I.

Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself.

The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden, from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden, that Norway’s position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839 the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two later the last 1895-98 Norway was offered from the Swedish side complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have been accepted by Norway as for instance the law passed in 1844 concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc. others again were refused as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more general terms are added as in 1893 and during the present year , Nansen’s characterising Sweden’s Union policy as “90 years’ labour to procure a supremacy for Sweden", ought to appear in its true colours[2:1].

The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union, partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union.

Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or less ignored[2:2]. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that Sweden’s supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from the first, placed in Sweden’s hands[2:3], and this Swedish standpoint has also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian writers on State law[3:1]. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right, for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden’s defence of her conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting “designs of supremacy”.

Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans to mention one, the late professor Oscar ALIN have on different occasions maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality within the Union, and it must be asserted that no Swedish political party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway[3:2].

That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable oppositions in opinions concerning the manner and the aim for a reform.

Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the entire reorganization, Norway the partial the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was complete[4:1].

Sweden has furthermore insisted on negotiations and agreements, as the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained.

Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the aim of the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a Union, which outworldly represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a purely personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as the main object in view.

The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian programme, especially since 1885.

Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were forced practically if not legally to capitulate in essentials to the orthodox parliamentarism, the Norwegian party champions became in need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian people[5:1], who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife. The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of BJOeRNSON and other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by BJOeRNSON as the only enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their (Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the “Norwegians of the Future” buried themselves deeper and deeper in the study of “Ancient Glorious Norway”. Imagination was fed on Norwegian heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place for renewed worship[5:2].

This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years played a dominating rôle in Norwegian party politics[6:1]. It became the more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in need, of BJOeRNSON and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this. It is true, that one party the Norwegian Right Side , for a long time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost entirely vanished from the “national junction.”

During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.

But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any sort of “confusion”; their inability to comprehend the requirements of the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula’s unity to Europe. The currents of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish majority in the Committe of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union, but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the enticing reward harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting Norway honestly to meet her half way has been sufficiently uncertain, in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims.

II.

The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the Union struggles during the last fourteen years

The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885[8:1].

What was it then that happened in 1885?

By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs, which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden’s leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal right[9:1].

But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which, being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be more impartially treated, so that even Norway’s lawful interests could receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885 the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have become the source of the last twenty year’s Union struggle[9:2]. Now the state of the case is this, the Foreign Minister’s parliamentary responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the Constitution in 1885. Formerly he was just as he is now responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all resolutions in Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885 was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also prepare matters concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden’s foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he held in all cases for Sweden’s Foreign policy. It may be added that this constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever.

Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary control over foreign affairs, but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet. But the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression.

The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in 1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran leader of the Left Side (separatists) JOHAN SVERDRUP; it was indicated “to take matters into our own hands”. The system was founded on the Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs, its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway were fixed by the Separatists[10:1].

It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able, of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the Union. A Union policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union. Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations of fidelity to the Union the last speech of this sort was heard a short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of whech Sweden has had to complain.

There was a cautious beginning with “their own Consuls”; it was too venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their own Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own[11:1]. In reality, it is an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners were in opposition for a long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the Consular Committee’s deliberations on the subject before the mercantile authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that “the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested, or amongst the masses of the people”. There are principally two reasons for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and not for the exports[12:1]; the second reason loses its chief point by the fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their business to promote trade for private individuals, but only to give reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much-talked of fears, that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office, partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact that for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls’ duties have, on Norway’s side, been performed by one of the Norwegian Government Departements, proves how vain those fears were.

Norwegian separatists, among others MICHELSEN himself, long ago, in a moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. “Directly they have got the wedge fixed into the small end”, wrote in 1892 President HANS FORSSELL, “they will try to persuade us that there will be no danger in letting them drive it in a bit”. Above all they considered that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the dominating rôle interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office.

The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway’s right. That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and of Norway.

When therefore the King, in the interests of the Union, at first opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this, that has brought about the rupture of the Union.

Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter, which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State alone; on the other hand the winding up of the joint Consular Service would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions “concerning the two Kingdoms[14:1].” And this one-sided right of decision was maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes the last in 1886 having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it would be Norway’s prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up; Norway might without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign affairs from the joint Foreign administration.

Through its leader, EMIL STANG, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the Union King’s view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed, and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the revolution, which has now broken out.

