30. When we speak of legislation
we have in view as a rule a state, wherein there is
a law-making power which acts without reference to
the consent of individual subjects. For even
if in a constitutional state an individual does anyhow
exercise so much influence upon legislation as comes
from voting at the election of members of parliament,
still he has no direct influence, and must submit
to a law that has been enacted whether he approves
of it or not. That is why it is asserted that
there cannot be any talk of legislation in the domain
of international law. And, in fact, that is so
if we adhere rigorously to the meaning of the concept
‘legislation’, as developed in the domain
of internal state life. The nature of the case
does not, however, demand so rigid an adherence as
this; legislation is really nothing more than the conscious
creation of law in contrast to the growth of law out
of custom. And it is an admitted fact that, side
by side with international law developed in this latter
way, there is an international law which the members
of the community of states have expressly created
by agreement. We might therefore quite well substitute
the term agreeing a law for the term decreeing
a law, but why introduce a new technical
term? This international ‘agreeing a law’
does consciously and intentionally create law, and
it is therefore a source of law. And provided
that we always bear in mind that this source of law
operates only through a quasi-legislative activity,
there is no obstacle to speaking, in a borrowed sense,
of international ‘legislation’. Nevertheless,
agreeable and apt as this term is, it must not lead
us to assimilate the internal legislation of a state
and international legislation save in the one respect
that in both law is made in a direct, conscious and
purposive manner, in contrast to law that originates
in custom.
31. International law of the
legislative kind existed before the law of the Hague
Peace Conferences; it issued from the conventions drawn
up from time to time at congresses and conferences.
It was a great step forward that the Congress of Vienna
was able, for the first time, to create general international
law by agreement, and that thereby general international
law of the legislative kind could come into existence
side by side with the customary law of nations.
But the nineteenth century introduced international
legislation only occasionally. If, as sketched
above, success attends the attempt to make the Hague
Peace Conferences a permanent institution, there would
be evolved for the society of states a legislative
organ corresponding to the parliaments of individual
states. A wide field opens thus for further international
legislative activity. Even if the time be not
ripe for a comprehensive codification of the whole
law of nations, there is nevertheless a series of matters
in need of international regulation; for example, extradition,
the so-called international private law and international
criminal law, acquisition and loss of nationality,
and a series of other matters, not to mention matters
of international administration. Matters which
are already governed by customary law might also be
brought within the domain of enacted law, and at the
same time could be put as regards details upon a surer
basis. I have in mind the law of ambassadors and
consuls, the law concerning the open sea and territorial
waters, the law about merchantmen and men-of-war in
foreign territorial waters, and more of this kind.
32. The peculiar character of
international legislation involves, however, difficulties
of all sorts.
There is, to begin with, the question
of language. Seeing that it is impossible to
employ all languages in the enactment of rules of
international law, an agreement must be made for adopting
some one language for these laws, in the same way
that French is used at the present time. But
the difficulty thence arising is not insuperable, and
is hardly greater than that which is encountered in
drafting a treaty between peoples whose speech belongs
to different families. It must, however, be a
rigid rule that in every case of doubt the text of
the law in its original language not that
of a translation into the languages of other countries is
authoritative.
33. There is, secondly, the difficulty
of contenting the opposite interests of the members
of the community of states. But this, too, is
in practice not insurmountable. Of course, where
there is such a brawling between these interests that
no agreement is possible, there can from the outset
be no talk of international legislation. This,
however, is not everywhere the case. On the contrary,
it is often and in different areas the case, that
the international interests of states make
themselves felt so urgently and so cogently that these
states are ready to sacrifice their particular interests
if only a reasonable compromise be open to them.
34. There is further the difficulty
of finding expression in adequate language for the
intention of the legislator. Even the internal
legislation of states suffers under this difficulty
in so far as the art of legislation is still very
clumsy and undeveloped. For international
legislation there is in addition the further difficulty
that different groups of peoples employ very different
methods in drafting their laws. If we were to
give to an Englishman, a Frenchman, and a German the
task of drafting a law upon the same topic, and if
they were provided with the point of view from which
the regulation of individual points was to proceed,
so that the intention of the draftsmen would be the
same, three very different drafts would nevertheless
emerge. The English draft would deal in the most
concrete manner possible with the situations to which
it meant to apply; it would adduce as many particular
cases as possible, and so would run the risk of forgetting
some series of cases altogether. The German draft
would be as abstract as is possible, and would entirely
disregard individual cases, except such as required
a special treatment; and so it would expose itself
to the danger that in practice cases would be brought
within the enactment which were outside the intention
of the legislator. The French draft would attach
more weight to principles than to individual points,
enunciating principles in a legislative manner and
leaving it to practice to construct out of these principles
the rule for the particular case. Now, seeing
that French is the language of international legislation,
and so in the editing of drafts at the Hague Conferences
the lion’s share will naturally fall to French
jurists attending the Conference, it will scarcely
be possible to prevent the French method of legislation
from obtaining great influence over international
legislation. But there is no need for this mode
of legislation to become dominant. The jurist
representatives of other states must see to it that
the French method is perfected by their own; the English
and the Germans must make it their business to bring
the drafts into a more concrete form, and to split
up principles into more abstract rules. In this
way, it may in time be possible by means of common
international labour to make essential advance in the
art of legislation.
