By Thomas H. Huxley
Mr. Darwin’s long-standing and
well-earned scientific eminence probably renders him
indifferent to that social notoriety which passes by
the name of success; but if the calm spirit of the
philosopher have not yet wholly superseded the ambition
and the vanity of the carnal man within him, he must
be well satisfied with the results of his venture in
publishing the ‘Origin of Species’.
Overflowing the narrow bounds of purely scientific
circles, the “species question” divides
with Italy and the Volunteers the attention of general
society. Everybody has read Mr. Darwin’s
book, or, at least, has given an opinion upon its merits
or demerits; pietists, whether lay or ecclesiastic,
decry it with the mild railing which sounds so charitable;
bigots denounce it with ignorant invective; old ladies
of both sexes consider it a decidedly dangerous book,
and even savants, who have no better mud to throw,
quote antiquated writers to show that its author is
no better than an ape himself; while every philosophical
thinker hails it as a veritable Whitworth gun in the
armoury of liberalism; and all competent naturalists
and physiologists, whatever their opinions as to the
ultimate fate of the doctrines put forth, acknowledge
that the work in which they are embodied is a solid
contribution to knowledge and inaugurates a new epoch
in natural history.
Nor has the discussion of the subject
been restrained within the limits of conversation.
When the public is eager and interested, reviewers
must minister to its wants; and the genuine ‘litterateur’
is too much in the habit of acquiring his knowledge
from the book he judges-as the Abyssinian
is said to provide himself with steaks from the ox
which carries him-to be withheld from criticism
of a profound scientific work by the mere want of
the requisite preliminary scientific acquirement;
while, on the other hand, the men of science who wish
well to the new views, no less than those who dispute
their validity, have naturally sought opportunities
of expressing their opinions. Hence it is not
surprising that almost all the critical journals have
noticed Mr. Darwin’s work at greater or less
length; and so many disquisitions, of every degree
of excellence, from the poor product of ignorance,
too often stimulated by prejudice, to the fair and
thoughtful essay of the candid student of Nature,
have appeared, that it seems an almost hopeless task
to attempt to say anything new upon the question.
But it may be doubted if the knowledge
and acumen of prejudged scientific opponents, or the
subtlety of orthodox special pleaders, have yet exerted
their full force in mystifying the real issues of the
great controversy which has been set afoot, and whose
end is hardly likely to be seen by this generation;
so that, at this eleventh hour, and even failing anything
new, it may be useful to state afresh that which is
true, and to put the fundamental positions advocated
by Mr. Darwin in such a form that they may be grasped
by those whose special studies lie in other directions.
And the adoption of this course may be the more advisable,
because, notwithstanding its great deserts, and indeed
partly on account of them, the ‘Origin of Species’
is by no means an easy book to read-if
by reading is implied the full comprehension of an
author’s meaning.
We do not speak jestingly in saying
that it is Mr. Darwin’s misfortune to know more
about the question he has taken up than any man living.
Personally and practically exercised in zoology, in
minute anatomy, in geology; a student of geographical
distribution, not on maps and in museums only, but
by long voyages and laborious collection; having largely
advanced each of these branches of science, and having
spent many years in gathering and sifting materials
for his present work, the store of accurately registered
facts upon which the author of the ‘Origin of
Species’ is able to draw at will is prodigious.
But this very superabundance of matter
must have been embarrassing to a writer who, for the
present, can only put forward an abstract of his views;
and thence it arises, perhaps, that notwithstanding
the clearness of the style, those who attempt fairly
to digest the book find much of it a sort of intellectual
pemmican-a mass of facts crushed and pounded
into shape, rather than held together by the ordinary
medium of an obvious logical bond; due attention will,
without doubt, discover this bond, but it is often
hard to find.
Again, from sheer want of room, much
has to be taken for granted which might readily enough
be proved; and hence, while the adept, who can supply
the missing links in the evidence from his own knowledge,
discovers fresh proof of the singular thoroughness
with which all difficulties have been considered and
all unjustifiable suppositions avoided, at every reperusal
of Mr. Darwin’s pregnant paragraphs, the novice
in biology is apt to complain of the frequency of what
he fancies is gratuitous assumption.
Thus while it may be doubted if, for
some years, any one is likely to be competent to pronounce
judgment on all the issues raised by Mr. Darwin, there
is assuredly abundant room for him, who, assuming the
humbler, though perhaps as useful, office of an interpreter
between the ’Origin of Species’ and the
public, contents himself with endeavouring to point
out the nature of the problems which it discusses;
to distinguish between the ascertained facts and the
theoretical views which it contains; and finally,
to show the extent to which the explanation it offers
satisfies the requirements of scientific logic.
At any rate, it is this office which we purpose to
undertake in the following pages.
It may be safely assumed that our
readers have a general conception of the nature of
the objects to which the word “species”
is applied; but it has, perhaps, occurred to a few,
even to those who are naturalists ’ex professo’,
to reflect, that, as commonly employed, the term has
a double sense and denotes two very different orders
of relations. When we call a group of animals,
or of plants, a species, we may imply thereby, either
that all these animals or plants have some common peculiarity
of form or structure; or, we may mean that they possess
some common functional character. That part of
biological science which deals with form and structure
is called Morphology-that which concerns
itself with function, Physiology-so that
we may conveniently speak of these two senses, or
aspects, of “species”-the one
as morphological, the other as physiological.
Regarded from the former point of view, a species
is nothing more than a kind of animal or plant, which
is distinctly definable from all others, by certain
constant, and not merely sexual, morphological peculiarities.
Thus horses form a species, because the group of animals
to which that name is applied is distinguished from
all others in the world by the following constantly
associated characters. They have-1,
A vertebral column; 2, Mammae; 3, A placental
embryo; 4, Four legs; 5, A single well-developed toe
in each foot provided with a hoof; 6, A bushy tail;
and 7, Callosities on the inner sides of both the
fore and the hind legs. The asses, again, form
a distinct species, because, with the same characters,
as far as the fifth in the above list, all asses have
tufted tails, and have callosities only on the inner
side of the fore-legs. If animals were discovered
having the general characters of the horse, but sometimes
with callosities only on the fore-legs, and more or
less tufted tails; or animals having the general characters
of the ass, but with more or less bushy tails, and
sometimes with callosities on both pairs of legs, besides
being intermediate in other respects-the
two species would have to be merged into one.
They could no longer be regarded as morphologically
distinct species, for they would not be distinctly
definable one from the other.
However bare and simple this definition
of species may appear to be, we confidently appeal
to all practical naturalists, whether zoologists,
botanists, or palaeontologists, to say if, in the vast
majority of cases, they know, or mean to affirm anything
more of the group of animals or plants they so denominate
than what has just been stated. Even the most
decided advocates of the received doctrines respecting
species admit this.
“I apprehend,” says Professor
Owen , “that few naturalists nowadays, in
describing and proposing a name for what they call
‘a new species,’ use that term to signify
what was meant by it twenty or thirty years ago; that
is, an originally distinct creation, maintaining its
primitive distinction by obstructive generative peculiarities.
The proposer of the new species now intends to state
no more than he actually knows; as, for example, that
the differences on which he founds the specific character
are constant in individuals of both sexes, so far as
observation has reached; and that they are not due
to domestication or to artificially superinduced external
circumstances, or to any outward influence within
his cognizance; that the species is wild, or is such
as it appears by Nature.”
If we consider, in fact, that by far
the largest proportion of recorded existing species
are known only by the study of their skins, or bones,
or other lifeless exuvia; that we are acquainted
with none, or next to none, of their physiological
peculiarities, beyond those which can be deduced from
their structure, or are open to cursory observation;
and that we cannot hope to learn more of any of those
extinct forms of life which now constitute no inconsiderable
proportion of the known Flora and Fauna of the world:
it is obvious that the definitions of these species
can be only of a purely structural, or morphological,
character. It is probable that naturalists would
have avoided much confusion of ideas if they had more
frequently borne the necessary limitations of our
knowledge in mind. But while it may safely be
admitted that we are acquainted with only the morphological
characters of the vast majority of species-the
functional or physiological, peculiarities of a few
have been carefully investigated, and the result of
that study forms a large and most interesting portion
of the physiology of reproduction.
