ON THE NATURE AND USES OF PATRIOTISM
Patriotism may be defined as a sense
of partisan solidarity in respect of prestige.
What the expert psychologists, and perhaps the experts
in Political Science, might find it necessary to say
in the course of an exhaustive analysis and definition
of this human faculty would presumably be something
more precise and more extensive. There is no
inclination here to forestall definition, but only
to identify and describe the concept that loosely
underlies the colloquial use of this term, so far
as seems necessary to an inquiry into the part played
by the patriotic animus in the life of modern peoples,
particularly as it bears on questions of war and peace.
On any attempt to divest this concept
of all extraneous or adventitious elements it will
be found that such a sense of an undivided joint interest
in a collective body of prestige will always remain
as an irreducible minimum. This is the substantial
core about which many and divers subsidiary interests
cluster, but without which these other clustering
interests and aspirations will not, jointly or severally,
make up a working palladium of the patriotic spirit.
It is true, seen in some other light
or rated in some other bearing or connection, one
and another of these other interests, ideals, aspirations,
beatitudes, may well be adjudged nobler, wiser, possibly
more urgent than the national prestige; but in the
forum of patriotism all these other necessaries of
human life the glory of God and the good
of man rise by comparison only to the rank
of subsidiaries, auxiliaries, amenities. He is
an indifferent patriot who will let “life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness” cloud the issue
and get in the way of the main business in hand.
There once were, we are told, many
hardy and enterprising spirits banded together along
the Spanish Main for such like ends, just as there
are in our day an even greater number of no less single-minded
spirits bent on their own “life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness,” according to their light,
in the money-markets of the modern world; but for all
their admirable qualities and splendid achievements,
their passionate quest of these amenities has not
entitled these Gentlemen Adventurers to claim rank
as patriots. The poet says:
“Strike for your altars and
your fires!
Strike for the green graves of your
sires!
God and your native
land!”
But, again, a temperate scrutiny of
the list of desiderata so enumerated in the poet’s
flight, will quickly bring out the fact that any or
all of them might drop out of the situation without
prejudice to the plain call of patriotic duty.
In the last resort, when the patriotic spirit falls
back on its naked self alone, it is not reflection
on the merits of these good and beautiful things in
Nature that gives him his cue and enforces the ultimate
sacrifice. Indeed it is something infinitely more
futile and infinitely more urgent, provided
only that the man is imbued with the due modicum of
patriotic devotion; as, indeed, men commonly are.
It is not faith, hope or charity that abide as the
irreducible minimum of virtue in the patriot’s
scheme of things; particularly not that charity that
has once been highly spoken of as being the greatest
of these. It may be that, viewed in the light
of reason, as Doctor Katzenberger would say, patriotic
devotion is the most futile thing in the world; but,
for good or ill, the light of reason has nothing to
do with the case, no more than “The
flowers that bloom in the spring.”
The patriotic spirit is a spirit of
emulation, evidently, at the same time that it is
emulation shot through with a sense of solidarity.
It belongs under the general caption of sportsmanship,
rather than of workmanship. Now, any enterprise
in sportsmanship is bent on an invidious success,
which must involve as its major purpose the defeat
and humiliation of some competitor, whatever else may
be comprised in its aim. Its aim is a differential
gain, as against a rival; and the emulative spirit
that comes under the head of patriotism commonly, if
not invariably, seeks this differential advantage by
injury of the rival rather than by an increase of
home-bred well-being.
Indeed, well-being is altogether out
of the perspective, except as underpinning for an
edifice of national prestige. It is, at least,
a safe generalisation that the patriotic sentiment
never has been known to rise to the consummate pitch
of enthusiastic abandon except when bent on some work
of concerted malevolence. Patriotism is of a contentious
complexion, and finds its full expression in no other
outlet than warlike enterprise; its highest and final
appeal is for the death, damage, discomfort and destruction
of the party of the second part.
It is not that the spirit of patriotism
will tolerate no other sentiments bearing on matters
of public interest, but only that it will tolerate
none that traverse the call of the national prestige.
Like other men, the patriot may be moved by many and
divers other considerations, besides that of the national
prestige; and these other considerations may be of
the most genial and reasonable kind, or they may also
be as foolish and mischievous as any comprised in the
range of human infirmities. He may be a humanitarian
given over to the kindliest solicitude for the common
good, or a religious devotee hedged about in all his
motions by the ever present fear of God, or taken up
with artistic, scholarly or scientific pursuits; or,
again, he may be a spendthrift devotee of profane
dissipation, whether in the slums or on the higher
levels of gentility, or he may be engaged on a rapacious
quest of gain, as a businessman within the law or as
a criminal without its benefit, or he may spend his
best endeavors in advancing the interests of his class
at the cost of the nation at large. All that is
understood as a matter of course and is beside the
point. In so far as he is a complete patriot
these other interests will fall away from him when
the one clear call of patriotic duty comes to enlist
him in the cause of the national prestige. There
is, indeed, nothing to hinder a bad citizen being
a good patriot; nor does it follow that a good citizen in
other respects may not be a very indifferent
patriot.
Many and various other preferences
and considerations may coincide with the promptings
of the patriotic spirit, and so may come in to coalesce
with and fortify its driving force; and it is usual
for patriotic men to seek support for their patriotic
impulses in some reasoned purpose of this extraneous
kind that is believed to be served by following the
call of the national prestige, it may be
a presumptive increase and diffusion of culture at
large, or the spread and enhancement of a presumptively
estimable religious faith, or a prospective liberation
of mankind from servitude to obnoxious masters and
outworn institutions; or, again, it may be the increase
of peace and material well-being among men, within
the national frontiers or impartially throughout the
civilised world. There are, substantially, none
of the desirable things in this world that are not
so counted on by some considerable body of patriots
to be accomplished by the success of their own particular
patriotic aspirations. What they will not come
to an understanding about is the particular national
ascendency with which the attainment of these admirable
ends is conceived to be bound up.
The ideals, needs and aims that so
are brought into the patriotic argument to lend a
color of rationality to the patriotic aspiration in
any given case will of course be such ideals, needs
and aims as are currently accepted and felt to be
authentic and self-legitimating among the people in
whose eyes the given patriotic enterprise is to find
favor. So one finds that, e.g., among the
followers of Islam, devout and resolute, the patriotic
statesman (that is to say the politician who designs
to make use of the popular patriotic fervor) will in
the last resort appeal to the claims and injunctions
of the faith. In a similar way the Prussian statesman
bent on dynastic enterprise will conjure in the name
of the dynasty and of culture and efficiency; or, if
worse comes to worst, an outbreak will be decently
covered with a plea of mortal peril and self-defense.
Among English-speaking peoples much is to be gained
by showing that the path of patriotic glory is at the
same time the way of equal-handed justice under the
rule of free institutions; at the same time, in a
fully commercialised community, such as the English-speaking
commonly are, material benefits in the way of trade
will go far to sketch in a background of decency for
any enterprise that looks to the enhancement of the
national prestige.
But any promise of gain, whether in
the nation’s material or immaterial assets,
will not of itself carry full conviction to the commonplace
modern citizen; or even to such modern citizens as
are best endowed with a national spirit. By and
large, and overlooking that appreciable contingent
of morally defective citizens that is to be counted
on in any hybrid population, it will hold true that
no contemplated enterprise or line of policy will
fully commend itself to the popular sense of merit
and expediency until it is given a moral turn, so as
to bring it to square with the dictates of right and
honest dealing. On no terms short of this will
it effectually coalesce with the patriotic aspiration.
