SECTION I.
Language — Quakers differ
in their language from others — the first
alteration made by George Fox of thou for you — this
change had been suggested by Erasmus and Luther — sufferings
of the Quakers in consequence of adapting this change — a
work published in their defence — this presented
to King Charles and others — other works on
the subject by Barclay and Penn — in these
the word thou shewn to be proper in all languages — you
to be a mark of flattery — the latter idea
corroborated by Harwell, Maresius, Godeau, Erasmus.
As the Quakers are distinguishable
from their fellow-citizens by their dress, as was
amply shewn in a former chapter, so they are no less
distinguishable from them by the peculiarities of their
language.
George Fox seemed to look at every
custom with the eye of a reformer. The language
of the country, as used in his own times, struck him
as having many censurable defects. Many of the
expressions, then in use, appeared to him to contain
gross flattery, others to be idolatrous, others to
be false representatives of the ideas they were intended
to convey. Now he considered that christianity
required truth, and he believed therefore that he
and his followers, who professed to be christians
in word and deed, and to follow the christian pattern
in all things, as far as it could be found, were called
upon to depart from all the censurable modes of speech,
as much as they were from any of the customs of the
world, which Christianity had deemed objectionable.
And so weightily did these improprieties in his own
language lie upon his mind, that he conceived himself
to have had an especial commission to correct them.
The first alteration, which he adopted,
was in the use of the pronoun thou. The pronoun
you, which grammarians had fixed to be of the plural
number, was then occasionally used, but less than it
is now, in addressing an individual. George Fox
therefore adopted thou in its place on this occasion,
leaving the word you to be used only where two or more
individuals were addressed.
George Fox however was not the first
of the religious writers, who had noticed the improper
use of the pronoun you. Erasmus employed a treatise
in shewing the propriety of thou when addressed to
a single person, and in ridiculing the use of you
on the same occasion. Martin Luther also took
great pains to expunge the word you from the station
which it occupied, and to put thou in its place.
In his Ludus, he ridicules the use of the former
by the, following invented sentence, “Magister,
Vosestis iratus?” This is as absurd, as
if he had said in English “gentlemen art thou
angry”?
But though George Fox was not the
first to recommend the substitution of thou for you,
he was the first to reduce this amended use of it to
practice. This he did in his own person, wherever
he went, and in all the works which he published.
All his followers did the same. And, from his
time to the present, the pronoun thou has come down
so prominent in the speech of the society, that a
Quaker is generally known by it at the present day.
The reader would hardly believe, if
historical facts did not prove it, how much noise
the introduction or rather the amended use of this
little particle, as reduced to practice by George
Fox, made in the world, and how much ill usage it
occasioned the early Quakers. Many magistrates,
before whom they were carried in the early times of
their institution occasioned their sufferings to be
greater merely on this account. They were often
abused and beaten by others, and sometimes put in danger
of their lives. It was a common question put
to a Quaker in those days, who addressed a great man
in this new and simple manner, “why you ill
bred clown do you thou me?” The rich and mighty
of those times thought themselves degraded by this
mode of address, as reducing them from a plural magnitude
to a singular, or individual, or simple station in
life. “The use of thou, says George Fox,
was a sore cut to proud flesh, and those who sought
self-honour.”
George Fox, finding that both he and
his followers were thus subject to much persecution
on this account, thought it right the world should
know, that, in using this little particle which had
given so much offence, the Quakers were only doing
what every grammarian ought to do, if he followed
his own rules. Accordingly a Quaker-work was produced,
which was written to shew that in all languages thou
was the proper and usual form of speech to a single
person, and you to more than one. This was exemplified
by instances, taken out of the scriptures, and out
of books of teaching in about thirty languages.
Two Quakers of the names of John Stubbs and Benjamin
Furley, took great pains in compiling it: and
some additions were made to it by George Fox himself,
who was then a prisoner in Lancaster castle.
This work, as soon as it was published,
was presented to King Charles the second, and to his
council. Copies of it were also sent to the Archbishop
of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, and to each of
the universities. The King delivered his sentiments
upon it so far as to say, that thou was undoubtedly
the proper language of all nations. The Archbishop
of Canterbury, when he was asked what he thought of
it, is described to have been so much at a stand,
that he could not tell what to say. The book
was afterwards bought by many. It is said to have
spread conviction, wherever it went. Hence it
had the effect of lessening the prejudices of some,
so that the Quakers were never afterwards treated,
on this account, in the same rugged manner as they
had been before.
But though this book procured the
Quakers an amelioration of treatment on the amended
use of the expression thou, there were individuals
in the society, who thought they ought to put their
defence on a better foundation, by stating all the
reasons, for there were many besides those in this
book, which had induced them to differ from their fellow
citizens on this subject. This was done both by
Robert Barclay and William Penn in works, which defended
other principles of the Quakers, and other peculiarities
in their language.
One of the arguments, by which the
use of the pronoun thou was defended, was the same
as that, on which it had been defended by Stubbs and
Furley, that is, its strict conformity with grammar.
The translators of the Bible had invariably used it.
The liturgy had been compiled on the same principle.
All addresses made by English Christians in their
private prayers to the Supreme Being, were made in
the language of thou, and not of you. And this
was done, because the rules of the English grammar
warranted the expression, and because any other mode
of expression would have been a violation of these
rules.
