Under every poetry, it has been said, there lies a philosophy.  Rather, it may almost be said, every poetry is a philosophy.  The poet and the philosopher live in the same world and are interested in the same truths.  What is the nature of man and the world in which he lives, and what, in consequence, should be our conduct?  These are the great problems, the answers to which may take a religious, a poetical, a philosophical, or an artistic form.  The difference is that the poet has intuitions, while the philosopher gives demonstrations; that the thought which in one mind is converted into emotion, is in the other resolved into logic; and that a symbolic representation of the idea is substituted for a direct expression.  The normal relation is exhibited in the case of the anatomist and the sculptor.  The artist intuitively recognises the most perfect form; the man of science analyses the structural relations by which it is produced.  Though the two provinces are concentric, they are not coincident.  The reasoner is interested in many details which have no immediate significance for the man of feeling; and the poetic insight, on the other hand, is capable of recognising subtle harmonies and discords of which our crude instruments of weighing and measuring are incapable of revealing the secret.  But the connection is so close that the greatest works of either kind seem to have a double nature.  A philosophy may, like Spinoza’s, be apparelled in the most technical and abstruse panoply of logic, and yet the total impression may stimulate a religious sentiment as effectively as any poetic or theosophic mysticism.  Or a great imaginative work, like Shakespeare’s, may present us with the most vivid concrete symbols, and yet suggest, as forcibly as the formal demonstrations of a metaphysician, the idealist conviction that the visible and tangible world is a dream-woven tissue covering infinite and inscrutable mysteries.  In each case the highest intellectual faculty manifests itself in the vigour with which certain profound conceptions of the world and life have been grasped and assimilated.  In each case that man is greatest who soars habitually to the highest regions and gazes most steadily upon the widest horizons of time and space.  The logical consistency which frames all dogmas into a consistent whole, is but another aspect of the imaginative power which harmonises the strongest and subtlest emotions excited.

The task, indeed, of deducing the philosophy from the poetry, of inferring what a man thinks from what he feels, may at times perplex the acutest critic.  Nor, if it were satisfactorily accomplished, could we infer that the best philosopher is also the best poet.  Absolute incapacity for poetical expression may be combined with the highest philosophic power.  All that can safely be said is that a man’s thoughts, whether embodied in symbols or worked out in syllogisms, are more valuable in proportion as they indicate greater philosophical insight; and therefore that, ceteris paribus, that man is the greater poet whose imagination is most transfused with reason; who has the deepest truths to proclaim as well as the strongest feelings to utter.

Some theorists implicitly deny this principle by holding substantially that the poet’s function is simply the utterance of a particular mood, and that, if he utters it forcibly and delicately, we have no more to ask.  Even so, we should not admit that the thoughts suggested to a wise man by a prospect of death and eternity are of just equal value, if equally well expressed, with the thoughts suggested to a fool by the contemplation of a good dinner.  But, in practice, the utterance of emotions can hardly be dissociated from the assertion of principles.  Psychologists have shown, ever since the days of Berkeley, that when a man describes (as he thinks) a mere sensation, and says, for example, ’I see a house,’ he is really recording the result of a complex logical process.  A great painter and the dullest observer may have the same impressions of coloured blotches upon their retina.  The great man infers the true nature of the objects which produce his sensations, and can therefore represent the objects accurately.  The other sees only with his eyes, and can therefore represent nothing.  There is thus a logic implied even in the simplest observation, and one which can be tested by mathematical rules as distinctly as a proposition in geometry.

When we have to find a language for our emotions instead of our sensations, we generally express the result of an incomparably more complex set of intellectual operations.  The poet, in uttering his joy or sadness, often implies, in the very form of his language, a whole philosophy of life or of the universe.  The explanation is given at the end of Shakespeare’s familiar passage about the poet’s eye:

    Such tricks hath strong imagination,
    That, if it would but apprehend some joy,
    It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
    Or in the night, imagining some fear,
    How easy is a bush supposed a bear!

The apprehension of the passion, as Shakespeare logically says, is a comprehension of its cause.  The imagination reasons.  The bare faculty of sight involves thought and feeling.  The symbol which the fancy spontaneously constructs, implies a whole world of truth or error, of superstitious beliefs or sound philosophy.  The poetry holds a number of intellectual dogmas in solution; and it is precisely due to these general dogmas, which are true and important for us as well as for the poet, that his power over our sympathies is due.  If his philosophy has no power in it, his emotions lose their hold upon our minds, or interest us only as antiquarians and lovers of the picturesque.  But in the briefest poems of a true thinker we read the essence of the life-long reflections of a passionate and intellectual nature.  Fears and hopes common to all thoughtful men have been coined into a single phrase.  Even in cases where no definite conviction is expressed or even implied, and the poem is simply, like music, an indefinite utterance of a certain state of the emotions, we may discover an intellectual element.  The rational and the emotional nature have such intricate relations that one cannot exist in great richness and force without justifying an inference as to the other.  From a single phrase, as from a single gesture, we can often go far to divining the character of a man’s thoughts and feelings.  We know more of a man from five minutes’ talk than from pages of what is called ‘psychological analysis.’  From a passing expression on the face, itself the result of variations so minute as to defy all analysis, we instinctively frame judgments as to a man’s temperament and habitual modes of thought and conduct.  Indeed, such judgments, if erroneous, determine us only too exclusively in the most important relations of life.