To give the fullest practical effect to the patriotic
fervor that animates any modern nation, and so turn
it to use in the most effective way, it is necessary
to show that the demands of equity are involved in
the case. Any cursory survey of modern historical
events bearing on this point, among the civilised
peoples, will bring out the fact that no concerted
and sustained movement of the national spirit can be
had without enlisting the community’s moral
convictions. The common man must be persuaded
that right is on his side. “Thrice is he
armed who knows his quarrel just.” The
grounds of this conviction may often be tawdry enough,
but the conviction is a necessary factor in the case.
The requisite moral sanction may be
had on various grounds, and, on the whole, it is not
an extremely difficult matter to arrange. In the
simplest and not infrequent case it may turn on a question
of equity in respect of trade or investment as between
the citizens or subjects of the several rival nations;
the Chinese “Open Door” affords as sordid
an example as may be desired. Or it may be only
an envious demand for a share in the world’s
material resources “A Place in the
Sun,” as a picturesque phrase describes it;
or “The Freedom of the Seas,” as another
equally vague and equally invidious demand for international
equity phrases it. These demands are put forward
with a color of demanding something in the way of
equitable opportunity for the commonplace peaceable
citizen; but quite plainly they have none but a fanciful
bearing on the fortunes of the common man in time of
peace, and they have a meaning to the nation only
as a fighting unit; apart from their prestige value,
these things are worth fighting for only as prospective
means of fighting. The like appeal to the moral
sensibilities may, again, be made in the way of a call
to self-defense, under the rule of Live and let live;
or it may also rest on the more tenuous obligation
to safeguard the national integrity of a weaker neighbor,
under a broader interpretation of the same equitable
rule of Live and let live. But in one way or
another it is necessary to set up the conviction that
the promptings of patriotic ambition have the sanction
of moral necessity.
It is not that the line of national
policy or patriotic enterprise so entered upon with
the support of popular sentiment need be right and
equitable as seen in dispassionate perspective from
the outside, but only that it should be capable of
being made to seem right and equitable to the biased
populace whose moral convictions are requisite to its
prosecution; which is quite another matter. Nor
is it that any such patriotic enterprise is, in fact,
entered on simply or mainly on these moral grounds
that so are alleged in its justification, but only
that some such colorable ground of justification or
extenuation is necessary to be alleged, and to be
credited by popular belief.
It is not that the common man is not
sufficiently patriotic, but only that he is a patriot
hampered with a plodding and uneasy sense of right
and honest dealing, and that one must make up one’s
account with this moral bias in looking to any sustained
and concerted action that draws on the sentiment of
the common man for its carrying on. But the moral
sense in the case may be somewhat easily satisfied
with a modicum of equity, in case the patriotic bias
of the people is well pronounced, or in case it is
reenforced with a sufficient appeal to self-interest.
In those cases where the national fervor rises to
an excited pitch, even very attenuated considerations
of right and justice, such as would under ordinary
conditions doubtfully bear scrutiny as extenuating
circumstances, may come to serve as moral authentication
for any extravagant course of action to which the
craving for national prestige may incite. The
higher the pitch of patriotic fervor, the more tenuous
and more thread-bare may be the requisite moral sanction.
By cumulative excitation some very remarkable results
have latterly been attained along this line.
Patriotism is evidently a spirit of
particularism, of aliency and animosity between contrasted
groups of persons; it lives on invidious comparison,
and works out in mutual hindrance and jealousy between
nations. It commonly goes the length of hindering
intercourse and obstructing traffic that would patently
serve the material and cultural well-being of both
nationalities; and not infrequently, indeed normally,
it eventuates in competitive damage to both.
All this holds true in the world of
modern civilisation, at the same time that the modern
civilised scheme of life is, notoriously, of a cosmopolitan
character, both in its cultural requirements and in
its economic structure. Modern culture is drawn
on too large a scale, is of too complex and multiform
a character, requires the cooperation of too many
and various lines of inquiry, experience and insight,
to admit of its being confined within national frontiers,
except at the cost of insufferable crippling and retardation.
The science and scholarship that is the peculiar pride
of civilised Christendom is not only international,
but rather it is homogeneously cosmopolitan; so that
in this bearing there are, in effect, no national
frontiers; with the exception, of course, that in
a season of patriotic intoxication, such as the current
war has induced, even the scholars and scientists will
be temporarily overset by their patriotic fervour.
Indeed, with the best efforts of obscurantism and
national jealousy to the contrary, it remains patently
true that modern culture is the culture of Christendom
at large, not the culture of one and another nation
in severalty within the confines of Christendom.
It is only as and in so far as they partake in and
contribute to the general run of Western civilisation
at large that the people of any one of these nations
of Christendom can claim standing as a cultured nation;
and even any distinctive variation from this general
run of civilised life, such as may give a “local
colour” of ideals, tastes and conventions, will,
in point of cultural value, have to be rated as an
idle detail, a species of lost motion, that serves
no better purpose than a transient estrangement.
So also, the modern state of the industrial
arts is of a like cosmopolitan character, in point
of scale, specialisation, and the necessary use of
diversified resources, of climate and raw materials.
None of the countries of Europe, e.g., is competent
to carry on its industry by modern technological methods
without constantly drawing on resources outside of
its national boundaries. Isolation in this industrial
respect, exclusion from the world market, would mean
intolerable loss of efficiency, more pronounced the
more fully the given country has taken over this modern
state of the industrial arts. Exclusion from
the general body of outlying resources would seriously
cripple any one or all of them, and effectually deprive
them of the usufruct of this technology; and partial
exclusion, by prohibitive or protective tariffs and
the like, unavoidably results in a partial lowering
of the efficiency of each, and therefore a reduction
of the current well-being among them all together.
Into this cultural and technological
system of the modern world the patriotic spirit fits
like dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings.
Its net contribution to the outcome is obscuration,
distrust, and retardation at every point where it
touches the fortunes of modern mankind. Yet it
is forever present in the counsels of the statesmen
and in the affections of the common man, and it never
ceases to command the regard of all men as the prime
attribute of manhood and the final test of the desirable
citizen. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say
that no other consideration is allowed in abatement
of the claims of patriotic loyalty, and that such
loyalty will be allowed to cover any multitude of
sins. When the ancient philosopher described Man
as a “political animal,” this, in effect,
was what he affirmed; and today the ancient maxim is
as good as new. The patriotic spirit is at cross
purposes with modern life, but in any test case it
is found that the claims of life yield before those
of patriotism; and any voice that dissents from this
order of things is as a voice crying in the wilderness.
To anyone who is inclined to moralise
on the singular discrepancies of human life this state
of the case will be fruitful of much profound speculation.
The patriotic animus appears to be an enduring trait
of human nature, an ancient heritage that has stood
over unshorn from time immemorial, under the Mendelian
rule of the stability of racial types. It is
archaic, not amenable to elimination or enduring suppression,
and apparently not appreciably to be mitigated by
reflection, education, experience or selective breeding.
