Of all the works of Plato the Symposium is the most perfect in form, and may be truly thought to contain more than any commentator has ever dreamed of; or, as Goethe said of one of his own writings, more than the author himself knew.  For in philosophy as in prophecy glimpses of the future may often be conveyed in words which could hardly have been understood or interpreted at the time when they were uttered (compare Symp.) ­which were wiser than the writer of them meant, and could not have been expressed by him if he had been interrogated about them.  Yet Plato was not a mystic, nor in any degree affected by the Eastern influences which afterwards overspread the Alexandrian world.  He was not an enthusiast or a sentimentalist, but one who aspired only to see reasoned truth, and whose thoughts are clearly explained in his language.  There is no foreign element either of Egypt or of Asia to be found in his writings.  And more than any other Platonic work the Symposium is Greek both in style and subject, having a beauty ’as of a statue,’ while the companion Dialogue of the Phaedrus is marked by a sort of Gothic irregularity.  More too than in any other of his Dialogues, Plato is emancipated from former philosophies.  The genius of Greek art seems to triumph over the traditions of Pythagorean, Eleatic, or Megarian systems, and ‘the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy’ has at least a superficial reconcilement. (Rep.)

An unknown person who had heard of the discourses in praise of love spoken by Socrates and others at the banquet of Agathon is desirous of having an authentic account of them, which he thinks that he can obtain from Apollodorus, the same excitable, or rather ‘mad’ friend of Socrates, who is afterwards introduced in the Phaedo.  He had imagined that the discourses were recent.  There he is mistaken:  but they are still fresh in the memory of his informant, who had just been repeating them to Glaucon, and is quite prepared to have another rehearsal of them in a walk from the Piraeus to Athens.  Although he had not been present himself, he had heard them from the best authority.  Aristodemus, who is described as having been in past times a humble but inseparable attendant of Socrates, had reported them to him (compare Xen.  Mem.).

The narrative which he had heard was as follows: ­

Aristodemus meeting Socrates in holiday attire, is invited by him to a banquet at the house of Agathon, who had been sacrificing in thanksgiving for his tragic victory on the day previous.  But no sooner has he entered the house than he finds that he is alone; Socrates has stayed behind in a fit of abstraction, and does not appear until the banquet is half over.  On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests, ’What shall they do about drinking? as they had been all well drunk on the day before, and drinking on two successive days is such a bad thing.’  This is confirmed by the authority of Eryximachus the physician, who further proposes that instead of listening to the flute-girl and her ‘noise’ they shall make speeches in honour of love, one after another, going from left to right in the order in which they are reclining at the table.  All of them agree to this proposal, and Phaedrus, who is the ‘father’ of the idea, which he has previously communicated to Eryximachus, begins as follows: ­

He descants first of all upon the antiquity of love, which is proved by the authority of the poets; secondly upon the benefits which love gives to man.  The greatest of these is the sense of honour and dishonour.  The lover is ashamed to be seen by the beloved doing or suffering any cowardly or mean act.  And a state or army which was made up only of lovers and their loves would be invincible.  For love will convert the veriest coward into an inspired hero.

And there have been true loves not only of men but of women also.  Such was the love of Alcestis, who dared to die for her husband, and in recompense of her virtue was allowed to come again from the dead.  But Orpheus, the miserable harper, who went down to Hades alive, that he might bring back his wife, was mocked with an apparition only, and the gods afterwards contrived his death as the punishment of his cowardliness.  The love of Achilles, like that of Alcestis, was courageous and true; for he was willing to avenge his lover Patroclus, although he knew that his own death would immediately follow:  and the gods, who honour the love of the beloved above that of the lover, rewarded him, and sent him to the islands of the blest.

Pausanias, who was sitting next, then takes up the tale: ­He says that Phaedrus should have distinguished the heavenly love from the earthly, before he praised either.  For there are two loves, as there are two Aphrodites ­one the daughter of Uranus, who has no mother and is the elder and wiser goddess, and the other, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, who is popular and common.  The first of the two loves has a noble purpose, and delights only in the intelligent nature of man, and is faithful to the end, and has no shadow of wantonness or lust.  The second is the coarser kind of love, which is a love of the body rather than of the soul, and is of women and boys as well as of men.  Now the actions of lovers vary, like every other sort of action, according to the manner of their performance.  And in different countries there is a difference of opinion about male loves.  Some, like the Boeotians, approve of them; others, like the Ionians, and most of the barbarians, disapprove of them; partly because they are aware of the political dangers which ensue from them, as may be seen in the instance of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.  At Athens and Sparta there is an apparent contradiction about them.  For at times they are encouraged, and then the lover is allowed to play all sorts of fantastic tricks; he may swear and forswear himself (and ’at lovers’ perjuries they say Jove laughs’); he may be a servant, and lie on a mat at the door of his love, without any loss of character; but there are also times when elders look grave and guard their young relations, and personal remarks are made.  The truth is that some of these loves are disgraceful and others honourable.  The vulgar love of the body which takes wing and flies away when the bloom of youth is over, is disgraceful, and so is the interested love of power or wealth; but the love of the noble mind is lasting.  The lover should be tested, and the beloved should not be too ready to yield.  The rule in our country is that the beloved may do the same service to the lover in the way of virtue which the lover may do to him.

A voluntary service to be rendered for the sake of virtue and wisdom is permitted among us; and when these two customs ­one the love of youth, the other the practice of virtue and philosophy ­meet in one, then the lovers may lawfully unite.  Nor is there any disgrace to a disinterested lover in being deceived:  but the interested lover is doubly disgraced, for if he loses his love he loses his character; whereas the noble love of the other remains the same, although the object of his love is unworthy:  for nothing can be nobler than love for the sake of virtue.  This is that love of the heavenly goddess which is of great price to individuals and cities, making them work together for their improvement.