But the great argument (to omit all
others) which Penn and Barclay insisted upon for the
change of you, was that the pronoun thou, in addressing
an individual, had been anciently in use, but that
it had been deserted for you for no other purpose,
than that of flattery to men; and that this dereliction
of it was growing greater and greater, upon the same
principle, in their own times. Hence as christians,
who were not to puff up the fleshly creature, it became
them to return to the ancient and grammatical use
of the pronoun thou, and to reject this growing fashion
of the world. “The word you, says William
Penn, was first ascribed in the way of flattery, to
proud Popes and Emperors, imitating the heathens vain
homage to their gods, thereby ascribing a plural honour
to a single person; as if one Pope had been made up
of many gods, and one Emperor of many men; for which
reason you, only to be addressed to many, became first
spoken to one. It seemed the word thou looked
like too lean and thin a respect; and therefore some,
bigger than they should be, would have a style suitable
to their own ambition.”
It will be difficult for those, who
now use the word you constantly to a single person,
and who, in such use of it, never attach any idea of
flattery to it, to conceive how it ever could have
had the origin ascribed to it, or, what is more extraordinary,
how men could believe themselves to be exalted, when
others applied to them the word you instead of thou.
But history affords abundant evidence of the fact.
It is well known that Caligula ordered
himself to be worshipped as a god. Domitian,
after him, gave similar orders with respect to himself.
In process of time the very statues of the emperors
began to be worshipped. One blasphemous innovation
prepared the way for another. The title of Pontifex
Maximus gave way at length for those of Eternity,
Divinity, and the like. Coeval with these appellations
was the change of the word thou for you, and upon
the same principles. These changes, however,
were not so disagreeable, as they might be expected
to have been, to the proud Romans; for while they
gratified the pride of their emperors by these appellations,
they made their despotism, in their own conceit, more
tolerable to themselves. That one man should be
lord ever many thousand Romans, who were the masters
of the world was in itself a degrading thought.
But they consoled themselves by the haughty consideration,
that they were yielding obedience, not to man, but
to an incarnate demon or good genius, or especial
envoy from heaven. They considered also the emperor
as an office, and as an office, including and representing
many other offices, and hence considering him as a
man in the plural number, they had less objection
to address him in a plural manner.
The Quakers, in behalf of their assertions
on this subject, quote the opinions of several learned
men, and of those in particular, who, from the nature
of their respective writings, had occasion to look
into the origin and construction of the words and
expressions of language.
Howell, in his epistle to the nobility
of England before his French and English Dictionary,
takes notice, “that both in France, and in other
nations, the word thou was used in speaking of one,
but by succession of time, when the Roman commonwealth
grew into an empire, the courtiers began to magnify
the emperor, as being furnished with power to confer
dignities and offices, using the word you, yea, and
deifying him with more remarkable titles, concerning
which matter we read in the epistles of Symmachus
to the emperors Theodosius and Valentinian, where he
useth these forms of speaking, Vestra AEternitas,
vestrum numen, vestra serenitas,
vestra Clementia, that is, your, and not
thy eternity, godhead, serenity, clemency. So
that the word you in the plural number, together with
the other titles and compellations of honour, seem
to have taken their rise from despotic government,
which afterwards, by degrees, came to be derived to
private persons.” He says also in his History
of France, that “in ancient times, the peasants
addressed their kings by the appellation of thou,
but that pride and flattery first put inferiors upon
paying a plural respect to the single person of every
superior, and superiors upon receiving it.”
John Maresius, of the French Academy,
in the preface to his Clovis, speaks much to the same
effect. “Let none wonder, says he, that
the word thou is used in this work to princes and
princesses, for we use the same to God, and of old
the same was used to Alexanders, Caesars, queens, and
empresses. The use of the word you, when only
base flatteries of men of later ages, to
whom it seemed good to use the plural number to one
person, that he may imagine himself alone to be equal
to many others in dignity and worth, from whence it
came at last to persons of lower quality.”
Godeau, in his preface to the translation
of the New Testament, makes an apology for differing
from the customs of the times in the use of thou,
and intimates that you was substituted for it, as a
word of superior respect. “I had rather,
says he, faithfully keep to the express words of Paul,
than exactly follow the polished style of our tongue.
Therefore I always use that form of calling God in
the singular number not in the plural, and therefore
I say rather thou than you. I confess indeed,
that the civility and custom of this word, requires
him to be honored after that manner. But it is
likewise on the contrary true, that the original tongue
of the New Testament hath nothing common with such
manners and civility, so that not one of these many
old versions we have doth observe it. Let not
men believe, that we give not respect enough to God,
in that we call him by the word thou, which is nevertheless
far otherwise. For I seem to myself (may be by
the effect of custom) more to honor his divine majesty,
in calling him after this manner, than if I should
call him after the manner of men, who are so delicate
in their forms of speech.”
Erasmus also in the treatise, which
he wrote on the impropriety of substituting you for
thou, when a person addresses an individual, states
that this strange substitution originated wholly in
the flattery of men.
SECTION II.
Other alterations in the language
of the Quakers — they address one another
by the title of friends — and others by the
title of friends and neigbours, or by their common
names — the use of sir and madam abolished — also
of master or mister — and of humble servant — also
of titles of honor — reasons of this abolition — example
of Jesus Christ.
Another alteration, that took place
in the language of the Quakers, was the expunging
of all expressions from their vocabulary, which were
either superfluous, or of the same flattering tendency
as the former.