Now the highest poetry is that which expresses the richest, most powerful, and most susceptible emotional nature, and the most versatile, penetrative, and subtle intellect.  Such qualities may be stamped upon trifling work.  The great artist can express his power within the limits of a coin or a gem.  The great poet will reveal his character through a sonnet or a song.  Shakespeare, or Milton, or Burns, or Wordsworth can express his whole mode of feeling within a few lines.  An ill-balanced nature reveals itself by a discord, as an illogical mind by a fallacy.  A man need not compose an epic on a system of philosophy to write himself down an ass.  And, inversely, a great mind and a noble nature may show itself by impalpable but recognisable signs within the ’sonnet’s scanty plot of ground.’  Once more, the highest poetry must be that which expresses not only the richest but the healthiest nature.  Disease means an absence or a want of balance of certain faculties, and therefore leads to false reasoning or emotional discord.  The defect of character betrays itself in some erroneous mode of thought or baseness of sentiment.  And since morality means obedience to those rules which are most essential to the spiritual health, vicious feeling indicates some morbid tendency, and is so far destructive of the poetical faculty.  An immoral sentiment is the sign either of a false judgment of the world and of human nature, or of a defect in the emotional nature which shows itself by a discord or an indecorum, and leads to a cynicism or indecency which offends the reason through the taste.  What is called immorality does not indeed always imply such defects.  Sound moral intuitions may be opposed to the narrow code prevalent at the time; or a protest against puritanical or ascetic perversions of the standard may hurry the poet into attacks upon true principles.  And, again, the keen sensibility which makes a man a poet, undoubtedly exposes him to certain types of disease.  He is more likely than his thick-skinned neighbour to be vexed by evil, and to be drawn into distorted views of life by an excess of sympathy or indignation.  Injudicious admirers prize the disease instead of the strength from which it springs; and value the cynicism or the despair instead of the contempt for heartless commonplace or the desire for better things with which it was unfortunately connected.  A strong moral sentiment has a great value, even when forced into an unnatural alliance.  Nay, even when it is, so to speak, inverted, it often receives a kind of paradoxical value from its efficacy against some opposite form of error.  It is only a complete absence of the moral faculty which is irredeemably bad.  The poet in whom it does not exist is condemned to the lower sphere, and can only deal with the deepest feelings on penalty of shocking us by indecency or profanity.  A man who can revel in ‘Epicurus’ stye’ without even the indirect homage to purity of remorse and bitterness, can do nothing but gratify our lowest passions.  They, perhaps, have their place, and the man who is content with such utterances may not be utterly worthless.  But to place him on a level with his betters is to confound every sound principle of criticism.

It follows that a kind of collateral test of poetical excellence may be found by extracting the philosophy from the poetry.  The test is, of course, inadequate.  A good philosopher may be an execrable poet.  Even stupidity is happily not inconsistent with sound doctrine, though inconsistent with a firm grasp of ultimate principles.  But the vigour with which a man grasps and assimilates a deep moral doctrine is a test of the degree in which he possesses one essential condition of the higher poetical excellence.  A continuous illustration of this principle is given in the poetry of Wordsworth, who, indeed, has expounded his ethical and philosophical views so explicitly, one would rather not say so ostentatiously, that great part of the work is done to our hands.  Nowhere is it easier to observe the mode in which poetry and philosophy spring from the same root and owe their excellence to the same intellectual powers.  So much has been said by the ablest critics of the purely poetical side of Wordsworth’s genius, that I may willingly renounce the difficult task of adding or repeating.  I gladly take for granted what is generally acknowledged that Wordsworth in his best moods reaches a greater height than any other modern Englishman.  The word ‘inspiration’ is less forced when applied to his loftiest poetry than when used of any of his contemporaries.  With defects too obvious to be mentioned, he can yet pierce furthest behind the veil; and embody most efficiently the thoughts and emotions which come to us in our most solemn and reflective moods.  Other poetry becomes trifling when we are making our inevitable passages through the Valley of the Shadow of Death.  Wordsworth’s alone retains its power.  We love him the more as we grow older and become more deeply impressed with the sadness and seriousness of life; we are apt to grow weary of his rivals when we have finally quitted the regions of youthful enchantment.  And I take the explanation to be that he is not merely a melodious writer, or a powerful utterer of deep emotion, but a true philosopher.  His poetry wears well because it has solid substance.  He is a prophet and a moralist, as well as a mere singer.  His ethical system, in particular, is as distinctive and capable of systematic exposition as that of Butler.  By endeavouring to state it in plain prose, we shall see how the poetical power implies a sensitiveness to ideas which, when extracted from the symbolical embodiment, fall spontaneously into a scientific system of thought.

There are two opposite types to which all moral systems tend.  They correspond to the two great intellectual families to which every man belongs by right of birth.  One class of minds is distinguished by its firm grasp of facts, by its reluctance to drop solid substance for the loveliest shadows, and by its preference of concrete truths to the most symmetrical of theories.  In ethical questions the tendency of such minds is to consider man as a being impelled by strong but unreasonable passions towards tangible objects.  He is a loving, hating, thirsting, hungering anything but a reasoning being.  As Swift a typical example of this intellectual temperament declared, man is not an animal rationale, but at most capax rationis.  At bottom, he is a machine worked by blind instincts.  Their tendency cannot be deduced by a priori reasoning, though reason may calculate the consequences of indulging them.  The passions are equally good, so far as equally pleasurable.  Virtue means that course of conduct which secures the maximum of pleasure.  Fine theories about abstract rights and correspondence to eternal truths are so many words.  They provide decent masks for our passions; they do not really govern them, or alter their nature, but they cover the ugly brutal selfishness of mankind, and soften the shock of conflicting interests.  Such a view has something in it congenial to the English love of reality and contempt for shams.  It may be represented by Swift or Mandeville in the last century; in poetry it corresponds to the theory attributed by some critics to Shakespeare; in a tranquil and reasoning mind it leads to the utilitarianism of Bentham; in a proud, passionate, and imaginative mind it manifests itself in such a poem as ‘Don Juan.’  Its strength is in its grasp of fact; its weakness, in its tendency to cynicism.  Opposed to this is the school which starts from abstract reason.  It prefers to dwell in the ideal world, where principles may be contemplated apart from the accidents which render them obscure to vulgar minds.  It seeks to deduce the moral code from eternal truths without seeking for a groundwork in the facts of experience.  If facts refuse to conform to theories, it proposes that facts should be summarily abolished.  Though the actual human being is, unfortunately, not always reasonable, it holds that pure reason must be in the long run the dominant force, and that it reveals the laws to which mankind will ultimately conform.  The revolutionary doctrine of the ‘rights of man’ expressed one form of this doctrine, and showed in the most striking way a strength and weakness, which are the converse of those exhibited by its antagonist.  It was strong as appealing to the loftier motives of justice and sympathy; and weak as defying the appeal to experience.  The most striking example in English literature is in Godwin’s ‘Political Justice.’  The existing social order is to be calmly abolished because founded upon blind prejudice; the constituent atoms called men are to be rearranged in an ideal order as in a mathematical diagram.  Shelley gives the translation of this theory into poetry.  The ‘Revolt of Islam’ or the ‘Prometheus Unbound,’ with all its unearthly beauty, wearies the imagination which tries to soar into the thin air of Shelley’s dreamworld; just as the intellect, trying to apply the abstract formulae of political metaphysics to any concrete problem, feels as though it were under an exhausted receiver.  In both cases we seem to have got entirely out of the region of real human passions and senses into a world, beautiful perhaps, but certainly impalpable.

