ATTACKED BY THE FEDERALS ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE VICKSBURG CAPTURE OF BERWICK’S BAY.

Increased activity of the enemy at Berwick’s Bay in the first days of April indicated an advance; and to guard against the danger from Grand Lake, Fuller, whose wounds in the Cotton affair were partially healed, was sent to Alexandria to complete repairs on the Queen and convert one or two other steamers into gunboats.  It was hoped that he might harass the enemy on Grand Lake, delay the landing of troops, and aid the little garrison at Butte a la Rose in defending the Atchafalaya.  Fuller was as energetic as brave, but the means at his disposal were very limited.  Accompanied by a tender, he descended the Atchafalaya on the Queen, leaving orders for his steamers to follow as soon as they were armed.  They failed to reach him, and his subsequent fate will be mentioned.

On the 10th of April the enemy had assembled at Berwick’s sixteen thousand men under Weitzel, Emory, and Grover ("Report on the Conduct of the War,” vol. ii., page 309).  On the 12th Weitzel and Emory, twelve thousand strong, advanced up the Teche against Bisland, while Grover, with four thousand men, embarked on transports to turn our position by Grand Lake.  Weitzel and Emory came in sight of our lines before nightfall, threw forward skirmishers, opened guns at long range, and bivouacked; and our scouts reported the movement on the lake.  My dispositions were as follows:  Mouton, with six hundred men and six guns, held the left from the lake to the Teche.  The Diana in the bayou and two twenty-fours on the right bank guarded the stream and the main road; and sixteen hundred men, with twelve guns, prolonged the line to the railway embankment on our extreme right, held by Green with his dismounted horsemen.  One of Green’s regiments, Colonel Reilly, the 2d Louisiana cavalry, Colonel Vincent, recently embodied, and a section of guns, were at Hutchin’s Point on Grand Lake.

The cannonading ceased at dark, and when all was quiet I rode up to Franklin, thirteen miles, to look after my rear.  A staff officer had been previously sent to direct the removal of stores from New Iberia, order down Clack’s battalion, some ninety men, from the salt mines, and communicate with Fuller at Butte a la Rose; but the country around the Butte was flooded, and he was unable to reach it.

Above Franklin the Teche makes a great bend to the east and approaches Grand Lake at Hutchin’s Point, where there was a shell bank, and a good road leading to the high ground along the bayou.  The road to New Iberia leaves the Teche at Franklin to avoid this bend, and runs due north across the prairie.  Just clear of the village it enters a small wood, through which flows a sluggish stream, the Bayou Yokely, crossed by a bridge.  In the wood and near the stream the ground was low and boggy, impassable for wagons except on a causeway.  The distance from Hutchin’s Point to Yokely Bridge was less than that from Bisland; and this bridge, held by the enemy, made escape from the latter place impossible; yet to retreat without fighting was, in the existing condition of public sentiment, to abandon Louisiana.

I remained at Franklin until after midnight, when, learning from Reilly that no landing had been made at Hutchin’s, I returned to Bisland.  The enemy was slow in moving on the 13th, apparently waiting for the effect of his turning movement to be felt.  As the day wore on he opened his guns, and gradually increased his fire until it became very heavy.  Many of his field pieces were twenty-pounder Parrotts, to which we had nothing to reply except the Parrott on the Diana and the twenty-fours; and, as our supply of ammunition was small, Major Brent desired to reserve it for an emergency.

With the exception of Green’s command, the troops on the right of the Teche were raw, and had never been in action.  As shot and shell tore over the breastwork behind which they were lying, much consternation was exhibited, and it was manifest that an assault, however feeble, would break a part of the line.  It was absolutely necessary to give the men some morale; and, mounting the breastwork, I made a cigarette, struck fire with my briquet, and walked up and down, smoking.  Near the line was a low tree with spreading branches, which a young officer, Bradford by name, proposed to climb, so as to have a better view.  I gave him my field glass, and this plucky youngster sat in his tree as quietly as in a chimney corner, though the branches around were cut away.  These examples, especially that of Captain Bradford, gave confidence to the men, who began to expose themselves, and some casualties were suffered in consequence.

From the extreme right Colonel Green sent word that his corner was uncomfortably hot, and I found it so.  The battery near him was cut up, its captain, Sayres, severely wounded, and Major Brent withdrew it.  Green was assured that there were no places on our line particularly cool, and there was nothing to be done but submit to the pounding.