The turn of Aristophanes comes next; but he has the hiccough, and therefore proposes that Eryximachus the physician shall cure him or speak in his turn.  Eryximachus is ready to do both, and after prescribing for the hiccough, speaks as follows: ­

He agrees with Pausanias in maintaining that there are two kinds of love; but his art has led him to the further conclusion that the empire of this double love extends over all things, and is to be found in animals and plants as well as in man.  In the human body also there are two loves; and the art of medicine shows which is the good and which is the bad love, and persuades the body to accept the good and reject the bad, and reconciles conflicting elements and makes them friends.  Every art, gymnastic and husbandry as well as medicine, is the reconciliation of opposites; and this is what Heracleitus meant, when he spoke of a harmony of opposites:  but in strictness he should rather have spoken of a harmony which succeeds opposites, for an agreement of disagreements there cannot be.  Music too is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm.  In the abstract, all is simple, and we are not troubled with the twofold love; but when they are applied in education with their accompaniments of song and metre, then the discord begins.  Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair Urania and the coarse Polyhymnia, who must be indulged sparingly, just as in my own art of medicine care must be taken that the taste of the epicure be gratified without inflicting upon him the attendant penalty of disease.

There is a similar harmony or disagreement in the course of the seasons and in the relations of moist and dry, hot and cold, hoar frost and blight; and diseases of all sorts spring from the excesses or disorders of the element of love.  The knowledge of these elements of love and discord in the heavenly bodies is termed astronomy, in the relations of men towards gods and parents is called divination.  For divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, and works by a knowledge of the tendencies of merely human loves to piety and impiety.  Such is the power of love; and that love which is just and temperate has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and friendship with the gods and with one another.  I dare say that I have omitted to mention many things which you, Aristophanes, may supply, as I perceive that you are cured of the hiccough.

Aristophanes is the next speaker: ­

He professes to open a new vein of discourse, in which he begins by treating of the origin of human nature.  The sexes were originally three, men, women, and the union of the two; and they were made round ­having four hands, four feet, two faces on a round neck, and the rest to correspond.  Terrible was their strength and swiftness; and they were essaying to scale heaven and attack the gods.  Doubt reigned in the celestial councils; the gods were divided between the desire of quelling the pride of man and the fear of losing the sacrifices.  At last Zeus hit upon an expedient.  Let us cut them in two, he said; then they will only have half their strength, and we shall have twice as many sacrifices.  He spake, and split them as you might split an egg with an hair; and when this was done, he told Apollo to give their faces a twist and re-arrange their persons, taking out the wrinkles and tying the skin in a knot about the navel.  The two halves went about looking for one another, and were ready to die of hunger in one another’s arms.  Then Zeus invented an adjustment of the sexes, which enabled them to marry and go their way to the business of life.  Now the characters of men differ accordingly as they are derived from the original man or the original woman, or the original man-woman.  Those who come from the man-woman are lascivious and adulterous; those who come from the woman form female attachments; those who are a section of the male follow the male and embrace him, and in him all their desires centre.  The pair are inseparable and live together in pure and manly affection; yet they cannot tell what they want of one another.  But if Hephaestus were to come to them with his instruments and propose that they should be melted into one and remain one here and hereafter, they would acknowledge that this was the very expression of their want.  For love is the desire of the whole, and the pursuit of the whole is called love.  There was a time when the two sexes were only one, but now God has halved them, ­much as the Lacedaemonians have cut up the Arcadians, ­and if they do not behave themselves he will divide them again, and they will hop about with half a nose and face in basso relievo.  Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may obtain the goods of which love is the author, and be reconciled to God, and find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world.  And now I must beg you not to suppose that I am alluding to Pausanias and Agathon (compare Protag.), for my words refer to all mankind everywhere.

Some raillery ensues first between Aristophanes and Eryximachus, and then between Agathon, who fears a few select friends more than any number of spectators at the theatre, and Socrates, who is disposed to begin an argument.  This is speedily repressed by Phaedrus, who reminds the disputants of their tribute to the god.  Agathon’s speech follows: ­

He will speak of the god first and then of his gifts:  He is the fairest and blessedest and best of the gods, and also the youngest, having had no existence in the old days of Iapetus and Cronos when the gods were at war.  The things that were done then were done of necessity and not of love.  For love is young and dwells in soft places, ­not like Ate in Homer, walking on the skulls of men, but in their hearts and souls, which are soft enough.  He is all flexibility and grace, and his habitation is among the flowers, and he cannot do or suffer wrong; for all men serve and obey him of their own free will, and where there is love there is obedience, and where obedience, there is justice; for none can be wronged of his own free will.  And he is temperate as well as just, for he is the ruler of the desires, and if he rules them he must be temperate.  Also he is courageous, for he is the conqueror of the lord of war.  And he is wise too; for he is a poet, and the author of poesy in others.  He created the animals; he is the inventor of the arts; all the gods are his subjects; he is the fairest and best himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in others; he makes men to be of one mind at a banquet, filling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection; the pilot, helper, defender, saviour of men, in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a strain of love.  Such is the discourse, half playful, half serious, which I dedicate to the god.

The turn of Socrates comes next.  He begins by remarking satirically that he has not understood the terms of the original agreement, for he fancied that they meant to speak the true praises of love, but now he finds that they only say what is good of him, whether true or false.  He begs to be absolved from speaking falsely, but he is willing to speak the truth, and proposes to begin by questioning Agathon.  The result of his questions may be summed up as follows: ­

Love is of something, and that which love desires is not that which love is or has; for no man desires that which he is or has.  And love is of the beautiful, and therefore has not the beautiful.  And the beautiful is the good, and therefore, in wanting and desiring the beautiful, love also wants and desires the good.  Socrates professes to have asked the same questions and to have obtained the same answers from Diotima, a wise woman of Mantinea, who, like Agathon, had spoken first of love and then of his works.  Socrates, like Agathon, had told her that Love is a mighty god and also fair, and she had shown him in return that Love was neither, but in a mean between fair and foul, good and evil, and not a god at all, but only a great demon or intermediate power (compare the speech of Eryximachus) who conveys to the gods the prayers of men, and to men the commands of the gods.