Throughout the historical period,
and presumably through an incalculable period of the
unrecorded past, patriotic manslaughter has consistently
been weeding out of each successive generation of men
the most patriotic among them; with the net result
that the level of patriotic ardor today appears to
be no lower than it ever was. At the same time,
with the advance of population, of culture and of
the industrial arts, patriotism has grown increasingly
disserviceable; and it is to all appearance as ubiquitous
and as powerful as ever, and is held in as high esteem.
The continued prevalence of this archaic
animus among the modern peoples, as well as the fact
that it is universally placed high among the virtues,
must be taken to argue that it is, in its elements,
an hereditary trait, of the nature of an inborn impulsive
propensity, rather than a product of habituation.
It is, in substance, not something that can be learned
and unlearned. From one generation to another,
the allegiance may shift from one nationality to another,
but the fact of unreflecting allegiance at large remains.
And it all argues also that no sensible change has
taken effect in the hereditary endowment of the race,
at least in this respect, during the period known
by record or by secure inference, say, since
the early Neolithic in Europe; and this in spite of
the fact that there has all this while been opportunity
for radical changes in the European population by
cross-breeding, infiltration and displacement of the
several racial stocks that go to make up this population.
Hence, on slight reflection the inference has suggested
itself and has gained acceptance that this trait of
human nature must presumably have been serviceable
to the peoples of the earlier time, on those levels
of savagery or of the lower barbarism on which the
ancestral stocks of the European population first
made good their survival and proved their fitness to
people that quarter of the earth. Such, indeed,
is the common view; so common as to pass for matter-of-course,
and therefore habitually to escape scrutiny.
Still it need not follow, as more
patient reflection will show. All the European
peoples show much the same animus in this respect;
whatever their past history may have been, and whatever
the difference in past experience that might be conceived
to have shaped their temperament. Any difference
in the pitch of patriotic conceit and animosity, between
the several nationalities or the several localities,
is by no means wide, even in cases where the racial
composition of the population is held to be very different,
as, e.g., between the peoples on the Baltic seaboard
and those on the Mediterranean. In point of fact,
in this matter of patriotic animus there appears to
be a wider divergence, temperamentally, between individuals
within any one of these communities than between the
common run in any one community and the corresponding
common run in any other. But even such divergence
of individual temper in respect of patriotism as is
to be met with, first and last, is after all surprisingly
small in view of the scope for individual variation
which this European population would seem to offer.
These peoples of Europe, all and several,
are hybrids compounded out of the same run of racial
elements, but mixed in varying proportions. On
any parallel of latitude taken in the climatic
rather than in the geometric sense the
racial composition of the west-European population
will be much the same, virtually identical in effect,
although always of a hybrid complexion; whereas on
any parallel of longitude also in the climatic
sense the racial composition will vary progressively,
but always within the limits of the same general scheme
of hybridisation, the variation being a
variation in the proportion in which the several racial
elements are present in any given case. But in
no case does a notable difference in racial composition
coincide with a linguistic or national frontier.
But in point of patriotic animus these European peoples
are one as good as another, whether the comparison
be traced on parallels of latitude or of longitude.
And the inhabitants of each national territory, or
of each detail locality, appear also to run surprisingly
uniform in respect of their patriotic spirit.
Heredity in any such community of
hybrids will, superficially, appear to run somewhat
haphazard. There will, of course, be no traceable
difference between social or economic classes, in point
of heredity, as is visibly the case in
Christendom. But variation of an apparently
haphazard description will be large and
ubiquitous among the individuals of such a populace.
Indeed, it is a matter of course and of easy verification
that individual variation within such a hybrid stock
will greatly exceed the extreme differences that may
subsist between the several racial types that have
gone to produce the hybrid stock. Such is the
case of the European peoples. The inhabitants
vary greatly among themselves, both in physical and
in mental traits, as would be expected; and the variation
between individuals in point of patriotic animus should
accordingly also be expected to be extremely wide, should,
in effect, greatly exceed the difference, if any,
in this respect between the several racial elements
engaged in the European population. Some appreciable
difference in this respect there appears to be, between
individuals; but individual divergence from the normal
or average appears always to be of a sporadic sort, it
does not run on class lines, whether of occupation,
status or property, nor does it run at all consistently
from parent to child. When all is told the argument
returns to the safe ground that these variations in
point of patriotic animus are sporadic and inconsequential,
and do not touch the general proposition that, one
with another, the inhabitants of Europe and the European
Colonies are sufficiently patriotic, and that the average
endowment in this respect runs with consistent uniformity
across all differences of time, place and circumstance.
It would, in fact, be extremely hazardous to affirm
that there is a sensible difference in the ordinary
pitch of patriotic sentiment as between any two widely
diverse samples of these hybrid populations, in spite
of the fact that the diversity in visible physical
traits may be quite pronounced.
In short, the conclusion seems safe,
on the whole, that in this respect the several racial
stocks that have gone to produce the existing populations
of Christendom have all been endowed about as richly
one as another. Patriotism appears to be a ubiquitous
trait, at least among the races and peoples of Christendom.
From which it should follow, that since there is,
and has from the beginning been, no differential advantage
favoring one racial stock or one fashion of hybrid
as against another, in this matter of patriotic animus,
there should also be no ground of selective survival
or selective elimination on this account as between
these several races and peoples. So that the undisturbed
and undiminished prevalence of this trait among the
European population, early or late, argues nothing
as to its net serviceability or disserviceability
under any of the varying conditions of culture and
technology to which these Europeans have been subjected,
first and last; except that it has, in any case, not
proved so disserviceable under the conditions prevailing
hitherto as to result in the extinction of these Europeans,
one with another.
The patriotic frame of mind has been
spoken of above as if it were an hereditary trait,
something after the fashion of a Mendelian unit character.
Doubtless this is not a competent account of the matter;
but the present argument scarcely needs a closer analysis.
Still, in a measure to quiet title and avoid annoyance,
it may be noted that this patriotic animus is of the
nature of a “frame of mind” rather than
a Mendelian unit character; that it so involves a
concatenation of several impulsive propensities (presumably
hereditary); and that both the concatenation and the
special mode and amplitude of the response are a product
of habituation, very largely of the nature of conventionalised
use and wont. What is said above, therefore, goes
little farther than saying that the underlying aptitudes
requisite to this patriotic frame of mind are heritable,
and that use and wont as bearing on this point run
with sufficient uniformity to bring a passably uniform
result. It may be added that in this concatenation
spoken of there seems to be comprised, ordinarily,
that sentimental attachment to habitat and custom
that is called love of home, or in its accentuated
expression, home-sickness; so also an invidious self-complacency,
coupled with a gregarious bent which gives the invidious
comparison a group content; and further, commonly
if not invariably, a bent of abnegation, self-abasement,
subservience, or whatever it may best be called, that
inclines the bearer unreasoningly and unquestioningly
to accept and serve a prescriptive ideal given by
custom or by customary authority.
The conclusion would therefore provisionally
run to the effect that under modern conditions the
patriotic animus is wholly a disserviceable trait
in the spiritual endowment of these peoples, in
so far as bears on the material conditions of life
unequivocally, and as regards the cultural interests
more at large presumptively; whereas there is no assured
ground for a discriminating opinion as touches its
possible utility or disutility at any remote period
in the past. There is, of course, always room
for the conservative estimate that, as the possession
of this spiritual trait has not hitherto resulted in
the extinction of the race, so it may also in the
calculable future continue to bring no more grievous
results than a degree of mischief, without even stopping
or greatly retarding the increase of population.