A heavy fire was concentrated on the twenty-fours and the Diana.  Captain Semmes, son of Admiral Semmes of Alabama fame, and an officer of much coolness in action, had been detached from his battery and placed in command of the boat.  A message from him informed me that the Diana was disabled.  She was lying against the bank under a severe fire.  The waters of the bayou seemed to be boiling like a kettle.  An officer came to the side of the boat to speak to me, but before he could open his mouth a shell struck him, and he disappeared as suddenly as Harlequin in a pantomine.  Semmes then reported his condition.  Conical shells from the enemy’s Parrotts had pierced the railway iron, killed and wounded several of his gunners and crew, and cut a steam pipe.  Fortunately, he had kept down his fires, or escaping steam would have driven every one from the boat.  It was necessary to take her out of fire for repairs.  To lose even temporarily our best gun, the thirty-pounder, was hard, but there was no help for it.

During the day staff officers were frequently sent to Mouton to ascertain his condition; and, as the bridge over which they passed was in the line of fire directed on the Diana and the twenty-fours, the promenade was not a holiday affair.

Several times in the afternoon the enemy appeared to be forming for an assault; and after my men had become steady, I hoped an attack would be made, feeling confident of repulsing it.

Night brought quiet, and no report came from Reilly at Hutchin’s.  No news seemed good news; for I would have ample time to provide against a debarkation north of Hutchin’s.  The force at Bisland was in fine spirits.  Protected by the breastwork, we had suffered but little; and the Diana was expected to resume her position before morning.

At 9 P.M. appeared Colonel Reilly to make the following report:  The enemy had landed at Hutchin’s, several thousand strong, with artillery, and advanced to the Teche, pushing our people back to and through Franklin.  Reilly had left his command in camp below Franklin, toward Bisland, but thought the enemy had not reached the village at nightfall.  Here was pleasant intelligence!  There was no time to ask questions.  I hoped to cut my way through, but feared the loss of wagons and material.  Mouton was directed to withdraw from the left bank of the bayou, start the artillery and trains to Franklin, and follow with the infantry.  Green, with his mounted men and a section of guns, was to form the rear guard; and Semmes was told to hurry his repairs and get the Diana to Franklin by dawn.  As there was no means of removing the two twenty-fours, they were to be disabled.  Leaving Major Brent to look after his artillery and Major Levy to superintend the prompt execution of orders, I rode for Franklin, taking Reilly with me.  Reaching his camp, three miles from the town, I found the men sleeping and the trains parked, though the enemy was so near at hand.  The camp was aroused, the troops were ordered under arms, and Reilly left to move up at once, with his trains following.

Two hours after midnight, and the village of Franklin was as silent as the grave.  Beyond the last houses, toward New Iberia, a faint light from some camp fires could be seen.  Were the Federals in possession of the road?  Approaching the fires cautiously, I saw a sentinel walking his post, and, as he passed between me and the light, marked his ragged Confederate garb.  Major Clack had reached this point after dark, and intended to resume his march to Bisland in the morning.  He speedily got his little band under arms, and in the darkness we beat the wood to our right.  Not a picket nor scout was found, and Yokely Causeway and Bridge were safe.  From the farther edge of the wood, in open fields, Federal camp fires were visible.  It was a wonderful chance.  Grover had stopped just short of the prize.  Thirty minutes would have given him the wood and bridge, closing the trap on my force.  Reilly, with his own and Vincent’s regiments of horse and the two guns, came up.  The guns were placed on the road near the Teche, with orders to stand fast.  Reilly and Vincent dismounted their men, sent horses well to the rear, and formed line in the wood to the left of the guns, with Clack to the left of Vincent.

The first light of dawn made objects visible and aroused the Federals, some two hundred yards distant.  Advancing rapidly from the wood, our line poured in a fire and rushed forward with a shout.  Taken by surprise, the Federals fell back, leaving a battery on their right exposed.  To prevent the sleepy gunners from opening, I rode straight on the guns, followed by my staff and four mounted couriers, and the gunners made off.  All this was easy enough.  Surprise and the uncertain light had favored us; but broad day exposed our weakness, and the enemy threw forward a heavy line of skirmishers.  It was necessary for us to regain the wood, now four hundred yards to the rear.  Officers behaved admirably in seconding my efforts to encourage and steady their men and keep them well in hand.  Our two guns on the road fired rapidly and effectively, but the Federals came on in numbers, and their fire began to tell.  Reilly was killed, Vincent wounded in the neck, and many others went down.  At this moment the peculiar whistle of a Parrott shell was heard, and Semmes appeared with the Diana.