35. But the difficulties inherent
in the legislative method must not be confused with
those which come from a careless employment of the
method; the latter must always be avoided, otherwise
we arrive at contradictions of interpretation, and
these are insuperable.
An example of such carelessness is
afforded by the incorporation at the second
Hague Conference of a new provision in the
former Article 23 of the ‘Regulations respecting
the laws of land warfare’. I am referring
to the provision added under the letter (h),
which runs as follows: [It is forbidden] ’to
declare extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in
a court of law, the rights and rights of action of
the nationals of the adverse party’.
36. From the German memorandum
on the second Peace Conference it is quite clear that
this additional rule, which was proposed by Germany
and adopted by the Conference, was directed to the
alteration of the rule, prevailing in several states,
whereby during a war the subjects of one belligerent
lose in the country of the other belligerent their
persona standi in judicio, and the like.
It is in this sense, then, that the addition has been
unanimously interpreted by German literature, with
the agreement of many foreign writers. The official
standpoint of England, on the contrary, is that Article
23 (h) has nothing whatever to do with the
municipal law of the belligerent countries. Article
23 (h), so the English Foreign Office explains,
forms a subdivision of Article 23, which itself comes
under the second section (headed ‘Hostilities’)
of the Regulations, and forbids a series of acts which
otherwise might be resorted to in the exercise of
hostilities by the members of the contending armies,
and by their commanding officers. That this interpretation
is the right one so it is further explained
by the English side is shown by the fact
that Article 1 of the Convention expressly says, with
reference to the ’Regulations respecting the
laws of land warfare’, that the contracting
parties shall issue to their armed land forces instructions
which shall be in conformity with the ‘Regulations
respecting the laws of land warfare’ annexed
to the Convention. It would therefore be the
duty of every contracting power to instruct the commanders
of its forces in an enemy’s country (among other
things) not ’to declare extinguished, suspended,
or unenforceable in a court of law, the rights and
rights of action of the nationals of the adverse party’.
37. This is also the opinion
of Davis, one of the American delegates to the second
Hague Conference; he gives the following explanation
with regard to Article 23 (h), in the third
edition of his Elements of International Law
(New York, 1908), :
In this article a number of acts are
described to which neither belligerent is permitted
to resort in the conduct of his military operations.
It was the well-understood purpose of the Convention
of 1899 to impose certain reasonable and wholesome
restrictions upon the authority of commanding
generals and their subordinates in the theatre
of belligerent activity. It is more than
probable that this humane and commendable purpose
would fail of accomplishment if a military commander
conceived it to be within his authority to suspend
or nullify their operation, or to regard their
application as a matter falling within his administrative
discretion. Especially is this true where
a military officer refuses to receive well-grounded
complaints, or declines to consider demands for
redress, in respect to the acts or conduct of
the troops under his command, from persons subject
to the jurisdiction of the enemy, who find themselves,
for the time being, in the territory which he holds
in military occupation. To provide against
such a contingency it was deemed wise to add
an appropriate declaratory clause to the prohibitions
of Article 23. The prohibition is included in
section (h).
38. If, from the fact that Davis
was an American delegate, we may conclude that he
represents the government view of the United States
of North America, we are confronted by the fact that
official England and America adopt an interpretation
of Article 23 (h) which is entirely at variance
with that of Germany, and it is quite impossible to
build a bridge of reconciliation between the two camps.