The great aim of moral philosophy is to unite the disjoined element, to end the divorce between reason and experience, and to escape from the alternative of dealing with empty but symmetrical formulae or concrete and chaotic facts.  No hint can be given here as to the direction in which a final solution must be sought.  Whatever the true method, Wordsworth’s mode of conceiving the problem shows how powerfully he grasped the questions at issue.  If his doctrines are not systematically expounded, they all have a direct bearing upon the real difficulties involved.  They are stated so forcibly in his noblest poems that we might almost express a complete theory in his own language.  But, without seeking to make a collection of aphorisms from his poetry, we may indicate the cardinal points of his teaching.

The most characteristic of all his doctrines is that which is embodied in the great ode upon the ‘Intimations of Immortality.’  The doctrine itself the theory that the instincts of childhood testify to the pre-existence of the soul sounds fanciful enough; and Wordsworth took rather unnecessary pains to say that he did not hold it as a serious dogma.  We certainly need not ask whether it is reasonable or orthodox to believe that ‘our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting.’  The fact symbolised by the poetic fancy the glory and freshness of our childish instincts is equally noteworthy, whatever its cause.  Some modern reasoners would explain its significance by reference to a very different kind of pre-existence.  The instincts, they would say, are valuable, because they register the accumulated and inherited experience of past generations.  Wordsworth’s delight in wild scenery is regarded by them as due to the ’combination of states that were organised in the race during barbarous times, when its pleasurable activities were amongst the mountains, woods, and waters.’  In childhood we are most completely under the dominion of these inherited impulses.  The correlation between the organism and its medium is then most perfect, and hence the peculiar theme of childish communion with nature.

Wordsworth would have repudiated the doctrine with disgust.  He would have been ‘on the side of the angels.’  No memories of the savage and the monkey, but the reminiscences of the once-glorious soul could explain his emotions.  Yet there is this much in common between him and the men of science whom he denounced with too little discrimination.  The fact of the value of these primitive instincts is admitted, and admitted for the same purpose.  Man, it is agreed, is furnished with sentiments which cannot be explained as the result of his individual experience.  They may be intelligible, according to the evolutionist, when regarded as embodying the past experience of the race; or, according to Wordsworth, as implying a certain mysterious faculty imprinted upon the soul.  The scientific doctrine, whether sound or not, has modified the whole mode of approaching ethical problems; and Wordsworth, though with a very different purpose, gives a new emphasis to the facts, upon a recognition of which, according to some theorists, must be based the reconciliation of the great rival schools the intuitionists and the utilitarians.  The parallel may at first sight seem fanciful; and it would be too daring to claim for Wordsworth the discovery of the most remarkable phenomenon which modern psychology must take into account.  There is, however, a real connection between the two doctrines, though in one sense they are almost antithetical.  Meanwhile we observe that the same sensibility which gives poetical power is necessary to the scientific observer.  The magic of the ode, and of many other passages in Wordsworth’s poetry, is due to his recognition of this mysterious efficacy of our childish instincts.  He gives emphasis to one of the most striking facts of our spiritual experience, which had passed with little notice from professed psychologists.  He feels what they afterwards tried to explain.

The full meaning of the doctrine comes out as we study Wordsworth more thoroughly.  Other poets almost all poets have dwelt fondly upon recollections of childhood.  But not feeling so strongly, and therefore not expressing so forcibly, the peculiar character of the emotion, they have not derived the same lessons from their observation.  The Epicurean poets are content with Herrick’s simple moral

    Gather ye rosebuds while ye may

and with his simple explanation

    That age is best which is the first,
    When youth and blood are warmer.

Others more thoughtful look back upon the early days with the passionate regret of Byron’s verses: 

    There’s not a joy the world can give like that it takes away,
    When the glow of early thought declines in feeling’s dull decay;
    ’Tis not on youth’s smooth cheek the blush alone which fades so fast,
    But the tender bloom of heart is gone, ere youth itself be past.

Such painful longings for the ‘tender grace of a day that is dead’ are spontaneous and natural.  Every healthy mind feels the pang in proportion to the strength of its affections.  But it is also true that the regret resembles too often the maudlin meditation of a fast young man over his morning’s soda-water.  It implies, that is, a non-recognition of the higher uses to which the fading memories may still be put.  A different tone breathes in Shelley’s pathetic but rather hectic moralisings, and his lamentations over the departure of the ‘spirit of delight.’  Nowhere has it found more exquisite expression than in the marvellous ’Ode to the West Wind.’  These magical verses his best, as it seems to me describe the reflection of the poet’s own mind in the strange stir and commotion of a dying winter’s day.  They represent, we may say, the fitful melancholy which oppresses a noble spirit when it has recognised the difficulty of forcing facts into conformity with the ideal.  He still clings to the hope that his ‘dead thoughts’ may be driven over the universe,

    Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth.

But he bows before the inexorable fate which has cramped his energies: 

    A heavy weight of years has chained and bowed
    One too like thee; tameless and swift and proud.

Neither Byron nor Shelley can see any satisfactory solution, and therefore neither can reach a perfect harmony of feeling.  The world seems to them to be out of joint, because they have not known how to accept the inevitable, nor to conform to the discipline of facts.  And, therefore, however intense the emotion, and however exquisite its expression, we are left in a state of intellectual and emotional discontent.  Such utterances may suit us in youth, when we can afford to play with sorrow.  As we grow older we feel a certain emptiness in them.  A true man ought not to sit down and weep with an exhausted debauchee.  He cannot afford to confess himself beaten with the idealist who has discovered that Rome was not built in a day, nor revolutions made with rose-water.  He has to work as long as he has strength; to work in spite of, even by strength of, sorrow, disappointment, wounded vanity, and blunted sensibilities; and therefore he must search for some profounder solution for the dark riddle of life.

This solution it is Wordsworth’s chief aim to supply.  In the familiar verses which stand as a motto to his poems

    The child is father to the man,
    And I could wish my days to be
    Bound each to each by natural piety

the great problem of life, that is, as he conceives it, is to secure a continuity between the period at which we are guided by half-conscious instincts, and that in which a man is able to supply the place of these primitive impulses by reasoned convictions.  This is the thought which comes over and over again in his deepest poems, and round which all his teaching centred.  It supplies the great moral, for example, of the ‘Leech-gatherer:’ 

    My whole life I have lived in pleasant thought,
      As if life’s business were a summer mood: 
    As if all needful things would come unsought
      To genial faith still rich in genial good.