The enemy’s advance was arrested; Gray’s infantry from Bisland came up; the wood was occupied; Mouton with the remaining infantry arrived, and all danger was over.  Green, in command of the rear guard, showed great vigor, and prevented Emory and Weitzel from pressing the trains.  Besides the twenty-fours mentioned, one gun of Cornay’s battery, disabled in the action of the 13th, was left at Bisland, and with these exceptions every wagon, pot, or pan was brought off.  Two months later these guns were recaptured, much to the delight of our men.

The trains over Yokely Bridge and on the road to New Iberia, Mouton skillfully withdrew from Grover’s front as Green entered Franklin from below.  To facilitate this, Semmes was directed to work the Diana’s gun to the last moment, then get ashore with his crew, and blow up the boat.  With his usual coolness Semmes carried out his instructions, but, remaining too long near the Diana to witness the explosion he had arranged, was captured.

The object sought in holding on to Bisland was attained.  From this time forward I had the sympathy and support of the people, and my troops were full of confidence.  Our retreat to Opelousas, by New Iberia and Vermilionville, was undisturbed, Green with his horse keeping the enemy in check.  Indeed, the pursuit was without energy or vigor.  The first defensible position was at the Bayou Vermilion, thirty miles south of Opelousas.  Here, after an action of some warmth, the enemy was held back until night and the bridge destroyed.  From Opelousas the infantry, by easy marches, moved to and up the valley of the Red River, where supplies were abundant.  The country was open, and the great superiority of his numbers enabled the enemy to do as he liked.  Mouton, with Green’s horse, marched west of Opelousas.  It was hoped that he could find subsistence between that place and the Mermentou River, and be in position to fall on the enemy’s rear and capture any small force left on the Teche.  I supposed that the Federal army, after reaching Alexandria, would turn to the east, cross the Mississippi, and invest Port Hudson; and this supposition proved to be correct.

Meantime, accompanied by a tender, Fuller on the Queen entered Grand Lake on the 13th, expecting his two armed steamers to follow.  On the morning of the 14th the Federal gunboats from Berwick’s Bay appeared, and Fuller, dispatching the tender up the Atchafalaya to hasten his steamers, prepared for action, as he doubtless would have done in presence of Admiral Farragut’s fleet.  A shell set fire to the Queen, and Fuller with his crew was captured.  On the 20th the enemy’s gunboats, assisted by four companies of infantry, captured Butte a la Rose with two twenty-four-pounders and sixty men.  Semmes, Fuller, and the prisoners taken from the Queen and at the Butte, were on the transport Maple Leaf with Captain Fusilier, and escaped in the manner related, excepting Fuller, who from wounds received in his last action was unable to walk.  Remaining in charge of the Maple Leaf until his friends were ashore, he restored her to the Federals, was taken to Fort Delaware, and died in prison.  A braver man never lived.

The Federal army reached Opelousas on the 20th of April, and remained there until the 5th of May, detained by fear of Mouton’s horse to the west.  Unfortunately, this officer was forced by want of supplies to move to the Sabine, more than a hundred miles away, and thrown out of the game for many days.

In the “Report on the Conduct of the War,” vol. ii., pp. 309 and 310, the Federal General Banks makes the following statements:  “During these operations on the Teche we captured over twenty-five hundred prisoners and twenty-two guns; destroyed three gunboats and eight steamers”; and further:  “A dispatch from Governor Moore to General Taylor was intercepted, in which Taylor was directed to fall back into Texas.”  At the time, my entire force in western Louisiana was under three thousand, and it is rather startling to learn that we were all captured.  Two twenty-fours and one field gun were abandoned at Bisland, and two twenty-fours lost at Butte a la Rose.  We scuttled and burnt the Cotton at Bisland, and blew up the Diana (captured from the enemy) at Franklin.  The Queen (also captured) was destroyed in action on Grand Lake.  The Federals caught two small steamers, the Ellen and Cornie, in the Atchafalaya, and we destroyed two in the Teche.  The other four reported by General Banks must have come from the realm of the multitude of prisoners and guns.  It also appears from the intercepted dispatch of Governor Moore that major-generals of the Confederate army were under the orders of State governors an original discovery.