The student of Nature wonders the
more and is astonished the less, the more conversant
he becomes with her operations; but of all the perennial
miracles she offers to his inspection, perhaps the
most worthy of admiration is the development of a
plant or of an animal from its embryo. Examine
the recently laid egg of some common animal, such as
a salamander or newt. It is a minute spheroid
in which the best microscope will reveal nothing but
a structureless sac, enclosing a glairy fluid, holding
granules in suspension. But strange possibilities
lie dormant in that semi-fluid globule. Let a
moderate supply of warmth reach its watery cradle,
and the plastic matter undergoes changes so rapid,
yet so steady and purposelike in their succession,
that one can only compare them to those operated by
a skilled modeller upon a formless lump of clay.
As with an invisible trowel, the mass is divided and
subdivided into smaller and smaller portions, until
it is reduced to an aggregation of granules not too
large to build withal the finest fabrics of the nascent
organism. And, then, it is as if a delicate finger
traced out the line to be occupied by the spinal column,
and moulded the contour of the body; pinching up the
head at one end, the tail at the other, and fashioning
flank and limb into due salamandrine proportions, in
so artistic a way, that, after watching the process
hour by hour, one is almost involuntarily possessed
by the notion, that some more subtle aid to vision
than an achromatic, would show the hidden artist, with
his plan before him, striving with skilful manipulation
to perfect his work.
As life advances, and the young amphibian
ranges the waters, the terror of his insect contemporaries,
not only are the nutritious particles supplied by
its prey, by the addition of which to its frame, growth
takes place, laid down, each in its proper spot, and
in such due proportion to the rest, as to reproduce
the form, the colour, and the size, characteristic
of the parental stock; but even the wonderful powers
of reproducing lost parts possessed by these animals
are controlled by the same governing tendency.
Cut off the legs, the tail, the jaws, separately or
all together, and, as Spallanzani showed long ago,
these parts not only grow again, but the redintegrated
limb is formed on the same type as those which were
lost. The new jaw, or leg, is a newt’s,
and never by any accident more like that of a frog.
What is true of the newt is true of every animal and
of every plant; the acorn tends to build itself up
again into a woodland giant such as that from whose
twig it fell; the spore of the humblest lichen reproduces
the green or brown incrustation which gave it birth;
and at the other end of the scale of life, the child
that resembled neither the paternal nor the maternal
side of the house would be regarded as a kind of monster.
So that the one end to which, in all
living beings, the formative impulse is tending-the
one scheme which the Archaeus of the old speculators
strives to carry out, seems to be to mould the offspring
into the likeness of the parent. It is the first
great law of reproduction, that the offspring tends
to resemble its parent or parents, more closely than
anything else.
Science will some day show us how
this law is a necessary consequence of the more general
laws which govern matter; but, for the present, more
can hardly be said than that it appears to be in harmony
with them. We know that the phenomena of vitality
are not something apart from other physical phenomena,
but one with them; and matter and force are the two
names of the one artist who fashions the living as
well as the lifeless. Hence living bodies should
obey the same great laws as other matter-nor,
throughout Nature, is there a law of wider application
than this, that a body impelled by two forces takes
the direction of their resultant. But living
bodies may be regarded as nothing but extremely complex
bundles of forces held in a mass of matter, as the
complex forces of a magnet are held in the steel by
its coercive force; and, since the differences of
sex are comparatively slight, or, in other words,
the sum of the forces in each has a very similar tendency,
their resultant, the offspring, may reasonably be
expected to deviate but little from a course parallel
to either, or to both.
Represent the reason of the law to
ourselves by what physical metaphor or analogy we
will, however, the great matter is to apprehend its
existence and the importance of the consequences deducible
from it. For things which are like to the same
are like to one another; and if; in a great series
of generations, every offspring is like its parent,
it follows that all the offspring and all the parents
must be like one another; and that, given an original
parental stock, with the opportunity of undisturbed
multiplication, the law in question necessitates the
production, in course of time, of an indefinitely large
group, the whole of whose members are at once very
similar and are blood relations, having descended
from the same parent, or pair of parents. The
proof that all the members of any given group of animals,
or plants, had thus descended, would be ordinarily
considered sufficient to entitle them to the rank
of physiological species, for most physiologists consider
species to be definable as “the offspring of
a single primitive stock.”
But though it is quite true that all
those groups we call species ‘may’, according
to the known laws of reproduction, have descended from
a single stock, and though it is very likely they
really have done so, yet this conclusion rests on
deduction and can hardly hope to establish itself
upon a basis of observation. And the primitiveness
of the supposed single stock, which, after all, is
the essential part of the matter, is not only a hypothesis,
but one which has not a shadow of foundation, if by
“primitive” he meant “independent
of any other living being.” A scientific
definition, of which an unwarrantable hypothesis forms
an essential part, carries its condemnation within
itself; but, even supposing such a definition were,
in form, tenable, the physiologist who should attempt
to apply it in Nature would soon find himself involved
in great, if not inextricable, difficulties. As
we have said, it is indubitable that offspring ‘tend’
to resemble the parental organism, but it is equally
true that the similarity attained never amounts to
identity, either in form or in structure. There
is always a certain amount of deviation, not only
from the precise characters of a single parent, but
when, as in most animals and many plants, the sexes
are lodged in distinct individuals, from an exact mean
between the two parents. And indeed, on general
principles, this slight deviation seems as intelligible
as the general similarity, if we reflect how complex
the co-operating “bundles of forces” are,
and how improbable it is that, in any case, their
true resultant shall coincide with any mean between
the more obvious characters of the two parents.
Whatever be its cause, however, the co-existence of
this tendency to minor variation with the tendency
to general similarity, is of vast importance in its
bearing on the question of the origin of species.
As a general rule, the extent to which
an offspring differs from its parent is slight enough;
but, occasionally, the amount of difference is much
more strongly marked, and then the divergent offspring
receives the name of a Variety. Multitudes, of
what there is every reason to believe are such varieties,
are known, but the origin of very few has been accurately
recorded, and of these we will select two as more especially
illustrative of the main features of variation.
The first of them is that of the “Ancon,”
or “Otter” sheep, of which a careful account
is given by Colonel David Humphreys, F.R.S., in a
letter to Sir Joseph Banks, published in the Philosophical
Transactions for 1813. It appears that one Seth
Wright, the proprietor of a farm on the banks of the
Charles River, in Massachusetts, possessed a flock
of fifteen ewes and a ram of the ordinary kind.
In the year 1791, one of the ewes presented her owner
with a male lamb, differing, for no assignable reason,
from its parents by a proportionally long body and
short bandy legs, whence it was unable to emulate
its relatives in those sportive leaps over the neighbours’
fences, in which they were in the habit of indulging,
much to the good farmer’s vexation.
The second case is that detailed by
a no less unexceptionable authority than Reaumur,
in his ‘Art de faire éclore
les Poulets’. A Maltese couple,
named Kelleia, whose hands and feet were constructed
upon the ordinary human model, had born to them a
son, Gratio, who possessed six perfectly movable fingers
on each hand, and six toes, not quite so well formed,
on each foot. No cause could be assigned for the
appearance of this unusual variety of the human species.
Two circumstances are well worthy
of remark in both these cases. In each, the variety
appears to have arisen in full force, and, as it were,
‘per saltum’; a wide and definite difference
appearing, at once, between the Ancon ram and the
ordinary sheep; between the six-fingered and six-toed
Gratio Kelleia and ordinary men. In neither case
is it possible to point out any obvious reason for
the appearance of the variety. Doubtless there
were determining causes for these as for all other
phenomena; but they do not appear, and we can be tolerably
certain that what are ordinarily understood as changes
in physical conditions, as in climate, in food, or
the like, did not take place and had nothing to do
with the matter. It was no case of what is commonly
called adaptation to circumstances; but, to use a
conveniently erroneous phrase, the variations arose
spontaneously. The fruitless search after final
causes leads their pursuers a long way; but even those
hardy teleologists, who are ready to break through
all the laws of physics in chase of their favourite
will-o’-the-wisp, may be puzzled to discover
what purpose could be attained by the stunted legs
of Seth Wright’s ram or the hexadactyle members
of Gratio Kelleia.