When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly stated in the division of the Constitution. The King’s veto over legal questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the King’s Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the King’s Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National Law[15:1]. Furthermore the Constitution originally did not recognize something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the Ministery were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the old only possible forms.

Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet STEEN did not venture to carry the Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire. Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr MICHELSEN. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the dissolution of the Union and Norway was not yet armed for defence.

The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences “that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present constitution”. This time the Conservatives stepped into the breach on behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet STANG opposed a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King’s opposition, Sweden’s and the King’s of Sweden, not the King’s of the United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union. It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the disloyalty of the Radicals to the Union was entirely ignored. The Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the country.

In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of her defence which of late years she has neglected.

The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected a couple of year’s truce; any real results were not to be expected. The Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance, the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union[18:1]. In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded, that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service[18:2].

The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time, they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of State, Dr. SIGURD IBSEN, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. LAGERHEIM, made a proposal, the consequences of which brought about the present crisis.

III.

His Excellency Mr. LAGERHEIM’S proposal implied an attempt to settle the Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this, he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent the old attempts on Norway’s side “to take matters into her own hands”, to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.

In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt. The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom and independence[19:1]. It was certainly on that account that their courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been acceptable.

But Mr LAGERHEIM’S experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable difficulties through which to pilot its way.

In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since deviated in any way.

In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.

But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r IBSEN’S aforesaid inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day. “As to one’s rights, no one negotiates”. This has become well nigh the axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to one and all of her demands.

In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two Norwegian authorities,[21:1] who were to institute an examination as to how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present joint diplomatic representatives.

The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability[21:2] of the arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain circumstances and nothing more.

The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be an “anomaly”. The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it, nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration of the Minister for Foreign affairs.

The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving instructions directly to the different consuls; his ‘wishes’ were first to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian Consular Service would “duly value the importance of a loyal co-operation.”

It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any reference to them be made on Norway’s part without further notice, the Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee’s conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish side for the solution of the question[22:1].

Mr. BOSTROeM became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well known so-called Communique[23:1].

This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments themselves[23:2], but only by different members in each, and that the Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.

Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of Foreign administration, in other words, they plainly offered a general agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign affairs, but that the Norwegian negotiators refused this offer. On the Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were evidently determined not to give up their claim so unreasonable from a Union point of view to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.

With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be “not impossible” that under certain circumstances a system with different Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the most important advantage of the political agreement between the two countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the question on the following basis:

1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.

2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the authorities of both Kingdoms.

It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other. The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms[24:1].

When the Communique was issued, it was received with very great diversity of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held, contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give some enlightenment on the point.

In the first part of the Communique, which decribes the offer of the Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be altered or abolished without the consent of the Government powers of both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws “which cannot be altered by one of the parties”, the word ‘abolish’ does not occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission had any important significance. It was observed that Mr BOSTROeM, in the Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr BLEHR in the Norwegian Diet of the second.[25:1] In reality, the difference depended on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full contents were grasped. Mr HAGERUP acknowledged later that the expressions in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word ‘alter’, must necessarily include the conception of the word ‘abolish’. It was afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been significant only through the connection which may be found to exist between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the extent to which the laws were to be changeable.

The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in the matter.

In other words, was it the intention of the Communique to force Norway to a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?

In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove too binding, Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to be bound in any way His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that the laws will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to the regulation of foreign administration; or be reckoned as a proof that they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP, and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all negotiations.

Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communique? It is evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of the Communique must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of authority.

On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be assumed that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really, among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of foreign administration “into her own hands.” The great fear of such a contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communique by the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2], without an agreement with Sweden.

How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing could interpret the Communique as it did?

As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it is impossible to make any definite assertions.

The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the Communique did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs that demand could scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden and passed over the Swedish delegates’ plain intention to bind Norway to the execution of that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates’ intentions with regard to the wording of the Communique on that point, and the Norwegian governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange, especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War Minister STANG’S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his idea of the matter, the decisions in respect to the identical laws were scarcely in accordance with Mr BLEHR’S interpretation of the Communique.

Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact remains clear, that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the Norwegian interpretation of the Communique. This must be kept strictly in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to be obtained.

IV.

Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was supposed to characterise the Communique, its general contents roused no unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate, serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home) was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless referred to the resolution of 1893.

Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs. Meanwhile after the publication of the Communique, the Norwegian Radicals immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.