Socrates asks:  Who are his father and mother?  To this Diotima replies that he is the son of Plenty and Poverty, and partakes of the nature of both, and is full and starved by turns.  Like his mother he is poor and squalid, lying on mats at doors (compare the speech of Pausanias); like his father he is bold and strong, and full of arts and resources.  Further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge: ­in this he resembles the philosopher who is also in a mean between the wise and the ignorant.  Such is the nature of Love, who is not to be confused with the beloved.

But Love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he desire of the beautiful?  He desires, of course, the possession of the beautiful; ­but what is given by that?  For the beautiful let us substitute the good, and we have no difficulty in seeing the possession of the good to be happiness, and Love to be the desire of happiness, although the meaning of the word has been too often confined to one kind of love.  And Love desires not only the good, but the everlasting possession of the good.  Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love?  Because all men and women at a certain age are desirous of bringing to the birth.  And love is not of beauty only, but of birth in beauty; this is the principle of immortality in a mortal creature.  When beauty approaches, then the conceiving power is benign and diffuse; when foulness, she is averted and morose.

But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals?  Because they too have an instinct of immortality.  Even in the same individual there is a perpetual succession as well of the parts of the material body as of the thoughts and desires of the mind; nay, even knowledge comes and goes.  There is no sameness of existence, but the new mortality is always taking the place of the old.  This is the reason why parents love their children ­for the sake of immortality; and this is why men love the immortality of fame.  For the creative soul creates not children, but conceptions of wisdom and virtue, such as poets and other creators have invented.  And the noblest creations of all are those of legislators, in honour of whom temples have been raised.  Who would not sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones?  (Compare Bacon’s Essays, 8: ­’Certainly the best works and of greatest merit for the public have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men; which both in affection and means have married and endowed the public.’)

I will now initiate you, she said, into the greater mysteries; for he who would proceed in due course should love first one fair form, and then many, and learn the connexion of them; and from beautiful bodies he should proceed to beautiful minds, and the beauty of laws and institutions, until he perceives that all beauty is of one kindred; and from institutions he should go on to the sciences, until at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science of universal beauty, and then he will behold the everlasting nature which is the cause of all, and will be near the end.  In the contemplation of that supreme being of love he will be purified of earthly leaven, and will behold beauty, not with the bodily eye, but with the eye of the mind, and will bring forth true creations of virtue and wisdom, and be the friend of God and heir of immortality.

Such, Phaedrus, is the tale which I heard from the stranger of Mantinea, and which you may call the encomium of love, or what you please.

The company applaud the speech of Socrates, and Aristophanes is about to say something, when suddenly a band of revellers breaks into the court, and the voice of Alcibiades is heard asking for Agathon.  He is led in drunk, and welcomed by Agathon, whom he has come to crown with a garland.  He is placed on a couch at his side, but suddenly, on recognizing Socrates, he starts up, and a sort of conflict is carried on between them, which Agathon is requested to appease.  Alcibiades then insists that they shall drink, and has a large wine-cooler filled, which he first empties himself, and then fills again and passes on to Socrates.  He is informed of the nature of the entertainment; and is ready to join, if only in the character of a drunken and disappointed lover he may be allowed to sing the praises of Socrates: ­

He begins by comparing Socrates first to the busts of Silenus, which have images of the gods inside them; and, secondly, to Marsyas the flute-player.  For Socrates produces the same effect with the voice which Marsyas did with the flute.  He is the great speaker and enchanter who ravishes the souls of men; the convincer of hearts too, as he has convinced Alcibiades, and made him ashamed of his mean and miserable life.  Socrates at one time seemed about to fall in love with him; and he thought that he would thereby gain a wonderful opportunity of receiving lessons of wisdom.  He narrates the failure of his design.  He has suffered agonies from him, and is at his wit’s end.  He then proceeds to mention some other particulars of the life of Socrates; how they were at Potidaea together, where Socrates showed his superior powers of enduring cold and fatigue; how on one occasion he had stood for an entire day and night absorbed in reflection amid the wonder of the spectators; how on another occasion he had saved Alcibiades’ life; how at the battle of Delium, after the defeat, he might be seen stalking about like a pelican, rolling his eyes as Aristophanes had described him in the Clouds.  He is the most wonderful of human beings, and absolutely unlike anyone but a satyr.  Like the satyr in his language too; for he uses the commonest words as the outward mask of the divinest truths.

When Alcibiades has done speaking, a dispute begins between him and Agathon and Socrates.  Socrates piqués Alcibiades by a pretended affection for Agathon.  Presently a band of revellers appears, who introduce disorder into the feast; the sober part of the company, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others, withdraw; and Aristodemus, the follower of Socrates, sleeps during the whole of a long winter’s night.  When he wakes at cockcrow the revellers are nearly all asleep.  Only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon hold out; they are drinking from a large goblet, which they pass round, and Socrates is explaining to the two others, who are half-asleep, that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of tragedy ought to be a writer of comedy also.  And first Aristophanes drops, and then, as the day is dawning, Agathon.  Socrates, having laid them to rest, takes a bath and goes to his daily avocations until the evening.  Aristodemus follows.

...