Varieties then arise we know not why;
and it is more than probable that the majority of
varieties have arisen in this “spontaneous”
manner, though we are, of course, far from denying
that they may be traced, in some cases, to distinct
external influences; which are assuredly competent
to alter the character of the tegumentary covering,
to change colour, to increase or diminish the size
of muscles, to modify constitution, and, among plants,
to give rise to the metamorphosis of stamens into
petals, and so forth. But however they may have
arisen, what especially interests us at present is,
to remark that, once in existence, varieties obey
the fundamental law of reproduction that like tends
to produce like; and their offspring exemplify it by
tending to exhibit the same deviation from the parental
stock as themselves. Indeed, there seems to be,
in many instances, a pre-potent influence about a
newly-arisen variety which gives it what one may call
an unfair advantage over the normal descendants from
the same stock. This is strikingly exemplified
by the case of Gratio Kelleia, who married a woman
with the ordinary pentadactyle extremities, and
had by her four children, Salvator, George, Andre,
and Marie. Of these children Salvator, the
eldest boy, had six fingers and six toes, like his
father; the second and third, also boys, had five
fingers and five toes, like their mother, though the
hands and feet of George were slightly deformed.
The last, a girl, had five fingers and five toes, but
the thumbs were slightly deformed. The variety
thus reproduced itself purely in the eldest, while
the normal type reproduced itself purely in the third,
and almost purely in the second and last: so that
it would seem, at first, as if the normal type were
more powerful than the variety. But all these
children grew up and intermarried with normal wives
and husband, and then, note what took place:
Salvator had four children, three of whom exhibited
the hexadactyle members of their grandfather and father,
while the youngest had the pentadactyle limbs
of the mother and grandmother; so that here, notwithstanding
a double pentadactyle dilution of the blood,
the hexadactyle variety had the best of it. The
same pre-potency of the variety was still more markedly
exemplified in the progeny of two of the other children,
Marie and George. Marie (whose thumbs only were
deformed) gave birth to a boy with six toes, and three
other normally formed children; but George, who was
not quite so pure a pentadactyle, begot, first,
two girls, each of whom had six fingers and toes;
then a girl with six fingers on each hand and six toes
on the right foot, but only five toes on the left;
and lastly, a boy with only five fingers and toes.
In these instances, therefore, the variety, as it
were, leaped over one generation to reproduce itself
in full force in the next. Finally, the purely
pentadactyle Andre was the father of many
children, not one of whom departed from the normal
parental type.
If a variation which approaches the
nature of a monstrosity can strive thus forcibly to
reproduce itself, it is not wonderful that less aberrant
modifications should tend to be preserved even more
strongly; and the history of the Ancon sheep is, in
this respect, particularly instructive. With
the “’cuteness” characteristic of
their nation, the neighbours of the Massachusetts
farmer imagined it would be an excellent thing if
all his sheep were imbued with the stay-at-home tendencies
enforced by Nature upon the newly-arrived ram; and
they advised Wright to kill the old patriarch of his
fold, and install the Ancon ram in his place.
The result justified their sagacious anticipations,
and coincided very nearly with what occurred to the
progeny of Gratio Kelleia. The young lambs were
almost always either pure Ancóns, or pure
ordinary sheep. But when sufficient Ancon sheep
were obtained to interbreed with one another, it was
found that the offspring was always pure Ancon.
Colonel Humphreys, in fact, states that he was acquainted
with only “one questionable case of a contrary
nature.” Here, then, is a remarkable and
well-established instance, not only of a very distinct
race being established ‘per saltum’, but
of that race breeding “true” at once, and
showing no mixed forms, even when crossed with another
breed.
By taking care to select Ancóns
of both sexes, for breeding from, it thus became easy
to establish an extremely well-marked race; so peculiar
that, even when herded with other sheep, it was noted
that the Ancóns kept together. And there
is every reason to believe that the existence of this
breed might have been indefinitely protracted; but
the introduction of the Merino sheep, which were not
only very superior to the Ancóns in wool and
meat, but quite as quiet and orderly, led to the complete
neglect of the new breed, so that, in 1813, Colonel
Humphreys found it difficult to obtain the specimen,
whose skeleton was presented to Sir Joseph Banks.
We believe that, for many years, no remnant of it
has existed in the United States.
Gratio Kelleia was not the progenitor
of a race of six-fingered men, as Seth Wright’s
ram became a nation of Ancon sheep, though the tendency
of the variety to perpetuate itself appears to have
been fully as strong in the one case as in the other.
And the reason of the difference is not far to seek.
Seth Wright took care not to weaken the Ancon blood
by matching his Ancon ewes with any but males of the
same variety, while Gratio Kelleia’s sons were
too far removed from the patriarchal times to intermarry
with their sisters; and his grandchildren seem not
to have been attracted by their six-fingered cousins.
In other words, in the one example a race was produced,
because, for several generations, care was taken to
‘select’ both parents of the breeding stock
from animals exhibiting a tendency to vary in the
same condition; while, in the other, no race was evolved,
because no such selection was exercised. A race
is a propagated variety; and as, by the laws of reproduction,
offspring tend to assume the parental forms, they will
be more likely to propagate a variation exhibited
by both parents than that possessed by only one.
There is no organ of the body of an
animal which may not, and does not, occasionally,
vary more or less from the normal type; and there is
no variation which may not be transmitted and which,
if selectively transmitted, may not become the foundation
of a race. This great truth, sometimes forgotten
by philosophers, has long been familiar to practical
agriculturists and breeders; and upon it rest all the
methods of improving the breeds of domestic animals,
which, for the last century, have been followed with
so much success in England. Colour, form, size,
texture of hair or wool, proportions of various parts,
strength or weakness of constitution, tendency to
fatten or to remain lean, to give much or little milk,
speed, strength, temper, intelligence, special instincts;
there is not one of these characters whose transmission
is not an every-day occurrence within the experience
of cattle-breeders, stock-farmers, horse-dealers,
and dog and poultry fanciers. Nay, it is only
the other day that an eminent physiologist, Dr. Brown-Sequard,
communicated to the Royal Society his discovery that
epilepsy, artificially produced in guinea-pigs, by
a means which he has discovered, is transmitted to
their offspring.
But a race, once produced, is no more
a fixed and immutable entity than the stock whence
it sprang; variations arise among its members, and
as these variations are transmitted like any others,
new races may be developed out of the pre-existing
one ‘ad infinitum’, or, at least, within
any limit at present determined. Given sufficient
time and sufficiently careful selection, and the multitude
of races which may arise from a common stock is as
astonishing as are the extreme structural differences
which they may present. A remarkable example of
this is to be found in the rock-pigeon, which Dr. Darwin
has, in our opinion, satisfactorily demonstrated to
be the progenitor of all our domestic pigeons, of
which there are certainly more than a hundred well-marked
races. The most noteworthy of these races are,
the four great stocks known to the “fancy”
as tumblers, pouters, carriers, and fantails; birds
which not only differ most singularly in size, colour,
and habits, but in the form of the beak and of the
skull: in the proportions of the beak to the
skull; in the number of tail-feathers; in the absolute
and relative size of the feet; in the presence or absence
of the uropygial gland; in the number of vertebrae
in the back; in short, in precisely those characters
in which the genera and species of birds differ from
one another.
And it is most remarkable and instructive
to observe, that none of these races can be shown
to have been originated by the action of changes in
what are commonly called external circumstances, upon
the wild rock-pigeon. On the contrary, from time
immemorial, pigeon-fanciers have had essentially similar
methods of treating their pets, which have been housed,
fed, protected and cared for in much the same way in
all pigeonries. In fact, there is no case better
adapted than that of the pigeons to refute the doctrine
which one sees put forth on high authority, that “no
other characters than those founded on the development
of bone for the attachment of muscles” are capable
of variation. In precise contradiction of this
hasty assertion, Mr. Darwin’s researches prove
that the skeleton of the wings in domestic pigeons
has hardly varied at all from that of the wild type;
while, on the other hand, it is in exactly those respects,
such as the relative length of the beak and skull,
the number of the vertebrae, and the number of the
tail-feathers, in which muscular exertion can have
no important influence, that the utmost amount of
variation has taken place.
