I. PHILIP BEAUCHAMP

The application of Mill’s Analysis to the views of orthodox theologians required, one might have supposed, as little interpretation as a slap in the face.  But a respectable philosopher may lay down what premises he pleases if he does not avowedly draw his conclusions.  Mill could argue in perfect safety against the foundations of theology, while Richard Carlile was being sent to gaol again and again for attacking the superstructure.  The Utilitarians thought themselves justified in taking advantage of the illogicality of mankind.  Whether it was that the ruling powers had no philosophical principles themselves, or that they did not see what inferences would follow, or that they thought that the average person was incapable of drawing inferences, they drew the line at this point.  You may openly maintain doctrines inconsistent with all theology, but you must not point out the inconsistency.  The Utilitarians contented themselves with sapping the fort instead of risking an open assault.  If its defenders were blind to the obvious consequences of the procedure, so much the better.  In private, there was obviously no want of plain speaking.  In Bentham’s MSS. the Christian religion is nicknamed ‘Jug’ as the short for ‘Juggernaut.’  He and his friends were as anxious as Voltaire to crush the ‘infamous,’ but they would do it by indirect means.  They argued resolutely for more freedom; and Samuel Bailey’s essay upon the formation of opinions a vigorous argument on behalf of the widest possible toleration was enthusiastically praised by James Mill in the Westminster Review.  For the present they carefully abstained from the direct avowal of obnoxious opinions, which were still legally punishable, and which would undoubtedly excite the strongest hostility.  Bentham, as we have seen, had ventured, though anonymously, to assail the church catechism and to cross-examine St. Paul.  One remarkable manifesto gave a fuller utterance to his opinions.  A book called The Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind, by ‘Philip Beauchamp,’ appeared in 1822.  The publisher was Richard Carlile, who was then ‘safe in Dorchester gaol.’  No legal notice was taken of ’Philip Beauchamp.’  The reason may have been that the book excited very little attention in general.  Yet it is probably as forcible an attack as has often been written upon the popular theology.  The name of ’Philip Beauchamp’ covered a combination of Bentham and George Grote. The book, therefore, represents the view of representative Utilitarians of the first and third generation, and clearly expressed the real opinions of the whole party.  In his posthumous essays J. S. Mill speaks of it as the only explicit discussion known to him of the question of the utility, as distinguished from the question of the truth, of religion.  Obviously, it was desirable to apply the universal test to religious belief, and this very pithy and condensed statement shows the result.

A short summary may indicate the essence of the argument.  It is only necessary to observe that the phrase ‘natural religion’ is part of the disguise.  It enables the author to avoid an explicit attack upon revelation; but it is superabundantly obvious that the word ‘natural’ is superfluous.  Revelation is really a fiction, and all religions are ‘natural.’  A religion is called a ‘superstition,’ as ’Philip Beauchamp’ remarks at starting, when its results are thought to be bad; and allowed to be a religion only when they are thought to be good. That device covers the familiar fallacy of distinguishing between uses and abuses, and, upon that pretence, omitting to take bad consequences into account.  We must avoid it by defining religion and then tracing all the consequences, good or bad.  Religion is accordingly taken to mean the belief in the existence of ’an Almighty Being, by whom pains and pleasures will be dispensed to mankind during an infinite and future state of existence.’  The definition is already characteristic.  ‘Religion’ may be used in a far wider sense, corresponding to a philosophy of the universe, whether that philosophy does or does not include this particular doctrine.  But ‘Philip Beauchamp’s’ assumption is convenient because it gives a rational reasoning to the problem of utility.  Religion is taken to be something adventitious or superimposed upon other beliefs, and we can therefore intelligibly ask whether it does good or harm.  Taking this definition for granted, let us consider the results.

The first point is that we are of necessity in absolute ignorance as to a posthumous state.  Now, fear is from our earliest infancy the ‘never-failing companion and offspring of ignorance.’  Knowledge alone can rescue us from perpetual suffering, because all security depends upon knowledge.  Pain, moreover, is far more ‘pungent’ and distinct than pleasure.  ’Want and pain are natural; satisfaction and pleasure artificial and invented.’  Pain, therefore, as the strongest, will dictate our anticipations.  The hope of immortality is by the orthodox described as a blessing; but the truth, deducible from these principles of human nature and verified by experience, is that natural religion, instead of soothing apprehensions, adds fresh grounds of apprehension.  A revelation, as ‘Philip Beauchamp’ admits, might conceivably dispel our fears; but he would obviously say that the religion which is taken to be revealed gives a far more vivid picture of hell than of heaven. In the next place, it is ’obvious at first sight’ that natural religion can properly give ’no rule of guidance.’  It refers us to a region of ‘desperate and unfathomable’ darkness. But it nevertheless indirectly suggests a pernicious rule.  It rests entirely upon conjectures as to the character of the invisible Being who apportions pain or pleasure for inscrutable reasons.  Will this Being be expected to approve useful or pernicious conduct?  From men’s language we might suppose that he is thought to be purely benevolent.  Yet from their dogmas it would seem that he is a capricious tyrant.  How are we to explain the discrepancy?  The discrepancy is the infallible result of the circumstances already stated. The Deity has limitless power, and therefore is the natural object of our instinctive fears.  The character of the Deity is absolutely incomprehensible, and incomprehensibility in human affairs is identical with caprice and insanity. The ends and the means of the Deity are alike beyond our knowledge; and the extremes both of wisdom and of folly are equally unaccountable.  Now, we praise or blame human beings in order to affect their conduct towards us, to attract favours or repel injuries.  A tyrant possessed of unlimited power considers that by simple abstinence from injury he deserves boundless gratitude.  The weak will only dare to praise, and the strong will only blame.  The slave-owner never praises and the slave never blames, because one can use the lash while the other is subject to the lash.  If, then, we regard the invisible Being as a capricious despot, and, moreover, as a despot who knows every word we utter, we shall never speak of him without the highest eulogy, just because we attribute to him the most arbitrary tyranny.  Hence, the invisible despot will specially favour the priests whose lives are devoted to supporting his authority, and, next to priests, those who, by the practice of ceremonies painful or useless to themselves, show that their sole aim is to give him pleasure.  He will specially detest the atheists, and, next to atheists, all who venture to disregard his arbitrary laws.  A human judge may be benevolent, because he is responsible to the community.  They give and can take away his power.  But the invisible and irresponsible ruler will have no motives for benevolence, and approve conduct pernicious to men because it is the best proof of a complete subservience to himself. In spite of this, it has been generally asserted that religion supplies a motive, and the only adequate motive, to moral conduct.  But the decay of religion would leave the sources of pain and pleasure unchanged.  To say, then, that the conduct prescribed by religion would disappear if the religious motives were removed is virtually to admit that it produces no ‘temporal benefit.’  Otherwise, the motives for practising such conduct would not be affected.  In fact, morality is the same in all countries, though the injunctions of religion are various and contradictory.  If religion ordered only what is useful, it would coincide with human laws, and be at worst superfluous.  As a fact, it condemns the most harmless pleasures, such as the worst of human legislators have never sought to suppress.  People have become tolerant, that is, they have refused to enforce religious observances, precisely because they have seen that such observances cannot be represented as conducive to temporal happiness.

