Fortunately for the public, as soon
as Colonel Stewart left, Gordon commenced, in addition
to all his other duties, writing journals of events
at Khartoum, in which doubtless he recapitulated much
of what had been given in the Diary of Events he had
sent with Stewart. On September 21st, the General
received authentic news that an expedition was actually
on its way to Khartoum. On September 30th he sent
five steamers to Metemmah to meet the advancing army,
so that there should be no delay on his part in rendering
help. By the steamers he sent his Journals made
up to date, and it is from these that authentic information
is obtained. The despatch of these steamers to
Metemmah was a most unselfish act on his part; indeed,
it is by no means certain that their presence at Khartoum
might not have prevented the crowning disaster later
on. He calculated that each steamer was worth
to him at least 2000 men, so that he practically reduced
his force by something like 10,000 men in order to
assist the Relief Expedition. Since the Nile
had risen these vessels had considerably increased
in utility, and they had been most valuable in the
defence of Khartoum. Each was well provisioned,
so that they would not have required to draw on the
slender resources of the garrison.
On November 5th Gordon says:
“A curious thing has happened;
my friend Kitchener sent up the post; he wrapped
the letters in some old newspapers (he gave me no
news in his letter), the old newspapers were thrown
out into the garden: there a clerk who knew
some English found them blowing about, and gave
them to the apothecary of the hospital, who knows
English. The doctor found him reading them,
saw date 15th September, and secured them for
me; they are like gold, as you may imagine, since
we have had no news since 24th February 1884!
These papers gave us far more information than
any of your letters. Did K. send them by
accident or on purpose?”
In the newspaper appeared the following
statement in the form of a heading: “Lord
Wolseley seen off at Victoria Station for the Gordon
Relief Expedition.” To this Gordon appended,
“No! for the relief of the Soudan garrisons;”
and he extracted another statement to the following
effect, “An official telegram received here from
Wady Halfa states that, owing to the unprecedented
lowness of the Nile, no confidence is felt in the
practicability of hauling boats over the cataracts
till the end of September.” General Gordon
pasted this into the Journal, and wrote opposite to
it, “It was not a low Nile, it was an average
Nile, only you were too late” a
verdict which events only too completely justified.
It will be of interest to give here a few brief extracts
selected from Gordon’s remarks regarding the
Relief Expedition:
“If it is right to send
up an expedition now, why was it not right
to send it up before?”
“We are a wonderful
people; it was never our Government which made
us a great nation; our Government
has been ever the drag on our
wheels.”
“I am afraid to say
what numbers have been killed through this
present policy, certainly
some 80,000; and it is not over yet.”
“I altogether decline the imputation
that the projected expedition has come to relieve
me. It has come to save our national honour in
extricating the garrisons, &c., from a position
in which our action in Egypt had placed these
garrisons. I was relief expedition No. I.
They are relief expedition No. II. As
for myself I could make good my retreat at any
moment if I wished. Now realise what would happen
if this first relief expedition was to bolt and
the steamers fall into the hands of the Mahdi;
this second relief expedition (for the
honour of England engaged in extricating garrisons)
would be somewhat hampered. We, the first
and second, are equally engaged for the
honour of England. This is fair logic. Earle
comes up to extricate garrisons and (I hope) succeeds.
Earle does not come to extricate me.... I
am not the rescued lamb, and I will not
be.”
In spite of his great anxiety, and
the worries through which he was called to pass, Gordon
never seemed to lose his sense of humour. There
are many amusing entries in his Journals, of which
the following may be taken as fair specimens:
“A horse escaped from
the Arabs, formerly belonging to Government.
It gave no information;
but from its action, may be supposed not
to believe in the Mahdi.”
“It is really amusing to find
(when one can scarcely call one’s life one’s
own) one’s servant, already with one wife
(which most men find is enough), coming and asking
for three days’ leave, in order to take
another wife. Yet such was the case, a few days
ago, with one of my servants.”