When his faith is tried by harsh experience, the leech-gatherer comes,

    Like a man from some far region sent
    To give me human strength by apt admonishment;

for he shows how the ‘genial faith’ may be converted into permanent strength by resolution and independence.  The verses most commonly quoted, such as

    We poets in our youth begin in gladness,
    But thereof come in the end despondency and sadness,

give the ordinary view of the sickly school.  Wordsworth’s aim is to supply an answer worthy not only of a poet, but a man.  The same sentiment again is expressed in the grand ‘Ode to Duty,’ where the

    Stern daughter of the voice of God

is invoked to supply that ‘genial sense of youth’ which has hitherto been a sufficient guidance; or in the majestic morality of the ’Happy Warrior;’ or in the noble verses on ‘Tintern Abbey;’ or, finally, in the great ode which gives most completely the whole theory of that process by which our early intuitions are to be transformed into settled principles of feeling and action.

Wordsworth’s philosophical theory, in short, depends upon the asserted identity between our childish instincts and our enlightened reason.  The doctrine of a state of pre-existence, as it appears in other writers as, for example, in the Cambridge Platonists was connected with an obsolete metaphysical system, and the doctrine exploded in its old form of innate ideas.  Wordsworth does not attribute any such preternatural character to the ‘blank misgivings’ and ’shadowy recollections’ of which he speaks.  They are invaluable data of our spiritual experience; but they do not entitle us to lay down dogmatic propositions independently of experience.  They are spontaneous products of a nature in harmony with the universe in which it is placed, and inestimable as a clear indication that such a harmony exists.  To interpret and regulate them belongs to the reasoning faculty and the higher imagination of later years.  If he does not quite distinguish between the province of reason and emotion the most difficult of philosophical problems he keeps clear of the cruder mysticism, because he does not seek to elicit any definite formulae from those admittedly vague forebodings which lie on the border-land between the two sides of our nature.  With his invariable sanity of mind, he more than once notices the difficulty of distinguishing between that which nature teaches us and the interpretations which we impose upon nature. He carefully refrains from pressing the inference too far.

The teaching, indeed, assumes that view of the universe which is implied in his pantheistic language.  The Divinity really reveals Himself in the lonely mountains and the starry heavens.  By contemplating them we are able to rise into that ‘blessed mood’ in which for a time the burden of the mystery is rolled off our souls, and we can ’see into the life of things.’  And here we must admit that Wordsworth is not entirely free from the weakness which generally besets thinkers of this tendency.  Like Shaftesbury in the previous century, who speaks of the universal harmony as emphatically though not as poetically as Wordsworth, he is tempted to adopt a too facile optimism.  He seems at times to have overlooked that dark side of nature which is recognised in theological doctrines of corruption, or in the scientific theories about the fierce struggle for existence.  Can we in fact say that these early instincts prove more than the happy constitution of the individual who feels them?  Is there not a teaching of nature very apt to suggest horror and despair rather than a complacent brooding over soothing thoughts?  Do not the mountains which Wordsworth loved so well, speak of decay and catastrophe in every line of their slopes?  Do they not suggest the helplessness and narrow limitations of man, as forcibly as his possible exaltation?  The awe which they strike into our souls has its terrible as well as its amiable side; and in moods of depression the darker aspect becomes more conspicuous than the brighter.  Nay, if we admit that we have instincts which are the very substance of all that afterwards becomes ennobling, have we not also instincts which suggest a close alliance with the brutes?  If the child amidst his newborn blisses suggests a heavenly origin, does he not also show sensual and cruel instincts which imply at least an admixture of baser elements?  If man is responsive to all natural influences, how is he to distinguish between the good and the bad, and, in short, to frame a conscience out of the vague instincts which contain the germs of all the possible developments of the future?

To say that Wordsworth has not given a complete answer to such difficulties, is to say that he has not explained the origin of evil.  It may be admitted, however, that he does to a certain extent show a narrowness of conception.  The voice of nature, as he says, resembles an echo; but we ‘unthinking creatures’ listen to ’voices of two different natures.’  We do not always distinguish between the echo of our lower passions and the ‘echoes from beyond the grave.’  Wordsworth sometimes fails to recognise the ambiguity of the oracle to which he appeals.  The ‘blessed mood’ in which we get rid of the burden of the world, is too easily confused with the mood in which we simply refuse to attend to it.  He finds lonely meditation so inspiring that he is too indifferent to the troubles of less self-sufficing or clear-sighted human beings.  The ambiguity makes itself felt in the sphere of morality.  The ethical doctrine that virtue consists in conformity to nature becomes ambiguous with him, as with all its advocates, when we ask for a precise definition of nature.  How are we to know which natural forces make for us and which fight against us?

The doctrine of the love of nature, generally regarded as Wordsworth’s great lesson to mankind, means, as interpreted by himself and others, a love of the wilder and grander objects of natural scenery; a passion for the ‘sounding cataract,’ the rock, the mountain, and the forest; a preference, therefore, of the country to the town, and of the simpler to the more complex forms of social life.  But what is the true value of this sentiment?  The unfortunate Solitary in the ‘Excursion’ is beset by three Wordsworths; for the Wanderer and the Pastor are little more (as Wordsworth indeed intimates) than reflections of himself, seen in different mirrors.  The Solitary represents the anti-social lessons to be derived from communion with nature.  He has become a misanthrope, and has learnt from ‘Candide’ the lesson that we clearly do not live in the best of all possible worlds.  Instead of learning the true lesson from nature by penetrating its deeper meanings, he manages to feed

    Pity and scorn and melancholy pride

by accidental and fanciful analogies, and sees in rock pyramids or obelisks a rude mockery of human toils.  To confute this sentiment, to upset ‘Candide,’

    This dull product of a scoffer’s pen,

is the purpose of the lofty poetry and versified prose of the long dialogues which ensue.  That Wordsworth should call Voltaire dull is a curious example of the proverbial blindness of controversialists; but the moral may be equally good.  It is given most pithily in the lines

    We live by admiration, hope, and love;
    And even as these are well and wisely fused,
    The dignity of being we ascend.

‘But what is Error?’ continues the preacher; and the Solitary replies by saying, ‘somewhat haughtily,’ that love, admiration, and hope are ’mad fancy’s favourite vassals.’  The distinction between fancy and imagination is, in brief, that fancy deals with the superficial resemblances, and imagination with the deeper truths which underlie them.  The purpose, then, of the ‘Excursion,’ and of Wordsworth’s poetry in general, is to show how the higher faculty reveals a harmony which we overlook when, with the Solitary, we

    Skim along the surfaces of things.