However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards negotiating, and even BJOeRNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable, impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r IBSEN as Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious attitude, a powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in no favourable direction.

In a joint Council held on 11th De, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the basis of the Communique. They were carried on slowly during the Spring 1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.

It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development, from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration within the Union.

The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained intact[30:1].

But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most remarkable way. In the Consular Committee’s deliberations, Norwegian opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an “anomaly”, in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.

From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere forms. The evasive talk of the “spirit” of constitutional law, and the administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold in view, was this, that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its branches.

The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.

Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter, under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul. Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.

This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a deficiency so much the more serious as the Act Se c allowed the Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.

Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause for declaring from the Swedish side, “that the proposition includes scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the Communique, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their office”, and was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the acknowledged principles of the Communique.

From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno, till the autumn.

During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In November His Excellency Mr BOSTROeM went to Christiania and presented his conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers, the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King, recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases, should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2].

After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP made a written statement of his objections.

In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance, though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee, emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy the déficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to international and common law principles, and declared that from a national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets that Mr BOSTROeM’S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not touch the Norwegian Consul’s normal position as being a Norwegian civil Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTROeM, would very seldom occur.

It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTROeM’S demand, that the King, on the Swedish Minister’s representations, should be empowered to dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway’s Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers, as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.

The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further, the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions, suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors, though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs of that State.

What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2]

It declares that it “stands to reason” that the Norwegian Consular Office would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more important points the unsuitability of a “hierarchal” relation between Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of the legislative binding nature intended by the Communique. Finally the Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions unacceptable, and adds, that “if they should be adhered to further discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless"[36:1]. Really a formal ultimatum!

Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government’s Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the liberal party’s side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try, if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jath 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend operations into departments that had previously been considered as belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian Cabinet, to the Consular Committee’s resolution that the Norwegian Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was met by the Norwegian Cabinet’s own admissions, that the Minister for Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the guarantees presupposed by the Communique that the Consuls shall not exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on Norway’s side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of that kind was not intended in the Communique, as it had nothing to do with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian Consular Office.

On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions of the Communique. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions, but their essential items must “be adhered to”. The Cabinet does not consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.

To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the reply, “that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further communication on the matter.”

V.

The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway, and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.

Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden. Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the European Press resounded with accusations against the Swedish government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.

Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?

The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally, therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum, did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side, that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of points of minor importance.

The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their lawful rights.

The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting concessions.

It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular office would not disloyally when the time was ripe for it be provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its original goal the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTROeM’S demands ought undoubtedly to be seen.

It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an expression for a suspicion of Norway’s implicit loyalty in conducting its own Consular affairs, it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it. And that the old Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of taking matters into their own hands.

But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators’ (especially Mr BOSTROeM’S) bringing about the breaking off of the negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word, had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest by late events. Their object to throw on Sweden the responsibility of plans that were designed to be executed in Norway was too transparent, but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its true light.

The most naïve accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communique to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communique naturally implying only a promise to try to come to a conclusion that would be satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however, typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is illustrated in one way by the Norwegian government’s peculiar way of practically commencing negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very amusing manner, by professor TRYGGER in a debate in the First Chamber of the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communique. “Norwegians”, he said, “are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their demands”.

Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the Communique[41:1]. It has evidently been privately expressed by the negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations, and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister HAGERUP when he announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded the terms of the Communique. But the Norwegian government failed to produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations.

What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the Communique that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish government’s evident plans to arrange a “hierarchal” relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself, undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the light of their relation to the whole matter.

Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communique confirms among other things that they shall “give guarantee that the Consuls do not exceed the proper limits of their occupation.” What guarantee? The Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object: “that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communique, as this had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the Communique mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised by the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors over the Consuls”.

If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct and it is difficult to find any other it is plain that the presupposition cited by the Norwegians only referred to normal conditions and that it did not exclude in exceptional cases as for instance, when Consular affairs were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office a hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish government, is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this interpretation by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a concession beyond the demands of the Communique. It had already been made before the Communique was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be included in the frame of the Communique. The so much-disputed claims of Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional conditions, especially in an disciplinary sense, and are therefore within the frame of the Communique.

In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets, before the Communique existed.

It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the Norwegian Storthing.