All this, of course, is intended to
apply only so far as it goes. It must not be
taken as intending to say any least word in derogation
of those high qualities that inspire the patriotic
citizen. In its economic, biological and cultural
incidence patriotism appears to be an untoward trait
of human nature; which has, of course, nothing to say
as to its moral excellence, its aesthetic value, or
its indispensability to a worthy life. No doubt,
it is in all these respects deserving of all the esteem
and encomiums that fall to its share. Indeed,
its well-known moral and aesthetic value, as well
as the reprobation that is visited on any shortcomings
in this respect, signify, for the purposes of the
present argument, nothing more than that the patriotic
animus meets the unqualified approval of men because
they are, all and several, infected with it.
It is evidence of the ubiquitous, intimate and ineradicable
presence of this quality in human nature; all the more
since it continues untiringly to be held in the highest
esteem in spite of the fact that a modicum of reflection
should make its disserviceability plain to the meanest
understanding. No higher praise of moral excellence,
and no profounder test of loyalty, can be asked than
this current unreserved commendation of a virtue that
makes invariably for damage and discomfort. The
virtuous impulse must be deep-seated and indefeasible
that drives men incontinently to do good that evil
may come of it. “Though He slay me, yet
will I trust in Him.”
In the light and it is
a dim and wavering light of the archaeological
evidence, helped out by circumstantial evidence from
such parallel or analogous instances as are afforded
by existing communities on a comparable level of culture,
one may venture more or less confidently on a reconstruction
of the manner of life among the early Europeans, of
early neolithic times and later. And so one may
form some conception of the part played by this patriotic
animus among those beginnings, when, if not the race,
at least its institutions were young; and when the
native temperament of these peoples was tried out and
found fit to survive through the age-long and slow-moving
eras of stone and bronze. In this connection,
it appears safe to assume that since early neolithic
times no sensible change has taken effect in the racial
complexion of the European peoples; and therefore
no sensible change in their spiritual and mental make-up.
So that in respect of the spiritual elements that
go to make up this patriotic animus the Europeans of
today will be substantially identical with the Europeans
of that early time. The like is true as regards
those other traits of temperament that come in question
here, as being included among the stable characteristics
that still condition the life of these peoples under
the altered circumstances of the modern age.
The difference between prehistoric
Europe and the present state of these peoples resolves
itself on analysis into a difference in the state of
the industrial arts, together with such institutional
changes as have come on in the course of working out
this advance in the industrial arts. The habits
and the exigencies of life among these peoples have
greatly changed; whereas in temperament and capacities
the peoples that now live by and under the rule of
this altered state of the industrial arts are the
same as they were. It is to be noted, therefore,
that the fact of their having successfully come through
the long ages of prehistory by the use of this mental
and spiritual endowment can not be taken to argue
that these peoples are thereby fit to meet the exigencies
of this later and gravely altered age; nor will it
do to assume that because these peoples have themselves
worked out this modern culture and its technology,
therefore it must all be suitable for their use and
conducive to their biological success. The single
object lesson of the modern urban community, with
its endless requirements in the way of sanitation,
police, compulsory education, charities, all
this and many other discrepancies in modern life should
enjoin caution on anyone who is inclined off-hand
to hold that because modern men have created these
conditions, therefore these must be the most suitable
conditions of life for modern mankind.
In the beginning, that is to say in
the European beginning, men lived in small and close
groups. Control was close within the group, and
the necessity of subordinating individual gains and
preferences to the common good was enjoined on the
group by the exigencies of the case, on pain of common
extinction. The situation and usages of existing
Eskimo villages may serve to illustrate and enforce
the argument on this head. The solidarity of
sentiment necessary to support the requisite solidarity
of action in the case would be a prime condition of
survival in any racial stock exposed to the conditions
which surrounded these early Europeans. This
needful sense of solidarity would touch not simply
or most imperatively the joint prestige of the group,
but rather the joint material interests; and would
enforce a spirit of mutual support and dependence.
Which would be rather helped than hindered by a jealous
attitude of joint prestige; so long as no divergent
interests of members within the group were in a position
to turn this state of the common sentiment to their
own particular advantage.
This state of the case will have lasted
for a relatively long time; long enough to have tested
the fitness of these peoples for that manner of life, longer,
no doubt, than the interval that has elapsed since
history began. Special interests e.g.,
personal and family interests will have
been present and active in these days of the beginning;
but so long as the group at large was small enough
to admit of a close neighborly contact throughout
its extent and throughout the workday routine of life,
at the same time that it was too small and feeble
to allow any appreciable dissipation of its joint energies
in such pursuit of selfish gains as would run counter
to the paramount business of the common livelihood,
so long the sense of a common livelihood and a joint
fortune would continue to hold any particularist ambitions
effectually in check. Had it fallen out otherwise,
the story of the group in question would have been
ended, and another and more suitably endowed type
of men would have taken the place vacated by its extinction.
With a sensible advance in the industrial
arts the scale of operations would grow larger, and
the group more numerous and extensive. The margin
between production and subsistence would also widen
and admit additional scope for individual ambitions
and personal gains. And as this process of growth
and increasing productive efficiency went on, the control
exercised by neighborly surveillance, through the sentiment
of the common good as against the self-seeking pursuits
of individuals and sub-groups, would gradually slacken;
until by progressive disuse it would fall into a degree
of abeyance; to be called into exercise and incite
to concerted action only in the face of unusual exigencies
touching the common fortunes of the group at large,
or on persuasion that the collective interest of the
group at large was placed in jeopardy in the molestation
of one and another of its members from without.
The group’s prestige at least would be felt to
suffer in the defeat or discourtesy suffered by any
of its members at the hands of any alien; and, under
compulsion of the ancient sense of group solidarity,
whatever material hardship or material gain might so
fall to individual members in their dealings with
the alien would pass easy scrutiny as material detriment
or gain inuring to the group at large, in
the apprehension of men whose sense of community interest
is inflamed with a jealous disposition to safeguard
their joint prestige.
With continued advance in the industrial
arts the circumstances conditioning life will undergo
a progressive change of such a character that the
joint interest of the group at large, in the material
respect, will progressively be less closely bound
up with the material fortunes of any particular member
or members; until in the course of time and change
there will, in effect, in ordinary times be no general
and inclusive community of material interest binding
the members together in a common fortune and working
for a common livelihood. As the rights of ownership
begin to take effect, so that the ownership of property
and the pursuit of a livelihood under the rules of
ownership come to govern men’s economic relations,
these material concerns will cease to be a matter
of undivided joint interest, and will fall into the
shape of interest in severalty. So soon and so
far as this institution of ownership or property takes
effect, men’s material interests cease to run
on lines of group solidarity. Solely, or almost
solely, in the exceptional case of defense against
a predatory incursion from outside, do the members
of the group have a common interest of a material kind.