His comments on the Mahdi are also amusing:
“The Greek (refugee) who came
in told the Greek Consul that the Mahdi puts pepper
under his nails, and when he receives visitors then
he touches his eyes and weeps copiously; that he eats
a few grains of dhoora openly, but in the interior
of the house he has fine feeding and drinks alcoholic
drinks.... After this pepper business!
I think I shall drop any more trouble in writing him
letters, trying to convince or persuade him to
reasonable measures. I must confess that
the pepper business has sickened me; I had hitherto
hoped I had to do with a regular fanatic, who believed
in his mission, but when one comes to pepper in
the finger nails, it is rather humiliating to
have to succumb to him, and somehow I have the
belief that I shall not have to do so....
“One cannot help being amused
at this pepper business. Those who come in
for pardon, come in on their knees, with a halter round
their neck. The Mahdi rises, having scratched
his eyes and obtained a copious flow of tears,
and takes off the halter. As the production
of tears is generally considered the proof of sincerity,
I would recommend the Mahdi’s receipt to
Cabinet Ministers, justifying some job.”
It is not necessary to enumerate the
number of encounters that took place between Gordon’s
men and the Mahdists; he took little personal part
in these engagements. The fiery spirit of the
young soldier, who led his own troops in China, had
not expended itself, but was kept in subjection by
a higher spirit. He knew that much was staked
on his life, and that the risk was too great.
There was no one to succeed him; his death meant defeat
to his cause, and ruin to the country for which he
had done so much. Speaking generally, therefore,
he did not expose himself more than he could help.
But though he avoided rashness in any form, he was
a good deal exposed to danger, and the palace in which
he lived was an object on which the enemy expended
much of their ammunition.
The Mahdi had kept himself as far
from Gordon’s reach as possible, by remaining
at Obeid, while his troops conducted the investment
of Khartoum. But when the new year of the Mohammedan
Calendar commenced, on October 21st, and the Mahdi
had heard, through the capture of Colonel Stewart’s
papers, of the difficulties that Gordon was in, he
appears to have mustered his courage and to have brought
up 30,000 men to intimidate Gordon. When called
upon to surrender the following was the reply that
Gordon returned: “If you are the real Mahdi,
dry up the Nile and come over, and I will surrender.”
It is said that the Mahdi took him literally, and
lost 3000 men in an attempt to walk across the Nile!
Be that as it may, the Mahdi ordered an attack, which
was conducted with some vigour. It was resisted
successfully by Gordon, aided by his twelve steamers
and 800 men, but the fighting must have been severe,
for it lasted for eight hours. The bursting of
mines and torpedoes carried more havoc into the ranks
of the enemy than Gordon’s men did. Material
things of this kind at least responded to the will
of him who organised them, and did not prove cowardly
or treacherous.
The Mahdi then retreated to a more
respectful distance, and, it is said, hid himself
in a cave, prophesying that there should be sixty
days of rest, and that then blood would flow like water.
The real truth of the matter is that the Mahdi’s
military advisers saw that there was little use in
attempting to capture Khartoum by direct assault.
Having full information from Stewart’s papers
that the food supply could not last long, they prudently
decided to starve out the garrison.
English officers have before now gone
through trying sieges, as, for instance, Lawrence
and Havelock at Lucknow, and Sale at Jellalabad, but
it would be difficult in the whole of the military
history of England to find a case in which an officer
was left single-handed to contend with such frightful
odds for so long a time. The siege lasted 317
days, very nearly as long as the siege of Sebastopol.
English officers have usually had a few of their own
countrymen, on whom they could rely and with whom
they could take counsel, to share their hardships.
But Gordon stood alone, and the troops he had were
not only foreigners, but, with a few exceptions, they
were cowards, and he knew that very few of them were
really loyal to him. Nothing but his extraordinary
personality kept the force together. His opinion
of these miserable troops is frequently expressed
in his Journals. The following passages are examples:
“October 31st. I
have ever felt the greatest insecurity respecting
the lines, for I believe 100 determined men would carry
them with ease, if they made their attack on the
Shaggyeh or Bashi-Bazouk part.... The Cairo
Turkish Bashi-Bazouks, the Shaggyeh, and the Fellaheen
soldiers, I will back against any troops in the
world for cowardice.”