The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the Swedish Cabinet dated Ja:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had assumed that its proposition of the 28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be accepted by the Swedish Cabinet “it would find no support from admissions either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates.” Now, there were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the origin of the Communique, to the feigned conclusions of which the Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a “preliminary”, as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the origin of the Communique, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain. The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred, seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their agreeing. According to the authenticated assertion of the Swedish Cabinet with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his Excellency BOSTROeM brought forward casually several of the questions which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended laws were discussed only by special delegates from the two Cabinets[45:1].

Mr LAGERHEIM was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, “must be subjected to further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature”.

According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr BOSTROeM of breach of agreement[45:2].

With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the Communique and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the Communique to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communique it was not intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as the general decisions of the Communique, sensibly interpreted, were observed.

To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before the existence of the Communique, it was on account of the binding nature of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view, that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the laws, were succeeded by this, and there is strong reason to suppose that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of the laws, under the express supposition that safe guarantee would be granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communique, these to Sweden very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact too much from the Swedish delegate’s possible optimism respecting the prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points.

Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin air.

VI.

The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as extremely abnormal[47:1]. With the lack of consideration which in critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people’s part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the Consular question would rouse their passions

It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating that the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their fruit.

In these days much is said of “necessity” in the development of events. “Necessity”, it is said, “has been stronger than the wishes of individuals”. To those who in any degree believe in personal influence and personal responsibility, and not only the needs in the progress of history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to the front in Norway MICHELSEN, LOeVLAND, BERNER, ARCTANDER belong to the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of creating public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax.

The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken off[47:2]. And it is an indisputable fact that those men of action in Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid to rest.

That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place became manifest in innumerable ways. One symtom of this, was the systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of Swedish hatred and “national persecution”, which in Christiania were held in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a Norwegian ought to feel. The coarsest invectives were flung against the government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania. A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that the Swedish government’s claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as an insult to Norway, made themselves heard[48:1] in the beginning, but their voices were soon silenced in the tumultuons confusion that reigned. In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian opinion a tone of unreasonableness.

Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to express his hearty wishes, “that the two Kingdoms which could soon celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its two peoples”. To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making this speech[48:2].

A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins, that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway’s breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case, artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents Sweden and the Union King in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them.

In the Cabinet meeting held on Fe:th 1905[49:1] the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs, Count GYLDENSTOLPE, pointed out that the chief cause of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr HAGERUP shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr HAGERUP considered that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to continue, but by voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain “more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations”, in other words, prepare for the disssolution of the Union. In this way, said he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed it when he resigned in March.

A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was responsible for the Union, could never take the initiative in the matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms presented by Mr HAGERUP had certainly not been refused without further consideration[50:1].

But it soon appeared that Mr HAGERUP’S programme was not likely to be favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and therefore, when the State Secretaries MICHELSEN and SCHOeNING at the end of February protested against Mr HAGERUP’S proceeding, in sending in his resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached.

The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the matter in a document adressed to the President of the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing[50:2] He earnestly expresses his conviction that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was not the chief object for the dynasty, but it ought to be so to the two peoples concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union.

The persuasive tone of this document could not fail to make an effect, but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the document was of no “Constitutional importance”, and shrewdly trying to prove that the Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that manner[51:1].

Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans before the worked up excitement cooled down. Therfore the way of the negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to consent to a change of Ministry. Mr MICHELSEN, who was pointed out as the man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers, however, Mr MICHELSEN und Mr LOeVLAND, were rank radicals. In the beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into “their own hands”.

In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown Prince Regent on the matter.

On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the joint Cabinet[51:2] that the two governments should immediately open negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the continuance of the Union[52:1].

On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent’s proposal, the Prime Minister BOSTROeM, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the hands of State Secretary RAMSTEDT. The Crown Prince’s proposal was immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both Chambers of the Diet[52:2].

In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway, for the establisment of full equality within the Union, and that too in terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years back[52:3].

But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of which is solely accountable to the circumstance that on the part of Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially “given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the good relations existent between the two peoples”. The Norwegian government knows what means to employ to produce “these good relations”, namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated in the past. This accomplished, “that confidence, which is the mainspring of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate relations in a Union, will have revived”. Norway is thus always the injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might have or possibly could find cause for displeausure over Norwegian Union Policy[53:1].

In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned statements were carried[53:2]. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible, for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated imperatively to those who would believe it that it is not the object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final.