Duty, again, may be divided into duty to God and duty to man.  Our ‘duty to God’ is a ’deduction from the pleasures of the individual without at all benefiting the species.’  It must therefore be taken as a tax paid for the efficacy supposed to be communicated to the other branch the ’duty to man.’ Does religion, then, stimulate our obedience to the code of duty to man?  ‘Philip Beauchamp’ admits for once that, in certain cases, it ‘might possibly’ be useful.  It might affect ‘secret crimes,’ that is, crimes where the offender is undiscoverable.  That, however, is a trifle.  These cases, he thinks, would be ‘uncommonly rare’ under a well-conceived system.  The extent of evil in this life would therefore be trifling were superhuman inducements entirely effaced from the human bosom, and if ’human institutions were ameliorated according to the progress of philosophy.’ On the other hand, the imaginary punishments are singularly defective in the qualities upon which Bentham had insisted in human legislation.  They are remote and uncertain, and to make up for this are represented as boundless in intensity and durability.  For that reason, they precisely reverse the admitted principle that punishment should be so devised as to produce the greatest possible effect by the smallest infliction of pain.  Supernatural sanctions are supposed to maximise pain with a minimum of effect.  The fear of hell rarely produces any effect till a man is dying, and then inflicts great suffering, though it has been totally inefficient as a preventive at the time of temptation.  The influence of supernatural penalties is therefore in ’an inverse ratio to the demand for it.’ In reality, the efficacy of the sanctions is due to their dependence upon public opinion.  Our real motive for acting rightly is our desire for the praise of our fellows and our interest in their good conduct.  We conceal this motive even from ourselves, because we wish to have the credit of serving the Deity exclusively.  This is confirmed by the familiar instances of a conflict between public opinion and religious sanctions.  Duelling, fornication, and perjury are forbidden by the divine law, but the prohibition is ineffectual whenever the real sentiment of mankind is opposed to it.  The divine law is set aside as soon as it conflicts with the popular opinion.  In exceptional cases, indeed, the credit attached to unreasonable practices leads to fanaticism, asceticism, and even insanity; but superhuman terrors fail at once when they try to curb the action of genuine substantial motives.  Hence we must admit that they are useless in the case even of ‘secret crimes.’  Religion, in short, prescribes mischievous practices, becomes impotent except for the production of misery, and is really, though not avowedly, dependent on the popular sanction.

We can now classify the evils actually produced.  Religion injures individuals by prescribing useless and painful practices:  fasting, celibacy, voluntary self-torture, and so forth.  It suggests vague terrors which often drive the victim to insanity, and it causes remorse for harmless enjoyments. Religion injures society by creating antipathies against unbelievers, and in a less degree against heretics and nonconformists.  It perverts public opinion by making innocent actions blameable; by distorting the whole science of morality and sanctioning the heterogeneous dictates of a certain blind and unaccountable impulse called the ’moral instinct or conscience.’ Morality becomes a ’mere catalogue of reigning sentiments,’ because it has cast away the standard of utility.  A special aversion to improvement is generated, because whatever changes our conceptions of the ‘sequences of phenomena’ is supposed to break the divine ‘laws of nature.’  ‘Unnatural’ becomes a ‘self-justifying’ epithet forbidding any proposed change of conduct, which will counteract the ‘designs of God.’  Religion necessarily injures intellectual progress.  It disjoins belief from its only safe ground, experience.  The very basis, the belief in an inscrutable and arbitrary power, sanctions supernatural or ‘extra-experimental’ beliefs of all kinds.  You reject in the case of miracles all the tests applicable to ordinary instruction, and appeal to trial by ordeal instead of listening to witnesses.  Instead of taking the trouble to plough and sow, you expect to get a harvest by praying to an inscrutable Being.  You marry without means, because you hold that God never sends a child without sending food for it to eat.  Meanwhile you suborn ‘unwarranted belief’ by making belief a matter of reward and penalty.  It is made a duty to dwell upon the arguments upon one side without attending to those upon the other, and ’the weaker the evidence the greater the merit in believing.’ The temper is depraved not only by the antipathies generated, but by the ’fitful and intermittent character’ of the inducements to conduct.

The final result of all this is still more serious.  It is that religion, besides each separate mischief, ’subsidises a standing army for the perpetuation of all the rest.’ The priest gains power as a ‘wonder-worker,’ who knows how to propitiate the invisible Being, and has a direct interest in ‘depraving the intellect,’ cherishing superstition, surrounding himself with mysteries, representing the will of the Deity as arbitrary and capricious, and forming an organised ’array of human force and fraud.’ The priesthood sets up an infallible head, imposes upon the weak and dying, stimulates antipathy, forms the mass of ‘extra-experimental’ beliefs into the likeness of a science, and allies itself with the state.  Heresy becomes a crime.  The ruler helps the priests to raise a tax for their own comfort, while they repay him by suppressing all seditious opinions.  Thus is formed an unholy alliance between the authorities of ‘natural religion’ and the ‘sinister interests of the earth.’  The alliance is so complete that it is even more efficient than if it had been openly proclaimed.  ’Prostration and plunder of the community is indeed the common end of both’ (priests and rulers).  The only chance of dissension is about the ’partition of the spoil.’

The book is as characteristic of the Utilitarians in style as in spirit.  It is terse, vigorous reasoning, with no mere rhetorical flourishes.  The consequences of the leading principle are deduced without flinching and without reserve.  Had the authors given their names, they would no doubt have excited antipathies injurious to the propaganda of Utilitarianism.  They held, for that reason presumably, that they were not bound to point out the ultimate goal of their speculations.  No intelligent reader of their other writings could fail to see what that goal must be; but an ‘open secret’ is still for many purposes a real secret.  Whatever might be the suspicions of their antagonists, they could only be accused of a tendency.  The book amounts to an admission that the suspicions were well founded.  Utilitarianism, the Utilitarians clearly recognised, logically implied the rejection of all theology.  Religion on their understanding of the word must, like everything else, be tested by its utility, and it was shown to be either useless or absolutely pernicious.  The aim of the Utilitarians was, in brief, to be thoroughly scientific.  The man of science must be opposed to the belief in an inscrutable agent of boundless power, interfering at every point with the laws of nature, and a product of the fancy instead of the reason.  Such a conception, so far as accepted, makes all theory of human conduct impossible, suggests rules conflicting with the supreme rule of utility, and gives authority to every kind of delusion, imposture, and ’sinister interest.’

It would, I think, be difficult to mention a more vigorous discussion of the problem stated.  As anonymous, it could be ignored instead of answered; and probably such orthodox persons as read it assumed it to be a kind of reductio ad absurdum of the Utilitarian creed.  It might follow, they could admit, logically from the Utilitarian analysis of human nature, but it could only prove that the analysis was fundamentally wrong.  Yet its real significance is precisely its thorough applicability to the contemporary state of opinion.  Beauchamp’s definition coincides with Paley’s.  The coincidence was inevitable.  Utilitarians both in ethical and philosophical questions start from the same assumptions as Paley, and the Paley doctrine gave the pith of the dominant theology.  I have observed that the Scottish philosophers had abandoned the a priori argument, and laid the whole stress of their theological doctrine upon Paley’s argument from final causes.  The change of base was an inevitable consequence of their whole system.  They appealed to experience, to ‘Baconian’ methods, and to ‘inductive psychology.’  The theory of ‘intuitions,’ effective where it fell in with admitted beliefs, was idle against an atheist, who denied that he had the intuition.  The ‘final causes’ argument, however, rested upon common ground, and supplied a possible line of defence.  The existence of the Deity could perhaps be proved empirically, like the existence of the ‘watchmaker.’  Accordingly, this was the argument upon which reliance was really placed by the average theologian of the time.  Metaphysical or ontological reasoning had been discarded for plain common-sense.  The famous Bridgewater Treatises are the characteristic product of the period.  It had occurred to the earl of Bridgewater, who died in 1829, that L8000 from his estate might be judiciously spent in proving the existence of a benevolent creator.  The council of the Royal Society employed eight eminent men of science to carry out this design. They wrote some interesting manuals of popular science, interspersed with proper theological applications.  The arguments were sincere enough, though they now seem to overlook with singular blindness the answer which would be suggested by the ‘evolutionist.’  The logical result is, in any case, a purely empirical theology.  The religion which emerges is not a philosophy or theory of the world in general, but corresponds to a belief in certain matters of fact (or fiction).  The existence of the Deity is to be proved, like the existence of Cæsar, by special evidence.