In addressing one another, either
personally or by letter, they made use of the word
friend, to signify the bond of their own union, and
the character, which man, under the christian dispensation,
was bound to exhibit in his dealings with his fellow-man.
They addressed each other also, and spoke of each
other, by their real names. If a man’s name
was John, they called him John; they talked to him
as John, and added only his sir-name to distinguish
him from others.
In their intercourse with the world
they adopted the same mode of speech: for they
addressed individuals either by their plain names,
or they made use of the appellations of friends
or neighbours.
They rejected the words sir or madam,
as then in use. This they did, because they considered
them like the word you, as remnants of ancient flattery,
derived from the papal and anti-christian ages; and
because these words still continued to be considered
as tides of flattery, that puffed up people in their
own times. Howell, who was before quoted on the
pronoun thou, is usually quoted by the Quakers on this
occasion also. He states in his history, that
“sir and madam were originally names given to
none, but the king, his brother, and their wives, both
in France and England. Yet now the ploughman
in France is called sir and his wife madam; and men
of ordinary trades in England sir, and their wives
dame, which is the legal title of a lady, and is the
same as madam in French. So prevalent hath pride
and flattery been in all ages, the one to give, and
the other to receive respect”
The Quakers banished also the word
master, or mister as it is now pronounced, from their
language, either when they spoke concerning any one,
or addressed any one by letter. To have used the
word master to a person, who was no master over them,
would have been, they considered, to have indicated
a needless servility, and to have given a false picture
of their own situation, as well as of those addressed.
Upon the same or similar principles
they hesitated to subscribe themselves as the humble
or obedient servants of any one, as is now usual,
at the bottom of their letters. “Horrid
apostacy, says Barclay, for it is notorious that the
use of these compliments implies not any design of
service.” This expression in particular
they reprobated for another reason. It was one
of those, which had followed the last degree of impious
services and expressions, which had poured in after
the statues of the emperors had been worshipped, after
the titles of eternity and divinity had been ushered
in, and after thou had been exchanged for you, and
it had taken a certain station, and flourished among
these. Good christians, however, had endeavoured
to keep themselves clear of such inconsistencies Casaubon
has preserved a letter of Paulinus, Bishop of Nola,
in which he rebukes Sulpicius Severus for having subscribed
himself “his humble servant.” A part
of the letter runs thus. “Take heed hereafter,
how thou, being from a servant called unto liberty,
dost subscribe thyself servant to one, who is thy
brother and fellow servant: for it is a sinful
flattery, not a testament of humility, to pay those
honours to a man and to a sinner, which are due to
the one Lord, one Master, and one God.”
The Quakers also banished from the
use of their society all those modes of expression,
which were considered as marks or designations of honour
among men. Hence, in addressing any peer of the
realm, they never used the common formula of “my
lord,” for though the peer in question might
justly be the lord over many possessions, and tenants,
and servants, yet he was no lord over their heritages
or persons. Neither did they ever use the terms
excellency, or grace, or honour, upon similar occasions.
They considered that the bestowing of these titles
might bring them under the necessity of uttering what
might be occasionally false. “For the persons,
says Barclay, obtaining these titles, either by election
or hereditarily, may frequently be found to have nothing
really in them deserving them, or answering to them,
as some, to whom it is said your excellency may have
nothing of excellency in them, and he, who is called
your grace, may be an enemy to grace, and he, who is
called your honour, may be base and ignoble.”
They considered also, that they might be setting up
the creature, by giving him the titles of the creator,
so that he might think more highly of himself than
he ought, and more degradingly than he ought, of the
rest of the human race.
But, independently of these moral
considerations, they rejected these titles, because
they believed, that Jesus Christ had set them an example
by his own declarations and conduct on a certain occasion.
When a person addressed him by the name of good master,
he was rebuked as having done an improper thing.
“Why, says our Saviour, callest thou me good?
There is none good but one, that is God.”
This censure they believe to have been passed upon
him, because Jesus Christ knew, that when he addressed
him by this title, he addressed him, not in his divine
nature or capacity, but only as a man.
But Jesus Christ not only refused
to receive such titles of distinction himself in his
human nature, but on another occasion exhorted his
followers to shun them also. They were not to
be like the Scribes and Pharisees, who wished for
high and eminent distinctions, that is, to be called
Rabbi Rabbi of men; but says he, “be ye not
called Rabbi, for one is your master, even Christ,
and all ye are brethren;” and he makes the desire
which he discovered in the Jews, of seeking after worldly
instead of heavenly honours, to be one cause of their
infidelity towards Christ, for that such could
not believe, as received honour from one another,
and sought not the honour, which cometh from God only;
that is, that those persons, who courted earthly honours,
could not have that humility of mind, that spirit
that was to be of no reputation in the world, which
was essential to those, who wished to become the followers
of Christ.
These considerations, both those of
a moral nature, and those of the example of Jesus
Christ, weighed so much with the early Quakers, that
they made no exceptions even in favour of those of
royal dignity, or of the rulers of their own land.
George Fox wrote several letters to great men.
He wrote twice to the king of Poland, three or four
tunes to Oliver Cromwell, and several times to Charles
the second; but he addressed them in no other manner
man by their plain names, or by simple titles, expressive
of their situations as rulers or kings.
These several alterations, which took
place in the language of the early Quakers, were adopted
by their several successors, and are in force in the
society at the present day.
SECTION III.
Other alterations in the language — the
names of the days and months altered — reasons
for this change — the word saint disused — various
new phrases introduced.