If it be true that there are more things in the Symposium of Plato than any commentator has dreamed of, it is also true that many things have been imagined which are not really to be found there.  Some writings hardly admit of a more distinct interpretation than a musical composition; and every reader may form his own accompaniment of thought or feeling to the strain which he hears.  The Symposium of Plato is a work of this character, and can with difficulty be rendered in any words but the writer’s own.  There are so many half-lights and cross-lights, so much of the colour of mythology, and of the manner of sophistry adhering ­rhetoric and poetry, the playful and the serious, are so subtly intermingled in it, and vestiges of old philosophy so curiously blend with germs of future knowledge, that agreement among interpreters is not to be expected.  The expression ’poema magis putandum quam comicorum poetarum,’ which has been applied to all the writings of Plato, is especially applicable to the Symposium.

The power of love is represented in the Symposium as running through all nature and all being:  at one end descending to animals and plants, and attaining to the highest vision of truth at the other.  In an age when man was seeking for an expression of the world around him, the conception of love greatly affected him.  One of the first distinctions of language and of mythology was that of gender; and at a later period the ancient physicist, anticipating modern science, saw, or thought that he saw, a sex in plants; there were elective affinities among the elements, marriages of earth and heaven. (Aesch.  Frag.  Dan.) Love became a mythic personage whom philosophy, borrowing from poetry, converted into an efficient cause of creation.  The traces of the existence of love, as of number and figure, were everywhere discerned; and in the Pythagorean list of opposites male and female were ranged side by side with odd and even, finite and infinite.

But Plato seems also to be aware that there is a mystery of love in man as well as in nature, extending beyond the mere immediate relation of the sexes.  He is conscious that the highest and noblest things in the world are not easily severed from the sensual desires, or may even be regarded as a spiritualized form of them.  We may observe that Socrates himself is not represented as originally unimpassioned, but as one who has overcome his passions; the secret of his power over others partly lies in his passionate but self-controlled nature.  In the Phaedrus and Symposium love is not merely the feeling usually so called, but the mystical contemplation of the beautiful and the good.  The same passion which may wallow in the mire is capable of rising to the loftiest heights ­of penetrating the inmost secret of philosophy.  The highest love is the love not of a person, but of the highest and purest abstraction.  This abstraction is the far-off heaven on which the eye of the mind is fixed in fond amazement.  The unity of truth, the consistency of the warring elements of the world, the enthusiasm for knowledge when first beaming upon mankind, the relativity of ideas to the human mind, and of the human mind to ideas, the faith in the invisible, the adoration of the eternal nature, are all included, consciously or unconsciously, in Plato’s doctrine of love.

The successive speeches in praise of love are characteristic of the speakers, and contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads anew, and skims the highest points of each of them.  But they are not to be regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax.  They are fanciful, partly facetious performances, ’yet also having a certain measure of seriousness,’ which the successive speakers dedicate to the god.  All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical, but glimpses of truth appear in them.  When Eryximachus says that the principles of music are simple in themselves, but confused in their application, he touches lightly upon a difficulty which has troubled the moderns as well as the ancients in music, and may be extended to the other applied sciences.  That confusion begins in the concrete, was the natural feeling of a mind dwelling in the world of ideas.  When Pausanias remarks that personal attachments are inimical to despots.  The experience of Greek history confirms the truth of his remark.  When Aristophanes declares that love is the desire of the whole, he expresses a feeling not unlike that of the German philosopher, who says that ‘philosophy is home sickness.’  When Agathon says that no man ‘can be wronged of his own free will,’ he is alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (compare Arist.  Nic.  Ethics).  So naturally does Plato mingle jest and earnest, truth and opinion in the same work.

The characters ­of Phaedrus, who has been the cause of more philosophical discussions than any other man, with the exception of Simmias the Theban (Phaedrus); of Aristophanes, who disguises under comic imagery a serious purpose; of Agathon, who in later life is satirized by Aristophanes in the Thesmophoriazusae, for his effeminate manners and the feeble rhythms of his verse; of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and great vices, which meets us in history ­are drawn to the life; and we may suppose the less-known characters of Pausanias and Eryximachus to be also true to the traditional recollection of them (compare Phaedr., Protag.; and compare Sympos. with Phaedr.).  We may also remark that Aristodemus is called ‘the little’ in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (compare Symp.).

The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs:  Phaedrus and Pausanias being the ethical, Eryximachus and Aristophanes the physical speakers, while in Agathon and Socrates poetry and philosophy blend together.  The speech of Phaedrus is also described as the mythological, that of Pausanias as the political, that of Eryximachus as the scientific, that of Aristophanes as the artistic (!), that of Socrates as the philosophical.  But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato; ­they are the points of view of his critics, and seem to impede rather than to assist us in understanding him.

When the turn of Socrates comes round he cannot be allowed to disturb the arrangement made at first.  With the leave of Phaedrus he asks a few questions, and then he throws his argument into the form of a speech (compare Gorg., Protag.).  But his speech is really the narrative of a dialogue between himself and Diotima.  And as at a banquet good manners would not allow him to win a victory either over his host or any of the guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously represented as having been already gained over himself by her.  The artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession of ignorance (compare Menex.).  Even his knowledge of the mysteries of love, to which he lays claim here and elsewhere (Lys.), is given by Diotima.

