Read CHAPTER VII of A Short History of the 6th Division Aug. 1914-March 1919 , free online book, by Thomas Owen Marden, on ReadCentral.com.

LOOS SALIENT

1916-17

On 25th November the Division took over the La Bassee sector, which included the famous Givenchy Ridge and Cuinchy Brickstacks. After about a month it side-stepped to the Cambrin-Hohenzollern Quarries front of about 5,500 yards, where it remained until the 28th February 1917. All this front had a most evil repute, but so exhausted was the enemy by the Somme fighting that this four months’ trench sojourn proved the quietest the Division ever experienced, except before the storm of March 1918, and the casualties would have been far fewer had it not been for several raids carried out by us.

The machine-guns of the Division were strengthened on 15th December by the arrival of the 192nd M.G. Company, and on 2nd January 1917 Lt.-Col. G. F. B. Goldney, D.S.O., succeeded Lt.-Col. H. R. S. Christie as C.R.E., the latter having been nearly a year with the Division.

On the 1st March the Division took over a 11,000 yards’ front extending north from the Double Crassier at Loos with sectors Loos 14bis Hulluch Hohenzollern, all three brigades being in line and a brigade of the 21st Division also which came under the command of G.O.C., 6th Division.

March and the first portion of April were notable for raids and counter-raids, and for considerable artillery and trench-mortar activity, which gave place to more or less continuous fighting consequent on the withdrawal of the enemy opposite the right of the Division after the successful attack by the Canadians at Vimy.

Notice was received on the morning of the 13th April that a withdrawal was contemplated by the enemy opposite part of the Divisional front. The right section of the front was at that time held by the 16th Infantry Brigade, with the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment on its right. On the 13th April the withdrawal commenced, the enemy being so closely followed up by the York and Lancaster Regiment that by 6.20 p.m. the brigade was able to report the Railway Triangle in our occupation, and the whole of the battalion in the enemy’s trenches. Our troops were into the enemy’s dug-outs before the candles left by them had burnt out.

The policy laid down for the Division was that the enemy was to be closely followed up wherever he fell back, but that our troops were not to be committed to a serious engagement. In accordance with these instructions the enemy’s trenches were subjected to heavy bombardment, with pauses during which patrols were sent forward and occupied as much ground as they could. This policy was maintained for four days, during which the 16th Infantry Brigade pressed the enemy with such vigour, within the limits allowed to it, that he was evidently rushed rather farther back than had been his intention, and began to become apprehensive as to his hold on Hill 70. The opposition stiffened on the 15th April, and on the 16th a counter-attack drove the 1st The Buffs back slightly, but was unsuccessful against the 8th Bedfordshire Regiment on the right. An advanced post of the latter battalion put up a very fine defence and maintained its position. A further attack on this battalion on the following day again failed to shake the defence.

On the 16th April a systematic bombardment of the trenches on Hill 70 was commenced, and authority was given for a slightly greater employment of force. Attacks on the 18th and 19th April, by the 1st K.S.L.I. and the 8th Bedfordshire Regiment, gained some ground and gave us between forty and fifty prisoners.

By this time continuous fighting, under very trying weather conditions, had exhausted the 16th Infantry Brigade. In order to maintain the pressure it became necessary to withdraw battalions from the front of the other brigades and to put them straight in on the offensive front, replacing them by the battalions withdrawn from that front.

An attack by the 14th D.L.I. on the 21st April in conjunction with the left of the 46th Division, who by this time had relieved the 24th on the right of the 6th Division, yielded thirty-five prisoners and two machine-guns, and disposed of a strong machine-gun nest on the Double Crassier Railway which had been holding up our right. Two counter-attacks were repelled, and on the 22nd April the 14th D.L.I. and the 11th Essex Regiment delivered a combined attack. The 14th D.L.I. secured the whole of their objective, with forty-six prisoners and three machine-guns, but the 11th Essex Regiment was unable to gain any ground. The 46th Division had been prevented by uncut wire from co-operating in the attack, with the result that the 14th D.L.I., after enduring a very heavy bombardment with exemplary determination, were eventually sniped and machine-gunned out of the captured line from the houses on their right. Eventually the position stabilized itself, with the enemy in possession of Nash Alley.

During ten days the Division had been engaged in continuous fighting on the front of one brigade, whilst holding with the other two a front of approximately 7,000 yards. Four battalions from other brigades, in addition to its own four, had passed through the hands of the 16th Infantry Brigade which was conducting the fighting. Battalions relieved from the fighting front one night were put straight into the line elsewhere on the following night, and battalions which had already done a long continuous tour in the trenches were relieved one night, put into the fighting front on the following night, and twenty-four hours later had to deliver an attack. The enemy, concerned about the fate of Hill 70, concentrated a very formidable artillery on the narrow front involved, and the bombardments and barrages on the front of attack were of exceptional severity. The extent to which the Division was stretched on the rest of its front is exemplified by two incidents. On one occasion an enemy raid penetrated both our front and support lines without being detected or meeting anyone, and came upon our reserve line by chance at the only place on the front of the brigade concerned where there was one company in that line. At another part of the front it was found, when normal conditions were restored, that in an abandoned part of our front line between two posts, the enemy had actually made himself so much at home that he had established a small dump of rations and bombs.

For the manner in which the Division had followed up and pressed the enemy withdrawal it received the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief.