We have said that the following out
of the properties exhibited by physiological species
would lead us into difficulties, and at this point
they begin to be obvious; for if, as the result of
spontaneous variation and of selective breeding, the
progeny of a common stock may become separated into
groups distinguished from one another by constant,
not sexual, morphological characters, it is clear
that the physiological definition of species is likely
to clash with the morphological definition. No
one would hesitate to describe the pouter and the tumbler
as distinct species, if they were found fossil, or
if their skins and skeletons were imported, as those
of exotic wild birds commonly are-and without
doubt, if considered alone, they are good and distinct
morphological species. On the other hand, they
are not physiological species, for they are descended
from a common stock, the rock-pigeon.
Under these circumstances, as it is
admitted on all sides that races occur in Nature,
how are we to know whether any apparently distinct
animals are really of different physiological species,
or not, seeing that the amount of morphological difference
is no safe guide? Is there any test of a physiological
species? The usual answer of physiologists is
in the affirmative. It is said that such a test
is to be found in the phenomena of hybridization-in
the results of crossing races, as compared with the
results of crossing species.
So far as the evidence goes at present,
individuals, of what are certainly known to be mere
races produced by selection, however distinct they
may appear to be, not only breed freely together, but
the offspring of such crossed races are only perfectly
fertile with one another. Thus, the spaniel and
the greyhound, the dray-horse and the Arab, the pouter
and the tumbler, breed together with perfect freedom,
and their mongrels, if matched with other mongrels
of the same kind, are equally fertile.
On the other hand, there can be no
doubt that the individuals of many natural species
are either absolutely infertile if crossed with individuals
of other species, or, if they give rise to hybrid offspring,
the hybrids so produced are infertile when paired together.
The horse and the ass, for instance, if so crossed,
give rise to the mule, and there is no certain evidence
of offspring ever having been produced by a male and
female mule. The unions of the rock-pigeon and
the ring-pigeon appear to be equally barren of result.
Here, then, says the physiologist, we have a means
of distinguishing any two true species from any two
varieties. If a male and a female, selected from
each group, produce offspring, and that offspring
is fertile with others produced in the same way, the
groups are races and not species. If, on the
other hand, no result ensues, or if the offspring are
infertile with others produced in the same way, they
are true physiological species. The test would
be an admirable one, if, in the first place, it were
always practicable to apply it, and if, in the second,
it always yielded results susceptible of a definite
interpretation. Unfortunately, in the great majority
of cases, this touchstone for species is wholly inapplicable.
The constitution of many wild animals
is so altered by confinement that they will not breed
even with their own females, so that the negative
results obtained from crosses are of no value; and
the antipathy of wild animals of the same species
for one another, or even of wild and tame members
of the same species, is ordinarily so great, that it
is hopeless to look for such unions in Nature.
The hermaphrodism of most plants, the difficulty in
the way of insuring the absence of their own, or the
proper working of other pollen, are obstacles of no
less magnitude in applying the test to them.
And, in both animals and plants, is superadded the
further difficulty, that experiments must be continued
over a long time for the purpose of ascertaining the
fertility of the mongrel or hybrid progeny, as well
as of the first crosses from which they spring.
Not only do these great practical
difficulties lie in the way of applying the hybridization
test, but even when this oracle can be questioned,
its replies are sometimes as doubtful as those of Delphi.
For example, cases are cited by Mr. Darwin, of plants
which are more fertile with the pollen of another
species than with their own; and there are others,
such as certain ‘fuci’, whose male
element will fertilize the ovule of a plant of distinct
species, while the males of the latter species are
ineffective with the females of the first. So
that, in the last-named instance, a physiologist, who
should cross the two species in one way, would decide
that they were true species; while another, who should
cross them in the reverse way, would, with equal justice,
according to the rule, pronounce them to be mere races.
Several plants, which there is great reason to believe
are mere varieties, are almost sterile when crossed;
while both animals and plants, which have always been
regarded by naturalists as of distinct species, turn
out, when the test is applied, to be perfectly fertile.
Again, the sterility or fertility of crosses seems
to bear no relation to the structural resemblances
or differences of the members of any two groups.
Mr. Darwin has discussed this question
with singular ability and circumspection, and his
conclusions are summed up as follows, at page 276
of his work:-
“First crosses between forms
sufficiently distinct to be ranked as species, and
their hybrids, are very generally, but not universally,
sterile. The sterility is of all degrees, and
is often so slight that the two most careful experimentalists
who have ever lived have come to diametrically opposite
conclusions in ranking forms by this test. The
sterility is innately variable in individuals of the
same species, and is eminently susceptible of favourable
and unfavourable conditions. The degree of sterility
does not strictly follow systematic affinity, but is
governed by several curious and complex laws.
It is generally different and sometimes widely different,
in reciprocal crosses between the same two species.
It is not always equal in degree in a first cross,
and in the hybrid produced from this cross.
“In the same manner as in grafting
trees, the capacity of one species or variety to take
on another is incidental on generally unknown differences
in their vegetative systems; so in crossing, the greater
or less facility of one species to unite with another
is incidental on unknown differences in their reproductive
systems. There is no more reason to think that
species have been specially endowed with various degrees
of sterility to prevent them crossing and breeding
in Nature, than to think that trees have been specially
endowed with various and somewhat analogous degrees
of difficulty in being grafted together, in order
to prevent them becoming inarched in our forests.
“The sterility of first crosses
between pure species, which have their reproductive
systems perfect, seems to depend on several circumstances;
in some cases largely on the early death of the embryo.
The sterility of hybrids which have their reproductive
systems imperfect, and which have had this system
and their whole organization disturbed by being compounded
of two distinct species, seems closely allied to that
sterility which so frequently affects pure species
when their natural conditions of life have been disturbed.
This view is supported by a parallelism of another
kind: namely, that the crossing of forms, only
slightly different, is favourable to the vigour and
fertility of the offspring; and that slight changes
in the conditions of life are apparently favourable
to the vigour and fertility of all organic beings.
It is not surprising that the degree of difficulty
in uniting two species, and the degree of sterility
of their hybrid offspring, should generally correspond,
though due to distinct causes; for both depend on
the amount of difference of some kind between the species
which are crossed. Nor is it surprising that
the facility of effecting a first cross, the fertility
of hybrids produced from it, and the capacity of being
grafted together-though this latter capacity
evidently depends on widely different circumstances-should
all run to a certain extent parallel with the systematic
affinity of the forms which are subjected to experiment;
for systematic affinity attempts to express all kinds
of resemblance between all species.
“First crosses between forms
known to be varieties, or sufficiently alike to be
considered as varieties, and their mongrel offspring,
are very generally, but not quite universally, fertile.
Nor is this nearly general and perfect fertility surprising,
when we remember how liable we are to argue in a circle
with respect to varieties in a state of Nature; and
when we remember that the greater number of varieties
have been produced under domestication by the selection
of mere external differences, and not of differences
in the reproductive system. In all other respects,
excluding fertility, there is a close general resemblance
between hybrids and mongrels.”-Pp.
276-8.
We fully agree with the general tenor
of this weighty passage; but forcible as are these
arguments, and little as the value of fertility or
infertility as a test of species may be, it must not
be forgotten that the really important fact, so far
as the inquiry into the origin of species goes, is,
that there are such things in Nature as groups of
animals and of plants, whose members are incapable
of fertile union with those of other groups; and that
there are such things as hybrids, which are absolutely
sterile when crossed with other hybrids. For,
if such phenomena as these were exhibited by only
two of those assemblages of living objects, to which
the name of species (whether it be used in its physiological
or in its morphological sense) is given, it would have
to be accounted for by any theory of the origin of
species, and every theory which could not account
for it would be, so far, imperfect.
Up to this point, we have been dealing
with matters of fact, and the statements which we
have laid before the reader would, to the best of
our knowledge, be admitted to contain a fair exposition
of what is at present known respecting the essential
properties of species, by all who have studied the
question. And whatever may be his theoretical
views, no naturalist will probably be disposed to
demur to the following summary of that exposition:-
Living beings, whether animals or
plants, are divisible into multitudes of distinctly
definable kinds, which are morphological species.
They are also divisible into groups of individuals,
which breed freely together, tending to reproduce
their like, and are physiological species. Normally
resembling their parents, the offspring of members
of these species are still liable to vary; and the
variation may be perpetuated by selection, as a race,
which race, in many cases, presents all the characteristics
of a morphological species. But it is not as yet
proved that a race ever exhibits, when crossed with
another race of the same species, those phenomena
of hybridization which are exhibited by many species
when crossed with other species. On the other
hand, not only is it not proved that all species give
rise to hybrids infertile ‘inter se’,
but there is much reason to believe that, in crossing,
species exhibit every gradation from perfect sterility
to perfect fertility.