The speeches are attested to us by the very best authority.  The madman Apollodorus, who for three years past has made a daily study of the actions of Socrates ­to whom the world is summed up in the words ’Great is Socrates’ ­he has heard them from another ‘madman,’ Aristodemus, who was the ‘shadow’ of Socrates in days of old, like him going about barefooted, and who had been present at the time.  ’Would you desire better witness?’ The extraordinary narrative of Alcibiades is ingeniously represented as admitted by Socrates, whose silence when he is invited to contradict gives consent to the narrator.  We may observe, by the way, (1) how the very appearance of Aristodemus by himself is a sufficient indication to Agathon that Socrates has been left behind; also, (2) how the courtesy of Agathon anticipates the excuse which Socrates was to have made on Aristodemus’ behalf for coming uninvited; (3) how the story of the fit or trance of Socrates is confirmed by the mention which Alcibiades makes of a similar fit of abstraction occurring when he was serving with the army at Potidaea; like (4) the drinking powers of Socrates and his love of the fair, which receive a similar attestation in the concluding scene; or the attachment of Aristodemus, who is not forgotten when Socrates takes his departure. (5) We may notice the manner in which Socrates himself regards the first five speeches, not as true, but as fanciful and exaggerated encomiums of the god Love; (6) the satirical character of them, shown especially in the appeals to mythology, in the reasons which are given by Zeus for reconstructing the frame of man, or by the Boeotians and Eleans for encouraging male loves; (7) the ruling passion of Socrates for dialectics, who will argue with Agathon instead of making a speech, and will only speak at all upon the condition that he is allowed to speak the truth.  We may note also the touch of Socratic irony, (8) which admits of a wide application and reveals a deep insight into the world: ­that in speaking of holy things and persons there is a general understanding that you should praise them, not that you should speak the truth about them ­this is the sort of praise which Socrates is unable to give.  Lastly, (9) we may remark that the banquet is a real banquet after all, at which love is the theme of discourse, and huge quantities of wine are drunk.

The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself, true to the character which is given him in the Dialogue bearing his name, is half-sophist, half-enthusiast.  He is the critic of poetry also, who compares Homer and Aeschylus in the insipid and irrational manner of the schools of the day, characteristically reasoning about the probability of matters which do not admit of reasoning.  He starts from a noble text:  ’That without the sense of honour and dishonour neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work.’  But he soon passes on to more common-place topics.  The antiquity of love, the blessing of having a lover, the incentive which love offers to daring deeds, the examples of Alcestis and Achilles, are the chief themes of his discourse.  The love of women is regarded by him as almost on an equality with that of men; and he makes the singular remark that the gods favour the return of love which is made by the beloved more than the original sentiment, because the lover is of a nobler and diviner nature.

There is something of a sophistical ring in the speech of Phaedrus, which recalls the first speech in imitation of Lysias, occurring in the Dialogue called the Phaedrus.  This is still more marked in the speech of Pausanias which follows; and which is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely confused and pedantic.  Plato is attacking the logical feebleness of the sophists and rhetoricians, through their pupils, not forgetting by the way to satirize the monotonous and unmeaning rhythms which Prodicus and others were introducing into Attic prose (compare Protag.).  Of course, he is ‘playing both sides of the game,’ as in the Gorgias and Phaedrus; but it is not necessary in order to understand him that we should discuss the fairness of his mode of proceeding.  The love of Pausanias for Agathon has already been touched upon in the Protagoras, and is alluded to by Aristophanes.  Hence he is naturally the upholder of male loves, which, like all the other affections or actions of men, he regards as varying according to the manner of their performance.  Like the sophists and like Plato himself, though in a different sense, he begins his discussion by an appeal to mythology, and distinguishes between the elder and younger love.  The value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and philosophy is at variance with modern and Christian notions, but is in accordance with Hellenic sentiment.  The opinion of Christendom has not altogether condemned passionate friendships between persons of the same sex, but has certainly not encouraged them, because though innocent in themselves in a few temperaments they are liable to degenerate into fearful evil.  Pausanias is very earnest in the defence of such loves; and he speaks of them as generally approved among Hellènes and disapproved by barbarians.  His speech is ‘more words than matter,’ and might have been composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint given that Plato is specially referring to them.  As Eryximachus says, ’he makes a fair beginning, but a lame ending.’

Plato transposes the two next speeches, as in the Republic he would transpose the virtues and the mathematical sciences.  This is done partly to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes ’the cause of wit in others,’ and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into juxtaposition, as if by accident.  A suitable ‘expectation’ of Aristophanes is raised by the ludicrous circumstance of his having the hiccough, which is appropriately cured by his substitute, the physician Eryximachus.  To Eryximachus Love is the good physician; he sees everything as an intelligent physicist, and, like many professors of his art in modern times, attempts to reduce the moral to the physical; or recognises one law of love which pervades them both.  There are loves and strifes of the body as well as of the mind.  Like Hippocrates the Asclepiad, he is a disciple of Heracleitus, whose conception of the harmony of opposites he explains in a new way as the harmony after discord; to his common sense, as to that of many moderns as well as ancients, the identity of contradictories is an absurdity.  His notion of love may be summed up as the harmony of man with himself in soul as well as body, and of all things in heaven and earth with one another.

Aristophanes is ready to laugh and make laugh before he opens his mouth, just as Socrates, true to his character, is ready to argue before he begins to speak.  He expresses the very genius of the old comedy, its coarse and forcible imagery, and the licence of its language in speaking about the gods.  He has no sophistical notions about love, which is brought back by him to its common-sense meaning of love between intelligent beings.  His account of the origin of the sexes has the greatest (comic) probability and verisimilitude.  Nothing in Aristophanes is more truly Aristophanic than the description of the human monster whirling round on four arms and four legs, eight in all, with incredible rapidity.  Yet there is a mixture of earnestness in this jest; three serious principles seem to be insinuated: ­first, that man cannot exist in isolation; he must be reunited if he is to be perfected:  secondly, that love is the mediator and reconciler of poor, divided human nature:  thirdly, that the loves of this world are an indistinct anticipation of an ideal union which is not yet realized.