On the 26th June 1917 the 46th Division was engaged on our right in active operations in the outskirts of Lens. The 2nd Sherwood Foresters and the 9th Norfolk Regiment were placed at the disposal of the 46th Division for these operations. The 9th Norfolk Regiment was not actively engaged, but the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, used in the later stages of the attack, fought with great gallantry and suffered fairly heavily.

On the 25th July the Division was relieved after a continuous tour in the Loos front of just under five months a period of particularly bitter and severe trench warfare. Trench-mortaring was continuous on both sides on the greater part of the front held, and shelling heavy. The artillery suffered no less severely than the infantry, owing to the very restricted choice of positions and the advantages of the observation enjoyed by the enemy. Raids and counter-raids were numerous. An analysis of the diary shows that during the six months from the end of January to the end of July the Division carried out 30 raids, of which 13 were successful in obtaining their objective and securing prisoners (total for the 13 raids: 54), 11 secured their objective but failed to yield any prisoners, and only 6 definitely failed. During the same period the enemy attempted 21 raids, of which only 4 succeeded in taking prisoners, 5 entered our trenches without securing any prisoners, and 12 were entire failures. Three of the enemy’s attempted raids yielded us prisoners, and 4 yielded identifications. The low average of prisoners taken by us in successful raids is attributable to two causes first the extraordinary precautions taken by the enemy in the latter part of the period to avoid losing prisoners by evacuating his trenches on the slightest alarm or remaining in his dug-outs, and secondly the fierceness engendered in our troops by the severity of the bombardment, and particularly of the trench-mortaring to which they were normally subjected.

A very successful battalion raid by the 1st The Buffs on the 24th June, which yielded 15 prisoners, might have made a better showing if it had not followed closely on the receipt of the mail containing accounts of an enemy bombing raid on Folkestone.

It is invidious to differentiate among so many carefully prepared and gallantly executed enterprises, but a reference to the successful battalion raid of the 11th Essex Regiment on the 24th March, to the raid carried out by the 14th D.L.I. on the 15th June, in the early morning which caught the Germans at breakfast, and particularly to the combined raid by the 2nd D.L.I. and the 11th Essex Regiment on the 28th June, will perhaps be forgiven. The latter was an exceptionally fine performance. It was carried out in connection with the operations of the 46th Division already referred to, by one company from each of the two battalions. Everything possible had been done beforehand to induce the enemy to expect attack on the front of the Division, yet these two companies succeeded in establishing and maintaining themselves for one hour in the enemy’s line, though constantly counter-attacked. They inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy, who counter-attacked both over the open and by bombing along the trenches. It was on this occasion that 2/Lieut. F. B. Wearne, late 11th Essex Regiment, won the V.C. Mention ought also to be made of the very gallant repulse of an enemy raid by the 1st K.S.L.I. and the 1st The Buffs on the 7th July. In one post of the 1st K.S.L.I. one wounded Lewis gunner, the only survivor of his post from the enemy bombardment, kept his gun in action and beat off the raiders.

On the 25th July the Division was relieved by the Canadians, with a view to an attack by the latter on Hill 70, and withdrew into rest in the Monchy Breton area with Divisional Headquarters at Ourton.

A feature of this period of rest was the very successful two-day rifle meeting, held on the Monchy-Breton Range.

During the month’s rest out of the line Major-Gen. Ross left the Division, being succeeded in command by Major-Gen. T. O. Marden, C.M.G., on the 19th August, and Brig.-Gen. Feetham, C.B., C.M.G., left the 71st Infantry Brigade to assume command of the 39th Division, in command of which he was killed in March 1918.

From the 31st July to the 5th August the 1st Leicestershire Regiment and 9th Norfolk Regiment were away from the Division, lent to the 57th Division to assist in a relief at the time of the gas shelling of Armentieres.

On the 24th to the 27th August the Division was relieving the Canadians on the Hill 70 front. The month spent in that sector was one of hard work for all ranks consolidating the newly won position, but was without important incident.

On the 24th September the Division side-stepped into the Cite St. Emile sector just north of Lens, and commenced preparations for an attack north of Lens, to be carried out in conjunction with the projected attack by the Canadian Corps on Sallaumines Hill. This project was, however, abandoned, and on the 23rd October the Division was withdrawn into rest in the St. Hilaire area, west of Lillers.

Six days later it commenced its march south to the Riencourt area, to join the Third Army for the Battle of Cambrai.

The 11th Leicesters (Pioneers) had gone north to the II Corps, to work on light railway construction near Dickebusch on 2nd July 1917. Their absence was much felt by the Division, and in view of the approaching operations they were welcomed back on 6th November, when they brought with them a letter from G.O.C., II Corps (Lt.-Gen. Jacob) congratulating them on their excellent work.

Before leaving the subject of the tour of the Division in the Loos-Lens front, some reference ought to be made to the successes won during that period by the Division in horse shows. After practically sweeping the board in all events at the I Corps show for which it was eligible to enter, the Division secured seven first and eight second prizes at the First Army show, as well as the cup for the best R.A. turn-out presented by G.O.C., R.A., First Army, and also that for the best R.E. turn-out, presented by the C.E., First Army.

The Divisional Ammunition Column secured prizes for the two best teams of mules, the best single mule, and the best light draught horse.