The rightly prepared mind can recognise the divine harmony which underlies all apparent disorder.  The universe is to its perceptions like the shell whose murmur in a child’s ear seems to express a mysterious union with the sea.  But the mind must be rightly prepared.  Everything depends upon the point of view.  One man, as he says in an elaborate figure, looking upon a series of ridges in spring from their northern side, sees a waste of snow, and from the south a continuous expanse of green.  That view, we must take it, is the right one which is illuminated by the ‘ray divine.’  But we must train our eyes to recognise its splendour; and the final answer to the Solitary is therefore embodied in a series of narratives, showing by example how our spiritual vision may be purified or obscured.  Our philosophy must be finally based, not upon abstract speculation and metaphysical arguments, but on the diffused consciousness of the healthy mind.  As Butler sees the universe by the light of conscience, Wordsworth sees it through the wider emotions of awe, reverence, and love, produced in a sound nature.

The pantheistic conception, in short, leads to an unsatisfactory optimism in the general view of nature, and to an equal tolerance of all passions as equally ‘natural.’  To escape from this difficulty we must establish some more discriminative mode of interpreting nature.  Man is the instrument played upon by all impulses, good or bad.  The music which results may be harmonious or discordant.  When the instrument is in tune, the music will be perfect; but when is it in tune, and how are we to know that it is in tune?  That problem once solved, we can tell which are the authentic utterances and which are the accidental discords.  And by solving it, or by saying what is the right constitution of human beings, we shall discover which is the true philosophy of the universe, and what are the dictates of a sound moral sense.  Wordsworth implicitly answers the question by explaining, in his favourite phrase, how we are to build up our moral being.

The voice of nature speaks at first in vague emotions, scarcely distinguishable from mere animal buoyancy.  The boy, hooting in mimicry of the owls, receives in his heart the voice of mountain torrents and the solemn imagery of rocks, and woods, and stars.  The sportive girl is unconsciously moulded into stateliness and grace by the floating clouds, the bending willow, and even by silent sympathy with the motions of the storm.  Nobody has ever shown, with such exquisite power as Wordsworth, how much of the charm of natural objects in later life is due to early associations, thus formed in a mind not yet capable of contemplating its own processes.  As old Matthew says in the lines which, however familiar, can never be read without emotion

    My eyes are dim with childish tears,
      My heart is idly stirred;
    For the same sound is in my ears
      Which in those days I heard.

And the strangely beautiful address to the cuckoo might be made into a text for a prolonged commentary by an aesthetic philosopher upon the power of early association.  It curiously illustrates, for example, the reason of Wordsworth’s delight in recalling sounds.  The croak of the distant raven, the bleat of the mountain lamb, the splash of the leaping fish in the lonely tarn, are specially delightful to him, because the hearing is the most spiritual of our senses; and these sounds, like the cuckoo’s cry, seem to convert the earth into an ’unsubstantial fairy place.’  The phrase ‘association’ indeed implies a certain arbitrariness in the images suggested, which is not quite in accordance with Wordsworth’s feeling.  Though the echo depends partly upon the hearer, the mountain voices are specially adapted for certain moods.  They have, we may say, a spontaneous affinity for the nobler affections.  If some early passage in our childhood is associated with a particular spot, a house or a street will bring back the petty and accidental details:  a mountain or a lake will revive the deeper and more permanent elements of feeling.  If you have made love in a palace, according to Mr. Disraeli’s prescription, the sight of it will recall the splendour of the object’s dress or jewellery; if, as Wordsworth would prefer, with a background of mountains, it will appear in later days as if they had absorbed, and were always ready again to radiate forth, the tender and hallowing influences which then for the first time entered your life.  The elementary and deepest passions are most easily associated with the sublime and beautiful in nature.

    The primal duties shine aloft like stars;
    The charities that soothe, and heal, and bless,
    Are scattered at the feet of man like flowers.

And, therefore, if you have been happy enough to take delight in these natural and universal objects in the early days, when the most permanent associations are formed, the sight of them in later days will bring back by pre-ordained and divine symbolism whatever was most ennobling in your early feelings.  The vulgarising associations will drop off of themselves, and what was pure and lofty will remain.

From this natural law follows another of Wordsworth’s favourite precepts.  The mountains are not with him a symbol of anti-social feelings.  On the contrary, they are in their proper place as the background of the simple domestic affections.  He loves his native hills, not in the Byronic fashion, as a savage wilderness, but as the appropriate framework in which a healthy social order can permanently maintain itself.  That, for example, is, as he tells us, the thought which inspired the ‘Brothers,’ a poem which excels all modern idylls in weight of meaning and depth of feeling, by virtue of the idea thus embodied.  The retired valley of Ennerdale, with its grand background of hills, precipitous enough to be fairly called mountains, forces the two lads into closer affection.  Shut in by these ‘enormous barriers,’ and undistracted by the ebb and flow of the outside world, the mutual love becomes concentrated.  A tie like that of family blood is involuntarily imposed upon the little community of dalesmen.  The image of sheep-tracks and shepherds clad in country grey is stamped upon the elder brother’s mind, and comes back to him in tropical calms; he hears the tones of his waterfalls in the piping shrouds; and when he returns, recognises every fresh scar made by winter storms on the mountain sides, and knows by sight every unmarked grave in the little churchyard.  The fraternal affection sanctifies the scenery, and the sight of the scenery brings back the affection with overpowering force upon his return.  This is everywhere the sentiment inspired in Wordsworth by his beloved hills.  It is not so much the love of nature pure and simple, as of nature seen through the deepest human feelings.  The light glimmering in a lonely cottage, the one rude house in the deep valley, with its ’small lot of life-supporting fields and guardian rocks,’ are necessary to point the moral and to draw to a definite focus the various forces of sentiment.  The two veins of feeling are inseparably blended.  The peasant noble, in the ‘Song at the Feast of Brougham Castle,’ learns equally from men and nature:

    Love had he found in huts where poor men lie;
      His daily teachers had been woods and hills,
    The silence that is in the starry skies,
      The sleep that is among the lonely hills.

Without the love, the silence and the sleep would have had no spiritual meaning.  They are valuable as giving intensity and solemnity to the positive emotion.

The same remark is to be made upon Wordsworth’s favourite teaching of the advantages of the contemplative life.  He is fond of enforcing the doctrine of the familiar lines, that we can feed our minds ’in a wise passiveness,’ and that

    One impulse from the vernal wood
      Can teach you more of man,
    Of moral evil and of good,
      Than all the sages can.