This regrettable fact has its origin simply in the
careless use of the legislative method. If the
German conception of Article 23 (h) be the correct
one, the lines of subsection (h) ought never
to have found a shelter in Article 23, for they have
not the slightest connexion with hostilities between
the contending forces. If, on the other hand,
the Anglo-American interpretation be the right one,
pains should have been taken to secure a wholly different
draft of the provision in question, for the present
wording is by no means transparently clear. The
protocols of the Conference (Actes, i, 101;
iii, 14, 103) are not sufficiently explicit on the
matter. The German delegate, Goeppert, did indeed
explain (cf. Actes, iii, 103) at the session
of the first subcommission of the Second Commission
on July 3, 1907, ’that this proposal is in the
direction of not limiting to corporeal goods the inviolability
of enemy property, and that it has in view the whole
domain of obligations with the object of forbidding
all legislative measures which, in time of war, would
deprive an enemy subject of the right to take proceedings
for the performance of a contract in the courts of
the adverse party’. But we shall scarcely
go wrong if we assume that the members of the Second
Commission, who were entrusted with the consideration
of the ‘Regulations respecting the laws of land
warfare’, had not sufficiently realized the
full meaning of the German proposal. It would
otherwise be quite unintelligible that the reporter
upon the German proposal could say (cf. Actes,
i, 101): ’This addition is deemed a very
happy attempt to bring out in clear language one of
the principles admitted in 1899’, for these
‘principles’ (concerning the immunity of
the private property of enemy subjects in land warfare)
have very little indeed to do with the question of
the persona standi in judicio of an enemy subject.
39. A difficulty of a special
kind besets international legislation, owing to the
fact that international rules cannot be created by
a majority vote, and that, when once in existence,
they cannot be repealed save by a unanimous resolution.
But when once we free ourselves from
the preconception that the equality of states makes
it improper for legislative conferences to adopt any
resolutions which are not unanimously supported, there
is nothing to prevent a substantial result being arrived
at even without unanimity. At this point the
difference between general and universal international
law furnishes a way out. Rules of universal international
law must certainly rest on unanimity. It is postulated
in the equality of states that no state can be bound
by any law to which it has not given its consent.
But there is naught to prevent a legislative conference
from framing rules of general international law for
those states which assent to it and leaving the dissentient
states out of consideration. If the inclusion
in a single convention of all the points under discussion
be avoided, and if the method, adopted at the second
Peace Conference, of dividing the topics of discussion
among as many smaller conventions as possible be followed,
it will always be found possible to secure the support
of the greater number of states for the regulation
of any given matter. In no long time thereafter
the dissentient states will give in their adherence
to these conventions, either in their existing or some
amended form. Attention will then be paid also
to the consolidation of several smaller laws in a
single more comprehensive statute. The nature
of the case and the conditions of international life
call for concessions without which no progress would
be practicable. The course of international legislation
hitherto shows unmistakably that the trodden path
is the right path. And it must be emphasized that
it is open to a state to assent to an act of international
legislation although some one or other provision thereof
be unacceptable to it. In such a case the assent
of the state in question is given with a reservation
as regards the particular article of the Act, so that
it is in no wise bound by that article. Numerous
instances of this could be adduced: thus, at
the Hague Conference of 1907 Germany withheld her
assent to some of the proposed rules of land war, and
England to certain articles in Conventions V and XIII.
40. So also, the difficulty is
not insuperable as regards the other point, namely,
that international enactments when once in existence
cannot be repealed or amended save by a unanimous resolution
of the participant states. Here, too, the analogy
between municipal and international legislation must
not be pushed too far. Municipal legislation
can at any time be annulled or altered by the sovereign
law-maker; but international legislation, for want
of a sovereign over sovereign states, is not open
to such treatment. Here there is a way out, which
was in fact adopted at the second Peace Conference,
and also at the Naval Conference of London, namely,
the enactment of laws so limited in duration to a
period of years, that at the expiry of the period
every participant state can withdraw. In this
way, for example, it was agreed that the law about
the International Prize Court and the Declaration
of London should only be in force for twelve years,
and that any of the powers which were parties thereto
might withdraw twelve months before the expiry of
that period, and that, if and as far as no withdrawal
ensued, these laws should from time to time be continued
in force automatically for a further period of six
years. This kind of international legislation,
with its time limit and the right of denunciation,
is to be recommended wherever more or less hazardous
legislative experiments are being made, or where interests
are at stake which in course of time are liable to
such an alteration as obliges states to insist on
the amendment or repeal of the previously made law.
For example, the International Prize Court as a whole,
and its composition, constitution, and procedure in
particular, form an unparalleled experiment.
But the fact that its institution is only to be agreed
on for a period of twelve years facilitates its general
acceptance, because of the possibility of either abrogating
it altogether, or of reforming it, should experience
show this to be necessary.
41. However this may be, one
point must be decisively emphasized, international
legislation can no longer be left to mere chance.