Such are the most essential characteristics
of species. Even were man not one of them-a
member of the same system and subject to the same
laws-the question of their origin, their
causal connexion, that is, with the other phenomena
of the universe, must have attracted his attention,
as soon as his intelligence had raised itself above
the level of his daily wants.
Indeed history relates that such was
the case, and has embalmed for us the speculations
upon the origin of living beings, which were among
the earliest products of the dawning intellectual
activity of man. In those early days positive
knowledge was not to be had, but the craving after
it needed, at all hazards, to be satisfied, and according
to the country, or the turn of thought, of the speculator,
the suggestion that all living things arose from the
mud of the Nile, from a primeval egg, or from some
more anthropomorphic agency, afforded a sufficient
resting-place for his curiosity. The myths of
Paganism are as dead as Osiris or Zeus, and the man
who should revive them, in opposition to the knowledge
of our time, would be justly laughed to scorn; but
the coeval imaginations current among the rude inhabitants
of Palestine, recorded by writers whose very name
and age are admitted by every scholar to be unknown,
have unfortunately not yet shared their fate, but,
even at this day, are regarded by nine-tenths of the
civilized world as the authoritative standard of fact
and the criterion of the justice of scientific conclusions,
in all that relates to the origin of things, and,
among them, of species. In this nineteenth century,
as at the dawn of modern physical science, the cosmogony
of the semi-barbarous Hebrew is the incubus of the
philosopher and the opprobrium of the orthodox.
Who shall number the patient and earnest seekers after
truth, from the days of Galileo until now, whose lives
have been embittered and their good name blasted by
the mistaken zeal of Bibliolaters? Who shall count
the host of weaker men whose sense of truth has been
destroyed in the effort to harmonize impossibilities-whose
life has been wasted in the attempt to force the generous
new wine of Science into the old bottles of Judaism,
compelled by the outcry of the same strong party?
It is true that if philosophers have
suffered, their cause has been amply avenged.
Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every
science as the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules;
and history records that whenever science and orthodoxy
have been fairly opposed, the latter has been forced
to retire from the lists, bleeding and crushed if
not annihilated; scotched, if not slain. But orthodoxy
is the Bourbon of the world of thought. It learns
not, neither can it forget; and though, at present,
bewildered and afraid to move, it is as willing as
ever to insist that the first chapter of Genesis contains
the beginning and the end of sound science; and to
visit, with such petty thunderbolts as its half-paralysed
hands can hurl, those who refuse to degrade Nature
to the level of primitive Judaism.
Philosophers, on the other hand, have
no such aggressive tendencies. With eyes fixed
on the noble goal to which “per aspera
et ardua” they tend, they may, now
and then, be stirred to momentary wrath by the unnecessary
obstacles with which the ignorant, or the malicious,
encumber, if they cannot bar, the difficult path; but
why should their souls be deeply vexed? The majesty
of Fact is on their side, and the elemental forces
of Nature are working for them. Not a star comes
to the meridian at its calculated time but testifies
to the justice of their methods-their beliefs
are “one with falling rain and with the growing
corn.” By doubt they are established, and
open inquiry is their bosom friend. Such men
have no fear of traditions however venerable, and no
respect for them when they become mischievous and obstructive;
but they have better than mere antiquarian business
in hand, and if dogmas, which ought to be fossil but
are not, are not forced upon their notice, they are
too happy to treat them as non-existent.
The hypotheses respecting the origin
of species which profess to stand upon a scientific
basis, and, as such, alone demand serious attention,
are of two kinds. The one, the “special
creation” hypothesis, presumes every species
to have originated from one or more stocks, these not
being the result of the modification of any other form
of living matter-or arising by natural
agencies-but being produced, as such, by
a supernatural creative act.
The other, the so-called “transmutation”
hypothesis, considers that all existing species are
the result of the modification of pre-existing species,
and those of their predecessors, by agencies similar
to those which at the present day produce varieties
and races, and therefore in an altogether natural
way; and it is a probable, though not a necessary
consequence of this hypothesis, that all living beings
have arisen from a single stock. With respect
to the origin of this primitive stock, or stocks,
the doctrine of the origin of species is obviously
not necessarily concerned. The transmutation
hypothesis, for example, is perfectly consistent either
with the conception of a special creation of the primitive
germ, or with the supposition of its having arisen,
as a modification of inorganic matter, by natural
causes.
The doctrine of special creation owes
its existence very largely to the supposed necessity
of making science accord with the Hebrew cosmogony;
but it is curious to observe that, as the doctrine
is at present maintained by men of science, it is
as hopelessly inconsistent with the Hebrew view as
any other hypothesis.
If there be any result which has come
more clearly out of geological investigation than
another, it is, that the vast series of extinct animals
and plants is not divisible, as it was once supposed
to be, into distinct groups, separated by sharply-marked
boundaries. There are no great gulfs between
epochs and formations-no successive periods
marked by the appearance of plants, of water animals,
and of land animals, ‘en masse’.
Every year adds to the list of links between what the
older geologists supposed to be widely separated epochs:
witness the crags linking the drift with older tertiaries;
the Maestricht beds linking the tertiaries with the
chalk; the St. Cassian beds exhibiting an abundant
fauna of mixed mesozoic and palaeozoic types, in rocks
of an epoch once supposed to be eminently poor in
life; witness, lastly, the incessant disputes as to
whether a given stratum shall be reckoned devonian
or carboniferous, silurian or devonian, cambrian or
silurian.
This truth is further illustrated
in a most interesting manner by the impartial and
highly competent testimony of M. Pictet, from whose
calculations of what percentage of the genera of animals,
existing in any formation, lived during the preceding
formation, it results that in no case is the proportion
less than ‘one-third’, or 33 per cent.
It is the triassic formation, or the commencement
of the mesozoic epoch, which has received the smallest
inheritance from preceding ages. The other formations
not uncommonly exhibit 60, 80, or even 94 per cent.
of genera in common with those whose remains are imbedded
in their predecessor. Not only is this true,
but the subdivisions of each formation exhibit new
species characteristic of, and found only in, them;
and, in many cases, as in the lias for example, the
separate beds of these subdivisions are distinguished
by well-marked and peculiar forms of life. A
section, a hundred feet thick, will exhibit, at different
heights, a dozen species of ammonite, none of which
passes beyond its particular zone of limestone, or
clay, into the zone below it or into that above it;
so that those who adopt the doctrine of special creation
must be prepared to admit, that at intervals of time,
corresponding with the thickness of these beds, the
Creator thought fit to interfere with the natural
course of events for the purpose of making a new ammonite.
It is not easy to transplant oneself into the frame
of mind of those who can accept such a conclusion
as this, on any evidence short of absolute demonstration;
and it is difficult to see what is to be gained by
so doing, since, as we have said, it is obvious that
such a view of the origin of living beings is utterly
opposed to the Hebrew cosmogony. Deserving no
aid from the powerful arm of Bibliolatry, then, does
the received form of the hypothesis of special creation
derive any support from science or sound logic?
Assuredly not much. The arguments brought forward
in its favour all take one form: If species were
not supernaturally created, we cannot understand the
facts ‘x’ or ‘y’, or ‘z’;
we cannot understand the structure of animals or plants,
unless we suppose they were contrived for special
ends; we cannot understand the structure of the eye,
except by supposing it to have been made to see with;
we cannot understand instincts, unless we suppose animals
to have been miraculously endowed with them.
As a question of dialectics, it must
be admitted that this sort of reasoning is not very
formidable to those who are not to be frightened by
consequences. It is an ’argumentum ad ignorantiam’-take
this explanation or be ignorant.
But suppose we prefer to admit our
ignorance rather than adopt a hypothesis at variance
with all the teachings of Nature? Or, suppose
for a moment we admit the explanation, and then seriously
ask ourselves how much the wiser are we; what does
the explanation explain? Is it any more than
a grandiloquent way of announcing the fact, that we
really know nothing about the matter? A phenomenon
is explained when it is shown to be a case of some
general law of Nature; but the supernatural interposition
of the Creator can, by the nature of the case, exemplify
no law, and if species have really arisen in this way,
it is absurd to attempt to discuss their origin.
