed up in two laws passed during this period:
the law reestablishing the duty on wine, and the laws
on education, to suppress infidelity. While the
drinking of wine was made difficult to the Frenchmen,
all the more bounteously was the water of pure life
poured out to them. Although in the law on the
duty on wine the bourgeoisie declares the old hated
French tariff system to be inviolable, it sought,
by means of the laws on education, to secure the old
good will of the masses that made the former bearable.
One wonders to see the Orleanists, the liberal bourgeois,
these old apostles of Voltarianism and of eclectic
philosophy, entrusting the supervision of the French
intellect to their hereditary enemies, the Jesuits.
But, while Orleanists and Legitimists could part company
on the question of the Pretender to the crown, they
understood full well that their joint reign dictated
the joining of the means of oppression of two distinct
epochs; that the means of subjugation of the July monarchy
had to be supplemented with and strengthened by the
means of subjugation of the restoration.
The farmers, deceived in all their
expectations, more than ever ground down by the law
scale of the price of corn, on the one hand, and, on
the other, by the growing load of taxation and mortgages,
began to stir in the Departments. They were answered
by the systematic baiting of the school masters, whom
the Government subjected to the clergy; by the systematic
baiting of the Mayors, whom it subjected to the Prefects;
and by a system of espionage to which all were subjected.
In Paris and the large towns, the reaction itself
carries the physiognomy of its own epoch; it irritates
more than it cows; in the country, it becomes low,
moan, petty, tiresome, vexatious, in a word,
it becomes “gensdarme.” It is easily
understood how three years of the gensdarme regime,
sanctified by the regime of the clergyman, was bound
to demoralize unripe masses.
Whatever the mass of passion and declamation,
that the party of Order expended from the speakers’
tribune in the National Assembly against the minority,
its speech remained monosyllabic, like that of the
Christian, whose speech was to be “Aye, aye;
nay, nay.” It was monosyllabic, whether
from the tribune or the press; dull as a conundrum,
whose solution is known beforehand. Whether the
question was the right of petition or the duty on
wine, the liberty of the press or free trade, clubs
or municipal laws, protection of individual freedom
or the regulation of national economy, the slogan
returns ever again, the theme is monotonously the
same, the verdict is ever ready and unchanged:
Socialism! Even bourgeois liberalism is pronounced
socialistic; socialistic, alike, is pronounced popular
education; and, likewise, socialistic national financial
reform. It was socialistic to build a railroad
where already a canal was; and it was socialistic to
defend oneself with a stick when attacked with a sword.
This was not a mere form of speech,
a fashion, nor yet party tactics. The bourgeoisie
perceives correctly that all the weapons, which it
forged against feudalism, turn their edges against
itself; that all the means of education, which it
brought forth, rebel against its own civilization;
that all the gods, which it made, have fallen away
from it. It understands that all its so-called
citizens’ rights and progressive organs assail
and menace its class rule, both in its social foundation
and its political superstructure consequently,
have become “socialistic.” It justly
scents in this menace and assault the secret of Socialism,
whose meaning and tendency it estimates more correctly
than the spurious, so-called Socialism, is capable
of estimating itself, and which, consequently, is
unable to understand how it is that the bourgeoisie
obdurately shuts up its ears to it, alike whether it
sentimentally whines about the sufferings of humanity;
or announces in Christian style the millennium and
universal brotherhood; or twaddles humanistically
about the soul, culture and freedom; or doctrinally
matches out a system of harmony and wellbeing for all
classes. What, however, the bourgeoisie does
not understand is the consequence that its own parliamentary
regime, its own political reign, is also of necessity
bound to fall under the general ban of “socialistic.”
So long as the rule of the bourgeoisie is not fully
organized, has not acquired its purely political character,
the contrast with the other classes cannot come into
view in all its sharpness; and, where it does come
into view, it cannot take that dangerous turn that
converts every conflict with the Government into a
conflict with Capital. When, however, the French
bourgeoisie began to realize in every pulsation of
society a menace to “peace,” how could
it, at the head of society, pretend to uphold the
regime of unrest, its own regime, the parliamentary
regime, which, according to the expression of one
of its own orators, lives in struggle, and through
struggle? The parliamentary regime lives on discussion, how
can it forbid discussion? Every single interest,
every single social institution is there converted
into general thoughts, is treated as a thought, how
could any interest or institution claim to be above
thought, and impose itself as an article of faith?
The orators’ conflict in the tribune calls forth
the conflict of the rowdies in the press the debating
club in parliament is necessarily supplemented by
debating clubs in the salons and the barrooms; the
representatives, who are constantly appealing to popular
opinion, justify popular opinion in expressing its
real opinion in petitions. The parliamentary regime
leaves everything to the decision of majorities, how
can the large majorities beyond parliament be expected
not to wish to decide? If, from above, they hear
the fiddle screeching, what else is to be expected
than that those below should dance?