Progressively as the state of the arts advances, the
industrial organisation advances to a larger scale
and a more extensive specialisation, with increasing
divergence among individual interests and individual
fortunes; and intercourse over larger distances grows
easier and makes a larger grouping practicable; which
enables a larger, prompter and more effective mobilisation
of forces with which to defend or assert any joint
claims. But by the same move it also follows,
or at least it appears uniformly to have followed
in the European case, that the accumulation of property
and the rights of ownership have progressively come
into the first place among the material interests of
these peoples; while anything like a community of usufruct
has imperceptibly fallen into the background, and
has presently gone virtually into abeyance, except
as an eventual recourse in extremis for the
common defense. Property rights have displaced
community of usufruct; and invidious distinctions
as between persons, sub-groups, and classes have displaced
community of prestige in the workday routine of these
peoples; and the distinctions between contrasted persons
or classes have come to rest, in an ever increasing
degree, directly or indirectly, on invidious comparisons
in respect of pecuniary standing rather than on personal
affiliation with the group at large.
So, with the advance of the industrial
arts a differentiation of a new character sets in
and presently grows progressively more pronounced and
more effectual, giving rise to a regrouping on lines
that run regardless of those frontiers that divide
one community from another for purposes of patriotic
emulation. So far as it comes chiefly and typically
in question here, this regrouping takes place on two
distinct but somewhat related principles of contrast:
that of wealth and poverty, and that of master and
servant, or authority and obedience. The material
interests of the population in this way come to be
divided between the group of those who own and those
who command, on the one hand, and of those who work
and who obey, on the other hand.
Neither of these two contrasted categories
of persons have any direct material interest in the
maintenance of the patriotic community; or at any
rate no such interest as should reasonably induce them
to spend their own time and substance in support of
the political (patriotic) organisation within which
they live. It is only in so far as one or another
of these interests looks for a more than proportionate
share in any prospective gain from the joint enterprise,
that the group or class in question can reasonably
be counted on to bear its share in the joint venture.
And it is only when and in so far as their particular
material or self-regarding interest is reenforced
by patriotic conceit, that they can be counted on
to spend themselves in furtherance of the patriotic
enterprise, without the assurance of a more than proportionate
share in any gains that may be held in prospect from
any such joint enterprise; and it is only in its patriotic
bearing that the political community continues to
be a joint venture. That is to say, in more generalised
terms, through the development of the rights of property,
and of such like prescriptive claims of privilege
and prerogative, it has come about that other community
interests have fallen away, until the collective prestige
remains as virtually the sole community interest which
can hold the sentiment of the group in a bond of solidarity.
To one or another of these several
interested groups or classes within the community
the political organisation may work a benefit; but
only to one or another, not to each and several, jointly
or collectively. Since by no chance will the
benefit derived from such joint enterprise on the
part of the community at large equal the joint cost;
in as much as all joint enterprise of the kind that
looks to material advantage works by one or another
method of inhibition and takes effect, if at all, by
lowering the aggregate efficiency of the several countries
concerned, with a view to the differential gain of
one at the cost of another. So, e.g., a
protective tariff is plainly a conspiracy in restraint
of trade, with a view to benefit the conspirators
by hindering their competitors. The aggregate
cost to the community at large of such an enterprise
in retardation is always more than the gains it brings
to those who may benefit by it.
In so speaking of the uses to which
the common man’s patriotic devotion may be turned,
there is no intention to underrate its intrinsic value
as a genial and generous trait of human nature.
Doubtless it is best and chiefly to be appreciated
as a spiritual quality that beautifies and ennobles
its bearer, and that endows him with the full stature
of manhood, quite irrespective of ulterior considerations.
So it is to be conceded without argument that this
patriotic animus is a highly meritorious frame of
mind, and that it has an aesthetic value scarcely
to be overstated in the farthest stretch of poetic
license. But the question of its serviceability
to the modern community, in any other than this decorative
respect, and particularly its serviceability to the
current needs of the common man in such a modern community,
is not touched by such an admission; nor does this
recognition of its generous spiritual nature afford
any help toward answering a further question as to
how and with what effect this animus may be turned
to account by anyone who is in position to make use
of the forces which it sets free.
Among Christian nations there still
is, on the whole, a decided predilection for that
ancient and authentic line of national repute that
springs from warlike prowess. This repute for
warlike prowess is what first comes to mind among
civilised peoples when speaking of national greatness.
And among those who have best preserved this warlike
ideal of worth, the patriotic ambition is likely to
converge on the prestige of their sovereign; so that
it takes the concrete form of personal loyalty to
a master, and so combines or coalesces with a servile
habit of mind.
But peace hath its victories no less
renowned than war, it is said; and peaceable folk
of a patriotic temper have learned to make the best
of their meager case and have found self-complacency
in these victories of the peaceable order. So
it may broadly be affirmed that all nations look with
complacency on their own peculiar Culture the
organised complex of habits of thought and of conduct
by which their own routine of life is regulated as
being in some way worthier than the corresponding habits
of their neighbors. The case of the German Culture
has latterly come under a strong light in this way.
But while it may be that no other nation has been
so naïve as to make a concerted profession of faith
to the effect that their own particular way of life
is altogether commendable and is the only fashion
of civilisation that is fit to survive; yet it will
scarcely be an extravagance to assert that in their
own secret mind these others, too, are blest with much
the same consciousness of unique worth. Conscious
virtue of this kind is a good and sufficient ground
for patriotic inflation, so far as it goes. It
commonly does not go beyond a defensive attitude, however.
Now and again, as in the latterday German animation
on this head, these phenomena of national use and
wont may come to command such a degree of popular
admiration as will incite to an aggressive or proselyting
campaign.
In all this there is nothing of a
self-seeking or covetous kind. The common man
who so lends himself to the aggressive enhancement
of the national Culture and its prestige has nothing
of a material kind to gain from the increase of renown
that so comes to his sovereign, his language, his
countrymen’s art or science, his dietary, or
his God. There are no sordid motives in all this.
These spiritual assets of self-complacency are, indeed,
to be rated as grounds of high-minded patriotism without
afterthought. These aspirations and enthusiasms
would perhaps be rated as Quixotic by men whose horizon
is bounded by the main chance; but they make up that
substance of things hoped for that inflates those
headlong patriotic animosities that stir universal
admiration.
So also, men find an invidious distinction
in such matters of physical magnitude as their country’s
area, the number of its population, the size of its
cities, the extent of its natural resources, its aggregate
wealth and its wealth per capita, its merchant marine
and its foreign trade. As a ground of invidious
complacency these phenomena of physical magnitude
and pecuniary traffic are no better and no worse than
such immaterial assets as the majesty of the sovereign
or the perfections of the language. They are
matters in which the common man is concerned only
by the accident of domicile, and his only connection
with these things is an imaginary joint interest in
their impressiveness. To these things he has
contributed substantially nothing, and from them he
derives no other merit or advantage than a patriotic
inflation. He takes pride in these things in
an invidious way, and there is no good reason why
he should not; just as there is also no good reason
why he should, apart from the fact that the common
man is so constituted that he, mysteriously, takes
pride in these things that concern him not.
Of the several groups or classes of
persons within the political frontiers, whose particular
interests run systematically at cross purposes with
those of the community at large under modern conditions,
the class of masters, rulers, authorities, or
whatever term may seem most suitable to designate
that category of persons whose characteristic occupation
is to give orders and command deference, of
the several orders and conditions of men these are,
in point of substantial motive and interest, most
patently at variance with all the rest, or with the
fortunes of the common man. The class will include
civil and military authorities and whatever nobility
there is of a prescriptive and privileged kind.