And, according to some commentators, this would seem to express the doctrine that the ultimate end of life is the cultivation of tender emotions without reference to action.  The doctrine, thus absolutely stated, would be immoral and illogical.  To recommend contemplation in preference to action is like preferring sleeping to waking; or saying, as a full expression of the truth, that silence is golden and speech silvern.  Like that familiar phrase, Wordsworth’s teaching is not to be interpreted literally.  The essence of such maxims is to be one-sided.  They are paradoxical in order to be emphatic.  To have seasons of contemplation, of withdrawal from the world and from books, of calm surrendering of ourselves to the influences of nature, is a practice commended in one form or other by all moral teachers.  It is a sanitary rule, resting upon obvious principles.  The mind which is always occupied in a multiplicity of small observations, or the regulation of practical details, loses the power of seeing general principles and of associating all objects with the central emotions of ‘admiration, hope, and love.’  The philosophic mind is that which habitually sees the general in the particular, and finds food for the deepest thought in the simplest objects.  It requires, therefore, periods of repose, in which the fragmentary and complex atoms of distracted feeling which make up the incessant whirl of daily life may have time to crystallise round the central thoughts.  But it must feed in order to assimilate; and each process implies the other as its correlative.  A constant interest, therefore, in the joys and sorrows of our neighbours is as essential as quiet, self-centred rumination.  It is when the eye ’has kept watch o’er man’s mortality,’ and by virtue of the tender sympathies of ’the human heart by which we live,’ that to us

The meanest flower which blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.

The solitude which implies severance from natural sympathies and affections is poisonous.  The happiness of the heart which lives alone,

Housed in a dream, an outcast from the kind,

Is to be pitied, for ’tis surely blind.

Wordsworth’s meditations upon flowers or animal life are impressive because they have been touched by this constant sympathy.  The sermon is always in his mind, and therefore every stone may serve for a text.  His contemplation enables him to see the pathetic side of the small pains and pleasures which we are generally in too great a hurry to notice.  There are times, of course, when this moralising tendency leads him to the regions of the namby-pamby or sheer prosaic platitude.  On the other hand, no one approaches him in the power of touching some rich chord of feeling by help of the pettiest incident.  The old man going to the fox-hunt with a tear on his cheek, and saying to himself,

    The key I must take, for my Helen is dead;

or the mother carrying home her dead sailor’s bird; the village schoolmaster, in whom a rift in the clouds revives the memory of his little daughter; the old huntsman unable to cut through the stump of rotten wood touch our hearts at once and for ever.  The secret is given in the rather prosaic apology for not relating a tale about poor Simon Lee: 

    O reader! had you in your mind
      Such stores as silent thought can bring,
    O gentle reader! you would find
      A tale in everything.

The value of silent thought is so to cultivate the primitive emotions that they may flow spontaneously upon every common incident, and that every familiar object becomes symbolic of them.  It is a familiar remark that a philosopher or man of science who has devoted himself to meditation upon some principle or law of nature, is always finding new illustrations in the most unexpected quarters.  He cannot take up a novel or walk across the street without hitting upon appropriate instances.  Wordsworth would apply the principle to the building up of our ’moral being.’  Admiration, hope, and love should be so constantly in our thoughts, that innumerable sights and sounds which are meaningless to the world should become to us a language incessantly suggestive of the deepest topics of thought.

This explains his dislike to science, as he understood the word, and his denunciations of the ‘world.’  The man of science is one who cuts up nature into fragments, and not only neglects their possible significance for our higher feelings, but refrains on principle from taking it into account.  The primrose suggests to him some new device in classification, and he would be worried by the suggestion of any spiritual significance as an annoying distraction.  Viewing all objects ’in disconnection, dead and spiritless,’ we are thus really waging

    An impious warfare with the very life
    Of our own souls.

We are putting the letter in place of the spirit, and dealing with nature as a mere grammarian deals with a poem.  When we have learnt to associate every object with some lesson

    Of human suffering or of human joy;

when we have thus obtained the ‘glorious habit,’

        By which sense is made
    Subservient still to moral purposes,
    Auxiliar to divine;

the ‘dull eye’ of science will light up; for, in observing natural processes, it will carry with it an incessant reference to the spiritual processes to which they are allied.  Science, in short, requires to be brought into intimate connection with morality and religion.  If we are forced for our immediate purpose to pursue truth for itself, regardless of consequences, we must remember all the more carefully that truth is a whole, and that fragmentary bits of knowledge become valuable as they are incorporated into a general system.  The tendency of modern times to specialism brings with it a characteristic danger.  It requires to be supplemented by a correlative process of integration.  We must study details to increase our knowledge; we must accustom ourselves to look at the detail in the light of the general principles in order to make it fruitful.

The influence of that world which ‘is too much with us late and soon’ is of the same kind.  The man of science loves barren facts for their own sake.  The man of the world becomes devoted to some petty pursuit without reference to ultimate ends.  He becomes a slave to money, or power, or praise, without caring for their effect upon his moral character.  As social organisation becomes more complete, the social unit becomes a mere fragment instead of being a complete whole in himself.  Man becomes

    The senseless member of a vast machine,
    Serving as doth a spindle or a wheel.

The division of labour, celebrated with such enthusiasm by Adam Smith, tends to crush all real life out of its victims.  The soul of the political economist may rejoice when he sees a human being devoting his whole faculties to the performance of one subsidiary operation in the manufacture of a pin.  The poet and the moralist must notice with anxiety the contrast between the old-fashioned peasant who, if he discharged each particular function clumsily, discharged at least many functions, and found exercise for all the intellectual and moral faculties of his nature, and the modern artisan doomed to the incessant repetition of one petty set of muscular expansions and contractions, and whose soul, if he has one, is therefore rather an encumbrance than otherwise.  This is the evil which is constantly before Wordsworth’s eyes, as it has certainly not become less prominent since his time.  The danger of crushing the individual is a serious one according to his view; not because it implies the neglect of some abstract political rights, but from the impoverishment of character which is implied in the process.  Give every man a vote, and abolish all interference with each man’s private tastes, and the danger may still be as great as ever.  The tendency to ’differentiation’ as we call it in modern phraseology the social pulverisation, the lowering and narrowing of the individual’s sphere of action and feeling to the pettiest details, depends upon processes underlying all political changes.  It cannot, therefore, be cured by any nostrum of constitution-mongers, or by the negative remedy of removing old barriers.  It requires to be met by profounder moral and religious teaching.  Men must be taught what is the really valuable part of their natures, and what is the purest happiness to be extracted from life, as well as allowed to gratify fully their own tastes; for who can say that men encouraged by all their surroundings and appeals to the most obvious motives to turn themselves into machines, will not deliberately choose to be machines?  Many powerful thinkers have illustrated Wordsworth’s doctrine more elaborately, but nobody has gone more decisively to the root of the matter.