Accordingly, by now persecuting as
Socialist what formerly it had celebrated as Liberal,
the bourgeoisie admits that its own interest orders
it to raise itself above the danger of self government;
that, in order to restore rest to the land, its own
bourgeois parliament must, before all, be brought
to rest; that, in order to preserve its social power
unhurt, its political power must be broken; that the
private bourgeois can continue to exploit the other
classes and rejoice in “property,” “family,”
“religion” and “order” only
under the condition that his own class be condemned
to the same political nullity of the other classes,
that, in order to save their purse, the crown must
be knocked off their heads, and the sword that was
to shield them, must at the same time be hung over
their heads as a sword of Damocles.
In the domain of general bourgeois
interests, the National Assembly proved itself so
barren, that, for instance, the discussion over the
Paris-Avignon railroad, opened in the winter of 1850,
was not yet ripe for a vote on December 2, 1851.
Wherever it did not oppress or was reactionary, the
bourgeoisie was smitten with incurable barrenness.
While Bonaparte’s Ministry either
sought to take the initiative of laws in the spirit
of the party of Order, or even exaggerated their severity
in their enforcement and administration, he, on his
part, sought to win popularity by means of childishly
silly propositions, to exhibit the contrast between
himself and the National Assembly, and to hint at a
secret plan, held in reserve and only through circumstances
temporarily prevented from disclosing its hidden treasures
to the French people. Of this nature was the
proposition to decree a daily extra pay of four
sous to the under-officers; so, likewise, the
proposition for a “word of honor” loan
bank for working-men. To have money given and
money borrowed that was the perspective
that he hoped to cajole the masses with. Presents
and loans to that was limited the financial
wisdom of the slums, the high as well as the low;
to that were limited the springs which Bonaparte knew
how to set in motion. Never did Pretender speculate
more dully upon the dullness of the masses.
Again and again did the National Assembly
fly into a passion at these unmistakable attempts
to win popularity at its expense, and at the growing
danger that this adventurer, lashed on by debts and
unrestrained by reputation, might venture upon some
desperate act. The strained relations between
the party of Order and the President had taken on a
threatening aspect, when an unforeseen event threw
him back, rueful into its arms. We mean the supplementary
elections of March, 1850. These elections took
place to fill the vacancies created in the National
Assembly, after June 13, by imprisonment and exile.
Paris elected only Social-Democratic candidates; it
even united the largest vote upon one of the insurgents
of June, 1848, Deflotte. In this way
the small traders’ world of Paris, now allied
with the proletariat, revenged itself for the defeat
of June 13, 1849. It seemed to have disappeared
from the field of battle at the hour of danger only
to step on it again at a more favorable opportunity,
with increased forces for the fray, and with a bolder
war cry. A circumstance seemed to heighten the
danger of this electoral victory. The Army voted
in Paris for a June insurgent against Lahitte, a Minister
of Bonaparte’s, and, in the Departments, mostly
for the candidates of the Mountain, who, there also,
although not as decisively as in Paris, maintained
the upper hand over their adversaries.
Bonaparte suddenly saw himself again
face to face with the revolution. As on January
29, 1849, as on June 13, 1849, on May 10, 1850, he
vanished again behind the party of Order. He bent
low; he timidly apologized; he offered to appoint
any Ministry whatever at the behest of the parliamentary
majority; he even implored the Orleanist and Legitimist
party leaders the Thiers, Berryers, Broglies,
Moles, in short, the so-called burgraves to
take hold of the helm of State in person. The
party of Order did not know how to utilize this opportunity,
that was never to return. Instead of boldly taking
possession of the proffered power, it did not even
force Bonaparte to restore the Ministry dismissed
on November 1; it contented itself with humiliating
him with its pardon, and with affiliating Mr. Baroche
to the d’Hautpoul Ministry. This Baroche
had, as Public Prosecutor, stormed before the High
Court at Bourges, once against the revolutionists
of May 15, another time against the Democrats of June
13, both times on the charge of “attentats”
against the National Assembly. None of Bonaparte’s
Ministers contributed later more towards the degradation
of the National Assembly; and, after December 2, 1851,
we meet him again as the comfortably stalled and dearly
paid Vice-President of the Senate. He had spat
into the soup of the revolutionists for Bonaparte
to eat it.
On its part, the Social Democratic
party seemed only to look for pretexts in order to
make its own victory doubtful, and to dull its edge.
Vidal, one of the newly elected Paris representatives,
was returned for Strassburg also. He was induced
to decline the seat for Paris and accept the one for
Strassburg. Thus, instead of giving a definite
character to their victory at the hustings, and thereby
compelling the party of Order forthwith to contest
it in parliament; instead of thus driving the foe
to battle at the season of popular enthusiasm and
of a favorable temper in the Army, the democratic party
tired out Paris with a new campaign during the months
of March and April; it allowed the excited popular
passions to wear themselves out in this second provisional
electoral play it allowed the revolutionary vigor
to satiate itself with constitutional successes, and
lose its breath in petty intrigues, hollow declamation
and sham moves; it gave the bourgeoisie time to collect
itself and make its preparations finally, it allowed
the significance of the March elections to find a
sentimentally weakening commentary at the subsequent
April election in the victory of Eugene Sue.