The main results are obvious.  The logical base of the whole creed is ‘natural theology,’ and ‘natural theology’ is simply a branch of science, amenable to the ordinary scientific tests.  It is intended to prove the existence of an agent essential to the working of the machinery, as from the movements of a planet we infer the existence of a disturbing planet.  The argument from design, in this acceptation, is briefly mentioned by ‘Philip Beauchamp.’  It is, he argues, ’completely extra-experimental’; for experience only reveals design in living beings:  it supposes a pre-existing chaos which can never be shown to have existed, and the ‘omnipotent will’ introduced to explain the facts is really no explanation at all, but a collection of meaningless words. The argument is briefly dismissed as concerning the truth, not the utility, of religion, but one point is sufficiently indicated.  The argument from ‘design’ is always plausible, because it applies reasoning undeniably valid when it is applied within its proper sphere.  The inference from a watch to a watchmaker is clearly conclusive.  We know sufficiently what is meant by the watchmaker and by ‘making.’  We therefore reason to a vera causa an agent already known.  When the inference is to the action of an inconceivable Being performing an inconceivable operation upon inconceivable materials, it really becomes illusory, or amounts to the simple assertion that the phenomenon is inexplicable.  Therefore, again, it is essentially opposed to science though claiming to be scientific.  The action of the creator is supposed to begin where the possibility of knowledge ends.  It is just the inexplicable element which suggests the creative agency.  Conversely, the satisfactory explanation of any phenomenon takes it out of the theological sphere.  As soon as the process becomes ‘natural’ it ceases to demand the supernatural artificer.  ‘Making,’ therefore, is contradistinguished from ‘growing.’  If we see how the eye has come into existence, we have no longer any reason to assume that it was put together mechanically.  In other words, ‘teleology’ of this variety is dispelled by theories of evolution.  The hypothesis of interference becomes needless when we see how things came to be by working out perfectly natural processes.  As science, therefore, expands, theology recedes.  This was to become more evident at a later period.  For the present, the teleological argument in the Paley form, triumphantly set forth in Bridgewater Treatises and the like, rested the defence of theology on the proofs of the discontinuity of the universe and the consequent necessity for admitting supernatural interference.  Science was therefore invoked to place absolute limits on its own progress.

But other vital difficulties were already felt.  The argument from contrivance naturally implies limitation.  The maker of a machine is strictly limited by the properties of the matter upon which he works.  The inference might be verbally saved by saying that the maker was ‘potentially’ omnipotent; but the argument, so far as it goes, is more easily satisfied by the hypothesis of a Being of great but still limited powers.  The Deity so proved, if the proof be valid, is not himself the ground of the universe, the source from which nature itself emanates, as well as the special laws of nature, but a part of the whole system; interfering, guiding, and controlling, but still only one of the powers which contribute to the formation of the whole.  Hence arise questions which theologians rather evaded than attempted to answer.  If with the help of Paley we can prove the existence of an invisible Being potentially omnipotent, though always operating as though limited there would still remain the question as to his attributes.  He is skilful, we may grant, but is he benevolent or is he moral?  The benevolence could of course be asserted by optimists, if facts were amenable to rhetoric.  But a theory which is essentially scientific or empirical, and consistently argues from the effect to the cause, must start from an impartial view of the facts, and must make no presupposition as to the nature of the cause.  The cause is known only through the effects, and our judgment of them cannot be modified by simply discovering that they are caused.  If, then, contrivance is as manifest in disease as in health, in all the sufferings which afflict mankind as well as in the pleasures which solace him, we must either admit that the creator is not benevolent, or frankly admit that he is not omnipotent and fall into Manichaeism.  Nature, we are frequently told, is indifferent if not cruel; and though Paley and his followers choose to shut their eyes to ugly facts, it could be only by sacrificing their logic.  They were bound to prove from observation that the world was so designed as to secure the ‘greatest happiness’ before they could logically infer a purely benevolent designer.  It was of the very essence of their position that observed facts should be the ultimate basis of the whole theory; and to alter the primary data by virtue of deductions drawn from them could obviously not be logically justifiable.

Such reflections, though sufficiently obvious, might be too far from practical application to have much immediate effect.  But the question of the moral bearing of theology was of more interest; and, here, the coincidence of the Utilitarianism with the accepted theology of the day is especially important.  The Deity regarded as the artificer appears to be far from purely benevolent.  In respect to morality, is he not simply indifferent?  Does he not make men fragile and place them amidst pitfalls?  Does he not constantly slay the virtuous and save the wicked?  How, indeed, from the purely empirical or scientific base, do you deduce any moral attributes whatever?  ‘Natural theology,’ as it was called, might reveal a contriver, but could it reveal a judge or a moral guide?  Here the difficulty of a purely matter-of-fact theology made itself felt on many sides.  The remarkable influence of Butler upon many minds was partly due to a perception of this omission.  Butler avowedly appeals to the conscience, and therefore at least recognises God as directly revealed in a moral character.  That seemed to supply a gap in the ordinary theology.  But in the purely empirical view Butler’s argument was untenable.  It appealed to one of the ‘intuitions’ which were incompatible with its fundamental assumptions.  The compunctions of conscience were facts to be explained by ‘association,’ not to be regarded as intimations of wrath.  Butler’s view might be inverted.  The ‘conscience’ does, in truth, suggest the divine wrath; but that only means that it suggests the quack remedies upon which ‘wonder-working’ priests establish their power.  Instead of proving the truth of the religion, it explains the origin of superstition.  To James Mill, as we have seen, Butler’s argument would logically prove not a righteous governor but a cruel creator.  Theologians, again, of the Paley school, were bound in consistency to the empirical or Utilitarian view of morality.  Paley accepted the consequences unreservedly; and if such philosophers as Brown and Mackintosh persisted in regarding the coincidence between morality and happiness as indicative of a pre-established harmony, not of an identification of morality with the pursuit of general happiness, they still admitted that ‘utility’ was the ‘criterion’ of morality.  The moral law, that is, coincides in its substance with the law, ’maximise happiness,’ and happiness means, as ‘Philip Beauchamp’ calls it, ‘temporal’ happiness the happiness of actual men living in this world and knowing nothing of any external world.  How, then, is the moral law related to theology?  To know what is moral, we must appeal to experience and ‘utility.’  We must discover what makes for happiness, just as in medicine we must discover what makes for health or pleasure, by the ordinary methods of observation.  What place is left for any supernatural intervention?  The ostensible answer was that though the moral code could be deduced from its utility, the motives by which it was to be enforced required some supernatural agency.  The natural man might see what was right, but need not therefore do what was right.  Here ‘Philip Beauchamp’ comes to a direct issue with the theologians.  He denies that the supernatural motive will be on the side of morality.  When J. S. Mill remarked that there had been few discussions of the ‘utility’ as distinguished from the truth of religion, he scarcely recognises one conspicuous fact.  The great argument of divines had always been the absolute necessity of religion to morality; and if morality be understood to mean utility, this is simply an argument from utility.  The point, indeed, was often taken for granted; but it certainly represents one of the strongest persuasives, if not one of the strongest reasons.  The divines, in fact, asserted that religion was of the highest utility as supplying the motive for moral conduct.  What motives, then, can be derived from such knowledge of the Deity as is attainable from the ’Natural theology’ argument?  How can we prove from it that he who puts the world together is more favourable to the virtues than to the vices which are its results; or, if more favourable, that he shows any other favour than can be inferred from experience?  He has, it is agreed, put men, as Bentham had said, under the command of two sovereign masters, Pleasure and Pain; and has enabled them to calculate consequences, and therefore to seek future pleasure and avoid future pain.  That only proves that we can increase our happiness by prudence; but it suggests no additional reasons either for seeking happiness or for altering our estimate of happiness.  As ‘Philip Beauchamp’ argues, we cannot from the purely empirical ground get any motive for taking into account anything beyond our ‘temporal’ or secular interests.  This, again, was in fact admitted by Paley.  His mode of escape from the dilemma is familiar.  The existence of a supreme artificer is inferred from the interventions in the general order of nature.  The existence of a moral ruler, or the fact that the ruler approves morality, is inferred from his interference by the particular manifestations of power which we call miraculous.  We know that actions will have other consequences than those which can be inferred from our own experience, because some two thousand years ago a Being appeared who could raise the dead and heal the sick.  If sufficient evidence of the fact be forthcoming, we are entitled to say upon his authority that the wicked will be damned and the virtuous go to heaven.  Obedience to the law enforced by these sanctions is obviously prudent, and constitutes the true differentia of moral conduct.  Virtue, according to the famous definition, is doing good ‘for the sake of everlasting happiness.’  The downright bluntness with which Paley announced these conclusions startled contemporaries, and yet it must be admitted that they were a natural outcome of his position.

