WAGES and prices, then, if the argument
recited in the preceding chapter of this series holds
good, do not under free competition tend towards social
justice. It is not true that every man gets what
he produces. It is not true that enormous salaries
represent enormous productive services and that humble
wages correspond to a humble contribution to the welfare
of society. Prices, wages, salaries, interest,
rent and profits do not, if left to themselves, follow
the simple law of natural justice. To think so
is an idle dream, the dream of the quietist who may
slumber too long and be roused to a rude awakening
or perish, perhaps, in his sleep. His dream is
not so dangerous as the contrasted dream of the socialist,
now threatening to walk abroad in his sleep, but both
in their degree are dreams and nothing more.
The real truth is that prices and
wages and all the various payments from hand to hand
in industrial society, are the outcome of a complex
of competing forces that are not based upon justice
but upon “economic strength.” To
elucidate this it is necessary to plunge into the jungle
of pure economic theory. The way is arduous.
There are no flowers upon the path. And out of
this thicket, alas, no two people ever emerge hand
in hand in concord. Yet it is a path that must
be traversed. Let us take, then, as a beginning
the very simplest case of the making of a price.
It is the one which is sometimes called in books on
economics the case of an unique monopoly. Suppose
that I offer for sale the manuscript of the Pickwick
Papers, or Shakespere’s skull, or, for the matter
of that, the skull of John Smith, what is the sum
that I shall receive for it? It is the utmost
that any one is willing to give for it. That is
all one can say about it. There is no question
here of cost or what I paid for the article or of
anything else except the amount of the willingness
to pay on the part of the highest bidder. It would
be possible, indeed, for a bidder to take the article
from me by force. But this we presume to be prevented
by the law, and for this reason we referred above
not to the physical strength, but to the “economic
strength” of the parties to a bargain. By
this is meant the relation that arises out of the
condition of the supply and the demand, the willingness
or eagerness, or the sheer necessity, of the buyers
and the sellers. People may offer much because
the thing to be acquired is an absolute necessity
without which they perish; a drowning man would sell
all that he had for a life belt. Or they may offer
much through the sheer abundance of their other possessions.
A millionaire might offer more for a life belt as
a souvenir than a drowning man could pay for it to
save his life.
Yet out of any particular conjunction
between desires on the one hand and goods or services
on the other arises a particular equation of demand
and supply, represented by a particular price.
All of this, of course, is A. B. C., and I am not
aware that anybody doubts it.
Now let us make the example a little
more elaborate. Suppose that one single person
owned all the food supply of a community isolated from
the outside world. The price which he could exact
would be the full measure of all the possessions of
his neighbors up to the point at least where they
would commit suicide rather than pay. True, in
such a case as this, “economic strength”
would probably be broken down by the intrusion of
physical violence. But in so far as it held good
the price of food would be based upon it.
Prices such as are indicated here
were dismissed by the earlier economist as mere economic
curiosities. John Stuart Mill has something to
say about the price of a “music box in the wilds
of Lake Superior,” which, as he perceived, would
not be connected with the expense of producing it,
but might be vastly more or perhaps decidedly less.
But Mill might have said the same thing about the
price of a music box, provided it was properly patented,
anywhere at all. For the music box and Shakespere’s
skull and the corner in wheat are all merely different
kinds of examples of the things called a monopoly sale.
Now let us change the example a little
further. Suppose that the monopolist has for
sale not simply a fixed and definite quantity of a
certain article, but something which he can produce
in larger quantities as desired. At what price
will he now sell? If he offers the article at
a very high price only a few people will take it:
if he lowers the price there will be more and more
purchasers. His interest seems divided. He
will want to put the price as high as possible so that
the profit on each single article (over what it costs
him to produce it) will be as great as possible.
But he will also want to make as many sales as he
possibly can, which will induce him to set the price
low enough to bring in new buyers. But, of course,
if he puts the price so low that it only covers the
cost of making the goods his profit is all gone and
the mere multiplicity of sales is no good to him.
He must try therefore to find a point of maximum profit
where, having in view both the number of sales and
the profit over cost on each sale the net profit is
at its greatest. This gives us the fundamental
law of monopoly price. It is to be noted that
under modern conditions of production the cost of manufacture
per article decreases to a great extent in proportion
as a larger and larger number is produced and thus
the widening of the sale lowers the proportionate
cost. In any particular case, therefore, it may
turn out that the price that suits the monopolist’s
own interest is quite a low price, one such as to
allow for an enormous quantity of sales and a very
low cost of manufacture. This, we say, may
be the case. But it is not so of necessity.