The delay of the Federals at Opelousas gave abundant time to remove our stores from Alexandria.  General Kirby Smith, the new departmental commander, was advised to retire to Shreveport, two hundred miles up Red River, where, remote from danger or disturbance, he could organize his administration.  Threatened in rear, Fort De Russy was untenable; so the place was dismantled and the little garrison withdrawn.  On the 16th of April Admiral Porter with several gunboats had passed the Vicksburg batteries, and the abandonment of De Russy now left the Red River open to him.  He reached Alexandria on the 9th of May, a few hours in advance of Banks’s army.  From the 8th to the 11th of the same month some of his gunboats bombarded Fort Beauregard, on the Washita, but were driven off by the garrison under Colonel Logan.

At this time I was sorely stricken by domestic grief.  On the approach of the enemy to Alexandria my family embarked on a steamer for Shreveport.  Accustomed to the gentlest care, my good wife had learned to take action for herself, insisting that she was unwilling to divert the smallest portion of my time from public duty.  A moment to say farewell, and she left with our four children, two girls and two boys, all pictures of vigorous health.  Before forty-eight hours had passed, just as she reached Shreveport, scarlet fever had taken away our eldest boy, and symptoms of the disease were manifest in the other children.  The bereaved mother had no acquaintance in Shreveport, but the Good Samaritan appeared in the person of Mr. Ulger Lauve, a resident of the place, who took her to his house and showed her every attention, though he exposed his own family to great danger from contagion.  The second boy died a few days later.  The two girls, older and stronger, recovered.  I was stunned by this intelligence, so unexpected, and it was well perhaps that the absorbing character of my duties left no time for the indulgence of private grief; but it was sad to think of the afflicted mother, alone with her dead and dying, deprived of the consolation of my presence.  Many days passed before we met, and then but for an hour.

My infantry, hardly a thousand strong, with the trains, had marched to Natchitoches and camped, and some mounted scouts to observe the enemy were kept in the vicinity of Alexandria.

On page 309 of the “Report” before quoted, General Banks says:  “A force under Generals Weitzel and Dwight pursued the enemy nearly to Grand Écore, so thoroughly dispersing his forces that he was unable to reorganize a respectable army until July.”  A party of Federal horse crossed Cane River at Monette’s Ferry, forty miles below Grand Écore, and chased a mounted orderly and myself about four miles, then turned back to Alexandria; but I maintain that the orderly and I were not dispersed, for we remained together to the end.

The Federal army withdrew from Alexandria on the 13th of May, and on the 23d crossed the Mississippi and proceeded to invest Port Hudson; whereupon I returned by steamer to Alexandria, directing the infantry at Natchitoches to march back to the Teche to unite with Mouton.  Having obtained supplies on the Sabine, Mouton and Green, the latter promoted to brigadier for gallant conduct, returned to the Teche country, but arrived too late to cut off the enemy, who with large plunder had crossed to the east side of Berwick’s Bay, where he had fortifications and gunboats.

At Alexandria a communication from General Kirby Smith informed me that Major-General Walker, with a division of infantry and three batteries, four thousand strong, was on the march from Arkansas, and would reach me within the next few days; and I was directed to employ Walker’s force in some attempt to relieve Vicksburg, now invested by General Grant, who had crossed the Mississippi below on the 1st of May.

The peculiar position of Vicksburg and the impossibility of approaching it from the west bank of the Mississippi have been stated, and were now insisted upon.  Granting the feasibility of traversing the narrow peninsula opposite the place, seven miles in length and swept by guns afloat on both sides, what would be gained?  The problem was to withdraw the garrison, not to reenforce it; and the correctness of this opinion was proved by the fact that Pemberton could not use the peninsular route to send out messengers.

