I. As both these men’s lives are now before us, let us briefly recapitulate them, observing as we do so the points in which they differ from one another. These are as follows:First, Pompeius obtained his power and renown by the most strictly legitimate means, chiefly by his own exertions when assisting Sulla in the liberation of Italy; while Agesilaus obtained the throne in defiance of both human and divine laws, for he declared Leotychides to be a bastard, although his brother had publicly recognised him as his own son, and he also by a quibble evaded the oracle about a lame reign.

Secondly, Pompeius both respected Sulla while he lived, gave his body an honourable burial, in spite of Lepidus, when he died, and married Sulla’s daughter to his own son Faustus; while Agesilaus, on a trifling pretext, disgraced and ruined Lysander. Yet Sulla gave Pompeius nothing more than he possessed himself, whereas Lysander made Agesilaus king of Sparta, and leader of the united armies of Greece.

Thirdly, the political wrong-doings of Pompeius were chiefly committed to serve his relatives, Caesar and Scipio; while Agesilaus saved Sphodrias from the death which he deserved for his outrage upon the Athenians merely to please his son, and vigorously supported Phoebidas when he committed a similar breach of the peace against the Thebans. And generally, we may say that while Pompeius only injured the Romans through inability to refuse the demands of friends, or through ignorance, Agesilaus ruined the Lacedaemonians by plunging them into war with Thebes, to gratify his own angry and quarrelsome temper.

II. If it be right to attribute the disasters which befel either of those men to some special ill-luck which attended them, the Romans had no reason whatever to suspect any such thing of Pompeius; but Agesilaus, although the Lacedaemonians well knew the words of the oracle, yet would not allow them to avoid “a lame reign.” Even if Leotychides had been proved a thousand times to be a bastard, the family of Eurypon could have supplied Sparta with a legitimate and sound king, had not Lysander, for the sake of Agesilaus, deceived them as to the true meaning of the oracle. On the other hand, we have no specimen of the political ingenuity of Pompeius which can be compared with that admirable device of Agesilaus, when he readmitted the survivors of the battle of Leuktra to the privileges of Spartan citizens, by permitting the laws to sleep for one day. Pompeius did not even think it his duty to abide by the laws which he had himself enacted, but broke them to prove his great power to his friends. Agesilaus, when forced either to abolish the laws or to ruin his friends, discovered an expedient by which the laws did his friends no hurt, and yet had not to be abolished in order to save them. I also place to the credit of Agesilaus that unparalleled act of obedience, when on receiving a despatch from Sparta he abandoned the whole of his Asian enterprise. For Agesilaus did not, like Pompeius, enrich the state by his own exploits, but looking solely to the interests of his country, he gave up a position of greater glory and power than any Greek before or since ever held, with the single exception of Alexander.

III. Looking at them from another point of view, I suppose that even Xenophon himself would not think of comparing the number of the victories won by Pompeius, the size of the armies which he commanded, and that of those which he defeated, with any of the victories of Agesilaus; although Xenophon has written so admirably upon other subjects, that he seems to think himself privileged to say whatever he pleases about the life of his favourite hero. I think also that the two men differ much in their treatment of their enemies. The Greek wished to sell the Thebans for slaves, and to drive the Messenians from their country, although Thebes was the mother city of Sparta, and the Messenians sprang from the same stock as the Lacedaemonians. In his attempts to effect this, he all but lost Sparta herself, and did lose the Spartan empire; while Pompeius even gave cities to be inhabited by such of the Mediterranean pirates as abandoned that mode of life; and when Tigranes the king of Armenia was in his power, he did not lead him in his triumph, but chose rather to make him an ally of Rome; observing, that he preferred an advantage which would last for all time to the glory which only endured for a single day.