One other side of Wordsworth’s teaching is still more significant and original.  Our vague instincts are consolidated into reason by meditation, sympathy with our fellows, communion with nature, and a constant devotion to ‘high endeavours.’  If life run smoothly, the transformation may be easy, and our primitive optimism turn imperceptibly into general complacency.  The trial comes when we make personal acquaintance with sorrow, and our early buoyancy begins to fail.  We are tempted to become querulous or to lap ourselves in indifference.  Most poets are content to bewail our lot melodiously, and admit that there is no remedy unless a remedy be found in ’the luxury of grief.’  Prosaic people become selfish, though not sentimental.  They laugh at their old illusions, and turn to the solid consolations of comfort.  Nothing is more melancholy than to study many biographies, and note not the failure of early promise, which may mean merely an aiming above the mark but the progressive deterioration of character which so often follows grief and disappointment.  If it be not true that most men grow worse as they grow old, it is surely true that few men pass through the world without being corrupted as much as purified.

Now Wordsworth’s favourite lesson is the possibility of turning grief and disappointment into account.  He teaches in many forms the necessity of ‘transmuting’ sorrow into strength.  One of the great evils is a lack of power,

An agonising sorrow to transmute.

The Happy Warrior is, above all, the man who in face of all human miseries can

                            Exercise a power
    Which is our human nature’s highest dower;
    Controls them, and subdues, transmutes, bereaves
    Of their bad influence, and their good receives;

who is made more compassionate by familiarity with sorrow, more placable by contest, purer by temptation, and more enduring by distress. It is owing to the constant presence of this thought, to his sensibility to the refining influence of sorrow, that Wordsworth is the only poet who will bear reading in times of distress.  Other poets mock us by an impossible optimism, or merely reflect the feelings which, however we may play with them in times of cheerfulness, have now become an intolerable burden.  Wordsworth suggests the single topic which, so far at least as this world is concerned, can really be called consolatory.  None of the ordinary commonplaces will serve, or serve at most as indications of human sympathy.  But there is some consolation in the thought that even death may bind the survivors closer, and leave as a legacy enduring motives to noble action.  It is easy to say this; but Wordsworth has the merit of feeling the truth in all its force, and expressing it by the most forcible images.  In one shape or another the sentiment is embodied in most of his really powerful poetry.  It is intended, for example, to be the moral of the ‘White Doe of Rylstone.’  There, as Wordsworth says, everything fails so far as its object is external and unsubstantial; everything succeeds so far as it is moral and spiritual.  Success grows out of failure; and the mode in which it grows is indicated by the lines which give the keynote of the poem.  Emily, the heroine, is to become a soul

    By force of sorrows high
    Uplifted to the purest sky
    Of undisturbed serenity.

The ‘White Doe’ is one of those poems which make many readers inclined to feel a certain tenderness for Jeffrey’s dogged insensibility; and I confess that I am not one of its warm admirers.  The sentiment seems to be unduly relaxed throughout; there is a want of sympathy with heroism of the rough and active type, which is, after all, at least as worthy of admiration as the more passive variety of the virtue; and the defect is made more palpable by the position of the chief actors.  These rough borderers, who recall William of Deloraine and Dandie Dinmont, are somehow out of their element when preaching the doctrines of quietism and submission to circumstances.  But, whatever our judgment of this particular embodiment of Wordsworth’s moral philosophy, the inculcation of the same lesson gives force to many of his finest poems.  It is enough to mention the ‘Leech-gatherer,’ the ‘Stanzas on Peele Castle,’ ‘Michael,’ and, as expressing the inverse view of the futility of idle grief, ‘Laodamia,’ where he has succeeded in combining his morality with more than his ordinary beauty of poetical form.  The teaching of all these poems falls in with the doctrine already set forth.  All moral teaching, I have sometimes fancied, might be summed up in the one formula, ‘Waste not.’  Every element of which our nature is composed may be said to be good in its proper place; and therefore every vicious habit springs out of the misapplication of forces which might be turned to account by judicious training.  The waste of sorrow is one of the most lamentable forms of waste.  Sorrow too often tends to produce bitterness or effeminacy of character.  But it may, if rightly used, serve only to detach us from the lower motives, and give sanctity to the higher.  That is what Wordsworth sees with unequalled clearness, and he therefore sees also the condition of profiting.  The mind in which the most valuable elements have been systematically strengthened by meditation, by association of deep thought with the most universal presences, by constant sympathy with the joys and sorrows of its fellows, will be prepared to convert sorrow into a medicine instead of a poison.  Sorrow is deteriorating so far as it is selfish.  The man who is occupied with his own interests makes grief an excuse for effeminate indulgence in self-pity.  He becomes weaker and more fretful.  The man who has learnt habitually to think of himself as part of a greater whole, whose conduct has been habitually directed to noble ends, is purified and strengthened by the spiritual convulsion.  His disappointment, or his loss of some beloved object, makes him more anxious to fix the bases of his happiness widely and deeply, and to be content with the consciousness of honest work, instead of looking for what is called success.

But I must not take to preaching in the place of Wordsworth.  The whole theory is most nobly summed up in the grand lines already noticed on the character of the Happy Warrior.  There Wordsworth has explained in the most forcible and direct language the mode in which a grand character can be formed; how youthful impulses may change into manly purpose; how pain and sorrow may be transmuted into new forces; how the mind may be fixed upon lofty purposes; how the domestic affections which give the truest happiness may also be the greatest source of strength to the man who is

    More brave for this, that he has much to lose;

and how, finally, he becomes indifferent to all petty ambition

    Finds comfort in himself and in his cause;
    And, while the mortal mist is gathering, draws
    His breath in confidence of Heaven’s applause. 
        This is the Happy Warrior, this is he
        Whom every man in arms should wish to be.