“November 17th. I
certainly lay claim to having commanded, more often
than any other man, cowardly troops, but this experience
of 1884 beats all past experiences; the worst
of the matter is that you cannot believe one word
the officers say.”
On November 2nd he writes: “Six
weeks’ consumption! and then the sponge must
be thrown up.” Fortunately, he discovered
on November 11th that a robbery by some corrupt Egyptian
officials had been going on, and that 2-1/2 million
lbs. of biscuit worth L9000 at any time,
but at least L26,000 during the siege had
been stolen. The recovery of this helped him
to hold out a little longer. On December 13th
he writes:
“We have in hand 1,796,000 rounds
Remington ammunition; 540 rounds Krupp; 6000 rounds
mountain gun ammunition; L140 in specie; L18,000 in
paper in treasury! L60,000 in town in paper; 110,000
okes of biscuits; 700 ard ebs of dhoora....
“We are going to send
down the Bordeen the day after to-morrow,
and with her I shall send
this Journal. If some effort is not made
before ten days’ time
the town will fall.”
The following day, December 14th,
was the last as far as his ability to communicate
with the outer world was concerned. Though he
held on for nearly six weeks longer, nothing is known
accurately after the Bordeen left Khartoum.
Writing to the commander of the approaching Expeditionary
Force, he says:
“I send down the steamer Bordeen
to-morrow, with vol. vi. of my private journal,
containing account of the events in Khartoum from
November 5 to December 14. The state of affairs
is such that one cannot foresee further than five
to seven days, after which the town may at any
time fall. I have done all in my power to hold
out, but I own I consider the position is extremely
critical, almost desperate; and I say this without
any feeling of bitterness with respect to Her
Majesty’s Government, but merely as a matter
of fact. Should the town fall, it will be
questionable whether it will be worth the while
of Her Majesty’s Government to continue its
expedition; for it is certain that the fall of
Khartoum will ensure that of Kassala and Senaar.”
Another letter of the same date was
received by Sir Gerald Graham in Cairo, saying:
“Farewell. You will never hear from me again.
I fear there will be treachery in the garrison, and
all will be over by Christmas.” The following
message, addressed to a friend in Cairo, and also
dated December 14, was received only on February 24:
“All is up. I expect a catastrophe in ten
days’ time. It would not have been so if
our people had kept me better informed as to their
intentions. My adieux to all.” He
also wrote to his sister:
“This may be the last letter you
will receive from me, for we are on our last legs,
owing to the delay of the expedition. However,
God rules all, and, as He will rule to His glory
and our welfare, His will be done. I fear,
owing to circumstances, that my affairs pecuniarily
are not over-bright.... Your affectionate
brother,
“C. G. GORDON.
“P.S. I
am quite happy, thank God, and like Lawrence, I have
‘tried to do
my duty.’”
It has already been mentioned that
August 12th was the day when the English Government
yielded to the pressure of public opinion and gave
orders to commence the building of the boats which
were to convey the troops to relieve Khartoum.
It is unnecessary to follow in detail the history
of that force. Suffice it to say that the commander,
Lord Wolseley, received at Korti a message from General
Gordon, dated 14th December 1884, “Come quickly,
come together; do not leave Berber behind you.”
But the verbal message which the messenger delivered
was far worse, “Famine was in Khartoum; the
Arabs knew it: there was not a moment to be lost.”
At once, Sir Herbert Stewart, with
a small force, was sent to dash through the desert
from Korti to Metemmah. He, Colonel Burnaby, and
several other brave men, fell on that famous march,
for the enemy at two points warmly disputed their
passage. The loss in these conflicts, at Abu
Klea on the 17th, and at Metemmah on the 19th, was
appalling for the Arabs, but such victories often
repeated would soon have done for the conquerors.
The entire force reached Gubat on the Nile on January
20th, and there they found the four steamers which
Gordon had sent down. Originally there were five
steamers, but one had been sunk. The six journals
were handed over to Sir Charles Wilson, who, by right
of seniority, had taken command on the death of Sir
Herbert Stewart. A note was also given to Sir
Charles, which had been brought by a messenger from
Khartoum, to the following effect: “Khartoum
all right, could hold out for years. C.