The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain, and receives the real, if half-ironical, approval of Socrates.  It is the speech of the tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities.  In the idea of the antiquity of love he cannot agree; love is not of the olden time, but present and youthful ever.  The speech may be compared with that speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus in which he describes himself as talking dithyrambs.  It is at once a preparation for Socrates and a foil to him.  The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to ‘sunlit heights,’ but at the same time contrasts with the natural and necessary eloquence of Socrates.  Agathon contributes the distinction between love and the works of love, and also hints incidentally that love is always of beauty, which Socrates afterwards raises into a principle.  While the consciousness of discord is stronger in the comic poet Aristophanes, Agathon, the tragic poet, has a deeper sense of harmony and reconciliation, and speaks of Love as the creator and artist.

All the earlier speeches embody common opinions coloured with a tinge of philosophy.  They furnish the material out of which Socrates proceeds to form his discourse, starting, as in other places, from mythology and the opinions of men.  From Phaedrus he takes the thought that love is stronger than death; from Pausanias, that the true love is akin to intellect and political activity; from Eryximachus, that love is a universal phenomenon and the great power of nature; from Aristophanes, that love is the child of want, and is not merely the love of the congenial or of the whole, but (as he adds) of the good; from Agathon, that love is of beauty, not however of beauty only, but of birth in beauty.  As it would be out of character for Socrates to make a lengthened harangue, the speech takes the form of a dialogue between Socrates and a mysterious woman of foreign extraction.  She elicits the final truth from one who knows nothing, and who, speaking by the lips of another, and himself a despiser of rhetoric, is proved also to be the most consummate of rhetoricians (compare Menexenus).

The last of the six discourses begins with a short argument which overthrows not only Agathon but all the preceding speakers by the help of a distinction which has escaped them.  Extravagant praises have been ascribed to Love as the author of every good; no sort of encomium was too high for him, whether deserved and true or not.  But Socrates has no talent for speaking anything but the truth, and if he is to speak the truth of Love he must honestly confess that he is not a good at all:  for love is of the good, and no man can desire that which he has.  This piece of dialectics is ascribed to Diotima, who has already urged upon Socrates the argument which he urges against Agathon.  That the distinction is a fallacy is obvious; it is almost acknowledged to be so by Socrates himself.  For he who has beauty or good may desire more of them; and he who has beauty or good in himself may desire beauty and good in others.  The fallacy seems to arise out of a confusion between the abstract ideas of good and beauty, which do not admit of degrees, and their partial realization in individuals.

But Diotima, the prophetess of Mantineia, whose sacred and superhuman character raises her above the ordinary proprieties of women, has taught Socrates far more than this about the art and mystery of love.  She has taught him that love is another aspect of philosophy.  The same want in the human soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children, may become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire.  As the Christian might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness; or of divine loves under the figure of human (compare Eph.  ’This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church’); as the mediaeval saint might speak of the ‘fruitio Dei;’ as Dante saw all things contained in his love of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb all other loves and desires in the love of knowledge.  Here is the beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather, perhaps, a proof (of which there are many) that the so-called mysticism of the East was not strange to the Greek of the fifth century before Christ.  The first tumult of the affections was not wholly subdued; there were longings of a creature moving about in worlds not realized, which no art could satisfy.  To most men reason and passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea and fact.  The union of the greatest comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature, which may have existed in a far-off primeval age in the mind of some Hebrew prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now become an imagination only.  Yet this ‘passion of the reason’ is the theme of the Symposium of Plato.  And as there is no impossibility in supposing that ’one king, or son of a king, may be a philosopher,’ so also there is a probability that there may be some few ­perhaps one or two in a whole generation ­in whom the light of truth may not lack the warmth of desire.  And if there be such natures, no one will be disposed to deny that ’from them flow most of the benefits of individuals and states;’ and even from imperfect combinations of the two elements in teachers or statesmen great good may often arise.

Yet there is a higher region in which love is not only felt, but satisfied, in the perfect beauty of eternal knowledge, beginning with the beauty of earthly things, and at last reaching a beauty in which all existence is seen to be harmonious and one.  The limited affection is enlarged, and enabled to behold the ideal of all things.  And here the highest summit which is reached in the Symposium is seen also to be the highest summit which is attained in the Republic, but approached from another side; and there is ‘a way upwards and downwards,’ which is the same and not the same in both.  The ideal beauty of the one is the ideal good of the other; regarded not with the eye of knowledge, but of faith and desire; and they are respectively the source of beauty and the source of good in all other things.  And by the steps of a ’ladder reaching to heaven’ we pass from images of visible beauty (Greek), and from the hypotheses of the Mathematical sciences, which are not yet based upon the idea of good, through the concrete to the abstract, and, by different paths arriving, behold the vision of the eternal (compare Symp. (Greek) Republic (Greek) also Phaedrus).  Under one aspect ’the idea is love’; under another, ‘truth.’  In both the lover of wisdom is the ‘spectator of all time and of all existence.’  This is a ‘mystery’ in which Plato also obscurely intimates the union of the spiritual and fleshly, the interpenetration of the moral and intellectual faculties.