We may now see what ethical theory underlies Wordsworth’s teaching of the transformation of instinct into reason.  We must start from the postulate that there is in fact a Divine order in the universe; and that conformity to this order produces beauty as embodied in the external world, and is the condition of virtue as regulating our character.  It is by obedience to the ‘stern lawgiver,’ Duty, that flowers gain their fragrance, and that ‘the most ancient heavens’ preserve their freshness and strength.  But this postulate does not seek for justification in abstract metaphysical reasoning.  The ‘Intimations of Immortality’ are precisely imitations, not intellectual intuitions.  They are vague and emotional, not distinct and logical.  They are a feeling of harmony, not a perception of innate ideas.  And, on the other hand, our instincts are not a mere chaotic mass of passions, to be gratified without considering their place and function in a certain definite scheme.  They have been implanted by the Divine hand, and the harmony which we feel corresponds to a real order.  To justify them we must appeal to experience, but to experience interrogated by a certain definite procedure.  Acting upon the assumption that the Divine order exists, we shall come to recognise it, though we could not deduce it by an a priori method.

The instrument, in fact, finds itself originally tuned by its Maker, and may preserve its original condition by careful obedience to the stern teaching of life.  The buoyancy common to all youthful and healthy natures then changes into a deeper and more solemn mood.  The great primary emotions retain the original impulse, but increase their volume.  Grief and disappointment are transmuted into tenderness, sympathy, and endurance.  The reason, as it develops, regulates, without weakening, the primitive instincts.  All the greatest, and therefore most common, sights of nature are indelibly associated with ‘admiration, hope, and love;’ and all increase of knowledge and power is regarded as a means for furthering the gratification of our nobler emotions.  Under the opposite treatment, the character loses its freshness, and we regard the early happiness as an illusion.  The old emotions dry up at their source.  Grief produces fretfulness, misanthropy, or effeminacy.  Power is wasted on petty ends and frivolous excitement, and knowledge becomes barren and pedantic.  In this way the postulate justifies itself by producing the noblest type of character.  When the ‘moral being’ is thus built up, its instincts become its convictions, we recognise the true voice of nature, and distinguish it from the echo of our passions.  Thus we come to know how the Divine order and the laws by which the character is harmonised are the laws of morality.

To possible objections it might be answered by Wordsworth that this mode of assuming in order to prove is the normal method of philosophy.  ’You must love him,’ as he says of the poet,

                    Ere to you
    He will seem worthy of your love.

The doctrine corresponds to the crede ut intelligas of the divine; or to the philosophic theory that we must start from the knowledge already constructed within us by instincts which have not yet learnt to reason.  And, finally, if a persistent reasoner should ask why even admitting the facts the higher type should be preferred to the lower, Wordsworth may ask, Why is bodily health preferable to disease?  If a man likes weak lungs and a bad digestion, reason cannot convince him of his error.  The physician has done enough when he has pointed out the sanitary laws obedience to which generates strength, long life, and power of enjoyment.  The moralist is in the same position when he has shown how certain habits conduce to the development of a type superior to its rivals in all the faculties which imply permanent peace of mind and power of resisting the shocks of the world without disintegration.  Much undoubtedly remains to be said.  Wordsworth’s teaching, profound and admirable as it may be, has not the potency to silence the scepticism which has gathered strength since his day, and assailed fundamental or what to him seemed fundamental tenets of his system.  No one can yet say what transformation may pass upon the thoughts and emotions for which he found utterance in speaking of the Divinity and sanctity of nature.  Some people vehemently maintain that the words will be emptied of all meaning if the old theological conceptions to which he was so firmly attached should disappear with the development of new modes of thought.  Nature, as regarded by the light of modern science, will be the name of a cruel and wasteful, or at least of a purely neutral and indifferent power, or perhaps as merely an equivalent for the Unknowable, to which the conditions of our intellect prevent us from ever attaching any intelligible predicate.  Others would say that in whatever terms we choose to speak of the mysterious darkness which surrounds our little island of comparative light, the emotion generated in a thoughtful mind by the contemplation of the universe will remain unaltered or strengthen with clearer knowledge; and that we shall express ourselves in a new dialect without altering the essence of our thought.  The emotions to which Wordsworth has given utterance will remain, though the system in which he believed should sink into oblivion; as, indeed, all human systems have found different modes of symbolising the same fundamental feelings.  But it is enough vaguely to indicate considerations not here to be developed.

It only remains to be added once more that Wordsworth’s poetry derives its power from the same source as his philosophy.  It speaks to our strongest feelings because his speculation rests upon our deepest thoughts.  His singular capacity for investing all objects with a glow derived from early associations; his keen sympathy with natural and simple emotions; his sense of the sanctifying influences which can be extracted from sorrow, are of equal value to his power over our intellects and our imaginations.  His psychology, stated systematically, is rational; and, when expressed passionately, turns into poetry.  To be sensitive to the most important phenomena is the first step equally towards a poetical or a scientific exposition.  To see these truly is the condition of making the poetry harmonious and the philosophy logical.  And it is often difficult to say which power is most remarkable in Wordsworth.  It would be easy to illustrate the truth by other than moral topics.  His sonnet, noticed by De Quincey, in which he speaks of the abstracting power of darkness, and observes that as the hills pass into twilight we see the same sight as the ancient Britons, is impressive as it stands, but would be equally good as an illustration in a metaphysical treatise.  Again, the sonnet beginning

    With ships the sea was sprinkled far and wide,

is at once, as he has shown in a commentary of his own, an illustration of a curious psychological law of our tendency, that is, to introduce an arbitrary principle of order into a random collection of objects and, for the same reason, a striking embodiment of the corresponding mood of feeling.  The little poem called ’Stepping Westward’ is in the same way at once a delicate expression of a specific sentiment and an acute critical analysis of the subtle associations suggested by a single phrase.  But such illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely.  As he has himself said, there is scarcely one of his poems which does not call attention to some moral sentiment, or to a general principle or law of thought, of our intellectual constitution.

Finally, we might look at the reverse side of the picture, and endeavour to show how the narrow limits of Wordsworth’s power are connected with certain moral defects; with the want of quick sympathy which shows itself in his dramatic feebleness, and the austerity of character which caused him to lose his special gifts too early and become a rather commonplace defender of conservatism; and that curious diffidence (he assures us that it was ‘diffidence’) which induced him to write many thousand lines of blank verse entirely about himself.  But the task would be superfluous as well as ungrateful.  It was his aim, he tells us, ’to console the afflicted; to add sunshine to daylight by making the happy happier; to teach the young and the gracious of every age to see, to think, and therefore to become more actively and securely virtuous;’ and, high as was the aim he did much towards its accomplishment.