G. Gordon, 29th December 1884.”
It was at first generally believed
that this document was but one of many sent out in
order to deceive the enemy, but it is now thought that
his real object was not to deceive the enemy, who knew
only too well the actual state of affairs, so much
as to get them to let his messengers pass, if caught
by them, and that then the messengers could deliver
a viva voce message, and tell the appalling
truth.
Sir Charles Wilson, with two officers
and a small detachment of Englishmen belonging to
the Sussex regiment (late 35th), started on the morning
of the 24th for Khartoum in two of Gordon’s steamers.
The delay that occurred between the arrival of the
English force at Gubat, and the start up the river
for Khartoum, has been freely criticised by the press.
The journey from Gubat to Khartoum being entirely by
water, Lord Charles Beresford, a well-known naval
officer, had been attached to Stewart’s force,
with orders “at once to take over and man any
steamer or steamers that were either there or in the
vicinity,” and to “use every means in
his power to get one or more of the steamers into an
efficient state.” Unfortunately, the British
force that reached the Nile was in a very different
condition from that which left Korti in such high
spirits. Rapid marching and hard fighting had
demanded a heavy penalty, and the death-roll and sick-list
were very high; among others, Lord Charles Beresford
himself was on the latter.
The whole force under Sir Charles
Wilson did not equal a battalion of infantry on its
war strength, and it included a large percentage of
sick and wounded to be looked after. In addition
to this, reports came into camp that large bodies
of Arabs were advancing from the north as well as
from the south, with the object of annihilating the
force. The commander, therefore, had an anxious
time of it, and was compelled to undertake a reconnaissance
to ascertain the truth of the rumours, and to make
all sorts of preparations for defending his little
camp with its sick and wounded against any sudden
onslaught. He was unconscious of the fact that
time was so pressing, and that instead of his camp
being attacked, it would be Khartoum, where Gordon
had for so long held out against overwhelming odds.
Thus the valuable hours of the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd
glided away, all too rapidly.
Even when Wilson’s force was
ready to start, Lord Charles Beresford was not able
to accompany it, and Sir Charles had to go without
him. The distance to Khartoum was about 100 miles,
but it was not until January 28th that the steamers
got clear of the Sixth Cataract, which was about half-way
between Gubat and Khartoum. For about a dozen
miles large boulders and rocks caused delay and danger.
No sooner had the steamers got clear of these obstacles
than all eyes were strained to catch sight of the
Egyptian flag floating over Khartoum. The steamers
made rapid progress in the open water, and as the
distance was reduced, the square roof of the palace
where Gordon had resided came into view. But there
was no Egyptian flag flying from it, and the reception
accorded to the relieving force, although a warm one,
was not such as Gordon would have given. His
eyes had often been strained looking to the quarter
whence he thought his grateful countrymen would surely
send aid, but he had looked in vain. Now, when
the tardy help was at hand, it received no welcome
from him, for just two days before, on January 26th,
he had yielded up his heroic spirit. From every
side the Mahdists poured shot and shell upon Sir Charles
Wilson and his little band; and it was matter for
grateful surprise that they escaped the fate of him
whom, too late, they had come to rescue. They
approached within eight hundred yards of the city,
and then, convinced that it had fallen, retreated to
a safer position, from which they could institute inquiries
as to the fate of the gallant hero, hoping, yet hardly
daring to hope, that his life might have been spared.
It is not necessary to follow further
in detail the history of Sir Charles Wilson’s
party, the narrow escape they had from being treacherously
run on to a rock, and the way in which they were gallantly
rescued by Lord Charles Beresford, who by February
1st was sufficiently recovered to enable him to take
command of another of Gordon’s steamers, and
relieve the would-be relievers. There followed
at least six days of suspense, as the accounts brought
in by natives were very conflicting, but by the 11th
of February it was known in England that a consensus
of evidence pointed to the fact that the noble hero
of Khartoum had been killed at his post.