Another alteration, which took place
in the language of the Quakers was the disuse of the
common names of the days of the week, and of those
of the months of the year.
The names of the days were considered
to be of heathen origin. Sunday had been so called
by the Saxons, because it was the day, on which they
sacrificed to the sun. Monday on which they sacrificed
to the moon. Tuesday to the god Tuisco.
Wednesday to the god Woden. Thursday to the god
Thor, and so on. Now when the Quakers considered
that Jéhovah had forbidden the Israelites to make
mention even of the names of other gods, they thought
it inconsistent in Christians to continue to use the
names of heathen idols for the common divisions of
their time, so that these names must be almost always
in their mouths. They thought too, that they
were paying a homage, in continuing the use of them,
that bordered on idolatry. They considered also
as neither Monday, nor Tuesday, nor any other of these
days, were days, in which these sacrifices were now
offered, they were using words, which conveyed false
notions of things. Hence they determined upon
the disuse of these words, and to put other names
in their stead. The numerical way of naming the
days seemed to them to be the most rational, and the
most innocent. They called therefore Sunday the
first day, Monday the second, Tuesday the third, and
soon to Saturday, which was of course the seventh.
They used no other names but these, either in their
conversation, or in their letters.
Upon the same principles they altered
the names of the months also. These, such as
March and June, which had been so named by the ancient
Romans, because they were sacred to Mars and Juno,
were exploded, because they seemed in the use of them
to be expressive of a kind of idolatrous homage.
Others again were exploded, because they were not the
representatives of the truth. September, for example,
means the seventh month from the storms.
It took this seventh station in the kalendar of Romulus,
and it designated there its own station as well as
the reason of its name. But when it lost its
place in the kalendar by the alteration of the style
in England, it lost its meaning. It became no
representative of its station, nor any representative
of the truth. For it still continues to signify
the seventh month, whereas it is made to represent,
or to stand in the place of, the ninth. The Quakers
therefore banished from their language the ancient
names of the months, and as they thought they could
not do better than they had done in the case of the
days, they placed numerical in their stead. They
called January the first month, February the second,
March the third, and so on to December, which they
called the twelfth. Thus the Quaker kalendar
was made up by numerical distinctions, which have continued
to the present day.
Another alteration, which took place
very generally in the language of the Quakers, was
the rejection of the word saint, when they spoke either
of the apostles, or of the primitive fathers.
The papal authority had canonized these. This
they considered to be an act of idolatry, and they
thought they should be giving a sanction to superstition,
if they continued the use of such a title, either
in their speech or writings. After this various
other alterations took place according as individuals
among them thought it right to expunge old expressions,
and to substitute new; and these alterations were
adopted by the rest, as they had an opinion of those
who used them, or as they felt the propriety of doing
it. Hence new phrases came into use, different
from those which were used by the world on the same
occasions; and these were gradually spread, till they
became incorporated into the language of the society.
Of these the following examples may suffice.
It is not usual with Quakers to use
the words lucky or fortunate, in the way in which
many others do. If a Quaker had been out on a
journey, and had experienced a number of fine days,
he would never say that he had been lucky in his weather.
In the same manner if a Quaker had recovered from
an indisposition, he would never say, in speaking of
the circumstance, that he had fortunately recovered,
but he would say, that he had recovered, and “that
it was a favour.” Luck, chance, or fortune,
are allowed by the Quakers to have no power in the
settlement of human affairs.
It is not usual with Quakers to beg
ten thousand pardons, as some of the world do, for
any little mistake. A Quaker generally on such
an occasion asks a persons excuse.
The Quakers never make use of the
expression “christian name.” This
name is called christian by the world, because it
is the name given to children in baptism, or in other
words, when they are christened, or when they are
initiated as christians. But the Quakers are never
baptised. They have no belief that water-baptism
can make a christian, or that it is any true mark
of membership with the christian church. Hence
a man’s christian name is called by them his
first name, because it is the first of the two, or
of any other number of names, that may belong to him.
The Quakers, on meeting a person,
never say “good morrow,” because all days
are equally good. Nor in parting with a person
at night, do they say “good evening,”
for a similar reason, but they make use of the expression
of “farewell.”
I might proceed, till I made a little
vocabulary of Quaker-expressions; but this is not
necessary, and it is not at all consistent with my
design. I shall therefore only observe, that it
is expected of Quakers, that they should use the language
of the society; that they should substitute thou for
you; that they should discard all flattering titles
and expressions; and that they should adopt the numerical,
instead of the heathen names, of the days and months.
George Fox gave the example himself in all these instances.
Those of the society, who depart from this usage,
are said by the Quakers to depart from “the plain
language.”
SECTION IV.
Great objections by the world against
the preceding alterations by the Quakers — first
against the use of thou for you — you said
to be no longer a mark of flattery — the
use of it is said to be connected often with false
Grammar — Custom said to give it, like a noun
of number, a singular as well as plural Meaning — Consideration
of these objections.
There will be no difficulty in imagining,
if the Quakers have found fault with the words and
expressions adopted by others, and these the great
majority of the world, that the world will scrutinize,
and find fault with, those of the Quakers in return.
This in fact has turned out to be the case. — And
I know of no subject, except that of dress, where
the world have been more lavish of their censures,
than in that before us.
When the Quakers first appeared as
a religious community, many objections were thrown
but against the peculiarities of their language.