Or, lastly, let us ask ourselves whether
any amount of evidence which the nature of our faculties
permits us to attain, can justify us in asserting
that any phenomenon is out of the reach of natural
causation. To this end it is obviously necessary
that we should know all the consequences to which
all possible combinations, continued through unlimited
time, can give rise. If we knew these, and found
none competent to originate species, we should have
good ground for denying their origin by natural causation.
Till we know them, any hypothesis is better than one
which involves us in such miserable presumption.
But the hypothesis of special creation
is not only a mere specious mask for our ignorance;
its existence in Biology marks the youth and imperfection
of the science. For what is the history of every
science but the history of the elimination of the
notion of creative, or other interferences, with the
natural order of the phenomena which are the subject-matter
of that science? When Astronomy was young “the
morning stars sang together for joy,” and the
planets were guided in their courses by celestial
hands. Now, the harmony of the stars has resolved
itself into gravitation according to the inverse squares
of the distances, and the orbits of the planets are
deducible from the laws of the forces which allow
a schoolboy’s stone to break a window. The
lightning was the angel of the Lord; but it has pleased
Providence, in these modern times, that science should
make it the humble messenger of man, and we know that
every flash that shimmers about the horizon on a summer’s
evening is determined by ascertainable conditions,
and that its direction and brightness might, if our
knowledge of these were great enough, have been calculated.
The solvency of great mercantile companies
rests on the validity of the laws which have been
ascertained to govern the seeming irregularity of
that human life which the moralist bewails as the most
uncertain of things; plague, pestilence, and famine
are admitted, by all but fools, to be the natural
result of causes for the most part fully within human
control, and not the unavoidable tortures inflicted
by wrathful Omnipotence upon His helpless handiwork.
Harmonious order governing eternally
continuous progress-the web and woof of
matter and force interweaving by slow degrees, without
a broken thread, that veil which lies between us and
the Infinite-that universe which alone
we know or can know; such is the picture which science
draws of the world, and in proportion as any part
of that picture is in unison with the rest, so may
we feel sure that it is rightly painted. Shall
Biology alone remain out of harmony with her sister
sciences?
Such arguments against the hypothesis
of the direct creation of species as these are plainly
enough deducible from general considerations; but
there are, in addition, phenomena exhibited by species
themselves, and yet not so much a part of their very
essence as to have required earlier mention, which
are in the highest degree perplexing, if we adopt the
popularly accepted hypothesis. Such are the facts
of distribution in space and in time; the singular
phenomena brought to light by the study of development;
the structural relations of species upon which our
systems of classification are founded; the great doctrines
of philosophical anatomy, such as that of homology,
or of the community of structural plan exhibited by
large groups of species differing very widely in their
habits and functions.
The species of animals which inhabit
the sea on opposite sides of the isthmus of Panama
are wholly distinct the animals and plants which
inhabit islands are commonly distinct from those of
the neighbouring mainlands, and yet have a similarity
of aspect.
The mammals of the latest tertiary
epoch in the Old and New Worlds belong to the same
genera, or family groups, as those which now inhabit
the same great geographical area. The crocodilian
reptiles which existed in the earliest secondary epoch
were similar in general structure to those now living,
but exhibit slight differences in their vertebrae,
nasal passages, and one or two other points. The
guinea-pig has teeth which are shed before it is born,
and hence can never subserve the masticatory purpose
for which they seem contrived, and, in like manner,
the female dugong has tusks which never cut the gum.
All the members of the same great group run through
similar conditions in their development, and all their
parts, in the adult state, are arranged according
to the same plan. Man is more like a gorilla than
a gorilla is like a lemur. Such are a few, taken
at random, among the multitudes of similar facts which
modern research has established; but when the student
seeks for an explanation of them from the supporters
of the received hypothesis of the origin of species,
the reply he receives is, in substance, of Oriental
simplicity and brevity-“Mashallah!
it so pleases God!” There are different species
on opposite sides of the isthmus of Panama, because
they were created different on the two sides.
The pliocène mammals are like the existing ones,
because such was the plan of creation; and we find
rudimental organs and similarity of plan, because
it has pleased the Creator to set before Himself a
“divine exemplar or archetype,” and to
copy it in His works; and somewhat ill, those who
hold this view imply, in some of them. That such
verbal hocus-pocus should be received as science will
one day be regarded as evidence of the low state of
intelligence in the nineteenth century, just as we
amuse ourselves with the phraseology about Nature’s
abhorrence of a vacuum, wherewith Torricelli’s
compatriots were satisfied to explain the rise of
water in a pump. And be it recollected that this
sort of satisfaction works not only negative but positive
ill, by discouraging inquiry, and so depriving man
of the usufruct of one of the most fertile fields
of his great patrimony, Nature.
The objections to the doctrine of
the origin of species by special creation which have
been detailed, must have occurred, with more or less
force, to the mind of every one who has seriously and
independently considered the subject. It is therefore
no wonder that, from time to time, this hypothesis
should have been met by counter hypotheses, all as
well, and some better founded than itself; and it is
curious to remark that the inventors of the opposing
views seem to have been led into them as much by their
knowledge of geology, as by their acquaintance with
biology. In fact, when the mind has once admitted
the conception of the gradual production of the present
physical state of our globe, by natural causes operating
through long ages of time, it will be little disposed
to allow that living beings have made their appearance
in another way, and the speculations of De Maillet
and his successors are the natural complement of Scilla’s
demonstration of the true nature of fossils.
A contemporary of Newton and of Leibnitz,
sharing therefore in the intellectual activity of
the remarkable age which witnessed the birth of modern
physical science, Benoit de Maillet spent a long life
as a consular agent of the French Government in various
Mediterranean ports. For sixteen years, in fact,
he held the office of Consul-General in Egypt, and
the wonderful phenomena offered by the valley of the
Nile appear to have strongly impressed his mind, to
have directed his attention to all facts of a similar
order which came within his observation, and to have
led him to speculate on the origin of the present
condition of our globe and of its inhabitants.
But, with all his ardour for science, De Maillet seems
to have hesitated to publish views which, notwithstanding
the ingenious attempts to reconcile them with the
Hebrew hypothesis contained in the preface to “Telliamed,”
were hardly likely to be received with favour by his
contemporaries.
But a short time had elapsed since
more than one of the great anatomists and physicists
of the Italian school had paid dearly for their endeavours
to dissipate some of the prevalent errors; and their
illustrious pupil, Harvey, the founder of modern physiology,
had not fared so well, in a country less oppressed
by the benumbing influences of theology, as to tempt
any man to follow his example. Probably not uninfluenced
by these considerations, his Catholic majesty’s
Consul-General for Egypt kept his theories to himself
throughout a long life, for ‘Telliamed,’
the only scientific work which is known to have proceeded
from his pen, was not printed till 1735, when its author
had reached the ripe age of seventy-nine; and though
De Maillet lived three years longer, his book was
not given to the world before 1748. Even then
it was anonymous to those who were not in the secret
of the anagrammatic character of its title; and the
preface and dedication are so worded as, in case of
necessity, to give the printer a fair chance of falling
back on the excuse that the work was intended for
a mere ‘jeu d’esprit’.
The speculations of the suppositious
Indian sage, though quite as sound as those of many
a “Mosaic Geology,” which sells exceedingly
well, have no great value if we consider them by the
light of modern science. The waters are supposed
to have originally covered the whole globe; to have
deposited the rocky masses which compose its mountains
by processes comparable to those which are now forming
mud, sand, and shingle; and then to have gradually
lowered their level, leaving the spoils of their animal
and vegetable inhabitants embedded in the strata.
As the dry land appeared, certain of the aquatic animals
are supposed to have taken to it, and to have become
gradually adapted to terrestrial and aerial modes
of existence. But if we regard the general tenor
and style of the reasoning in relation to the state
of knowledge of the day, two circumstances appear
very well worthy of remark. The first, that De
Maillet had a notion of the modifiability of living
forms (though without any precise information on the
subject), and how such modifiability might account
for the origin of species; the second, that he very
clearly apprehended the great modern geological doctrine,
so strongly insisted upon by Hutton, and so ably and
comprehensively expounded by Lyell, that we must look
to existing causes for the explanation of past geological
events. Indeed, the following passage of the
preface, in which De Maillet is supposed to speak of
the Indian philosopher Telliamed, his ‘alter
ego’, might have been written by the most philosophical
uniformitarian of the present day:-
“Ce qu’il y
a d’etonnant, est que pour arriver
a ces connoissances il semble avoir
perverti l’ordre naturel, puisqu’au
lieu de s’attacher d’abord a rechercher
l’origine de nôtre globe
il a commence par travailler a
s’instruire de la nature. Mais a l’entendre,
ce renversement de l’ordre a
été pour lui l’effet d’un
genie favorable qui l’a conduit
pas a pas et comme par la
main aux decouvertes les plus sublimes.