On the other hand, I was confident that, with Walker’s force, Berwick’s Bay could be captured, the Lafourche overrun, Banks’s communication with New Orleans interrupted, and that city threatened.  Its population of two hundred thousand was bitterly hostile to Federal rule, and the appearance of a Confederate force on the opposite bank of the river would raise such a storm as to bring General Banks from Port Hudson, the garrison of which could then unite with General Joseph Johnston in the rear of General Grant.  Too late to relieve Port Hudson, I accomplished all the rest with a force of less than three thousand of all arms.

Remonstrances were of no avail.  I was informed that all the Confederate authorities in the east were urgent for some effort on our part in behalf of Vicksburg, and that public opinion would condemn us if we did not try to do something.  To go two hundred miles and more away from the proper theatre of action in search of an indefinite something was hard; but orders are orders.  Time was so important that I determined to run the risk of moving Walker by river, though the enemy could bring gunboats into the lower Red and Washita, as well as into the Tensas, and had some troops in the region between this last and the Mississippi.  Steamers were held in readiness, and as soon as Walker arrived his command was embarked and taken up the Tensas.  I went on in advance to give notice to the boats behind of danger; for, crowded with troops, these would have been helpless in the event of meeting an enemy.

Without interference, a point on the Tensas opposite Vicksburg was reached and the troops disembarked.  Here Captain Harrison’s mounted men, previously mentioned, met us.  For safety the steamers were sent down the Tensas to its junction with the Washita, and up the last above Fort Beauregard; and bridges were thrown over the Tensas and Macon to give communication with the terminus of the Monroe Railway.

Walker rapidly advanced to the village of Richmond, midway between the Tensas and Mississippi, some twelve miles from each, where he surprised and captured a small Federal party.  At Young’s Point, ten miles above Vicksburg, on the west bank of the river, the enemy had a fortified camp, and a second one four miles above Young’s, both occupied by negro troops.  Holding one brigade in reserve at the point of separation of the roads, Walker sent a brigade to Young’s and another to the camp above.  Both attacks were made at dawn, and, with the loss of some scores of prisoners, the negroes were driven over the levee to the protection of gunboats in the river.

Fifteen miles above Vicksburg the Yazoo River enters the Mississippi from the east, and twenty-five miles farther up Steele’s Bayou connects the two rivers.  Before reaching the Mississippi the Yazoo makes a bend to the south, approaching the rear of Vicksburg.  The right of Grant’s army rested on this bend, and here his supplies were landed, and his transports were beyond the reach of annoyance from the west bank of the Mississippi.

As foreseen, our movement resulted, and could result, in nothing.  Walker was directed to desist from further efforts on the river, and move to Monroe, where steamers would be in readiness to return his command to Alexandria, to which place I pushed on in advance.  Subsequently, General Kirby Smith reached Monroe direct from Shreveport, countermanded my orders, and turned Walker back into the region east of the Tensas, where this good soldier and his fine division were kept idle for some weeks, until the fall of Vicksburg.  The time wasted on these absurd movements cost us the garrison of Port Hudson, nearly eight thousand men; but the pressure on General Kirby Smith to do something for Vicksburg was too strong to be resisted.

At Alexandria I found three small regiments of Texan horse, just arrived.  Together they numbered six hundred and fifty, and restored the loss suffered in action and in long marches by the forces on the Teche.  Colonel (afterward brigadier) Major, the senior officer, was ordered to move these regiments to Morgan’s Ferry on the Atchafalaya; and by ambulance, with relays of mules, I reached Mouton and Green on the lower Teche in a few hours.

The Federals had a number of sick and convalescent at Berwick’s Bay, but the effective force was small.  Some works strengthened their positions, and there was a gunboat anchored in the bay.  Mouton and Green were directed to collect small boats, skiffs, flats, even sugar-coolers, in the Teche; and the importance of secrecy was impressed upon them.  Pickets were doubled to prevent communication with the enemy, and only a few scouts permitted to approach the bay.  Returning north to Morgan’s Ferry, I crossed the Atchafalaya with Major’s command, and moved down the Fordoche and Grosse-Tete, bayous draining the region between the Atchafalaya and Mississippi.  A short march brought us near the Fausse Riviere, an ancient bed of the Mississippi, some miles west of the present channel, and opposite Port Hudson.