In short, the theological position of the Paley school and the Utilitarian position of ‘Philip Beauchamp’ start from the common ground of experience.  Religion means the knowledge of certain facts, which are to be inferred from appropriate evidence.  It does not modify the whole system of thought, but simply adds certain corollaries; and the whole question is whether the corollaries are or are not proved by legitimate reasoning.  Can we discover heaven and hell as we discovered America?  Can observation of nature reveal to us a supernatural world?’ The first difficulty is that the argument for natural theology has to rest upon interference, not upon order, and therefore comes into conflict with the first principles of scientific procedure.  The Deity is revealed not by the rational but by the arbitrary; and the more the world is explained, the less the proof that he exists, because the narrower the sphere of his action.  Then, as such a Deity, even if proved, is not proved to be benevolent or moral, we have to rely for the moral element upon the evidence of ‘miracles,’ that is, again, of certain interruptions of order.  The scientific tendency more or less embodied in Protestantism, so far as it appealed to reason or to ‘private judgment,’ had, moreover, made it necessary to relegate miracles to a remote period, while denying them at the present.  To prove at once that there are no miracles now, and that there were a few miracles two thousand years ago, was really hopeless.  In fact, the argument had come to be stated in an artificial form which had no real relation to the facts.  If the apostles had been a jury convinced by a careful legal examination of the evidence; if they had pronounced their verdict, in spite of the knowledge that they would be put to death for finding it, there would have been some force in Paley’s argument.  But then they had not.  To assume such an origin for any religion implied a total misconception of the facts.  Paley assumed that the apostles resembled twelve respectable deans of Carlisle solemnly declaring, in spite of the most appalling threats, that John Wesley had been proved to have risen from the dead.  Paley might plausibly urge that such an event would require a miracle.  But, meanwhile, his argument appeared to rest the whole case for morality and religion upon this narrow and perilous base.  We can only know that it is our interest to be moral if we know of heaven and hell; and we only know of heaven and hell if we accept the evidence of miracles, and infer that the worker of miracles had supernatural sources of information.  The moral difficulty which emerges is obvious.  The Paley conception of the Deity is, in fact, coincident with Bentham’s conception of the sovereign.  He is simply an invisible sovereign, operating by tremendous sanctions.  The sanctions are ‘external,’ that is to say, pains and pleasures, annexed to conduct by the volition of the sovereign, not intrinsic consequences of the conduct itself.  Such a conception, thoroughly carried through, makes the relation between religion and morality essentially arbitrary.  Moreover, if with ’Philip Beauchamp’ we regard the miracle argument as obviously insufficient, and consider what are the attributes really attributed to the sovereign, we must admit that they suggest such a system as he describes rather than the revelation of an all-wise and benevolent ruler.  It is true, as ‘Philip Beauchamp’ argues, that the system has all the faults of the worst human legislation; that the punishment is made atrociously indeed infinitely severe to compensate for its uncertainty and remoteness; and that (as he would clearly add), to prevent it from shocking and stunning the intellect, it is regarded as remissible in consideration of vicarious suffering.  If, then, the religion is really what its dogmas declare, it is easier to assume that it represents the cunning of a priesthood operating upon the blind fears and wild imaginations of an inaccessible world; and the ostensible proofs of a divine origin resting upon miraculous proofs are not worth consideration.  It professes to be a sanction to all morality, but is forced to construct a mythology which outrages all moral considerations.  Taken as a serious statement of fact, the anthropomorphism of the vulgar belief was open to the objections which Socrates brought against the Pagan mythology.  The supreme ruler was virtually represented as arbitrary, cruel, and despotic.

If we ask the question, whether in point of fact the religion attacked by ‘Philip Beauchamp’ fairly represented the religion of the day, we should have, of course, to admit that it was in one sense a gross caricature.  If, that is, we asked what were the real roots of the religious zeal of Wilberforce and the Evangelicals, or of the philanthropists with whom even James Mill managed to associate on friendly terms, it would be the height of injustice to assume that they tried to do good simply from fear of hell and hope of heaven, or that their belief in Christianity was due to a study of Paley’s Evidences.  Their real motives were far nobler:  genuine hatred of injustice and sympathy for suffering, joined to the conviction that the sects to which they belonged were working on the side of justice and happiness; while the creeds which they accepted were somehow congenial to their best feelings, and enabled them to give utterance to their deepest emotions.  But when they had to give a ground for that belief they could make no adequate defence.  They were better than their ostensible creed, because the connection of their creed with their morality was really arbitrary and traditional.  We must always distinguish between the causes of strong convictions and the reasons officially assigned for them.  The religious creed, as distinguished from the religious sentiment, was really traditional, and rested upon the simple fact that it was congenial to the general frame of mind.  Its philosophy meanwhile had become hopelessly incoherent.  It wished to be sensible, and admitted in principle the right of ’private judgment’ or rationalism so far as consistent with Protestantism.  The effect had been that in substance it had become Utilitarian and empirical; while it had yet insisted upon holding on to the essentially irrational element.