In and of itself the monopoly price corresponds to
the monopolist’s profit and not to cheapness
of sale. The price may be set far above
the cost.
And now notice the peculiar relation
that is set up between the monopolist’s production
and the satisfaction of human wants. In proportion
as the quantity produced is increased the lower must
the price be set in order to sell the whole output.
If the monopolist insisted on turning out more and
more of his goods, the price that people would give
would fall until it barely covered the cost, then till
it was less than cost, then to a mere fraction of the
cost and finally to nothing at all. In other
words, if one produces a large enough quantity of
anything it becomes worthless. It loses all its
value just as soon as there is enough of it to satisfy,
and over-satisfy the wants of humanity. Thus
if the world produces three and a half billion bushels
of wheat it can be sold, let us say, at two dollars
a bushel; but if it produced twice as much it might
well be found that it would only sell for fifty cents
a bushel. The value of the bigger supply as a
total would actually be less than that of the smaller.
And if the supply were big enough it would be worth,
in the economic sense, just nothing at all. This
peculiarity is spoken of in economic theory as the
paradox of value. It is referred to in the older
books either as an economic curiosity or as a mere
illustration in extreme terms of the relation of supply
to price. Thus in many books the story is related
of how the East India Companies used at times deliberately
to destroy a large quantity of tea in order that by
selling a lesser amount they might reap a larger profit
than by selling a greater.
But in reality this paradox of value
is the most fundamental proposition in economic science.
Precisely here is found the key to the operation of
the economic society in which we live. The world’s
production is aimed at producing “values,”
not in producing plenty. If by some mad access
of misdirected industry we produced enough and too
much of everything, our whole machinery of buying
and selling would break down. This indeed does
happen constantly on a small scale in the familiar
phenomenon of over-production. But in the organization
in which we live over-production tends to check itself
at once. If the world’s machinery threatens
to produce a too great plenty of any particular thing,
then it turns itself towards producing something else
of which there is not yet enough. This is done
quite unconsciously without any philanthropic intent
on the part of the individual producer and without
any general direction in the way of a social command.
The machine does it of itself. When there is
enough the wheels slacken and stop. This
sounds at first hearing most admirable. But let
it be noted that the “enough” here
in question does not mean enough to satisfy human
wants. In fact it means precisely the converse.
It means enough not to satisfy them, and to
leave the selling price of the things made at the point
of profit.
Let it be observed also that we have
hitherto been speaking as if all things were produced
under a monopoly. The objection might at once
be raised that with competitive producers the price
will also keep falling down towards cost and will
not be based upon the point of maximum profit.
We shall turn to this objection in a moment. But
one or two other points must be considered before
doing so.
In the first place in following out
such an argument as the present in regard to the peculiar
shortcomings of the system under which we live, it
is necessary again and again to warn the reader against
a hasty conclusion to the possibilities of altering
and amending it. The socialist reads such criticism
as the above with impatient approval. “Very
well,” he says, “the whole organization
is wrong and works badly. Now let us abolish
it altogether and make a better one.” But
in doing so he begs the whole question at issue.
The point is, can we make a better one or must
we be content with patching up the old one? Take
an illustration. Scientists tell us that from
the point of view of optics the human eye is a clumsy
instrument poorly contrived for its work. A certain
great authority once said that if he had made it he
would have been ashamed of it. This may be true.
But the eye unfortunately is all we have to see by.
If we destroy our eyes in the hope of making better
ones we may go blind. The best that we can do
is to improve our sight by adding a pair of spectacles.
So it is with the organization of society. Faulty
though it is, it does the work after a certain fashion.
We may apply to it with advantage the spectacles of
social reform, but what the socialist offers us is
total blindness. But of this presently.
To return to the argument. Let
us consider next what wages the monopolist in the
cases described above will have to pay. We take
for granted that he will only pay as much as he has
to. How much will this be? Clearly enough
it will depend altogether on the number of available
working men capable of doing the work in question and
the situation in which they find themselves.
It is again a case of relative “economic strength.”
The situation may be altogether in favor of the employer
or altogether in favor of the men, or may occupy a
middle ground. If the men are so numerous that
there are more of them than are needed for the work,
and if there is no other occupation for them they must
accept a starvation wage. If they are so few
in number that they can all be employed, and
if they are so well organized as to act together, they
can in their turn exact any wage up to the point that
leaves no profit for the employer himself at all.