These were noticed by Robert Barclay and William Penn.
But, since that time, other objections have been started.
But as these have not been published (for they remain
where they have usually been, in the mouths of living
persons) Quaker writers have not felt themselves called
upon to attempt to answer them. These objections,
however, of both descriptions, I shall notice in the
present place.
As the change of the pronoun thou
for you was the first article, that I brought forward
on the subject of the language of the Quakers, I shall
begin with the objections, that are usually started
against it.
“Singularity, it is said, should
always be avoided, if it can be done with a clear
conscience. The Quakers might have had honest
scruples against you for thou, when you was a mark
of flattery. But they can have no reasonable
scruples now, and therefore they should cease to be
singular, for the word you is clearly no mark of flattery
at the present day. However improper it might
once have been, it is now an innocent synonime.”
“The use again of the word thou
for you, as insisted upon by the Quakers, leads them
frequently into false grammar. ‘Thee knowest,’
and terms like these, are not unusual in Quaker mouths.
Now the Quakers, though they defended the word thou
for you on the notion, that they ought not to accustom
their lips to flattery, defended it also strenuously
on the notion, that they were strictly adhering to
grammar-rules. But all such terms as ‘thee
knowest,’ and others of a similar kind, must
recoil upon themselves as incorrect, and as censurable,
even upon their own ground.”
“The word you again may be considered
as a singular, as well as a plural expression.
The world use it in this manner. And who are the
makers of language, but the world? Words change
their meaning, as the leaves their colour in autumn,
and custom has always been found powerful enough to
give authority for a change.”
With respect to these objections,
it may be observed, that the word you has certainly
so far lost its meaning, as to be no longer a mark
of flattery. The Quakers also are occasionally
found in the use of the ungrammatical expressions,
that have been brought against them. And unquestionably,
except they mean to give up the grammatical part of
the defence by Penn and Barclay, these ought to be
done away. That you, however, is of the singular
number, is not quite so clear. For while thou
is used in the singular number in the Bible, and in
the liturgy, and in the prayers of individuals, and
while it is the language, as it is, of a great portion
of the inhabitants of the northern part of the kingdom,
it will be a standing monument against the usurpation
and mutilated dominion of you.
SECTION V.
Secondly against the words friend
and neighbour, as used by the Quakers — Quakers
also said to be wrong in their disuse of titles — for
the use of these is sanctioned by St. Luke and St.
Paul — answer of Barclay to the latter assertion — this
answer not generally deemed satisfactory — observations
upon the subject in dispute.
The subject, that comes next in order,
will be that of the objections, that are usually made
against certain terms used by the Quakers, and against
their disuse of titles of honour, as sanctioned by
the world.
On the use of the words “friend,
and neighbour,” it is usually observed, that
these are too limited in their meaning, to be always,
if used promiscuously, representatives of the truth.
If the Quakers are so nice, that they will use no
expression, that is not precisely true, they should
invent additional terms, which should express the relative
condition of those, with whom they converse. The
word “friend” denotes esteem, and the
word “neighbour” proximity of dwelling.
But all the persons, to whom the Quakers address themselves,
are not persons, whom they love and respect, or who
are the inhabitants of the same neighbourhood with
themselves. There is, it is said, as much untruth
in calling a man friend, or neighbour, who is not
so, as excellency, in whom there may be nothing that
is excellent.
The Quakers, in reply to this, would
observe, that they use the word friend, as significative
of their own union, and, when they speak to others,
as significative of their Christian relation to one
another. In the same sense they use the word
neighbour. Jesus Christ, when the lawyer asked
him who was his neighbour, gave him a short history
of the Samaritan, who fell among thieves; from which
he suggested on inference, that the term neighbour
was not confined to those, who lived near one another,
or belonged to the same sect, but that it might extend
to those, who lived at a distance, and to the Samaritan
equally with the Jew. In the same manner he considered
all men as brethren. That is, they were thus
scripturally related to one another.
Another objection which has been raised
against the Quakers on this part of the subject, is
levelled against their disuse of the titles of honour
of the world. St. Luke, it has been said, makes
use of the terms most excellent, when he addresses
Theophilus, and St. Paul of the words most noble,
when he addresses Festus. Now the teachers and
promulgators of christianity would never have given
these titles, if they had not been allowable by the
gospel.
As this last argument was used in
the time of Barclay, he has noticed it in his celebrated
apology. — “Since Luke, says he, wrote
by the dictates of the infallible spirit of God, I
think it will not be doubted but Theophilus did deserve
it, as being really endued with that virtue; in which
case we shall not condemn those, who do it by the same
rule. But it is not proved, that Luke gave Theophilus
this title, as that which was inherent to him, either
by his father, or by any patent Theophilus had obtained
from any of the princes of the earth, or that he would
have given it to him, in case he had not been truly
excellent; and without this be proved, which never
can, there can nothing hence be deduced against us.
The like may be said of that of Paul to Festus, whom
he would not have called such, if he had not been
truly noble; as indeed he was, in that he suffered
him to be heard in his own cause, and would not give
way to the fury of the Jews against him. It was
not because of any outward title bestowed upon Festus,
that he so called him, else he would have given the
same compilation to his predecessor Felix, who had
the same office, but being a covetous man we find
he gives him no such title.”
This is the answer of Barclay.