The religious tradition was becoming untenable in this sense at the same time as the political tradition.  If radicalism in both were to be effectually resisted, some better foundation must be found for conservatism.  I should be tempted to say that a critical period was approaching, did I not admit that every period can always be described as critical.  In fact, however, thoughtful people, perceiving on the one hand that the foundations of their creed were shaking, and yet holding it to be essential to their happiness, began to take a new position.  The ‘Oxford movement,’ started soon afterwards, implied a conviction that the old Protestant position was as untenable as the radical asserted.  Its adherents attempted to find a living and visible body whose supernatural authority might maintain the old dogmatic system.  Liberal thinkers endeavoured to spiritualise the creed and prove its essential truths by philosophy, independently of the particular historical evidence.  The popular tendency was to admit in substance that the dogmas most assailed were in fact immoral:  but to put them into the background, or, if necessary, to explain them away.  The stress was to be laid not upon miracles, but upon the moral elevation of Christianity or the beauty of character of its founder.  The ‘unsectarian’ religion, represented in the most characteristic writings of the next generation, in Tennyson and Browning, Thackeray and Dickens, reflects this view.  Such men detested the coarse and brutalising dogmas which might be expounded as the true ’scheme of salvation’ by ignorant preachers seeking to rouse sluggish natures to excitement; but they held to religious conceptions which, as they thought, really underlay these disturbing images, and which, indeed, could hardly be expressed in any more definite form than that of a hope or a general attitude of the whole character.  The problem seemed to be whether we shall support a dogmatic system by recognising a living spiritual authority, or frankly accept reason as the sole authority, and, while explaining away the repulsive dogmas, try to retain the real essence of religious belief.

II.  CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

If I were writing a general history of opinion, it would be necessary to discuss the views of Mill’s English contemporaries; to note their attitude in regard to the Utilitarian position, and point out how they prepared the way for the later developments of thought.  The Utilitarians were opposed to a vague sentiment rather than to any definite system.  They were a small and a very unpopular sect.  They excited antipathy on all sides.  As advocating republicanism, they were hardly more disliked by the Tories, who directly opposed them, than by the Whigs, who might be suspected of complicity.  As enthusiastic political economists, they were equally detested by sentimental Radicals, Socialists, and by all who desired a strong government, whether for the suppression of social evils or the maintenance of social abuses.  And now, as suspected of atheism, they were hated by theologians.  But though the Utilitarians were on all sides condemned and denounced, they were met by no definite and coherent scheme of philosophy.  The philosophy of Stewart and Brown had at least a strong drift in their direction.  Though ‘political economy’ was denounced in general terms, all who spoke with authority accepted Adam Smith.  Their political opponents generally did not so much oppose their theories as object to theory in general.  The Utilitarian system might be both imperfect and dogmatic; but it had scarcely to contend with any clear and assignable rival.  The dislike of Englishmen to any systematic philosophy, whether founded upon the national character or chiefly due to special conditions, was still conspicuous outside of the small Utilitarian camp.

To discover, therefore, the true position of contemporary opinion, we should have to look elsewhere.  Instead of seeking for the philosophers who did not exist, we should have to examine the men of letters who expressed the general tendencies.  In Germany, philosophical theories may be held to represent the true drift of the national mind, and a historian of German thought would inquire into the various systems elaborated by professors of philosophy.  He would at least be in no want of materials for definite logical statements.  In England, there was no such intellectual movement.  There we should have to consider poetry and literature; to read Wordsworth and Coleridge, Scott and Byron and Shelley, if we would know what men were really thinking and feeling.  The difficulty is, of course, that none of these men, unless Coleridge be an exception, had any conscious or systematic philosophy.  We can only ask, therefore, what they would have said if they had been requested to justify their views by abstract reasoning; and that is a rather conjectural and indefinite enterprise.  It lies, fortunately, outside of my field; and it will be enough if I try to suggest one or two sufficiently vague hints.  In the first place, the contrast between the Utilitarians and their opponents may almost be identified with the contrast between the prosaic and the poetical aspects of the world in general.  Bentham frankly objected to poetry in general.  It proved nothing.  The true Utilitarian was the man who held on to fact, and to nothing but the barest, most naked and unadorned fact.  Poetry in general came within the sweep of his denunciations of ‘sentimentalism’ and ‘vague generalities.’  It was the ’production of a rude age’; the silly jingling which might be suitable to savages, but was needless for the grown-up man, and was destined to disappear along with the whole rubbish of mythology and superstition in whose service it had been enlisted.  There is indeed a natural sympathy between any serious view of life and a distrust of the aesthetic tendencies.  Theologians of many different types have condemned men for dallying with the merely pleasurable, when they ought to be preoccupied with the great ethical problems or the safety of their souls.  James Mill had enough of the old Puritan in him to sympathise with Carlyle’s aspiration, ‘May the devil fly away with the fine arts!’ To such men it was difficult to distinguish between fiction and lying; and if some concession might be made to human weakness, poets and novelists might supply the relaxations and serve to fill up the intervals of life, but must be sternly excluded if they tried to intrude into serious studies.  Somehow love of the beautiful only interfered with the scientific investigation of hard facts.

Poets, indeed, may take the side of reform, or may perhaps be naturally expected to take that side.  The idealist and the dreamer should be attracted most powerfully by the visions of a better world and the restoration of the golden age.  Shelley was among the most enthusiastic prophets of the coming era.  His words, he hoped, were to be ‘the trumpet of a prophecy’ to ‘unawakened earth.’  Shelley had sat at the feet of Godwin, and represented that vague metaphysical dreaming to which the Utilitarians were radically hostile.  To the literary critic, Shelley’s power is the more remarkable because from a flimsy philosophy he span an imaginative tissue of such magical and marvellous beauty.  But Shelley dwelt in an ethereal region, where ordinary beings found breathing difficult.  There facts seemed to dissolve into thin air instead of supplying a solid and substantial base.  His idealism meant unreality.  His ‘trumpet’ did not in fact stimulate the mass of mankind, and his fame at this period was confined to a few young gentlemen of literary refinement.  The man who had really stirred the world was Byron; and if the decline of Byron’s fame has resulted partly from real defects, it is partly due also to the fact that his poetry was so admirably adapted to his contemporaries.  Byron at least could see facts as clearly as any Utilitarian, though fact coloured by intense passion.  He, like the Utilitarians, hated solemn platitudes and hypocritical conventions.  I have noticed the point at which he came into contact with Bentham’s disciples.  His pathetic death shortly afterwards excited a singularly strong movement of sympathy.  ‘The news of his death,’ said Carlyle at the time, ’came upon my heart like a mass of lead; and yet the thought of it sends a painful twinge through all my being, as if I had lost a brother.’  At a later time he defines Byron as ’a dandy of sorrows and acquainted with grief.’ That hits off one aspect of Byronism.  Byron was the Mirabeau of English literature, in so far as he was at once a thorough aristocrat and a strong revolutionist.  He had the qualification of a true satirist.  His fate was at discord with his character.  He was proud of his order, and yet despised its actual leaders.  He was ready alternately to boast of his vices and to be conscious that they were degrading.  He shocked the respectable world by mocking ‘Satanically,’ as they held, at moral conventions, and yet rather denounced the hypocrisy and the heartlessness of precisians than insulted the real affections.  He covered sympathy with human suffering under a mask of misanthropy, and attacked war and oppression in the character of a reckless outlaw.  Full of the affectation of a ‘dandy,’ he was yet rousing all Europe by a cry of pure sentimentalism.  It would be absurd to attribute any definite doctrine to Byron.  His scepticism in religious matters was merely part of a general revolt against respectability.  What he illustrates is the vague but profound revolutionary sentiment which indicated a belief that the world seemed to be out of joint, and a vehement protest against the selfish and stolid conservatism which fancied that the old order could be preserved in all its fossil institutions and corresponding dogmas.