Indeed for a short time wages might even pass this
point, the monopolist employer being willing (for various
reasons, all quite obvious) actually to pay more as
wages than he gets as return and to carry on business
at a loss for the sake of carrying it on at all.
Clearly, then, wages, as Adam Smith said, “are
the result of a dispute” in which either party
must be pushed to the wall. The employer may
have to pay so much that there is nothing or practically
nothing left for himself, or so little that his workmen
can just exist and no more. These are the upward
and downward limits of the wages in the cases described.
It is therefore obvious that if all
the industries in the world were carried on as a series
of separate monopolies, there would be exactly the
kind of rivalry or competition of forces represented
by the consumer insisting on paying as little as possible,
the producer charging the most profitable price and
paying the lowest wage that he could, and the wage
earner demanding the highest wage that he could get.
The equilibrium would be an unstable one. It
would be constantly displaced and shifted by the movement
of all sorts of social forces by changes
of fashion, by abundance or scarcity of crops, by
alterations in the technique of industry and by the
cohesion or the slackening of the organization of
any group of workers. But the balanced forces
once displaced would be seen constantly to come to
an equilibrium at a new point.
All this has been said of industry
under monopoly. But it will be seen to apply
in its essentials to what we call competitive industry.
Here indeed certain new features come in. Not
one employer but many produce each kind of article.
And, as far as each employer can see by looking at
his own horizon, what he does is merely to produce
as much as he can sell at a price that pays him.
Since all the other employers are doing this, there
will be, under competition, a constant tendency to
cut the prices down to the lowest that is consistent
with what the employer has to pay as wages and interest.
This point, which was called by the orthodox economists
the “cost,” is not in any true and fundamental
sense of the words the “cost” at all.
It is merely a limit represented by what the other
parties to the bargain are able to exact. The
whole situation is in a condition of unstable equilibrium
in which the conflicting forces represented by the
interests of the various parties pull in different
directions. The employers in any one line of industry
and all their wage earners and salaried assistants
have one and the same interest as against the consumer.
They want the selling price to be as high as possible.
But the employers are against one another as wanting,
each of them, to make as many sales as possible, and
each and all the employers are against the wage earners
in wanting to pay as low wages as possible. If
all the employers unite, the situation turns to a monopoly,
and the price paid by the consumer is settled on the
monopoly basis already described. The employers
can then dispute it out with their working men as
to how much wages shall be. If the employers are
not united, then at each and every moment they are
in conflict both with the consumer and with their
wage earners. Thus the whole scene of industry
represents a vast and unending conflict, a fermentation
in which the moving bubbles crowd for space, expanding
and breaking one against the other. There is
no point of rest. There is no real fixed “cost”
acting as a basis. Anything that any one person
or group of persons worker or master, landlord
or capitalist is able to exact owing to
the existing conditions of demand or supply, becomes
a “cost” from the point of view of all
the others. There is nothing in this “cost”
which proportions to it the quantity of labor, or of
time, or of skill or of any other measure physical
or psychological of the effort involved. And
there is nothing whatever in it which proportions to
it social justice. It is the war of each against
all. Its only mitigation is that it is carried
on under the set of rules represented by the state
and the law.
The tendencies involved may be best
illustrated by taking one or two extreme or exaggerated
examples, not meant as facts but only to make clear
the nature of social and industrial forces among which
we live.
What, for example, will be the absolute
maximum to which wages in general could be forced?
Conceivably and in the purest and thinnest of theory,
they could include the whole product of the labor of
society with just such a small fraction left over
for the employers, the owners of capital and the owners
of land to induce them to continue acting as part
of the machine. That is to say, if all the laborers
all over the world, to the last one, were united under
a single control they could force the other economic
classes of society to something approaching a starvation
living. In practice this is nonsense. In
theory it is an excellent starting point for thought.
And how short could the hours of the
universal united workers be made? As short as
ever they liked: An hour a day: ten minutes,
anything they like; but of course with the proviso
that the shorter the hours the less the total of things
produced to be divided. It is true that up to
a certain point shortening the hours of labor actually
increases the total product. A ten-hour day,
speaking in general terms and leaving out individual
exceptions, is probably more productive than a day
of twelve. It may very well be that an eight-hour
day will prove, presently if not immediately, to be
more productive than one of ten. But somewhere
the limit is reached and gross production falls.