C’est en decomposant la substance
de ce globe par une anatomie
exacte de toutes ses parties qu’il
a premièrement appris de quelles matières
il était compose et quels arrangemens
ces mêmes matières observaient entre
elles. Ces lumières jointes a l’esprit
de comparaison toujours nécessaire
a quiconque entreprend de percer les
voiles dont la nature aime a se
cacher, ont servi de guide
a nôtre philosophe pour parvenir
a des connoissances plus interessantes. Par
la matière et l’arrangement de
ces compositions il pretend avoir
reconnu quelle est la veritable
origine de ce globe que nous
habitons, comment et par qui il
a été forme.”-Pp.
xix. xx.
But De Maillet was before his age,
and as could hardly fail to happen to one who speculated
on a zoological and botanical question before Linnaeus,
and on a physiological problem before Haller, he fell
into great errors here and there; and hence, perhaps,
the general neglect of his work. Robinet’s
speculations are rather behind, than in advance of,
those of De Maillet; and though Linnaeus may have played
with the hypothesis of transmutation, it obtained
no serious support until Lamarck adopted it, and advocated
it with great ability in his ‘Philosophie
Zoologique.’
Impelled towards the hypothesis of
the transmutation of species, partly by his general
cosmological and geological views; partly by the conception
of a graduated, though irregularly branching, scale
of being, which had arisen out of his profound study
of plants and of the lower forms of animal life, Lamarck,
whose general line of thought often closely resembles
that of De Maillet, made a great advance upon the
crude and merely speculative manner in which that writer
deals with the question of the origin of living beings,
by endeavouring to find physical causes competent
to effect that change of one species into another,
which De Maillet had only supposed to occur. And
Lamarck conceived that he had found in Nature such
causes, amply sufficient for the purpose in view.
It is a physiological fact, he says, that organs are
increased in size by action, atrophied by inaction;
it is another physiological fact that modifications
produced are transmissible to offspring. Change
the actions of an animal, therefore, and you will
change its structure, by increasing the development
of the parts newly brought into use and by the diminution
of those less used; but by altering the circumstances
which surround it you will alter its actions, and
hence, in the long run, change of circumstance must
produce change of organization. All the species
of animals, therefore, are, in Lamarck’s view,
the result of the indirect action of changes of circumstance,
upon those primitive germs which he considered to have
originally arisen, by spontaneous generation, within
the waters of the globe. It is curious, however,
that Lamarck should insist so strongly as he has
done, that circumstances never in any degree directly
modify the form or the organization of animals, but
only operate by changing their wants and consequently
their actions; for he thereby brings upon himself
the obvious question, how, then, do plants, which
cannot be said to have wants or actions, become modified?
To this he replies, that they are modified by the
changes in their nutritive processes, which are effected
by changing circumstances; and it does not seem to
have occurred to him that such changes might be as
well supposed to take place among animals.
When we have said that Lamarck felt
that mere speculation was not the way to arrive at
the origin of species, but that it was necessary,
in order to the establishment of any sound theory on
the subject, to discover by observation or otherwise,
some ‘vera causa’, competent
to give rise to them; that he affirmed the true order
of classification to coincide with the order of their
development one from another; that he insisted on
the necessity of allowing sufficient time, very strongly;
and that all the varieties of instinct and reason were
traced back by him to the same cause as that which
has given rise to species, we have enumerated his
chief contributions to the advance of the question.
On the other hand, from his ignorance of any power
in Nature competent to modify the structure of animals,
except the development of parts, or atrophy of them,
in consequence of a change of needs, Lamarck was led
to attach infinitely greater weight than it deserves
to this agency, and the absurdities into which he
was led have met with deserved condemnation.
Of the struggle for existence, on which, as we shall
see, Mr. Darwin lays such great stress, he had no
conception; indeed, he doubts whether there really
are such things as extinct species, unless they be
such large animals as may have met their death at the
hands of man; and so little does he dream of there
being any other destructive causes at work, that,
in discussing the possible existence of fossil shells,
he asks, “Pourquoi d’ailleurs seroient-ils
perdues des que l’homme n’a
pu opérer leur destruction?”
(’Phil. Zool.,’ vol. i. .)
Of the influence of selection Lamarck has as little
notion, and he makes no use of the wonderful phenomena
which are exhibited by domesticated animals, and illustrate
its powers. The vast influence of Cuvier was
employed against the Lamarckian views, and, as the
untenability of some of his conclusions was easily
shown, his doctrines sank under the opprobrium of
scientific, as well as of theological, heterodoxy.
Nor have the efforts made of late years to revive them
tended to re-establish their credit in the minds of
sound thinkers acquainted with the facts of the case;
indeed it may be doubted whether Lamarck has not suffered
more from his friends than from his foes.
Two years ago, in fact, though we
venture to question if even the strongest supporters
of the special creation hypothesis had not, now and
then, an uneasy consciousness that all was not right,
their position seemed more impregnable than ever,
if not by its own inherent strength, at any rate by
the obvious failure of all the attempts which had been
made to carry it. On the other hand, however much
the few, who thought deeply on the question of species,
might be repelled by the generally received dogmas,
they saw no way of escaping from them save by the
adoption of suppositions so little justified by experiment
or by observation as to be at least equally distasteful.
The choice lay between two absurdities
and a middle condition of uneasy scepticism; which
last, however unpleasant and unsatisfactory, was obviously
the only justifiable state of mind under the circumstances.
Such being the general ferment in
the minds of naturalists, it is no wonder that they
mustered strong in the rooms of the Linnaean Society,
on the 1st of July of the year 1858, to hear two papers
by authors living on opposite sides of the globe,
working out their results independently, and yet professing
to have discovered one and the same solution of all
the problems connected with species. The one of
these authors was an able naturalist, Mr. Wallace,
who had been employed for some years in studying the
productions of the islands of the Indian Archipelago,
and who had forwarded a memoir embodying his views
to Mr. Darwin, for communication to the Linnaean Society.
On perusing the essay, Mr. Darwin was not a little
surprised to find that it embodied some of the leading
ideas of a great work which he had been preparing
for twenty years, and parts of which, containing a
development of the very same views, had been perused
by his private friends fifteen or sixteen years before.
Perplexed in what manner to do full justice both to
his friend and to himself, Mr. Darwin placed the matter
in the hands of Dr. Hooker and Sir Charles Lyell,
by whose advice he communicated a brief abstract of
his own views to the Linnaean Society, at the same
time that Mr. Wallace’s paper was read.
Of that abstract, the work on the ‘Origin of
Species’ is an enlargement; but a complete statement
of Mr. Darwin’s doctrine is looked for in the
large and well-illustrated work which he is said to
be preparing for publication.
The Darwinian hypothesis has the merit
of being eminently simple and comprehensible in principle,
and its essential positions may be stated in a very
few words: all species have been produced by the
development of varieties from common stocks; by the
conversion of these, first into permanent races and
then into new species, by the process of ’natural
selection’, which process is essentially identical
with that artificial selection by which man has originated
the races of domestic animals-the ‘struggle
for existence’ taking the place of man, and exerting,
in the case of natural selection, that selective action
which he performs in artificial selection.
The evidence brought forward by Mr.
Darwin in support of his hypothesis is of three kinds.
First, he endeavours to prove that species may be
originated by selection; secondly, he attempts to show
that natural causes are competent to exert selection;
and thirdly, he tries to prove that the most remarkable
and apparently anomalous phenomena exhibited by the
distribution, development, and mutual relations of
species, can be shown to be deducible from the general
doctrine of their origin, which he propounds, combined
with the known facts of geological change; and that,
even if all these phenomena are not at present explicable
by it, none are necessarily inconsistent with it.