What was the philosophy congenial to Conservatism?  There is, of course, the simple answer, None.  Toryism was a ‘reaction’ due to the great struggle of the war and the excesses of the revolution.  A ‘reaction’ is a very convenient phrase.  We are like our fathers; then the resemblance is only natural.  We differ; then the phrase ‘reaction’ makes the alteration explain itself.  No doubt, however, there was in some sense a reaction.  Many people changed their minds as the revolutionary movement failed to fulfil their hopes.  I need not argue now that such men were not necessarily corrupt renegades.  I can only try to indicate the process by which they were led towards certain philosophical doctrines.  Scott, Wordsworth, and Coleridge represent it enough for my purpose.  When Mill was reproaching Englishmen for their want of interest in history, he pointed out that Thierry, ’the earliest of the three great French historians’ (Guizot and Michelet are the two others), ascribed his interest in his subject to Ivanhoe. Englishmen read Ivanhoe simply for amusement.  Frenchmen could see that it threw a light upon history, or at least suggested a great historical problem.  Scott, it is often said, was the first person to teach us that our ancestors were once as much alive as ourselves.  Scott, indeed, the one English writer whose fame upon the Continent could be compared to Byron’s, had clearly no interest in, or capacity for, abstract speculations.  An imaginative power, just falling short of the higher poetical gift, and a masculine common-sense were his most conspicuous faculties.  The two qualities were occasionally at issue; his judgment struggled with his prejudices, and he sympathised too keenly with the active leaders and concrete causes to care much for any abstract theory.  Yet his influence upon thought, though indirect, was remarkable.  The vividness of his historical painting inaccurate, no doubt, and delightfully reckless of dates and facts stimulated the growing interest in historical inquiries even in England.  His influence in one direction is recognised by Newman, who was perhaps thinking chiefly of his mediaevalism. But the historical novels are only one side of Scott.  Patriotic to the core, he lived at a time when patriotic feeling was stimulated to the utmost, and when Scotland in particular was still a province, and yet in many ways the most vigorous and progressive part of a great empire.  He represents patriotism stimulated by contact with cosmopolitan movements.  Loving every local peculiarity, painting every class from the noble to the peasant, loving the old traditions, and yet sharing the great impulses of the day, Scott was able to interest the world at large.  While the most faithful portrayer of the special national type, he has too much sense not to be well aware that picturesque cattle-stealers and Jacobite chiefs were things of the past; but he loves with his whole heart the institutions rooted in the past and rich in historical associations.  He transferred to poetry and fiction the political doctrine of Burke.  To him, the revolutionary movement was simply a solvent, corroding all the old ties because it sapped the old traditions, and tended to substitute a mob for a nation.  The continuity of national life seemed to him the essential condition; and a nation was not a mere aggregate of separate individuals, but an ancient organism, developing on an orderly system where every man had his rightful place, and the beggar, as he observes in the Antiquary, was as ready as the noble to rise against foreign invasion.  To him, the kings or priests who, to the revolutionist, represented simple despotism, represented part of a rough but manly order, in which many virtues were conspicuous and the governing classes were discharging great functions.  Though he did not use the phrase, the revolutionary or radical view was hateful to him on account of its ‘individualism.’  It meant the summary destruction of all that he cherished most warmly in order to carry out theories altogether revolting to his common-sense.  The very roots of a sound social order depend upon the traditions and accepted beliefs which bind together clans or families, and assign to every man a satisfactory function in life.  The vivid realisation of history goes naturally with a love excessive or reasonable of the old order; and Scott, though writing carelessly to amuse idle readers, was stimulating the historical conceptions, which, for whatever reason, were most uncongenial to the Utilitarian as to all the revolutionists.

The more conscious philosophical application is illustrated by Wordsworth and Coleridge.  Both of them had shared the truly revolutionary enthusiasm, and both came in time to be classed with the Tories.  Both, as will be seen, had a marked influence upon J. S. Mill.  Wordsworth has written in the Prelude one of the most remarkable of intellectual autobiographies.  He was to be, though he never quite succeeded in being, a great philosophical poet.  He never succeeded, because, in truth, he was not a great philosopher.  But no one has more clearly indicated the history of his mental evolution.  His sympathy with the revolution was perfectly genuine, but involved a vast misconception.  A sturdy, independent youth, thoroughly imbued with the instincts of his northern dalesmen, he had early leaned to a republican sentiment.  His dislike of the effete conventionalism of the literary creed blended with his aversion to the political rule of the time.  He caught the contagion of revolutionary enthusiasm in France, and was converted by the sight of the ‘hunger-bitten’ peasant girl the victim of aristocratic oppression.  ‘It is against that,’ said his friend, ‘that we are fighting,’ and so far Wordsworth was a convert.  The revolution, therefore, meant to him the restoration of an idyllic state, in which the homely virtues of the independent peasant should no longer be crushed and deprived of reward by the instruments of selfish despotism.  The outbreak of war put his principles at issue with his patriotism.  He suffered keenly when called upon to triumph over the calamities of his countrymen.  But gradually he came to think that his sympathies were misplaced.  The revolution had not altered human nature.  The atrocities disturbed him, but for a time he could regard them as a mere accident.  As the war went on, he began to perceive that the new power could be as tyrannical and selfish as the old.  Instead of reconstructing a simple social ideal, it was forming a military despotism.  When the French armies put down the simple Swiss peasantry, to whom he had been drawn by his home-bred sympathies, he finally gave up the revolutionary cause.  He had gone through a mental agony, and his distracted sympathies ultimately determined a change which corresponded to the adoption of a new philosophy.  Wordsworth, indeed, had little taste for abstract logic.  He had imbibed Godwin’s doctrine, but when acceptance of Godwin’s conclusions involved a conflict with his strongest affections the sacrifice not only of his patriotism but of the sympathies which bound him to his fellows he revolted.  Godwin represents the extreme of ‘individualism,’ the absolute dissolution of all social and political bonds.  Wordsworth escaped, not by discovering a logical defect in the argument, but by yielding to the protest of his emotions.  The system, he thought, was fatal to all the affections which had made life dear to him; to the vague ‘intimations’ which, whatever else they might be, had yet power to give harmony to our existence.

By degrees he adopted a new diagnosis of the great political evils.  On one side, he sympathised with Scott’s sense of the fatal effects upon the whole social organism.  Among his noblest poems are the ‘Brothers’ and ‘Michael,’ to which he specially called the attention of Fox.  They were intended, he explained, to show the surpassing value of the domestic affections conspicuous among the shepherds and ‘statesmen’ of the northern dales.  He had now come to hold that the principles of Godwin and his like were destructive to the most important elements of human welfare.  The revolutionists were not simply breaking the fetters of the simple peasant, but destroying the most sacred ties to which the peasant owed whatever dignity or happiness he possessed.  Revolution, in short, meant anarchy.  It meant, therefore, the destruction of all that gives real value to life.  It was, as he held, one product of the worship of the ’idol proudly named the “wealth of nations,"’ selfishness and greed replacing the old motives to ‘plain living and high thinking.’  Wordsworth, in short, saw the ugly side of the industrial revolution, the injury done to domestic life by the factory system, or the substitution of a proletariate for a peasantry, and the replacement of the lowest social order by a vast inorganic mob.  The contemporary process, which was leading to pauperism and to the evils of the factory system, profoundly affected Wordsworth, as well as the impulsive Southey; and their frequent denunciations gave colour to the imputations that they were opposed to all progress.  Certainly they were even morbidly alive to the evil aspects of the political economy of Malthus and Ricardo, which to them seemed to prescribe insensibility and indifference to most serious and rapidly accumulating evils.