If, however, we place the chief glory of a general in feats of arms and strategy, the Laconian will be found greatly to excel the Roman. Agesilaus did not abandon Sparta even when it was attacked by seventy thousand men, when he had but few troops with which to defend it, and those too all disheartened by their recent defeat at Leuktra. Pompeius, on hearing that Caesar, with only five thousand three hundred men, had taken a town in Italy, left Rome in terror, either yielding to this small force like a coward, or else falsely supposing it to be more numerous than it was. He carefully carried off his own wife and children, but left the families of his partizans unprotected in Rome, when he ought either to have fought for the city against Caesar, or else to have acknowledged him as his superior and submitted to him, for Caesar was both his fellow-countryman and his relative. Yet, after having violently objected to the prorogation of Caesar’s term of office as consul, he put it in his power to capture Rome itself, and to say to Metellus that he regarded him and all the rest of the citizens as prisoners of war.

IV. Agesilaus, when he was the stronger, always forced his enemy to fight, and when weaker, always avoided a battle. By always practising this, the highest art of a general, he passed through his life without a single defeat; whereas Pompeius was unable to make use of his superiority to Caesar by sea, and was forced by him to hazard everything on the event of a land battle; for as soon as Caesar had defeated him, he at once obtained possession of all Pompeius’s treasure, supplies, and command of the sea, without gaining which he must inevitably have been defeated, even without a battle. Pompeius’s excuse for his conduct is, in truth, his severest condemnation. It is very natural and pardonable for a young general to be influenced by clamours and accusations of remissness and cowardice, so as to abandon the course which he had previously decided upon as the safest; but that the great Pompeius, of whom the Romans used to say that the camp was his home, and that he only made an occasional campaign in the senate house, at a time when his followers called the consuls and generals of Rome traitors and rebels, and when they knew that he was in possession of absolute uncontrolled power, and had already conducted so many campaigns with such brilliant success as commander-in-chiefthat he should be moved by the scoffs of a Favonius or a Domitius, and hazard his army and his life lest they should call him Agamemnon, is a most discreditable supposition. If he were so sensitive on the point of honour, he ought to have made a stand at the very beginning, and fought a battle in defence of Rome, not first to have retreated, giving out that he was acting with a subtlety worthy of Themistokles himself, and then to have regarded every day spent in Thessaly without fighting as a disgrace. The plain of Pharsalia was not specially appointed by heaven as the arena in which he was to contend with Caesar for the empire of the world, nor was he summoned by the voice of a herald either to fight or to avow himself vanquished. There were many plains, and innumerable cities and countries which his command of the sea would have enabled him to reach, if he had wished to imitate Fabius Maximus, Marius, Lucullus, or Agesilaus himself, who resisted the same kind of clamour at Sparta, when his countrymen wished to fight the Thebans and protect their native land; while in Egypt he endured endless reproaches, abuse, and suspicion from Nektanebis because he forbade him to fight, and by consistently carrying out his own judicious policy saved the Egyptians against their will. He not only guided Sparta safely through that terrible crisis, but was enabled to win a victory over the Thebans in the city itself, which he never could have done had he yielded to the entreaties of the Lacedaemonians to fight when their country was first invaded. Thus it happened that Agesilaus was warmly praised by those whose opinions he had overruled, while Pompeius made mistakes to please his friends, and afterwards was reproached by them for what he had done. Some historians tell us, however, that he was deceived by his father-in-law, Scipio, who with the intention of embezzling and converting to his own use the greater part of the treasure which Pompeius brought from Asia, urged him to fight as soon as possible, as though there was likely to be a scarcity of money. In these respects, then, we have reviewed their respective characters.

V. Pompeius went to Egypt of necessity, fleeing for his life; but Agesilaus went there with the dishonourable purpose of acting as general for the barbarians, in order that he might employ the money which he earned by that means in making war upon the Greeks. We blame the Egyptians for their conduct to Pompeius; but the Egyptians have equal reason to complain of the conduct of Agesilaus towards themselves; for though Pompeius trusted them and was betrayed, yet Agesilaus deserted the man who trusted him, and joined the enemies of those whom he went out to assist.