There cannot be a doubt that the method
of inquiry which Mr. Darwin has adopted is not only
rigorously in accordance with the canons of scientific
logic, but that it is the only adequate method.
Critics exclusively trained in classics or in mathematics,
who have never determined a scientific fact in their
lives by induction from experiment or observation,
prate learnedly about Mr. Darwin’s method, which
is not inductive enough, not Baconian enough, forsooth,
for them. But even if practical acquaintance
with the process of scientific investigation is denied
them, they may learn, by the perusal of Mr. Mill’s
admirable chapter “On the Deductive Method,”
that there are multitudes of scientific inquiries
in which the method of pure induction helps the investigator
but a very little way.
“The mode of investigation,”
says Mr. Mill, “which, from the proved inapplicability
of direct methods of observation and experiment, remains
to us as the main source of the knowledge we possess,
or can acquire, respecting the conditions and laws
of recurrence of the more complex phenomena, is called,
in its most general expression, the deductive method,
and consists of three operations: the first, one
of direct induction; the second, of ratiocination;
and the third, of verification.”
Now, the conditions which have determined
the existence of species are not only exceedingly
complex, but, so far as the great majority of them
are concerned, are necessarily beyond our cognizance.
But what Mr. Darwin has attempted to do is in exact
accordance with the rule laid down by Mr. Mill; he
has endeavoured to determine certain great facts inductively,
by observation and experiment; he has then reasoned
from the data thus furnished; and lastly, he has tested
the validity of his ratiocination by comparing his
deductions with the observed facts of Nature.
Inductively, Mr. Darwin endeavours to prove that species
arise in a given way. Deductively, he desires
to show that, if they arise in that way, the facts
of distribution, development, classification, etc.,
may be accounted for, ‘i.e.’ may be deduced
from their mode of origin, combined with admitted
changes in physical geography and climate, during
an indefinite period. And this explanation, or
coincidence of observed with deduced facts, is, so
far as it extends, a verification of the Darwinian
view.
There is no fault to be found with
Mr. Darwin’s method, then; but it is another
question whether he has fulfilled all the conditions
imposed by that method. Is it satisfactorily
proved, in fact, that species may be originated by
selection? that there is such a thing as natural selection?
that none of the phenomena exhibited by species are
inconsistent with the origin of species in this way?
If these questions can be answered in the affirmative,
Mr. Darwin’s view steps out of the rank of hypotheses
into those of proved theories; but, so long as the
evidence at present adduced falls short of enforcing
that affirmation, so long, to our minds, must the
new doctrine be content to remain among the former-an
extremely valuable, and in the highest degree probable,
doctrine, indeed the only extant hypothesis which is
worth anything in a scientific point of view; but
still a hypothesis, and not yet the theory of species.
After much consideration, and with
assuredly no bias against Mr. Darwin’s views,
it is our clear conviction that, as the evidence stands,
it is not absolutely proven that a group of animals,
having all the characters exhibited by species in
Nature, has ever been originate by selection, whether
artificial or natural. Groups having the morphological
character of species, distinct and permanent races
in fact, have been so produced over and over again;
but there is no positive evidence, at present, that
any group of animals has, by variation and selective
breeding, given rise to another group which was, even
in the least degree, infertile with the first.
Mr. Darwin is perfectly aware of this weak point,
and brings forward a multitude of ingenious and important
arguments to diminish the force of the objection.
We admit the value of these arguments to their fullest
extent; nay, we will go so far as to express our belief
that experiments, conducted by a skilful physiologist,
would very probably obtain the desired production
of mutually more or less infertile breeds from a common
stock, in a comparatively few years; but still, as
the case stands at present, this “little rift
within the lute” is not to be disguised nor
overlooked.
In the remainder of Mr. Darwin’s
argument our own private ingenuity has not hitherto
enabled us to pick holes of any great importance; and
judging by what we hear and read, other adventurers
in the same field do not seem to have been much more
fortunate. It has been urged, for instance, that
in his chapters on the struggle for existence and on
natural selection, Mr. Darwin does not so much prove
that natural selection does occur, as that it must
occur; but, in fact, no other sort of demonstration
is attainable. A race does not attract our attention
in Nature until it has, in all probability, existed
for a considerable time, and then it is too late to
inquire into the conditions of its origin. Again,
it is said that there is no real analogy between the
selection which takes place under domestication, by
human influence, and any operation which can be effected
by Nature, for man interferes intelligently.
Reduced to its elements, this argument implies that
an effect produced with trouble by an intelligent
agent must, ‘a fortiori’, be more troublesome,
if not impossible, to an unintelligent agent.
Even putting aside the question whether Nature, acting
as she does according to definite and invariable laws,
can be rightly called an unintelligent agent, such
a position as this is wholly untenable. Mix salt
and sand, and it shall puzzle the wisest of men, with
his mere natural appliances, to separate all the grains
of sand from all the grains of salt; but a shower
of rain will effect the same object in ten minutes.
And so, while man may find it tax all his intelligence
to separate any variety which arises, and to breed
selectively from it, the destructive agencies incessantly
at work in Nature, if they find one variety to be more
soluble in circumstances than the other, will inevitably,
in the long run, eliminate it.
A frequent and a just objection to
the Lamarckian hypothesis of the transmutation of
species is based upon the absence of transitional forms
between many species. But against the Darwinian
hypothesis this argument has no force. Indeed,
one of the most valuable and suggestive parts of Mr.
Darwin’s work is that in which he proves, that
the frequent absence of transitions is a necessary
consequence of his doctrine, and that the stock whence
two or more species have sprung, need in no respect
be intermediate between these species. If any
two species have arisen from a common stock in the
same way as the carrier and the pouter, say, have
arisen from the rock-pigeon, then the common stock
of these two species need be no more intermediate
between the two than the rock-pigeon is between the
carrier and pouter. Clearly appreciate the force
of this analogy, and all the arguments against the
origin of species by selection, based on the absence
of transitional forms, fall to the ground. And
Mr. Darwin’s position might, we think, have been
even stronger than it is if he had not embarrassed
himself with the aphorism, “Natura non facit
saltum,” which turns up so often in his pages.
We believe, as we have said above, that Nature does
make jumps now and then, and a recognition of the
fact is of no small importance in disposing of many
minor objections to the doctrine of transmutation.
But we must pause. The discussion
of Mr. Darwin’s arguments in detail would lead
us far beyond the limits within which we proposed,
at starting, to confine this article. Our object
has been attained if we have given an intelligible,
however brief, account of the established facts connected
with species, and of the relation of the explanation
of those facts offered by Mr. Darwin to the theoretical
views held by his predecessors and his contemporaries,
and, above all, to the requirements of scientific
logic. We have ventured to point out that it does
not, as yet, satisfy all those requirements; but we
do not hesitate to assert that it is as superior to
any preceding or contemporary hypothesis, in the extent
of observational and experimental basis on which it
rests, in its rigorously scientific method, and in
its power of explaining biological phenomena, as was
the hypothesis of Copernicus to the speculations of
Ptolemy. But the planetary orbits turned out to
be not quite circular after all, and, grand as was
the service Copernicus rendered to science, Kepler
and Newton had to come after him. What if the
orbit of Darwinism should be a little too circular?
What if species should offer residual phenomena, here
and there, not explicable by natural selection?
Twenty years hence naturalists may be in a position
to say whether this is, or is not, the case; but in
either event they will owe the author of ‘The
Origin of Species’ an immense debt of gratitude.
We should leave a very wrong impression on the reader’s
mind if we permitted him to suppose that the value
of that work depends wholly on the ultimate justification
of the theoretical views which it contains. On
the contrary, if they were disproved to-morrow, the
book would still be the best of its kind-the
most compendious statement of well-sifted facts bearing
on the doctrine of species that has ever appeared.
The chapters on Variation, on the Struggle for Existence,
on Instinct, on Hybridism, on the Imperfection of
the Geological Record, on Geographical Distribution,
have not only no equals, but, so far as our knowledge
goes, no competitors, within the range of biological
literature. And viewed as a whole, we do not believe
that, since the publication of Von Baer’s Researches
on Development, thirty years ago, any work has appeared
calculated to exert so large an influence, not only
on the future of Biology, but in extending the domination
of Science over regions of thought into which she
has, as yet, hardly penetrated.