Meanwhile, Wordsworth was also impressed by the underlying philosophical difficulties.  The effect of the revolutionary principles was to destroy the religious sentiment, not simply by disproving this or that historical statement, but by making the whole world prosaic and matter-of-fact.  His occasional outbursts against the man of science the ‘fingering slave’ who would ’peep and botanise upon his mother’s grave’ are one version of his feeling.  The whole scientific method tended to materialism and atomism; to a breaking up of the world into disconnected atoms, and losing the life in dissecting the machinery.  His protest is embodied in the pantheism of the noble lines on Tintern Abbey, and his method of answering might be divined from the ode on the ‘Intimations of Immortality.’  Somehow or other the world represents a spiritual and rational unity, not a mere chaos of disconnected atoms and fragments.  We ‘see into the heart of things’ when we trust to our emotions and hold by the instincts, clearly manifested in childhood, but clouded and overwhelmed in our later struggles with the world.  The essential thing is the cultivation of our ‘moral being,’ the careful preservation and assimilation of the stern sense of duty, which alone makes life bearable and gives a meaning to the universe.

Wordsworth, it is plain, was at the very opposite pole from the Utilitarians.  He came to consider that their whole method meant the dissolution of all that was most vitally sacred, and to hold that the revolution had attracted his sympathies on false pretences.  Yet it is obvious that, however great the stimulus which he exerted, and however lofty his highest flights of poetry, he had no distinct theory to offer.  His doctrine undoubtedly was congenial to certain philosophical views, but was not itself an articulate philosophy.  He appeals to instincts and emotions, not to any definite theory.  In a remarkable letter, Coleridge told Wordsworth why he was disappointed with the Excursion. He had hoped that it would be the ’first and only true philosophical poem in existence.’  Wordsworth was to have started by exposing the ‘sandy sophisms of Locke,’ and after exploding Pope’s Essay on Man, and showing the vanity of (Erasmus) Darwin’s belief in an ‘ourang-outang state,’ and explaining the fall of man and the ‘scheme of redemption,’ to have concluded by ’a grand didactic swell on the identity of a true philosophy with true religion.’  He would show how life and intelligence were to be substituted for the ‘philosophy of mechanism.’  Facts would be elevated into theory, theory into laws, and laws into living and intelligent powers true idealism necessarily perfecting itself in realism, and realism refining itself into idealism.’

The programme was a large one.  If it represents what Coleridge seriously expected from Wordsworth, it also suggests that he was unconsciously wandering into an exposition of one of the gigantic but constantly shifting schemes of a comprehensive philosophy, which he was always proposing to execute.  To try to speak of Coleridge adequately would be hopeless and out of place.  I must briefly mention him, because he was undoubtedly the most conspicuous representative of the tendencies opposed to Utilitarianism.  The young men who found Bentham exasperating imbibed draughts of mingled poetry and philosophy from Coleridge’s monologues at Hampstead.  Carlyle has told us, in a famous chapter of his Life of Sterling, what they went out to see:  at once a reed shaken by the wind and a great expounder of transcendental truth.  The fact that Coleridge exerted a very great influence is undeniable.  To define precisely what that influence was is impossible.  His writings are a heap of fragments.  He contemplated innumerable schemes for great works, and never got within measurable distance of writing any.  He poured himself out indefinitely upon the margins of other men’s books; and the piety of disciples has collected a mass of these scattered and incoherent jottings, which announce conclusions without giving the premises, or suggest difficulties without attempting to solve them.  He seems to have been almost as industrious as Bentham in writing; but whereas Bentham’s fragments could be put together as wholes, Coleridge’s are essentially distracted hints of views never really elaborated.  He was always thinking, but seems always to be making a fresh start at any point that strikes him for the moment.  Besides all this, there is the painful question of plagiarism.  His most coherent exposition (in the Biographia Literaria) is simply appropriated from Schelling, though he ascribes the identity to a ‘genial coincidence’ of thought.  I need make no attempt to make out what Coleridge really thought for himself, and then to try to put his thoughts together, and indeed hold the attempt to be impossible.  The most remarkable thing is the apparent disproportion between Coleridge’s definite services to philosophy and the effect which he certainly produced upon some of his ablest contemporaries.  That seems to prove that he was really aiming at some important aspect of truth, incapable as he may have been of definitively reaching it.  I can only try to give a hint or two as to its general nature.  Coleridge, in the first place, was essentially a poet, and, moreover, his poetry was of the type most completely divorced from philosophy.  Nobody could say more emphatically that poetry should not be rhymed logic; and his most impressive poems are simply waking dreams.  They are spontaneous incarnations of sensuous imagery, which has no need of morals or definite logical schemes.  Although he expected Wordsworth to transmute philosophy into poetry, he admitted that the achievement would be unprecedented.  Even in Lucretius, he said, what was poetry was not philosophy, and what was philosophy was not poetry.  Yet Coleridge’s philosophy was essentially the philosophy of a poet.  He had, indeed, great dialectical ingenuity a faculty which may certainly be allied with the highest imagination, though it may involve certain temptations.  A poet who has also a mastery of dialectics becomes a mystic in philosophy.  Coleridge had, it seems, been attracted by Plotinus in his schooldays.  At a later period he had been attracted by Hartley, Berkeley, and Priestley.  To a brilliant youth, anxious to be in the van of intellectual progress, they represented the most advanced theories.  But there could never be a full sympathy between Coleridge and the forefathers of English empiricism; and he went to Germany partly to study the new philosophy which was beginning to shine though very feebly and intermittingly in England.  When he had returned he began to read Kant and Schelling, or rather to mix excursions into their books with the miscellaneous inquiries to which his versatile intellect attracted him.

Now, it is abundantly clear that Coleridge never studied any philosophy systematically.  He never acquired a precise acquaintance with the technical language of various schemes, or cared for their precise logical relations to each other.  The ‘genial coincidence’ with Schelling, though an unlucky phrase, represents a real fact.  He dipped into Plotinus or Behmen or Kant or Schelling, or any one who interested him, and did not know whether they were simply embodying ideas already in his own mind, or suggesting new ideas; or, what was probably more accurate, expressing opinions which, in a general way, were congenial to his own way of contemplating the world.  His power of stimulating other minds proves sufficiently that he frequently hit upon impressive and suggestive thoughts.  He struck out illuminating sparks, but he never diffused any distinct or steady daylight.  His favourite position, for example, of the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding is always coming up and being enforced with the strongest asseverations of its importance.  That he had adopted it more or less from Kant is obvious, though I imagine it to be also obvious that he did not clearly understand his authority. To what, precisely, it amounts is also unintelligible to me.  Somehow or other, it implies that the mind can rise into transcendental regions, and, leaving grovelling Utilitarians and the like to the conduct of the understanding in matters of practical expediency, can perceive that the universe is in some way evolved from the pure reason, and the mind capable of ideas which correspond to stages of the evolution.  How this leads to the conclusions that the Christian doctrines of the Logos and the Trinity are embodiments of pure philosophy is a problem upon which I need not touch.  When we have called Coleridge a mystic, with flashes of keen insight into the weakness of the opposite theory, I do not see how we are to get much further, or attribute to him any articulate and definite scheme.