Apart from the Declaration of London and the Geneva
Convention, it has always hitherto been a more or
less happy chance which has controlled international
legislation. Of conscious legislative consideration
and deliberation, based on far-reaching, thoroughgoing
preparation, there is no trace. For example, the
Declaration of Paris of 1856 was but a by-product
of the Peace of Paris of the same year. So also
the legislation of the first Peace Conference was simply
due to the anxiety to accomplish something positive
which might conceal the fact that the proposed aim
of the Conference general disarmament, to
wit had in no wise been realized. At
the second Peace Conference we did indeed see individual
states appear with some well-prepared projects of
legislation, but the preparation was entirely one-sided
on the part of the states in question, and not general;
accordingly, the adoption, rejection, amendment, and
final shaping of these projects were also none the
less the result of chance. The second Peace Conference
itself took steps to prevent a repetition of this,
calling the attention of the powers in its Final Act
to the necessity of preparing the programme of the
future third Conference a sufficient time in advance
to ensure its deliberations being conducted with the
necessary authority and expedition:
In order to attain this object the
Conference considers that it would be very desirable
that, some two years before the probable date
of the meeting, a preparatory committee should be
charged by the Governments with the task of collecting
the various proposals to be submitted to the
Conference, of ascertaining what subjects are
ripe for embodiment in an international regulation,
and of preparing a programme which the Governments
should decide upon in sufficient time to enable it
to be carefully examined by each country.
42. In contrast to the rules
of the Peace Conferences, a really notable and exemplary
preparation took place in connexion with the Declaration
of London, and the befitting result was a law excellent
alike in matter and in form. England, the state
which summoned the Naval Conference of London, made
a collection of the topics which would arise, and
communicated it to the states attending the Conference
with the request that they would send in full statements
on the subjects mentioned. After the answers
to this request had come in they were collated with
regard to each of the points on which discussion would
arise, and bases de discussion were elaborated
which made a thorough examination of each point possible
at the Conference. By this means it was at once
made clear when the different states were in accord
and when not. The door to compromise was opened.
And apart from a few vexed questions an agreement
was in this way successfully reached with regard to
a comprehensive law resting at every point on exhaustive
deliberation.
43. This model method must be
the method of the future. If, as indicated in
Se above, Ar, a permanent commission for the
preparation of the Peace Conferences be successfully
inaugurated, it will be its task to make preliminary
preparations for the legislative activity of the Conferences
in the manner just sketched out, and chance will no
longer have the same part to play as heretofore.
International legislation will no longer produce anything
so full of gaps as the ’Regulations respecting
the laws of land warfare’, which leave essential
matters for instance, capitulations
and armistices without any adequate
regulation.
44. Of course, where the interests
of different states are still involved in some uncertainty,
or are in such antagonism that a complete agreement
is impossible, even the fullest preparation and most
painstaking deliberation will not procure a more satisfactory
treatment for many matters than that the legislation
which regulates them should be (so to say) only experimental
and intentionally incomplete and fragmentary in character.
Thus, for example, the Conventions about the conversion
of merchantmen into men-of-war and about the use of
mines in naval war can only be considered as legislative
experiments, regulating these matters merely temporarily
and in an incomplete and unsatisfactory manner.
But even conventions which designedly are full of lacunae
have their value. They embody all the same an
agreement upon some important parts of the respective
topics, and provide a regulation which in every case
is better than the chaos previously prevailing in the
areas in question. They also constitute a firm
nucleus round which either custom or future legislation
can develop further regulation.
45. But even if international
legislation attains the degree of success suggested,
there still remains another great difficulty which
must indirectly influence legislation itself, and
that is the interpretation of international statutes
once they have been enacted. It is notorious
that no generally received rule of the law of nations
exists for the interpretation of international treaties.
Grotius and his successors applied thereto the rules
of interpretation adopted in Roman law, but these
rules, despite their aptness, are not recognized as
international rules of construction. It can scarcely
be said, however, that insurmountable difficulties
have arisen hitherto out of this situation, for the
majority of treaties have been between two parties,
and the interpretation thereof is the affair of the
contracting parties exclusively, and can be ultimately
settled by arbitration. But in the case of general
or universal international enactments we have to deal
with conventions between a large number of states or
between all states, and the question, accordingly,
now becomes acute.
46. The difficulty of solving
this question is increased by the fact that jurists
of different nations are influenced by their national
idiosyncrasies in the interpretation of enactments,
and are dependent on the method of their school of
law. Here are contrarieties which must always
make themselves powerfully felt. The continental
turn of mind is abstract, the turn of the English
and American mind is concrete. Germans, French,
and Italians have learnt to apply the abstract rules
of codified law to concrete cases; in their abstract
mode of thought they believe in general principles
of law, and they work outwards from these. English
and Americans, on the contrary, learn their law from
decided cases ’law is that which
the courts recognize as a coactive rule’ is an
accepted and widely current definition of law in the
Anglo-American jurisprudence; they regard abstract
legal rules, which for the most part they do not understand,
with marked distrust; they work outwards from previously
decided cases and, when a new case arises, they always
look for the respects in which it is to be taken as
covered by previous cases; they turn away as far as
possible from general principles of law, and always
fasten on the characteristic features of the particular
case. If continental jurists may be said to adapt
their cases to the law, English and American jurists
may be said to adapt the law to their cases.