Probably it will never be accurately
known either how Khartoum fell into the hands of the
Mahdi, or how the gallant defender actually met his
fate. There have been many wild rumours regarding
both events, but it is probable that the most authentic
account is that obtained by Colonel Kitchener, who
of all men was most likely to be well informed, for
not only was his experience of the Arabs great, but
he had personal opportunities of examining witnesses.
He thinks that the ordinary food supply at Khartoum
was quite exhausted by the 1st January 1885, and that
on the 6th the General issued a proclamation, offering
to any of the inhabitants who liked free permission
to leave the town and go to the Mahdi. Great
numbers availed themselves of this permission, and
Gordon wrote letters to the Mahdi, requesting him to
protect and feed these poor Moslem people, as he had
for the last nine months. In this way the population
of the city was reduced to about 14,000 out of the
34,000 inhabitants who were there in September.
About the 18th of January, a sortie was made which
resulted in desperate fighting, and a large number
of the Mahdi’s troops and about 200 of Gordon’s
men were killed. Colonel Kitchener says:
“The state of the garrison was
then desperate for want of food; all the donkeys,
dogs, cats, rats, &c., had been eaten; a small ration
of grain was issued daily to the troops, and a
sort of bread was made from pounded palm-tree
fibre.
“On the 23rd General Gordon had
a stormy interview with Farag Pasha [the commander
of his black troops]. An eye-witness states that
it was owing to Gordon having passed a fort on
the White Nile which was under Farag Pasha’s
charge, and found to be inadequately protected.
Gordon is said to have struck Farag Pasha on this
occasion. It seems probable to me that at
this interview Farag Pasha proposed to Gordon
to surrender the town, and stated the terms the
Mahdi had offered, declaring in his opinion that they
should be accepted. Farag Pasha left the palace
in a great rage, refusing the repeated attempts
of other officers to effect a reconciliation between
him and Gordon. On the following day (24th) General
Gordon held a council of the notables at the palace.
The question of the surrender of the town was
then discussed, and General Gordon declared, whatever
the council decided, he would never surrender
the town. I think it very probable that on this
occasion General Gordon brought Farag Pasha’s
action and proposals before the council, and it
appears that some in the council were of Farag
Pasha’s opinion, that the town could resist no
longer, and should be surrendered on the terms
offered by the Mahdi. General Gordon would
not, however, listen to this proposal.
“On the 25th Gordon was slightly
ill, and as it was Sunday, he did not appear in
public. He had, however, several interviews with
leading men of the town, and evidently knew that
the end was near.... On the night of the
25th many of the famished troops left their posts
on the fortifications in search of food in the town.
Some of the troops were also too weak, from want
of nourishment, to go to their posts.”
Meanwhile news had reached the Mahdists
of their terrible defeat at Abu Klea, and also rumours
that the English had taken Metemmah. Reports
which have quite recently arrived from Egypt say that
the Mahdi, alarmed at the approach of English troops,
had already packed up his goods and chattels and was
about to beat a retreat. There was a meeting
of all the Émirs in the camp of the Mahdi, and,
with one exception, all were in favour of abandoning
the siege. A single Emir, however, said, “Let
us make one more attempt. Let us fire 101 guns
and proclaim a great victory over the advancing English
army, and then make one more attempt on Khartoum.
If we fail we shall be no worse off than we are now,
for we can only retreat, but if we succeed we shall
be able to defy the approaching British.”
Unfortunately for us the advice of the Emir was taken,
and the British expedition, which was so near succeeding,
failed by forty-eight hours to gain its object.
The Mahdist attack took place at 3.30 A.M. on Monday,
January 26th, and was only too successful. With
regard to the report that the fall of Khartoum was
due to foul play on the part of Farag Pasha, Colonel
Kitchener says: “The accusations of treachery
have all been vague, and are, to my mind, the outcome
of mere supposition. In my opinion Khartoum fell
from sudden assault, when the garrison was too exhausted
by privation to make proper resistance!” Whether
Farag Pasha was guilty or not is not definitely known,
but it is certain that he was taken prisoner, and
three days after the fall of the town was brought up
to show where the wealth was hidden. As there
was none he could not reveal it, so he was killed
in the market-place at Omdurman. The Mahdi’s
troops massacred 4000 persons, and after they had
been engaged for six hours in thus wreaking their
vengeance, the Mahdi sent over to stop them, and a
systematic method was adopted of searching for loot.