It has not however been deemed quite satisfactory
by the world. It has been observed that one good
action will never give a man a right to a general
title. This is undoubtedly an observation of
some weight. But it must be contended on the other
hand, that both Luke and Paul must have been apprised
that the religion, they were so strenuous in propagating,
required every man to speak the truth. They must
have been apprised also, that it inculcated humility
of mind. And it is probable therefore that they
would never have bestowed titles upon men, which should
have been false in their application, or productive
of vanity and pride. St. Luke could not be otherwise
than aware of the answer of Jesus Christ, when he
rebuked the person for giving him the title of good,
because he was one of the evangelists, who recorded
it, and St. Paul could not have been otherwise than
aware of it also, on account of his intimacy with St.
Luke, as well as from other causes.
Neither has this answer been considered
as satisfactory for another reason. It has been
presumed that the expressions of excellent and of
noble were established titles of rank, and if an evangelist
and an apostle used them, they could not be objectionable
if used by others. But let us admit for a moment,
that they were titles of rank. How happens it
that St. Paul, when he was before Festus, and not in
a judicial capacity (for he had been reserved for
Caesar’s tribunal) should have given him this
epithet of noble; and that, when summoned before Felix,
and this in a judicial capacity, he should have omitted
it? This application of it to the one and not
to the other, either implies that it was no title,
or, if it was a title as we have supposed, that St.
Paul had some reason for this partial use of it.
And in this case, no better reason can be given, than
that suggested by Barclay. St. Paul knew that
Festus had done his duty. He knew, on the other
hand, the abandoned character of Felix. The latter
was then living, as Josephus relates, in open adultery
with Drusilla, who had been married to Azis, and brought
away from her husband by the help of Simon a Magician;
and this circumstance probably gave occasion to Paul
to dwell upon temperance, or continence as the word
might be rendered, among other subjects, when he made
Felix tremble. But, besides this, he must have
known the general character of a man, of whom Tacitus
complained, that “his government was distinguished
by servility and every species of cruelty and
lust.” —
If therefore the epithet of noble
was an established title for those Romans, who held
the government of Judea, the giving of it to one, and
the omission of it to the other, would probably shew
the discrimination of St. Paul as a Christian, that
he had no objection to give it, where it could be
applied with truth, but that he refused it, when it
was not applicable to the living character.
But that the expression of excellent
or of noble was any title at all, there is no evidence
to shew. And first, let us examine the word, which
was used upon this occasion. The original
Greek word has no meaning as a title in any Lexicon
that I have seen. It relates both to personal
and civil power, and in a secondary sense, to the strength
and disposition of the mind. It occurs but in
four places in the New Testament. In two of these
it is translated excellent and in the others noble.
But Gilbert Wakefield, one of our best scholars has
expunged the word noble, and substituted excellent
throughout. Indeed of all the meanings of this
word noble is the least proper. No judgment therefore
can be pronounced in favour of a title by any analysis
of the word.
Let us now examine it as used by St.
Luke. And here almost every consideration makes
against it, as an established title. In the first
place, the wisest commentators do not know who Theophilus
was. It has been supposed by many learned fathers,
such as Epephanius, Salvian, and others, that St.
Luke, in addressing his gospel to Theophilus, addressed
it as the words, “excellent Theophilus”
import, to every “firm lover of God,”
or, if St. Luke uses the style of Athanasius, to
“every good Christian.” But on a
supposition that Theophilus had been a living character,
and a man in power, the use of the epithet is against
it as a title of rank; because St. Luke gives it to
Theophilus in the beginning of his gospel, and does
not give it to him, when he addresses him in the acts.
If therefore he had addressed him in this manner, because
excellent was his proper title, on one occasion, it
would have been a kind of legal, and at any rate a
disrespectful omission, not to have given it to him
on the other. With respect to the term noble as
used by St. Paul to Festus, the sense of it must be
determined by general as well as by particular considerations.
There are two circumstances, which at the first sight
make in favour of it as a title,Lysias addresses
his letter to the “most excellent Felix,”
and the orator Tertullus says, “we except
it always and in all places most noble Felix!”
But there must be some drawback from the latter circumstance,
as an argument of weight. There is reason to
suppose that this expression was used by Tertullus,
as a piece of flattery, to compass the death of Paul;
for it is of a piece with the other expressions which
he used, when he talked of the worthy deeds done by
the providence of so detestable a wretch, as Felix.
And it will always be an objection to noble as a legal
title, that St. Paul gave it to one governor, and
omitted it to another, except he did it for the reasons,
that have been before described. To this it may
be added, that legal titles of eminence were not then,
as at this time of day, in use. Agrippa had no
other, or at least Paul gave him no other title, than
that of king. If Porcius Festus had been descended
from a Patrician, or had had the statues of his ancestors,
he might, on these accounts, be said to have been
of a noble family. But we know, that nobody on
this account, would have addressed him as noble in
those days, either by speech or letter. The first
Roman, who was ever honoured with a legal title, as
a title of distinction, was Octavius, upon whom the
senate, but a few years before the birth of Paul, had
conferred the name of Augustus. But no procurator
of a province took this title. Neither does it
appear that the circumstance gave birth to inferior
titles to those in inferior offices in the government.
And indeed on the title “Augustus” it
may be observed, that though it followed the successors
of Octavius, it was but sparingly used, being mostly
used on medals, monumental pillars, and in public
acts of the state. Pliny, in his letters to Trajan,
though reputed an excellent prince, addressed him
as only sir or master, and he wrote many years after
the death of Paul. Athenagoras, in addressing
his book, in times posterior to these, to the emperors
M. Aurelius Antoninus, and L. Aurelius Commodus, addresses
them only by the title of “great princes.”