The supply of things in general gets shorter.
But note that this itself would not matter much, if
somehow and in some way not yet found, the shortening
of the production of goods cut out the luxuries and
superfluities first. Mankind at large might well
trade leisure for luxuries. The shortening of
hours with the corresponding changes in the direction
of production is really the central problem in social
reform. I propose to return to it in the concluding
chapter of these papers, but for the present it is
only noted in connection with the general scheme of
industrial relations.
Now let us ask to what extent any
particular section or part of industrial society can
succeed in forcing up wages or prices as against the
others. In pure theory they may do this almost
to any extent, provided that the thing concerned is
a necessity and is without a substitute and provided
that their organization is complete and unbreakable.
If all the people concerned in producing coal, masters
and men, owners of mines and operators of machinery,
could stand out for their price, there is no limit,
short of putting all the rest of the world on starvation
rations, to what they might get. In practice and
in reality a thousand things intervene the
impossibility of such complete unity, the organization
of the other parties, the existing of national divisions
among industrial society, sentiment, decency, fear.
The proposition is only “pure theory.”
But its use as such is to dispose of any such idea
as that there is a natural price of coal or of anything
else.
The above is true of any article of
necessity. It is true though in a less degree
of things of luxury. If all the makers of instruments
of music, masters and men, capitalists and workers,
were banded together in a tight and unbreakable union,
then the other economic classes must either face the
horrors of a world without pianolas and trombones,
or hand over the price demanded. And what is
true of coal and music is true all through the whole
mechanism of industry.
Or take the supreme case of the owners
of land. If all of them acted together, with
their legal rights added into one, they could order
the rest of the world either to get off it or to work
at starvation wages.
Industrial society is therefore mobile,
elastic, standing at any moment in a temporary and
unstable equilibrium. But at any particular moment
the possibility of a huge and catastrophic shift such
as those described is out of the question except at
the price of a general collapse. Even a minor
dislocation breaks down a certain part of the machinery
of society. Particular groups of workers are
thrown out of place. There is no other place
where they can fit in, or at any rate not immediately.
The machine labors heavily. Ominous mutterings
are heard. The legal framework of the State and
of obedience to the law in which industrial society
is set threatens to break asunder. The attempt
at social change threatens a social revolution in
which the whole elaborate mechanism would burst into
fragments.
In any social movement, then, change
and alteration in a new direction must be balanced
against the demands of social stability. Some
things are possible and some are not; some are impossible
to-day, and possible or easy to-morrow. Others
are forever out of the question.
But this much at least ought to appear
clear if the line of argument indicated above is accepted,
namely, that there is no great hope for universal
betterment of society by the mere advance of technical
industrial progress and by the unaided play of the
motive of every man for himself.
The enormous increase in the productivity
of industrial effort would never of itself have elevated
by one inch the lot of the working class. The
rise of wages in the nineteenth century and the shortening
of hours that went with it was due neither to the
advance in mechanical power nor to the advance in
diligence and industriousness, nor to the advance,
if there was any, in general kindliness. It was
due to the organization of labor. Mechanical
progress makes higher wages possible. It does
not, of itself, advance them by a single farthing.
Labor saving machinery does not of itself save the
working world a single hour of toil: it only
shifts it from one task to another.
Against a system of unrestrained individualism,
energy, industriousness and honesty might shatter
itself in vain. The thing is merely a race in
which only one can be first no matter how great the
speed of all; a struggle in which one, and not all,
can stand upon the shoulders of the others. It
is the restriction of individualism by the force of
organization and by legislation that has brought to
the world whatever social advance has been achieved
by the great mass of the people.
The present moment is in a sense the
wrong time to say this. We no longer live in
an age when down-trodden laborers meet by candlelight
with the ban of the law upon their meeting. These
are the days when “labor” is triumphant,
and when it ever threatens in the overweening strength
of its own power to break industrial society in pieces
in the fierce attempt to do in a day what can only
be done in a generation. But truth is truth.
And any one who writes of the history of the progress
of industrial society owes it to the truth to acknowledge
the vast social achievement of organized labor in
the past.
And what of the future?
By what means and in what stages can
social progress be further accelerated? This
I propose to treat in the succeeding chapters, dealing
first with the proposals of the socialists and the
revolutionaries, and finally with the prospect for
a sane, orderly and continuous social reform.