In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they had given the Crown Prince’s resolution[54:1]. The Diet deeply deplored the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince’s programme would lead eventually to more favourable results.

While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were heard hesitations.

Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway’s side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home, that Norway’s cause was a righteous one, all Europe saw that.

When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the Storthing presented their proposals.

This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the beginning of the 90’s the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile shown that a delay would occur which would under present circumstances be exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being that according to the Norwegian Constitution, a law shall be laid before the King immediately after the resolution passed by the Storthing. But there was an obstacle to this: the King’s right of veto! On the ground of the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill three successive times after it has been passed by the unaltered resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his assent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as 1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King pronouncing his veto was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be brought to a climax.

The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign affairs.

The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly unreasonable.

To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, to take a revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union, far more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the interests of Norway, and had denied Norway’s Sovereign rights; then he should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said ‘No’, “it cannot”, Mr NANSEN says, “be the result of Norwegian influence, but on account of Swedish pressure"[56:1]. Here we are met by the dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive piety towards the Union when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King has kept in view the Union, and all it implied on all sides, more faithfully than King OSCAR II.

They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto and then they cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden. This is the basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness of this is sufficiently evident.

The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania, especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be no doubt as to what was in the wind. NANSEN used big words about Norway, and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand persons, a memorial wreath was laid as on several previous years on a Colonel KREBS’ grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment!

These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to protest in words in actions no one dared to protest.

With a frankness evidently embarrassing to all present, Mr HAGERUP pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently found most acceptable, and in Norway’s real interest, he warned them as to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to these eventualities which might exceed both the Constitution and the Act of Union should be deferred till after the new elections, as the Constitution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few in the minority made known their different views, and among them the Shipowner JOeRGEN KNUDSEN openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons for dissolving the joint Consular Service.

But the issue was plain. After Mr HAGERUP’S proposal for an adjournment was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was passed unanimously.

Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters as to how king OSCAR would express himself, simply implied ignorance of the political situation in an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King’s reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of NANSEN[58:1] and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said, “would really refuse Norway her right” seemed rather unnatural.

On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in Stockholm[58:2]. To the Norwegian Cabinet’s appeal for sanction to the Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of the Union Se, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by treaty with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The Cabinet raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway’s loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King’s decree implied a violation of Norway’s independence and Sovereign right, and would undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon, sent in their resignations[58:3], which the King, meanwhile, refused to allow, as he had at present no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King maintained his right based on the Constitutional law, to exercise his veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circumstances, only quote the not altogether applicable opinion after full consideration of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847[58:4].

Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Constitutional law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was furthermore the Prime Minister’s undoubted duty to countersign his decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from constitutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King, meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not for the present “now” form a new Ministry.

This word ‘now’ in the King’s refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign, undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the beginning of 1890, when the Ministry on one or two occasions Radical had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their post till the King released them. For, according to the general constitutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves.

It is not Norway’s King who has transgressed the law, in spite of all the accusations to that effect from Norway’s government[59:1]. The law was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed the King that they resigned office[59:2].

Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their inability to be a party to the King’s policy, which according to their opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution, and declared themselves to be ‘free men’ entitled to the right to resign office[60:1]. King OSCAR immediately sent protestations against this proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the Premier[60:2]. But before these came to hand, the next act was played out.

On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their resignation[60:3]. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little word now categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion that the Constitutional Royal Power was “no longer effectual”, on which the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government, which, according to Constitutional law, was the King’s prerogative alone. The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further. King OSCAR having ceased to act as Norway’s King, the declaration followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved[60:4]. This was all communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to deliver to King OSCAR by a deputation[60:5]. The King of course replied that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary Storthing[60:6].

It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway. They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal[60:7]!

The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the Constitution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first paragraph of her Constitution, is bound.

The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden, or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the Constitution and the Act of Union must be carried out[61:1]. And this last resolution was carried in spite of the Constitutional prescription that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of the Constitution, are inseparably connected with this Union[61:2].

As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that country.

On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution. In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to meet in on Extraordinary session[61:3], the Prime Minister strongly emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing’s proceedings had deeply violated Sweden’s rights.

The following day, June 10th, King OSCAR issued his protest in an address to the Norwegian Storthing[62:1]. In clear and convincing terms the King maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to the Cabinet’s opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the capacity of the chief representative of the Union that he had considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the Union, and he finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden “if Norway’s attack on the existing Union should lead to its legal dissolution”.