Hopelessly unsystematic as Coleridge may have been, his significance in regard to the Utilitarians is noteworthy.  It is indicated in a famous article which J. S. Mill contributed to the Westminster Review in March 1840. Mill’s concessions to Coleridge rather scandalised the faithful; and it is enough to observe here that it marks the apogee of Mill’s Benthamism.  Influences, of which I shall have to speak, had led him to regard his old creed as imperfect, and to assent to great part of Coleridge’s doctrine.  Mill does not discuss the metaphysical or theological views of the opposite school, though he briefly intimates his dissent.  But it is interesting to observe how Coleridge impressed a disciple of Bentham.  The ’Germano-Coleridgian doctrine,’ says Mill, was a reaction against the philosophy of the eighteenth century:  ‘ontological,’ ‘conservative,’ ‘religious,’ ‘concrete and historical,’ and finally ‘poetical,’ because the other was ‘experimental,’ ‘innovative,’ ‘infidel,’ ’abstract and metaphysical,’ and ‘matter-of-fact and prosaic.’  Yet the two approximate, and each helps to restore the balance and comes a little nearer to a final equilibrium.  The error of the French philosophers had been their negative and purely critical tendency.  They had thought that it was enough to sweep away superstition, priestcraft, and despotism, and that no constructive process was necessary.  They had not perceived the necessity of social discipline, of loyalty to rulers, or of patriotic feeling among the subjects.  They had, therefore, entirely failed to recognise the historical value of old creeds and institutions, and had tried to remodel society ’without the binding forces which hold society together.’ Hence, too, the philosophes came to despise history; and D’Alembert is said to have wished that all record of past events could be blotted out.  Their theory, in its popular version at least, came to be that states and churches had been got up ’for the sole purpose of picking people’s pockets.’ This had become incredible to any intelligent reasoner, and any Tory could prove that there was something good in the past.  The peculiarity of the ‘Germano-Coleridgian’ school was that they saw beyond the immediate controversy.  They were the first to inquire with any power into ’the inductive laws of the existence and growth of human society’; the first to recognise the importance of the great constructive principles; and the first to produce not a piece of party advocacy, but ’a philosophy of society in the only form in which it is yet possible, that of a philosophy of history.’  Hence arose that ‘series of great writers and thinkers, from Herder to Michelet,’ who have given to past history an intelligible place in the gradual evolution of humanity. This very forcible passage is interesting in regard to Mill, and shows a very clear perception of some defects in his own philosophy.  It also raises an important question.

Accepting Mill’s view, it is remarkable that the great error of his own school, which professed to be based upon experience, was the rejection of history; and the great merit of the a priori and ‘intuitionist’ school was precisely their insistence upon history.  To this I shall have to return hereafter.  Meanwhile, Mill proceeds to show how Coleridge, by arguing from the ‘idea’ of church and state, had at least recognised the necessity of showing that political and social institutions must have a sufficient reason, and be justified by something more than mere obstinate prejudice.  Men like Pitt and Sir Robert Peel, if they accepted Coleridge’s support, would have to alter their whole position.  Coleridge’s defence of his ideal church was at once the severest satire upon the existing body and a proof, as against Bentham and Adam Smith, of the advantages of an endowed class for the cultivation and diffusion of learning.  Coleridge, moreover, though he objected to the Reform Bill, showed himself a better reformer than Lord John Russell.  He admitted what the Whigs refused to see, the necessity of diminishing the weight of the landowner interest.  Landowners were not to be ultimate sources of power, but to represent one factor in a reasoned system.  In short, by admitting that all social arrangements in some sense were embodiments of reason, he admitted that they must also be made to conform to reason.

Coleridge and Bentham, then, are not really enemies but allies, and they wield powers which are ’opposite poles of one great force of progression.’ The question, however, remains, how the philosophy of each leader is really connected with his practical conclusions.  Mill’s view would apparently be that Coleridge somehow managed to correct the errors or fill the gaps of the Utilitarian system a very necessary task, as Mill admits while Coleridge would have held that those errors were the inevitable fruit of the whole empirical system of thought.  The Reason must be restored to its rightful supremacy over the Understanding, which had been working its wicked will since the days of Locke and eighteenth century.  The problem is a wide one.  I must be content to remark the inevitable antithesis.  Whether enemies or allies, the Utilitarians and their antagonists were separated by a gulf which could not be bridged for the time.  The men of common-sense, who had no philosophy at all, were shocked by the immediate practical applications of Utilitarianism, its hostility to the old order which they loved, its apparent helplessness in social questions, its relegation of all progress to the conflict of selfish interests, its indifference to all the virtues associated with patriotism and local ties.  By more reflective minds, it was condemned as robbing the world of its poetry, stifling the religious emotions, and even quenching sentiment in general.  The few who wished for a philosophy found the root of its errors in the assumptions which reduced the world to a chaos of atoms, outwardly connected and combined into mere dead mechanism.  The world, for the poet and the philosopher alike, must be not a congeries of separate things, but in some sense a product of reason.  Thought, not fact, must be the ultimate reality.  Unfortunately or otherwise, the poetical sentiment could never get itself translated into philosophical theory.  Coleridge’s random and discursive hints remained mere hints a suggestion at best for future thought.  Mill’s criticism shows how far they could be assimilated by a singularly candid Utilitarian.  To him, we see, they represented mainly the truth that his own party, following the general tendency of the eighteenth century, had been led to neglect the vital importance of the constructive elements of society; that they had sacrificed order to progress, and therefore confounded progress with destruction, and failed to perceive the real importance in past times even of the institutions which had become obsolete.  Social atomism or individualism, therefore, implied a total misconception of what Mill calls the ‘evolution of humanity.’  This marks a critical point.  The ‘Germano-Coleridgians’ had a theory of evolution.  By evolution, indeed, was meant a dialectical evolution; the evolution of ‘ideas’ or reason, in which each stage of history represents a moment of some vast and transcendental process of thought.  Evolution, so understood, seemed rightly or wrongly to be mere mysticism or intellectual juggling.  It took leave of fact, or managed by some illegitimate process to give to a crude generalisation from experience the appearance of a purely logical deduction.  In this shape, therefore, it was really opposed to science, although the time was to come in which evolution would present itself in a scientific form. Meanwhile, the concessions made by J. S. Mill were not approved by his fellows, and would have been regarded as little short of treason by the older Utilitarians.  The two schools, if Coleridge’s followers could be called a school, regarded each other’s doctrines as simply contradictory.  In appealing to experience and experience alone, the Utilitarians, as their opponents held, had reduced the world to a dead mechanism, destroyed every element of cohesion, made society a struggle of selfish interests, and struck at the very roots of all order, patriotism, poetry, and religion.  They retorted that their critics were blind adherents of antiquated prejudice, and sought to cover superstition and despotism either by unprovable dogmatic assertions, or by taking refuge in a cloudy mystical jargon, which really meant nothing.

They did not love each other.