In one word, it turned the 10th of March into an April
Fool.
The parliamentary majority perceived
the weakness of its adversary. Its seventeen
burgraves Bonaparte had left to it
the direction of and responsibility for the attack ,
framed a new election law, the moving of which was
entrusted to Mr. Faucher, who had applied for the honor.
On May 8, he introduced the new law whereby universal
suffrage was abolished; a three years residence in
the election district imposed as a condition for voting;
and, finally, the proof of this residence made dependent,
for the working-man, upon the testimony of his employer.
As revolutionarily as the democrats
had agitated and stormed during the constitutional
struggles, so constitutionally did they, now, when
it was imperative to attest, arms in hand, the earnestness
of their late electoral victories, preach order, “majestic
calmness,” lawful conduct, i. e., blind submission
to the will of the counter-revolution, which revealed
itself as law. During the debate, the Mountain
put the party of Order to shame by maintaining the
passionless attitude of the law-abiding burger, who
upholds the principle of law against revolutionary
passions; and by twitting the party of Order with the
fearful reproach of proceeding in a revolutionary manner.
Even the newly elected deputies took pains to prove
by their decent and thoughtful deportment what an
act of misjudgment it was to decry them as anarchists,
or explain their election as a victory of the revolution.
The new election law was passed on May 31. The
Mountain contented itself with smuggling a protest
into the pockets of the President of the Assembly.
To the election law followed a new press law, whereby
the revolutionary press was completely done away with.
It had deserved its fate. The “National”
and the “Presse,” two bourgeois organs,
remained after this deluge the extreme outposts of
the revolution.
We have seen how, during March and
April, the democratic leaders did everything to involve
the people of Paris in a sham battle, and how, after
May 8, they did everything to keep it away from a real
battle. We may not here forget that the year
1850 was one of the most brilliant years of industrial
and commercial prosperity; consequently, that the
Parisian proletariat was completely employed.
But the election law of May 31, 1850 excluded them
from all participation in political power; it cut
the field of battle itself from under them; it threw
the workingmen back into the state of pariahs, which
they had occupied before the February revolution.
In allowing themselves, in sight of such an occurrence,
to be led by the democrats, and in forgetting the
revolutionary interests of their class through temporary
comfort, the workingmen abdicated the honor of being
a conquering power; they submitted to their fate;
they proved that the defeat of June, 1848, had incapacitated
them from resistance for many a year to come finally,
that the historic process must again, for the time
being, proceed over their heads. As to the small
traders’ democracy, which, on June 13, had cried
out: “If they but dare to assail universal
suffrage . . . then . . . then we will show who we
are!” they now consoled themselves
with the thought that the counter-revolutionary blow,
which had struck them, was no blow at all, and that
the law of May 31 was no law. On May 2, 1852,
according to them, every Frenchman would appear at
the hustings, in one hand the ballot, in the other
the sword. With this prophecy they set their
hearts at ease. Finally, the Army was punished
by its superiors for the elections of May and April,
1850, as it was punished for the election of May 29,
1849. This time, however, it said to itself determinately:
“The revolution shall not cheat us a third time.”
The law of May 31, 1850, was the “coup
d’etat” of the bourgeoisie. All its
previous conquests over the revolution had only a temporary
character: they became uncertain the moment the
National Assembly stepped off the stage; they depended
upon the accident of general elections, and the history
of the elections since 1848 proved irrefutably that,
in the same measure as the actual reign of the bourgeoisie
gathered strength, its moral reign over the masses
wore off. Universal suffrage pronounced itself
on May 10 pointedly against the reign of the bourgeoisie;
the bourgeoisie answered with the banishment of universal
suffrage. The law of May 31 was, accordingly,
one of the necessities of the class struggle.
On the other hand, the constitution required a minimum
of two million votes for the valid ejection of the
President of the republic. If none of the Presidential
candidates polled this minimum, then the National
Assembly was to elect the President out of the three
candidates polling the highest votes. At the time
that the constitutive body made this law, ten million
voters were registered on the election rolls.
In its opinion, accordingly, one-fifth of the qualified
voters sufficed to make a choice for President valid.
The law of May 31 struck at least three million voters
off the rolls, reduced the number of qualified voters
to seven millions, and yet, not withstanding, it kept
the lawful minimum at two millions for the election
of a President. Accordingly, it raised the lawful
minimum from a fifth to almost a third of the qualified
voters, i.e., it did all it could to smuggle
the Presidential election out of the hands of the
people into those of the National Assembly. Thus,
by the election law of May 31, the party of Order
seemed to have doubly secured its empire, in that
it placed the election of both the National Assembly
and the President of the republic in the keeping of
the stable portion of society.