As the Mahdi had bribed his men by promises of untold
wealth, and they were disappointed, a large number
deserted his cause, and afterwards actually fought
against him.
The most contradictory reports have
been circulated as to the manner in which General
Gordon met his fate, and although it would be impossible
to allude to all, it may not be out of place to refer
to one which has been very widely accepted. It
is to the effect that the General, hearing that the
city had been betrayed, put on his uniform and rushed
out, sword in hand, to die as a soldier. Narratives
which have a dramatic element are always easily accepted.
Dramatic effect was, however, the last thing our gallant
hero thought of at any time, and still less on such
an occasion as this. As a matter of fact he had
not a stitch of uniform in Khartoum, and, considering
his Chinese experience, it is very unlikely that he
would have drawn his sword, even if he had possessed
one, which he certainly did not. One person who
recognised Gordon after his death says that he was
dressed in light clothes. Colonel Kitchener quotes
the only person who claimed to be an eye-witness of
his death, who says:
“On hearing the noise, I got my
master’s donkey, and went with him to the
palace. Muhamed Bey Mustapha, with my master,
Ibrahim Bey Rushdi, and about twenty cavasses,
then went with Gordon towards the house of the
Austrian Consul Hansall, near the church, when we
met some rebels in an open place near the outer
gate of the palace. Gordon Pasha was walking
in front leading the party. The rebels fired
a volley, and Gordon was killed at once; nine of the
cavasses, Ibrahim Bey Rushdi, and Muhamed Bey Mustapha
were killed; the rest ran away.”
Whether Gordon’s death was intended
by the Mahdi or was entirely an accident is not known.
Colonel Kitchener says that the Mahdi professed to
be very angry when he heard that Gordon was killed,
but the Colonel thinks that had he expressed himself
strongly on the subject beforehand, this calamity
would never have taken place. This, however,
is very doubtful; a rushing host of victorious soldiers,
firing wildly in every direction, are never very discriminating;
of course many of them did not know Gordon personally,
and the brave General was not the man to make himself
conspicuous by any distinguishing garb. Though
Colonel Kitchener is perhaps rather hard on the Mahdi
in this respect, he is probably correct in thinking
that “the want of discipline in the Mahdi’s
camp made it dangerous for him to keep as a prisoner
a man whom all the black troops liked better than
himself, and in favour of whom, on a revulsion of
feeling, a successful revolt might take place in his
own camp. Moreover, if Gordon was dead, he calculated
(and rightly) the English would retire and leave him
in peace.” How Gordon was actually killed,
and whether it was the intention of the Mahdi that
he should be “accidentally” disposed of,
is open to dispute. There can, however, be no
question that he was slain, for his dead body was recognised.
Well might Colonel Kitchener say, “Never was
a garrison so nearly rescued, never was a commander
so sincerely lamented.” As far back as October
13th General Gordon had written:
“It is, of course, on
the cards that Khartoum is taken under the
nose of the Expeditionary
Force, which will be just too late.
“The Expeditionary Force will
perhaps think it necessary to retake it; but that
will be of no use, and will cause loss of life uselessly
on both sides. It had far better return, with
its tail between its legs.... England was
made by adventurers, not by its Government, and
I believe it will only hold its place by adventurers.”
The Government decided to take Gordon’s
advice, and, to save further bloodshed, withdrew the
Relief Expedition. Wady Halfa, Korosko, and Assouan,
were held with some force, in case the Mahdi’s
adherents should seek to follow up their victory.
The death of the Mahdi, however, and the defeat of
his followers at the end of 1885, have together helped
to crush the Mahdist movement, and Egypt has been left
unmolested.