The reply to this address of the King was an address[62:2] from the Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the ranks of Nations.

The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have received this compliment a little sooner, instead of the overwhelming mass of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different in all respects.

The document of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since, step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on this account, from Norway’s side they have tried to cast the blame on Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions?

In the Norwegian Government’s proposal of the 17:th April negotiations are firmly refused, before the Consular question has been settled. Therefore Norway has never proposed negotiations respecting the situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the Norwegian government’s wording of the presuppositions for an eventual negotiation. It should be carried on “on an entirely free basis with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any reservation or restriction whatever”, and among other matters, it was stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should be able to decide, of its own accord, “the future form of its national existence.” Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this method of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature threat to rupture the Union on Norway’s side, that the Swedish Prime Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on the Norwegian side “as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union.” The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account that he refused to negotiate.

But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents af the Prime Minister’s speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility for dissolving the Union[63:1]. Of all the cunning devices, the object of which has been, on Norway’s side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden, this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr HAGERUP’S proposal, and this was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April, when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto; the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time beforehand.

On the 20:th June the Diet assembled.

VII.

Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History even the history of Sweden records many revolutions, which are said to have been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on the grounds of its having been the extreme means of protecting most important interests.

In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway’s breaking out of the Union, and Sweden’s struggle for freedom from Denmark in the middle ages. Sweden’s way of using its power has been stamped as an intolerable oppression. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to the fact that Norway’s “struggle for freedom” has had for its object the enormously important cause their own consuls!

The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union; in everything else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality with that of Sweden. An Norway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that in the present day, when the want to prove an antithesis in Norway, they can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the Union the well known Bodoe affair in 1819-1821 an episode concerning which Norwegian investigations of recent date, have served to place Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years’ uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour of material and spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian assistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs a Norwegian has lately been in office. the posts at the Embassies at Foreign Courts, even the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians. Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers, which even if they did not accede to all Norway’s demands, would, if realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously held.

But it has been said on the Norwegian side and this has been brought forward as the main point Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a “free and independent Kingdom”. If by that, they mean that Norway has been denied equality in the Union, it is not true.

Sweden’s only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desire on the part of the Norwegians to be absolutly their own masters, that and nothing else. Norway has bragged about her prerogatives without any feeling of responsibility, like an unreasoning whimsical child. It must be declared, both on historical and psychological grounds, that it can never be politically defended. Norway must already have made the discovery that the great era of universal politics, is entitled, if ever, to political action under a strict sense of responsibility.

By this it is by no means our intention to deny that Sweden herself is to a certain extent to blame for things going as they have done. Looking back over the Union Policy of Sweden, it must, in the first place, be noticeable that there has been, to a certain extent, a lack of firmness and authority. And it cannot either be denied that there have been mistakes that have unnecessarily roused opposition. For instance, in the so-called Stadtholder question, in the sixties, Sweden’s policy was undoubtedly too harsh. But whatever faults may be laid at the door of the Union Policy of Sweden, when the Swedish nation in these days tries to make a searching self examination, opinions are not little likely to be unanimous because Sweden has been too conciliatory towards Norways’ demands.

It is said that a foreigner recently travelling in the Scandinavian countries made the observation that Swedes always spoke kindly of the Norwegians, and the Norwegians always spoke ill of the Swedes. The observation doubtless contains a good deal of truth. It is, at least, true that Swedish public opinion, at large, has been distinguished by kindliness both to Norway and its people, and that every honest effort to smooth discussions has had the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of the people of Sweden. Swedes have been very unwilling to listen to the prophets of evil who have pointed to the deficiencies and deformities of Norwegian policy, and prognosticated trouble. It is just on that account that indignation from one end of Sweden to the other is so much the more intense when the veil is so rudely torn aside, and Norwegian politics are shown in their true light, such as they are and have been. The revolutionary act of Norway has like a flash of lightning illuminated the past background of Norwegian politics, and exhibited to the people of Sweden all the unreasonableness, the craftiness and dishonesty which Sweden has had to put up with from Norway during the past decennials.

In this way, the memories of the history of the Union of the latest periods are revived with indignation among the people of Sweden. If the indignation is at times expressed in unnecessarily strong and ill-chosen terms, Norway has in truth no manner of right to complain.