The substantial interest of these classes in the common
welfare is of the same kind as the interest which a
parasite has in the well-being of his host; a sufficiently
substantial interest, no doubt, but there is in this
relation nothing like a community of interest.
Any gain on the part of the community at large will
materially serve the needs of this group of personages,
only in so far as it may afford them a larger volume
or a wider scope for what has in latterday colloquial
phrase been called “graft.” These
personages are, of course, not to be spoken of with
disrespect or with the slightest inflection of discourtesy.
They are all honorable men. Indeed they afford
the conventional pattern of human dignity and meritorious
achievement, and the “Fountain of Honor”
is found among them. The point of the argument
is only that their material or other self-regarding
interests are of such a nature as to be furthered
by the material wealth of the community, and more
particularly by the increasing volume of the body
politic; but only with the proviso that this material
wealth and this increment of power must accrue without
anything like a corresponding cost to this class.
At the same time, since this class of the superiors
is in some degree a specialised organ of prestige,
so that their value, and therefore their tenure, both
in the eyes of the community and in their own eyes,
is in the main a “prestige value” and a
tenure by prestige; and since the prestige that invests
their persons is a shadow cast by the putative worth
of the community at large, it follows that their particular
interest in the joint prestige is peculiarly alert
and insistent. But it follows also that these
personages cannot of their own substance or of their
own motion contribute to this collective prestige
in the same proportion in which it is necessary for
them to draw on it in support of their own prestige
value. It would, in other words, be a patent
absurdity to call on any of the current ruling classes,
dynasties, nobility, military and diplomatic corps,
in any of the nations of Europe, e.g., to preserve
their current dignity and command the deference that
is currently accorded them, by recourse to their own
powers and expenditure of their own substance, without
the usufruct of the commonalty whose organ of dignity
they are. The current prestige value which they
enjoy is beyond their unaided powers to create or
maintain, without the usufruct of the community.
Such an enterprise does not lie within the premises
of the case.
In this bearing, therefore, the first
concern with which these personages are necessarily
occupied is the procurement and retention of a suitable
usufruct in the material resources and good-will of
a sufficiently large and industrious population.
The requisite good-will in these premises is called
loyalty, and its retention by the line of personages
that so trade on prestige rests on a superinduced association
of ideas, whereby the national honour comes to be confounded
in popular apprehension with the prestige of these
personages who have the keeping of it. But the
potentates and the establishments, civil and military,
on whom this prestige value rests will unavoidably
come into invidious comparison with others of their
kind; and, as invariably happens in matters of invidious
comparison, the emulative needs of all the competitors
for prestige are “indefinitely extensible,”
as the phrase of the economists has it. Each
and several of them incontinently needs a further
increment of prestige, and therefore also a further
increment of the material assets in men and resources
that are needful as ways and means to assert and augment
the national honor.
It is true, the notion that their
prestige value is in any degree conditioned by the
material circumstances and the popular imagination
of the underlying nation is distasteful to many of
these vicars of the national honour. They will
incline rather to the persuasion that this prestige
value is a distinctive attribute, of a unique order,
intrinsic to their own persons. But, plainly,
any such detached line of magnates, notables, kings
and mandarins, resting their notability on nothing
more substantial than a slightly sub-normal intelligence
and a moderately scrofulous habit of body could not
long continue to command that eager deference that
is accounted their due. Such a picture of majesty
would be sadly out of drawing. There is little
conviction and no great dignity to be drawn from the
unaided pronouncement:
“We’re here because,
We’re here because,
We’re here because
We’re here,”
even when the doggerel is duly given
the rhetorical benefit of a “Tenure by the Grace
of God.” The personages that carry this
dignity require the backing of a determined and patriotic
populace in support of their prestige value, and they
commonly have no great difficulty in procuring it.
And their prestige value is, in effect, proportioned
to the volume of material resources and patriotic
credulity that can be drawn on for its assertion.
It is true, their draught on the requisite sentimental
and pecuniary support is fortified with large claims
of serviceability to the common good, and these claims
are somewhat easily, indeed eagerly, conceded and
acted upon; although the alleged benefit to the common
good will scarcely be visible except in the light of
glory shed by the blazing torch of patriotism.
In so far as it is of a material nature
the benefit which the constituted authorities so engage
to contribute to the common good, or in other words
to confer on the common man, falls under two heads:
defense against aggression from without; and promotion
of the community’s material gain. It is
to be presumed that the constituted authorities commonly
believe more or less implicitly in their own professions
in so professing to serve the needs of the common man
in these respects. The common defense is a sufficiently
grave matter, and doubtless it claims the best affections
and endeavour of the citizen; but it is not a matter
that should claim much attention at this point in
the argument, as bearing on the service rendered the
common man by the constituted authorities, taken one
with another. Any given governmental establishment
at home is useful in this respect only as against another
governmental establishment elsewhere. So that
on the slightest examination it resolves itself into
a matter of competitive patriotic enterprise, as between
the patriotic aspirations of different nationalities
led by different governmental establishments; and the
service so rendered by the constituted authorities
in the aggregate takes on the character of a remedy
for evils of their own creation. It is invariably
a defense against the concerted aggressions of other
patriots. Taken in the large, the common defense
of any given nation becomes a detail of the competitive
struggle between rival nationalities animated with
a common spirit of patriotic enterprise and led by
authorities constituted for this competitive purpose.
Except on a broad basis of patriotic
devotion, and except under the direction of an ambitious
governmental establishment, no serious international
aggression is to be had. The common defense, therefore,
is to be taken as a remedy for evils arising out of
the working of the patriotic spirit that animates
mankind, as brought to bear under a discretionary
authority; and in any balance to be struck between
the utility and disutility of this patriotic spirit
and of its service in the hands of the constituted
authorities, it will have to be cancelled out as being
at the best a mitigation of some of the disorders brought
on by the presence of national governments resting
on patriotic loyalty at large.
But this common defense is by no means
a vacant rubric in any attempted account of modern
national enterprise. It is the commonplace and
conclusive plea of the dynastic statesmen and the aspiring
warlords, and it is the usual blind behind which events
are put in train for eventual hostilities. Preparation
for the common defense also appears unfailingly to
eventuate in hostilities. With more or less bona
fides the statesmen and warriors plead the cause
of the common defense, and with patriotic alacrity
the common man lends himself to the enterprise aimed
at under that cover. In proportion as the resulting
equipment for defense grows great and becomes formidable,
the range of items which a patriotically biased nation
are ready to include among the claims to be defended
grows incontinently larger, until by the overlapping
of defensive claims between rival nationalities the
distinction between defense and aggression disappears,
except in the biased fancy of the rival patriots.
Of course, no reflections are called
for here on the current American campaign of “Preparedness.”
Except for the degree of hysteria it appears to differ
in no substantial respect from the analogous course
of auto-intoxication among the nationalities of Europe,
which came to a head in the current European situation.
It should conclusively serve the turn for any self-possessed
observer to call to mind that all the civilised nations
of warring Europe are, each and several, convinced
that they are fighting a defensive war.
The aspiration of all right-minded
citizens is presumed to be “Peace with Honour.”
So that first, as well as last, among those national
interests that are to be defended, and in the service
of which the substance and affections of the common
man are enlisted under the aegis of the national prowess,
comes the national prestige, as a matter of course.