In short titles were not in use. They did not
creep in, so as to be commonly used, till after the
statues of the emperors had begun to be worshipped
by the military as a legal and accustomary homage.
The terms “eternity and divinity” with
others were then ushered in, but these were confined
wholly to the emperors themselves. In the time
of Constantine we find the title of illustrious.
This was given to those princes, who had distinguished
themselves in war, but it was not continued to their
descendants. In process of time, however, it
became more common, and the son of every prince began
to be called illustrious.
SECTION VI.
Thirdly against the alteration
of the names of the days and months — people,
it is said do not necessarily pay homage to Idols,
who continue in the use of the ancient names — if
the Quaker principles also were generally adopted
on this subject, language would be thrown into confusion — Quakers
also, by attempting to steer clear of Idolatry, fall
into it — replies of the Quakers to these
objections.
The next objections for consideration,
which are made against the language of the Quakers,
are those which relate to their alteration of the
names of the days and the months. These objections
are commonly made, when the language of the Quakers
becomes a subject of conversation with the world.
“There is great absurdity, it
is said, in supposing, that persons pay any respect
to heathen idols, who retain the use of the ancient
names of the divisions of time. How many thousands
are there, who know nothing of their origin?
The common people of the country know none of the reasons,
why the months, and the days are called as they are.
The middle classes are mostly ignorant of the same.
Those, who are well informed on the subject, never
once think, when they mention the months and days,
on the reason of the rise of their names. Indeed
the almost hourly use of those names secures the oblivion
of their origin. Who, when he speaks of Wednesday
and Thursday, thinks that these were the days sacred
to Woden and Thor? but there can be no idolatry, where
there is no intention to idolize.”
“Great weakness, it is said
again, is manifested by the Quakers, in quarrelling
with a few words in the language, and in living at
peace with others, which are equally objectionable.
Every reason, it is said, must be a weak one, which
is not universal. But if some of the reasons,
given by the Quakers, were universally applied, they
would throw language into as much confusion as the
builders of Babel. The word Smith for example,
which is the common name of many families, ought to
be objected to by this rule, if the person, to whom
it belongs, happens to be a carpenter. And the
word carpenter which is likewise a family-name, ought
to be objected to, if the person so called should happen
to be a smith. And, in this case, men would be
obliged to draw lots for numbers, and to be called
by the numerical ticket, which they should draw.”
“It is objected again to the
Quakers, that, by attempting to steer clear of idolatry,
they fall into it. The Quakers are considered
to be genuine idolaters, in this case. The blind
pagan imagined a moral being, either heavenly or infernal,
to inhere in a log of wood or a block of stone.
The Quakers, in like manner, imagine a moral being,
truth or falsehood, to exist in a lifeless word, and
this independently of the sense in which it is spoken,
and in which it is known that it will be understood.
What is this, it is said, but a species of idolatry
and a degrading superstition?”
The Quakers would reply to these observations,
first, that they do not charge others with idolatry,
in the use of these names, who know nothing of their
origin, or who feel no impropriety in their use.
Secondly, that if the principle, upon
which they found their alterations in language, cannot,
on account of existing circumstances, be followed
in all cases, there is no reason, why it should not
be followed, where it can. In the names of men
it would be impossible to adopt it. Old people
are going off, and young people are coming up, and
people of all descriptions are themselves changing,
and a change of names to suit every persons condition,
and qualification, would be impossible.
Thirdly, that they pay no more homage
or obeisance to words, than the obeisance of truth.
There is always a propriety in truth, and an impropriety
in falsehood. And in proportion as the names of
things accord with their essences, qualities, properties,
character, and the like, they are more or less proper.
September, for example, is not an appropriate name,
if its meaning be enquired into, for the month which
it represents: but the ninth month is, and the
latter appellation will stand the test of the strictest
enquiry.
They would say again that this, as
well as the other alterations in their language has
had a moral influence on the society, and has been
productive of moral good. In the same manner as
the dress, which they received from their ancestors
has operated as a guardian, or preservative of virtue,
so has the language which they received from them
also. The language has made the world overseers
of the conduct of the society. A Quaker is known
by his language as much as by his dress. It operates,
by discovering him, as a check upon his actions.
It keeps him also, like the dress distinct from others.
And the Quakers believe, that they can never keep
up their Christian discipline, except they keep clear
of the spirit of the world. Hence it has been
considered as of great importance to keep up the plain
language; and this importance has been further manifested
by circumstances, that have taken place within the
pale of the society. For in the same manner as
those, who begin to depart from the simplicity of
dress, are generally in the way to go off among the
world, so are those who depart from the simplicity
of the language. Each deviation is a sign of
a temper for desertion. Each deviation brings
them in appearance nearer to the world. But the
nearer they resemble the world in this respect, the
more they are found to mix with it. They are
of course the more likely to be seduced from the wholesome
prohibitions of the society. The language therefore
of the Quakers has grown up insensibly as a wall of
partition, which could not now, it is contended, be
taken away without endangering the innocence of their
youth.
SECTION VII.
Advantages and disadvantages of
the system of the Quaker, language — disadvantages
are that it may lead to superstition — and
hypocrisy — advantages are that it excludes
flattery — is founded upon truth — promotes
truth, and correctness in the expression of ideas — observation
of Hobbes — would be the most perfect model
for a universal calendar — the use or disuse
of this system may either of them be made useful to
morality.