It is obvious that this difference of intellectual
attitude and of juristic training must exercise a
far-reaching influence on the interpretation and construction
of international enactments.
47. It is because of what has
just been explained that the rules for the interpretation
of domestic legislation are different with different
nations. For example, whilst in Germany and France
the judge avails himself more or less liberally of
the Materialien of a statute in order to
arrive at its meaning, the English judge limits himself
to the strict wording of the text, and utterly refuses
to listen to an argument based on the historical origin
of the statute. The English bench, sticking more
closely to the letter of the law, allows also an extensive
or restrictive interpretation thereof much more seldom
than the continental judiciary does.
48. A good illustration of the
factors under consideration was furnished by the movement
in England against the ratification of the Declaration
of London, and the discussion evoked thereby in the
press and in Parliament. It was asserted that
many rules of the Declaration were so indefinitely
framed as to lie open, castle and keep, to the arbitrary
inroads of a belligerent interpreter. And when
the advocates of ratification pointed to the official
’General Report presented to the Naval Conference
by its Drafting Committee’, which gave a satisfying
solution to the issues raised, the answer came that
neither a belligerent nor the International Prize
Court would be bound by the interpretation of the
Declaration contained in this General Report.
It was asserted that the ratification of the Declaration
would refer only to the text itself, and that the
General Report, not being thereby ratified, would
not be binding; only by express extension of the ratification
to the General Report could the latter bind.
Continental jurisprudence, if my conception
of it be correct, would stand shaking its head at
the whole of this discussion. It would ask how
there could be any talk of ratifying a report, ratification
having only to do with agreements. And as regards
the question of the binding character of the General
Report, there might indeed be some objection on the
Continent to the epithet ‘binding’, but,
on the other hand, there would be no doubt that the
interpretation of the Declaration given in the Report
must be accepted on all sides. The Report expressly
says:
We now reach the explanation of the
Declaration itself, on which we shall try, by
summarizing the reports already approved by the
Conference, to give an exact and uncontroversial commentary;
this, when it has become an official commentary by
receiving the approval of the Conference, would
be fit to serve as a guide to the different authorities administrative,
military, and judicial who may be called
on to apply it.
Seeing that the Conference unanimously
accepted the Report, there is expressed in it and
by it the real and true meaning of the individual
articles of the Declaration as the Conference itself
understood and intended it. Every attempt to
procure an inconsistent interpretation must come to
grief on this fact, and so the Report is in this sense
‘binding’. The ratification of a treaty
extends, of course, not only to the words themselves,
but also to their meaning, and if the Conference which
produces an agreement itself unanimously applies a
definite meaning to the words of the agreement, there
cannot remain any doubt that this is the meaning of
the verbal text. Nevertheless, the contrary was
maintained in England by a party of men of legal eminence,
and the explanation of this is only to be found in
the fact that these English lawyers were applying
to the interpretation of the Declaration the rules
which govern the interpretation of English statutes.
The only way to enable the English Government to ratify
the Declaration seems to be a statement by the Powers
at the time of ratification that the interpretation
of the Declaration expressed in the General Report
is accepted on all sides.
49. However this may be, the
illustration adduced is sufficient proof that the
interpretation of international enactments creates
a difficulty of its own for international legislation.
International legislators must bring even greater
solicitude than municipal legislators to the expression
of their real meaning in rigid terms. And this
aim can only be attained by the most assiduous preparation
and consideration of the contents of the enactment.
It would be best if these contents were published
and thereby submitted to expert discussion before they
were finally accepted at the Conferences. The
national jurisconsults of the participant states would
thus be enabled to criticize the proposals and to
indicate the points which especially need clearing
up. It might also be possible to consider the
enactment, by convention, of an international ordinance
containing a series of rules for the interpretation
and construction of all international statutes.
This much is sure, that the interpretation of international
statutes must be freer than that of municipal statutes,
and must therefore be directed rather to the spirit
of the law than to the meaning of the words used.
This is all the more requisite because French legal
language is foreign to most of the states concerned,
and because it is not to be expected that before ratification
they should obtain minute information about the meaning
of every single foreign word employed.