Halting the command on the Fordoche, I rode out to the estate of an acquaintance on Fausse Riviere, whence the noise of battle at Port Hudson could be heard.  Two ladies of the family, recently from New Orleans, told me that the Federal force left in the city would not exceed a thousand men; that a small garrison occupied a work near Donaldsonville, where the Lafourche leaves the Mississippi, and with this exception there were no troops on the west bank of the river.  From our position on the Fordoche to the Bayou Boeuf, in rear of the Federal camp at Berwick’s Bay, was over a hundred miles.  The route followed the Grosse-Tete to Plaquemine on the Mississippi, and to escape observation Plaquemine must be passed in the night.  Below this point there was an interior road that reached the Lafourche some distance below Donaldsonville.  Minute instructions and guides were given to Major.

It was now the 19th of June, and he was expected to reach the Boeuf on the morning of the 23d.  The necessity of punctuality was impressed on him and his officers, as I would attack Berwick’s at dawn on the 23d, and their cooeperation was required to secure success.  Indeed, their own safety depended on promptness.  The men carried rations, with some forage, and wagons were sent back across the Atchafalaya.  Major moved in time to pass Plaquemine, twenty odd miles, before midnight, and I hastened to Mouton’s camp below Bisland, reaching it in the afternoon of the 22d.

Fifty-three small craft, capable of transporting three hundred men, had been collected.  Detachments for the boats were drawn from Green’s brigade and the 2d Louisiana horse.  Major Hunter of Baylor’s Texans was placed in command, with Major Blair of the 2d Louisiana as second.  After nightfall Hunter embarked his men, and paddled down the Teche to the Atchafalaya and Grand Lake.  Fortunately, there was no wind; for the slightest disturbance of the lake would have swamped his fleet.  He had about twelve miles to make, and was expected to reach before daylight the northeast end of the island, a mile from Berwick’s and the railway terminus, where he was instructed to lie quiet until he heard General Green’s guns from the west side of the bay, then rush on the rear of the Federal works.  During the night Green placed a battery opposite the gunboat and railway station, and deployed five hundred dismounted men along the shores of the bay, here eight hundred yards wide.  The battery was run up by hand, and every precaution to secure silence taken.  At dawn of the 23d (June, 1863) our guns opened on the gunboat, and speedily drove it away.  Fire was then directed on the earthwork, where the enemy, completely surprised, had some heavy pieces with which he attempted to reply.  A shout was heard in his rear, and Hunter with his party came rushing on.  Resistance ceased at once; but before Hunter closed in, a train of three engines and many carriages escaped from the station toward the Boeuf, seven miles away.  I crossed in a “pirogue” with Green, and sent back two flats and several skiffs found on the east side for his men, who used them to get over, their horses swimming alongside.

It was a scene of the wildest excitement and confusion.  The sight of such quantities of “loot” quite upset my hungry followers.  Wandering through the station and warehouse, filled with stores, a Texan came upon a telegraphic instrument, clicking in response to one down the line.  Supposing this to be some infernal machine for our destruction, he determined to save his friends at the risk of his own life, and smashed the instrument with his heavy boots; then rushed among his comrades, exclaiming:  “Boys! they is trying to blow us up.  I seen the triggers a-working, but I busted ’em.”

Mouton now crossed with some infantry, and order was restored; and Green, who had brought over several scores of horses, mounted his men and followed the rail toward the Boeuf.  Before reaching it he heard the noise of the train; then, firing and moving forward, found the train stopped, and Major, up to time, in possession of the bridge.  The capture of the train was of importance, as it enabled us to operate the thirty miles of rail between Berwick’s and the Lafourche.

In the combined movements described, Green and Major had set out from points more than a hundred miles apart, the latter marching through a region in possession or under control of the enemy, while the boat expedition of Hunter passed over twelve miles of water; yet all reached their goal at the appointed time.  Although every precaution had been taken to exclude mistakes and insure cooeperation, such complete success is not often attained in combined military movements; and I felt that sacrifices were due to Fortune.

In his rapid march from the Fordoche Major captured seventy prisoners and burned two steamers at Plaquemine.  He afterward encountered no enemy until he reached Thibodeaux, near which place, at Lafourche Crossing, there was a stockade held by a small force to protect the railway bridge.  Colonel Pyron, with two hundred men, was detached to mask or carry this stockade, and Major passed on to the Boeuf.  Pyron’s attack was repulsed with a loss of fifty-five killed and wounded, Pyron among the latter; but the enemy, after destroying the bridge, abandoned the post and three guns and retired to New Orleans.