The divine image of beauty which resides within Socrates has been revealed; the Silenus, or outward man, has now to be exhibited.  The description of Socrates follows immediately after the speech of Socrates; one is the complement of the other.  At the height of divine inspiration, when the force of nature can no further go, by way of contrast to this extreme idealism, Alcibiades, accompanied by a troop of revellers and a flute-girl, staggers in, and being drunk is able to tell of things which he would have been ashamed to make known if he had been sober.  The state of his affections towards Socrates, unintelligible to us and perverted as they appear, affords an illustration of the power ascribed to the loves of man in the speech of Pausanias.  He does not suppose his feelings to be peculiar to himself:  there are several other persons in the company who have been equally in love with Socrates, and like himself have been deceived by him.  The singular part of this confession is the combination of the most degrading passion with the desire of virtue and improvement.  Such an union is not wholly untrue to human nature, which is capable of combining good and evil in a degree beyond what we can easily conceive.  In imaginative persons, especially, the God and beast in man seem to part asunder more than is natural in a well-regulated mind.  The Platonic Socrates (for of the real Socrates this may be doubted:  compare his public rebuke of Critias for his shameful love of Euthydemus in Xenophon, Memorabilia) does not regard the greatest evil of Greek life as a thing not to be spoken of; but it has a ridiculous element (Plato’s Symp.), and is a subject for irony, no less than for moral reprobation (compare Plato’s Symp.).  It is also used as a figure of speech which no one interpreted literally (compare Xen.  Symp.).  Nor does Plato feel any repugnance, such as would be felt in modern times, at bringing his great master and hero into connexion with nameless crimes.  He is contented with representing him as a saint, who has won ‘the Olympian victory’ over the temptations of human nature.  The fault of taste, which to us is so glaring and which was recognized by the Greeks of a later age (Athenaeus), was not perceived by Plato himself.  We are still more surprised to find that the philosopher is incited to take the first step in his upward progress (Symp.) by the beauty of young men and boys, which was alone capable of inspiring the modern feeling of romance in the Greek mind.  The passion of love took the spurious form of an enthusiasm for the ideal of beauty ­a worship as of some godlike image of an Apollo or Antinous.  But the love of youth when not depraved was a love of virtue and modesty as well as of beauty, the one being the expression of the other; and in certain Greek states, especially at Sparta and Thebes, the honourable attachment of a youth to an elder man was a part of his education.  The ’army of lovers and their beloved who would be invincible if they could be united by such a tie’ (Symp.), is not a mere fiction of Plato’s, but seems actually to have existed at Thebes in the days of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, if we may believe writers cited anonymously by Plutarch, Pelop.  Vit.  It is observable that Plato never in the least degree excuses the depraved love of the body (compare Charm.; Rep.; Laws; Symp.; and once more Xenophon, Mem.), nor is there any Greek writer of mark who condones or approves such connexions.  But owing partly to the puzzling nature of the subject these friendships are spoken of by Plato in a manner different from that customary among ourselves.  To most of them we should hesitate to ascribe, any more than to the attachment of Achilles and Patroclus in Homer, an immoral or licentious character.  There were many, doubtless, to whom the love of the fair mind was the noblest form of friendship (Rep.), and who deemed the friendship of man with man to be higher than the love of woman, because altogether separated from the bodily appetites.  The existence of such attachments may be reasonably attributed to the inferiority and seclusion of woman, and the want of a real family or social life and parental influence in Hellenic cities; and they were encouraged by the practice of gymnastic exercises, by the meetings of political clubs, and by the tie of military companionship.  They were also an educational institution:  a young person was specially entrusted by his parents to some elder friend who was expected by them to train their son in manly exercises and in virtue.  It is not likely that a Greek parent committed him to a lover, any more than we should to a schoolmaster, in the expectation that he would be corrupted by him, but rather in the hope that his morals would be better cared for than was possible in a great household of slaves.

It is difficult to adduce the authority of Plato either for or against such practices or customs, because it is not always easy to determine whether he is speaking of ’the heavenly and philosophical love, or of the coarse Polyhymnia:’  and he often refers to this (e.g. in the Symposium) half in jest, yet ‘with a certain degree of seriousness.’  We observe that they entered into one part of Greek literature, but not into another, and that the larger part is free from such associations.  Indecency was an element of the ludicrous in the old Greek Comedy, as it has been in other ages and countries.  But effeminate love was always condemned as well as ridiculed by the Comic poets; and in the New Comedy the allusions to such topics have disappeared.  They seem to have been no longer tolerated by the greater refinement of the age.  False sentiment is found in the Lyric and Elegiac poets; and in mythology ’the greatest of the Gods’ (Rep.) is not exempt from evil imputations.  But the morals of a nation are not to be judged of wholly by its literature.  Hellas was not necessarily more corrupted in the days of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, or of Plato and the Orators, than England in the time of Fielding and Smollett, or France in the nineteenth century.  No one supposes certain French novels to be a representation of ordinary French life.  And the greater part of Greek literature, beginning with Homer and including the tragedians, philosophers, and, with the exception of the Comic poets (whose business was to raise a laugh by whatever means), all the greater writers of Hellas who have been preserved to us, are free from the taint of indecency.