And the constituted authorities are doubtless sincere
and single-minded in their endeavors to advance and
defend the national honour, particularly those constituted
authorities that hold their place of authority on
grounds of fealty; since the national prestige in such
a case coalesces with the prestige of the nation’s
ruler in much the same degree in which the national
sovereignty devolves upon the person of its ruler.
In so defending or advancing the national prestige,
such a dynastic or autocratic overlord, together with
the other privileged elements assisting and dependent
on him, is occupied with his own interest; his own
tenure is a tenure by prestige, and the security of
his tenure lies in the continued maintenance of that
popular fancy that invests his person with this national
prestige and so constitutes him and his retinue of
notables and personages its keeper.
But it is uniformly insisted by the
statesmen potentates, notables, kings and
mandarins that this aegis of the national
prowess in their hands covers also many interests
of a more substantial and more tangible kind.
These other, more tangible interests of the community
have also a value of a direct and personal sort to
the dynasty and its hierarchy of privileged subalterns,
in that it is only by use of the material forces of
the nation that the dynastic prestige can be advanced
and maintained. The interest of such constituted
authorities in the material welfare of the nation
is consequently grave and insistent; but it is evidently
an interest of a special kind and is subject to strict
and peculiar limitations. The common good, in
the material respect, interests the dynastic statesman
only as a means to dynastic ends; that is to say,
only in so far as it can be turned to account in the
achievement of dynastic aims. These aims are
“The Kingdom, the Power and the Glory,”
as the sacred formula phrases the same conception
in another bearing.
That is to say, the material welfare
of the nation is a means to the unfolding of the dynastic
power; provided always that this material welfare
is not allowed to run into such ramifications as will
make the commonwealth an unwieldy instrument in the
hands of the dynastic statesmen. National welfare
is to the purpose only in so far as it conduces to
political success, which is always a question of warlike
success in the last resort. The limitation which
this consideration imposes on the government’s
economic policy are such as will make the nation a
self-sufficient or self-balanced economic commonwealth.
It must be a self-balanced commonwealth at least in
such measure as will make it self-sustaining in case
of need, in all those matters that bear directly on
warlike efficiency.
Of course, no community can become
fully self-sustaining under modern conditions, by
use of the modern state of the industrial arts, except
by recourse to such drastic measures of repression
as would reduce its total efficiency in an altogether
intolerable degree. This will hold true even
of those nations who, like Russia or the United States,
are possessed of extremely extensive territories and
extremely large and varied resources; but it applies
with greatly accentuated force to smaller and more
scantily furnished territorial units. Peoples
living under modern conditions and by use of the modern
state of the industrial arts necessarily draw on all
quarters of the habitable globe for materials and
products which they can procure to the best advantage
from outside their own special field so long as they
are allowed access to these outlying sources of supply;
and any arbitrary limitation on this freedom of traffic
makes the conditions of life that much harder, and
lowers the aggregate efficiency of the community by
that much. National self-sufficiency is to be
achieved only by a degree of economic isolation; and
such a policy of economic isolation involves a degree
of impoverishment and lowered efficiency, but it will
also leave the nation readier for warlike enterprise
on such a scale as its reduced efficiency will compass.
So that the best that can be accomplished
along this line by the dynastic statesmen is a shrewd
compromise, embodying such a degree of isolation and
inhibition as will leave the country passably self-sufficient
in case of need, without lowering the national efficiency
to such a point as to cripple its productive forces
beyond what will be offset by the greater warlike
readiness that is so attained. The point to which
such a policy of isolation and sufficiency will necessarily
be directed is that measure of inhibition that will
yield the most facile and effective ways and means
of warlike enterprise, the largest product of warlike
effectiveness to be had on multiplying the nation’s
net efficiency into its readiness to take the field.
Into any consideration of this tactical
problem a certain subsidiary factor enters, in that
the patriotic temper of the nation is always more
or less affected by such an economic policy. The
greater the degree of effectual isolation and discrimination
embodied in the national policy, the greater will
commonly be its effect on popular sentiment in the
way of national animosity and spiritual self-sufficiency;
which may be an asset of great value for the purposes
of warlike enterprise.
Plainly, any dynastic statesman who
should undertake to further the common welfare regardless
of its serviceability for warlike enterprise would
be defeating his own purpose. He would, in effect,
go near to living up to his habitual professions touching
international peace, instead of professing to live
up to them, as the exigencies of his national enterprise
now conventionally require him to do. In effect,
he would be functus officio.
There are two great administrative
instruments available for this work of repression
and national self-sufficiency at the hands of the
imperialistic statesman: the protective tariff,
and commercial subvention. The two are not consistently
to be distinguished from one another at all points,
and each runs out into a multifarious convolution
of variegated details; but the principles involved
are, after all, fairly neat and consistent. The
former is of the nature of a conspiracy in restraint
of trade by repression; the latter, a conspiracy to
the like effect by subsidised monopoly; both alike
act to check the pursuit of industry in given lines
by artificially increasing the cost of production
for given individuals or classes of producers, and
both alike impose a more than proportionate cost on
the community within which they take effect.
Incidentally, both of these methods of inhibition bring
a degree, though a less degree, of hardship, to the
rest of the industrial world.
All this is matter of course to all
economic students, and it should, reasonably, be plain
to all intelligent persons; but its voluble denial
by interested parties, as well as the easy credulity
with which patriotic citizens allow themselves to
accept the sophistries offered in defense of these
measures of inhibition, has made it seem worth while
here to recall these commonplaces of economic science.
The ground of this easy credulity
is not so much infirmity of intellect as it is an
exuberance of sentiment, although it may reasonably
be believed that its more pronounced manifestations as,
e.g., the high protective tariff can
be had only by force of a formidable cooperation of
the two. The patriotic animus is an invidious
sentiment of joint prestige; and it needs no argument
or documentation to bear out the affirmation that
its bias will lend a color of merit and expediency
to any proposed measure that can, however speciously,
promise an increase of national power or prestige.
So that when the statesmen propose a policy of inhibition
and mitigated isolation on the professed ground that
such a policy will strengthen the nation economically
by making it economically self-supporting, as well
as ready for any warlike adventure, the patriotic
citizen views the proposed measures through the rosy
haze of national aspirations and lets the will to believe
persuade him that whatever conduces to a formidable
national battle-front will also contribute to the
common good. At the same time all these national
conspiracies in restraint of trade are claimed, with
more or less reason, to inflict more or less harm
on rival nationalities with whom economic relations
are curtailed; and patriotism being an invidious sentiment,
the patriotic citizen finds comfort in the promise
of mischief to these others, and is all the more prone
to find all kinds of merit in proposals that look
to such an invidious outcome. In any community
imbued with an alert patriotic spirit, the fact that
any given circumstance, occurrence or transaction
can be turned to account as a means of invidious distinction
or invidious discrimination against humanity beyond
the national pale, will always go far to procure acceptance
of it as being also an article of substantial profit
to the community at large, even though the slightest
unbiased scrutiny would find it of no ascertainable
use in any other bearing than that of invidious mischief.
And whatever will bear interpretation as an increment
of the nation’s power or prowess, in comparison
with rival nationalities, will always be securely
counted as an item of joint credit, and will be made
to serve the collective conceit as an invidious distinction;
and patriotic credulity will find it meritorious also
in other respects.