The spoils of Berwick’s were of vast importance.  Twelve guns, thirty-twos and twenty-fours (among which were our old friends from Bisland), seventeen hundred prisoners, with many small arms and accouterments, and great quantities of quarter-master’s, commissary, ordnance, and medical stores, fell into our hands.  For the first time since I reached western Louisiana I had supplies, and in such abundance as to serve for the Red River campaign of 1864.  Three fourths of the prisoners were sick and convalescent men left here, as well as the stores, by General Banks, when he marched up the Teche in April.  Excepting those too ill to be moved, the prisoners were paroled and sent to New Orleans under charge of their surgeons.

I was eager to place batteries on the Mississippi to interrupt Banks’s communication with New Orleans; but the passage of Berwick’s Bay consumed much time, though we worked night and day.  We were forced to dismount guns and carriages and cross them piecemeal in two small flats, and several days elapsed before a little steamer from the upper Teche could be brought down to assist.  It must be remembered that neither artillery nor wagons accompanied Major’s march from the Fordoche.

On the 24th General Green, with Major’s men and such of his own as had crossed their horses, marched for Donaldsonville, sixty-five miles, and General Mouton, with two regiments of infantry, took rail to Thibodeaux and sent pickets down the line to Bayou Des Allemands, twenty-five miles from New Orleans.  Our third regiment of infantry remained at the bay, where Major Brent was at work mounting the captured guns on the southern end of the island and on the western shore opposite.  Gunboats could stop the crossing, and entrance from the Gulf was open.  While we might drive off “tin-clads” the enemy had boats capable of resisting field guns, and it is remarkable that, from the 23d of June to the 22d of July, he made no attempt to disturb us at Berwick’s Bay.

General Green reached the vicinity of Donaldsonville on the 27th, and found an earthwork at the junction of the Lafourche and Mississippi.  This work, called Fort Butler, had a ditch on three sides, and the river face was covered by gunboats in the stream.  The garrison was reported to be from two to three hundred negro troops.  After some correspondence with Mouton, Green determined to assault the place, and drew around it five hundred of his men in the night of the 27th.  Two hours before dawn of the 28th Colonel Joseph Phillipps led his regiment, two hundred strong, to the attack.  Darkness and ignorance of the ground caused much blundering.  The levee above the fort was mistaken for the parapet, and some loss was sustained from the fire of gunboats.  Changing direction, Phillipps came upon the ditch, unknown to him as to Green, who had been deceived by false information.  The ditch passed, Phillipps mounted the parapet and fell dead as he reached the top.  An equally brave man, Major Ridley, worthy of his leader, followed, and, calling on his men to come, jumped into the work.  Frightened by his appearance, the enemy abandoned the parapet; but finding that Ridley was alone, returned and captured him.  A dozen men would have carried the place; but the ditch afforded protection from fire, and the men, disheartened by Phillipps’s death, could not be induced to leave it.  Indeed, the largest part of our loss, ninety-seven, was made up of these men, who remained in the ditch until daylight and surrendered.

The above statements are taken from the report of Major Ridley, made after he was exchanged.  The affair was unfortunate.  Open to fire from vessels on the river, Fort Butler was of no value to us, and the feeble garrison would have remained under cover; but, like the Irishman at Donnybrook, Green’s rule was to strike an enemy whenever he saw him a most commendable rule in war, and covering a multitude of such small errors as the attack on Fort Butler.

Meantime I was detained at Berwick’s Bay, engaged in hurrying over and forward artillery and arranging to transport the more valuable stores into the interior.  It was not, however, until near the end of the first week in July that I succeeded in placing twelve guns on the river below Donaldsonville.  Fire was opened, one transport destroyed and several turned back.  Gunboats attempted to dislodge us, but were readily driven away by the aid of Green’s men, dismounted and protected by the levee.  For three days the river was closed to transports, and our mounted scouts were pushed down to a point opposite Kenner, sixteen miles above New Orleans.  A few hours more, and the city would have been wild with excitement; but in war time once lost can not be regained.  The unwise movement toward Vicksburg retarded operations at Berwick’s and on the river, and Port Hudson fell.  During the night of the 10th of July intelligence of its surrender on the previous day reached me, and some hours later the fall of Vicksburg on the 4th was announced.