Some general considerations occur to our mind when we begin to reflect on this subject. (1) That good and evil are linked together in human nature, and have often existed side by side in the world and in man to an extent hardly credible.  We cannot distinguish them, and are therefore unable to part them; as in the parable ’they grow together unto the harvest:’  it is only a rule of external decency by which society can divide them.  Nor should we be right in inferring from the prevalence of any one vice or corruption that a state or individual was demoralized in their whole character.  Not only has the corruption of the best been sometimes thought to be the worst, but it may be remarked that this very excess of evil has been the stimulus to good (compare Plato, Laws, where he says that in the most corrupt cities individuals are to be found beyond all praise). (2) It may be observed that evils which admit of degrees can seldom be rightly estimated, because under the same name actions of the most different degrees of culpability may be included.  No charge is more easily set going than the imputation of secret wickedness (which cannot be either proved or disproved and often cannot be defined) when directed against a person of whom the world, or a section of it, is predisposed to think evil.  And it is quite possible that the malignity of Greek scandal, aroused by some personal jealousy or party enmity, may have converted the innocent friendship of a great man for a noble youth into a connexion of another kind.  Such accusations were brought against several of the leading men of Hellas, e.g.  Cimon, Alcibiades, Critias, Demosthenes, Epaminondas:  several of the Roman emperors were assailed by similar weapons which have been used even in our own day against statesmen of the highest character. (3) While we know that in this matter there is a great gulf fixed between Greek and Christian Ethics, yet, if we would do justice to the Greeks, we must also acknowledge that there was a greater outspokenness among them than among ourselves about the things which nature hides, and that the more frequent mention of such topics is not to be taken as the measure of the prevalence of offences, or as a proof of the general corruption of society.  It is likely that every religion in the world has used words or practised rites in one age, which have become distasteful or repugnant to another.  We cannot, though for different reasons, trust the representations either of Comedy or Satire; and still less of Christian Apologists. (4) We observe that at Thebes and Lacedemón the attachment of an elder friend to a beloved youth was often deemed to be a part of his education; and was encouraged by his parents ­it was only shameful if it degenerated into licentiousness.  Such we may believe to have been the tie which united Asophychus and Cephisodorus with the great Epaminondas in whose companionship they fell (Plutarch, Amat.; Athenaeus on the authority of Theopompus). (5) A small matter:  there appears to be a difference of custom among the Greeks and among ourselves, as between ourselves and continental nations at the present time, in modes of salutation.  We must not suspect evil in the hearty kiss or embrace of a male friend ‘returning from the army at Potidaea’ any more than in a similar salutation when practised by members of the same family.  But those who make these admissions, and who regard, not without pity, the victims of such illusions in our own day, whose life has been blasted by them, may be none the less resolved that the natural and healthy instincts of mankind shall alone be tolerated (Greek); and that the lesson of manliness which we have inherited from our fathers shall not degenerate into sentimentalism or effeminacy.  The possibility of an honourable connexion of this kind seems to have died out with Greek civilization.  Among the Romans, and also among barbarians, such as the Celts and Persians, there is no trace of such attachments existing in any noble or virtuous form.

(Compare Hoeck’s Creta and the admirable and exhaustive article of Meier in Ersch and Grueber’s Cyclopedia on this subject; Plutarch, Amatores; Athenaeus; Lysias contra Simonem; Aesch. c.  Timarchum.)

The character of Alcibiades in the Symposium is hardly less remarkable than that of Socrates, and agrees with the picture given of him in the first of the two Dialogues which are called by his name, and also with the slight sketch of him in the Protagoras.  He is the impersonation of lawlessness ­’the lion’s whelp, who ought not to be reared in the city,’ yet not without a certain generosity which gained the hearts of men, ­strangely fascinated by Socrates, and possessed of a genius which might have been either the destruction or salvation of Athens.  The dramatic interest of the character is heightened by the recollection of his after history.  He seems to have been present to the mind of Plato in the description of the democratic man of the Republic (compare also Alcibiades 1).

There is no criterion of the date of the Symposium, except that which is furnished by the allusion to the division of Arcadia after the destruction of Mantinea.  This took place in the year B.C. 384, which is the forty-fourth year of Plato’s life.  The Symposium cannot therefore be regarded as a youthful work.  As Mantinea was restored in the year 369, the composition of the Dialogue will probably fall between 384 and 369.  Whether the recollection of the event is more likely to have been renewed at the destruction or restoration of the city, rather than at some intermediate period, is a consideration not worth raising.

The Symposium is connected with the Phaedrus both in style and subject; they are the only Dialogues of Plato in which the theme of love is discussed at length.  In both of them philosophy is regarded as a sort of enthusiasm or madness; Socrates is himself ‘a prophet new inspired’ with Bacchanalian revelry, which, like his philosophy, he characteristically pretends to have derived not from himself but from others.  The Phaedo also presents some points of comparison with the Symposium.  For there, too, philosophy might be described as ‘dying for love;’ and there are not wanting many touches of humour and fancy, which remind us of the Symposium.  But while the Phaedo and Phaedrus look backwards and forwards to past and future states of existence, in the Symposium there is no break between this world and another; and we rise from one to the other by a regular series of steps or stages, proceeding from the particulars of sense to the universal of reason, and from one universal to many, which are finally reunited in a single science (compare Rep.).  At first immortality means only the succession of existences; even knowledge comes and goes.  Then follows, in the language of the mysteries, a higher and a higher degree of initiation; at last we arrive at the perfect vision of beauty, not relative or changing, but eternal and absolute; not bounded by this world, or in or out of this world, but an aspect of the divine, extending over all things, and having no limit of space or time:  this is the highest knowledge of which the human mind is capable.  Plato does not go on to ask whether the individual is absorbed in the sea of light and beauty or retains his personality.  Enough for him to have attained the true beauty or good, without enquiring precisely into the relation in which human beings stood to it.  That the soul has such a reach of thought, and is capable of partaking of the eternal nature, seems to imply that she too is eternal (compare Phaedrus).  But Plato does not distinguish the eternal in man from the eternal in the world or in God.  He is willing to rest in the contemplation of the idea, which to him is the cause of all things (Rep.), and has no strength to go further.

The Symposium of Xenophon, in which Socrates describes himself as a pander, and also discourses of the difference between sensual and sentimental love, likewise offers several interesting points of comparison.  But the suspicion which hangs over other writings of Xenophon, and the numerous minute references to the Phaedrus and Symposium, as well as to some of the other writings of Plato, throw a doubt on the genuineness of the work.  The Symposium of Xenophon, if written by him at all, would certainly show that he wrote against Plato, and was acquainted with his works.  Of this hostility there is no trace in the Memorabilia.  Such a rivalry is more characteristic of an imitator than of an original writer.  The (so-called) Symposium of Xenophon may therefore have no more title to be regarded as genuine than the confessedly spurious Apology.

There are no means of determining the relative order in time of the Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo.  The order which has been adopted in this translation rests on no other principle than the desire to bring together in a series the memorials of the life of Socrates.