I have now given to the reader the
objections, that are usually made to the alterations,
which the Quakers have introduced into the language
of the country, as well as the replies, which the
Quakers would make to these objections. I shall
solicit the continuance of his patience a little longer,
or till I have made a few remarks of my own upon this
subject.
It certainly becomes people, who introduce
great peculiarities into their system, to be careful,
that they are well founded, and to consider how far
they may bring their minds into bondage, or what moral
effects they may produce on their diameter in a course
of time.
On the reformed language of the Quakers
it may be observed, that both advantages and disadvantages
may follow according to the due or undue estimation
in which individuals may hold it.
If individuals should lay too great
a stress upon language, that is, if they should carry
their prejudices so far against outward and lifeless
words, that they should not dare to pronounce them,
and this as a matter of religion, they are certainly
in the way of becoming superstitious, and of losing
the dignified independence of their minds.
If again they should put an undue
estimate upon language, so as to consider it as a
criterion of religious purity, they may be encouraging
the growth of hypocrisy within their own precincts.
For if the use of this reformed language be considered
as an essential of religion, that is, if men are highly
thought of in proportion as they conform to it rigidly,
it may be a covering to many to neglect the weightier
matters of righteousness; at least the fulfilling
of such minor duties may shield them from the suspicion
of neglecting the greater: and if they should
be reported as erring in the latter case, their crime
would be less credited under their observance of these
minutiae of the law.
These effects are likely to result
to the society, if the peculiarities of their language
be insisted on beyond their due bounds. But, on
the other hand, it must be confessed, that advantages
are likely to follow from the same system, which are
of great importance in themselves, and which may be
set off as a counterbalance to the disadvantages described.
The Quakers may say, and this with
the greatest truth, “we have never cringed or
stooped below the dignity of men. We have never
been guilty of base flattery; we have never been instrumental
in raising the creature, with whom we have conversed,
above his condition, so that in the imagination of
his own consequence, he should lose sight of his dependence
on the Supreme Being, or treat his fellow-men, because
they should happen to be below him, as worms or reptiles
of the earth.”
They may say also that the system
of their language originated in the purest motives,
and that it is founded on the sacred basis of truth.
It may be said also, that the habits
of caution which the different peculiarities in their
language have introduced and interwoven into their
constitution, have taught them particularly to respect
the truth, and to aim at it in all their expressions
whether in speech or letters, and that it has given
them a peculiar correctness in the expression of their
ideas, which they would scarcely have had by means
of the ordinary education of the world. Hobbes
says “animadverte, quam sit ab improprietate
verborum pronum hominibus prolabi in errores
circa res,” or “how prone men are to fall
into errors about things, when they use improper expressions.”
The converse of this proposition may be observed to
be true with respect to the Quakers, or it may be observed,
that the study of proper expressions has given them
correct conceptions of things, and has had an influence
in favor of truth. There are no people, though
the common notion may be otherwise, who speak so accurately
as the Quakers, or whose letters, if examined on any
subject, would be so free from any double meaning,
so little liable to be mistaken, and so easy to be
understood.
It may be observed also on the language
of the Quakers, that is, on that part of it, which
relates to the alteration of the names of the months
and days, that this alteration would form the most
perfect model for an universal calendar of any that
has yet appeared in the world. The French nation
chose to alter their calendar, and, to make it useful
to husbandry, they designated their months, so that
they should be representatives of the different seasons
of the year. They called them snowy, and windy,
and harvest, and vintage-months, and the like.
But in so large a territory, as that of France, these
new designations were not the representatives of the
truth. The northern and southern parts were not
alike in their climate. Much less could these
designations speak the truth for other parts of the
world: whereas numerical appellations might
be adopted with truth, and be attended with usefulness
to all the nations of the world, who divided their
time in the same manner.
On the latter subject of the names
of the days and months, the alteration of which is
considered as the most objectionable by the world,
I shall only observe, that, if the Quakers have religious
scruples concerning them, it is their duty to persevere
in the disuse of them. Those of the world, on
the other hand, who have no such scruples, are under
no obligation to follow their example. And in
the same manner as the Quakers convert the disuse
of these ancient terms to the improvement of their
moral character, so those of the world may convert
the use of them to a moral purpose. Man is a reasonable,
and moral being, and capable of moral improvement;
and this improvement may be made to proceed from apparently
worthless causes. If we were to find crosses
or other Roman-Catholic relics fixed in the walls of
our places of worship, why should we displace them?
Why should we not rather suffer them to remain, to
put us in mind of the necessity of thankfulness for
the reformation in our religion? If again we were
to find an altar, which had been sacred to Moloc,
but which had been turned into a stepping stone, to
help the aged and infirm upon their horses, why should
we destroy it? Might it not be made useful to
our morality, as far as it could be made to excite
sorrow for the past and gratitude for the present?
And in the same manner might it not be edifying to
retain the use of the ancient names of the days and
months? Might not thankful feelings be excited
in our hearts, that the crime of idolatry had ceased
among us, and that the only remnant of it was a useful
signature of the times? In fact, if it be the
tendency of the corrupt part of our nature to render
innocent things vicious, it is, on the other hand,
in the essence of our nature, to render vicious things
in process of time innocent; so that the remnants
of idolatry and superstition may be made subservient
to the moral improvement of mankind.