An iron-clad or two in Berwick’s Bay, and the road at Plaquemine held by troops, supported by vessels in the river, would close all egress from the Lafourche, and the enemy could make arrangements to bag us at his leisure; while Grant’s army and Porter’s fleet, now set free, might overrun the Washita and Red River regions and destroy Walker’s division, separated from me by a distance of more than three hundred miles.  The outlook was not cheerful, but it was necessary to make the best of it, and at all hazards save our plunder.  Batteries and outposts were ordered in to the Lafourche; Green concentrated his horse near Donaldsonville, the infantry moved to Labadieville to support him, and Mouton went to Berwick’s, where he worked night and day in crossing stores to the west side of the bay.

On the 13th of July Generals Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight, with six thousand men, came from Port Hudson, disembarked at Donaldsonville, and advanced down the Lafourche.  Ordering up the infantry, I joined Green, but did not interfere with his dispositions, which were excellent.  His force, fourteen hundred, including a battery, was dismounted and in line.  As I reached the field the enemy came in sight, and Green led on his charge so vigorously as to drive the Federals into Donaldsonville, capturing two hundred prisoners, many small arms, and two guns, one of which was the field gun lost at Bisland.  The affair was finished too speedily to require the assistance of the infantry.

Undisturbed, we removed not only all stores from Berwick’s, but many supplies from the abundant Lafourche country, including a large herd of cattle driven from the prairies of Opelousas by the Federals some weeks before.  On the 21st of July, we ran the engines and carriages on the railway into the bay, threw in the heavy guns, and moved up the Teche, leaving pickets opposite Berwick’s.  Twenty-four hours thereafter the enemy’s scouts reached the bay.  The timidity manifested after the action of the 13th may be ascribed to the fertile imagination of the Federal commander, General Banks, which multiplied my force of less than three thousand of all arms into nine or twelve thousand.

In the “Report on the Conduct of the War,” vol. ii., pages 313 and 314, General Banks states: 

“Orders had been sent to Brashear City [Berwick’s] to remove all stores, but to hold the position, with the aid of gunboats, to the last.  The enemy succeeded in crossing Grand Lake by means of rafts, and surprised and captured the garrison, consisting of about three hundred men.  The enemy, greatly strengthened in numbers, then attacked the works at Donaldsonville, on the Mississippi, which were defended by a garrison of two hundred and twenty-five men, including convalescents, commanded by Major J.D.  Bullen, 28th Maine volunteers.  The attack was made on the morning of the 28th of June, and lasted until daylight.  The garrison made a splendid defense, killing and wounding more than their own number, and capturing as many officers and nearly as many men as their garrison numbered.  The enemy’s troops were under the command of General Green of Texas, and consisted of the Louisiana troops under General Taylor and five thousand Texas cavalry, making a force of nine to twelve thousand in that vicinity.

“The troops engaged in these different operations left but four hundred men for the defense of New Orleans.  Upon the surrender of Port Hudson it was found that the enemy had established batteries below, on the river, cutting off our communication with New Orleans, making it necessary to send a large force to dislodge them.  On the 9th of July seven transports, containing all my available force, were sent below against the enemy in the vicinity of Donaldsonville.  The country was speedily freed from his presence, and Brashear City [Berwick’s] was recaptured on the 22d of July.”

Here are remarkable statements.  Fourteen hundred men and the vast stores at Berwick’s (Brashear City) are omitted, as is the action of the 13th of July with “all my [his] available force....  The country was speedily freed from his [my] presence, and Brashear City reoccupied,” though I remained in the country for eleven days after the 9th, and had abandoned Brashear City twenty-four hours before the first Federal scout made his appearance.  The conduct of Major J.D.  Bullen, 28th Maine volunteers, with two hundred and twenty-five negroes, “including convalescents,” appears to have surpassed that of Leonidas and his Spartans; but, like the early gods, modern democracies are pleased by large utterances.

While we were engaged in these operations on the Lafourche, a movement of Grant’s forces from Natchez was made against Fort Beauregard on the Washita.  The garrison of fifty men abandoned the place on the 3d of September, leaving four heavy and four field guns, with their ammunition, to be destroyed or carried off by the enemy.