So, e.g., it is past conception
that such a patent imbecility as a protective tariff
should enlist the support of any ordinarily intelligent
community except by the help of some such chauvinistic
sophistry. So also, the various royal establishments
of Europe, e.g., afford an extreme but therefore
all the more convincing illustration of the same logical
fallacy. These establishments and personages are
great and authentic repositories of national prestige,
and they are therefore unreflectingly presumed by
their several aggregations of subjects to be of some
substantial use also in some other bearing; but it
would be a highly diverting exhibition of credulity
for any outsider to fall into that amazing misconception.
But the like is manifestly true of commercial turnover
and export trade among modern peoples; although on
this head the infatuation is so ingrained and dogmatic
that even a rank outsider is expected to accept the
fallacy without reflection, on pain of being rated
as unsafe or unsound. Such matters again, as the
dimensions of the national territory, or the number
of the population and the magnitude of the national
resources, are still and have perhaps always been
material for patriotic exultation, and are fatuously
believed to have some great significance for the material
fortunes of the common man; although it should be
plain on slight reflection that under modern conditions
of ownership, these things, one and all, are of no
consequence to the common man except as articles of
prestige to stimulate his civic pride. The only
conjuncture under which these and the like national
holdings can come to have a meaning as joint or collective
assets would arise in case of a warlike adventure carried
to such extremities as would summarily cancel vested
rights of ownership and turn them to warlike uses.
While the rights of ownership hold, the common man,
who does not own these things, draws no profit from
their inclusion in the national domain; indeed, he
is at some cost to guarantee their safe tenure by
their rightful owners.
In so pursuing their quest of the
Kingdom, the Power and the Glory, by use of the national
resources and by sanction of the national spirit,
the constituted authorities also assume the guardianship
of sundry material interests that are presumed to
touch the common good; such as security of person
and property in dealings with aliens, whether at home
or abroad; security of investment and trade, and vindication
of their citizens before the law in foreign parts;
and, chiefly and ubiquitously, furtherance and extension
of the national trade into foreign parts, particularly
of the export trade, on terms advantageous to the traders
of the nation.
The last named of these advantages
is the one on which stress is apt to fall in the argument
of all those who advocate an unfolding of national
power, as being a matter of vital material benefit
to the common man. The other items indicated
above, it is plain on the least reflection, are matters
of slight if any material consequence to him.
The common man that is ninety-nine and
a fraction in one hundred of the nation’s common
men has no dealings with aliens in foreign
parts, as capitalist, trader, missionary or wayfaring
man, and has no occasion for security of person or
property under circumstances that raise any remotest
question of the national prowess or the national prestige;
nor does he seek or aspire to trade to foreign parts
on any terms, equitable or otherwise, or to invest
capital among aliens under foreign rule, or to exploit
concessions or take orders, for acceptance or delivery;
nor, indeed, does he at all commonly come into even
that degree of contact with abroad that is implied
in the purchase of foreign securities. Virtually
the sole occasion on which he comes in touch with the
world beyond the frontier is when, and if, he goes
away from home as an emigrant, and so ceases to enjoy
the tutelage of the nation’s constituted authorities.
But the common man, in point of fact, is a home-keeping
body, who touches foreign parts and aliens outside
the national frontiers only at the second or third
remove, if at all, in the occasional purchase of foreign
products, or in the sale of goods that may find their
way abroad after he has lost sight of them. The
exception to this general rule would be found in the
case of those under-sized nations that are too small
to contain the traffic in which their commonplace population
are engaged, and that have neither national prowess
nor national prestige to fall back on in a conceivable
case of need, and whose citizens, individually,
appear to be as fortunately placed in their workday
foreign relations, without a background of prowess
and prestige, as the citizens of the great powers
who are most abundantly provided in these respects.
With wholly negligible exceptions,
these matters touch the needs or the sensibilities
of the common man only through the channel of the
national honour, which may be injured in the hardships
suffered by his compatriots in foreign parts, or which
may, again, be repaired or enhanced by the meritorious
achievements of the same compatriots; of whose existence
he will commonly have no other or more substantial
evidence, and in whose traffic he has no share other
than this vicarious suffering of vague and remote
indignity or vainglory by force of the wholly fortuitous
circumstance that they are (inscrutably) his compatriots.
These immaterial goods of vicarious prestige are, of
course, not to be undervalued, nor is the fact to be
overlooked or minimised that they enter into the sum
total of the common citizen’s “psychic
income,” for whatever they may foot up to; but
evidently their consideration takes us back to the
immaterial category of prestige value, from which
the argument just now was hopefully departing with
a view to consideration of the common man’s
material interest in that national enterprise about
which patriotic aspirations turn.
These things, then, are matters in
which the common man has an interest only as they
have a prestige value. But there need be no question
as to their touching his sensibilities and stirring
him to action, and even to acts of bravery and self-sacrifice.
Indignity or ill treatment of his compatriots in foreign
parts, even when well deserved, as is not infrequently
the case, are resented with a vehemence that is greatly
to the common man’s credit, and greatly also
to the gain of those patriotic statesmen who find
in such grievances their safest and most reliable raw
materials for the production of international difficulty.
That he will so respond to the stimulus of these,
materially speaking irrelevant, vicissitudes of good
or ill that touch the fortunes of his compatriots,
as known to him by hearsay, bears witness, of course,
to the high quality of his manhood; but it falls very
far short of arguing that these promptings of his
patriotic spirit have any value as traits that count
toward his livelihood or his economic serviceability
in the community in which he lives. It is all
to his credit, and it goes to constitute him a desirable
citizen, in the sense that he is properly amenable
to the incitements of patriotic emulation; but it is
none the less to be admitted, however reluctantly,
that this trait of impulsively vicarious indignation
or vainglory is neither materially profitable to himself
nor an asset of the slightest economic value to the
community in which he lives. Quite the contrary,
in fact. So also is it true that the common man
derives no material advantage from the national success
along this line, though he commonly believes that
it all somehow inures to his benefit. It would
seem that an ingrown bias of community interest, blurred
and driven by a jealously sensitive patriotic pride,
bends his faith uncritically to match his inclination.
His persuasion is a work of preconception rather than
of perception.
But the most substantial and most
unqualified material benefit currently believed to
be derivable from a large unfolding of national prowess
and a wide extension of the national domain is an
increased volume of the nation’s foreign trade,
particularly of the export trade. “Trade
follows the Flag.” And this larger trade
and enhanced profit is presumed to inure to the joint
benefit of the citizens. Such is the profession
of faith of the sagacious statesmen and such is also
the unreflecting belief of the common man.
It may be left an open question if
an unfolding of national prowess and prestige increases
the nation’s trade, whether in imports or in
exports. There is no available evidence that it
has any effect of the kind. What is not an open
question is the patent fact that such an extension
of trade confers no benefit on the common man, who
is not engaged in the import or export business.
More particularly does it yield him no advantage at
all commensurate with the cost involved in any endeavour
so to increase the volume of trade by increasing the
nation’s power and extending its dominion.
The profits of trade go not to the common man at large
but to the traders whose capital is invested; and it
is a completely idle matter to the common citizen whether
the traders who profit by the nation’s trade
are his compatriots or not.
The pacifist argument on the economic
futility of national ambitions will commonly rest
its case at this point; having shown as unreservedly
as need be that national ambition and all its works
belong of right under that rubric of the litany that
speaks of Fire, Flood and Pestilence. But an
hereditary bent of human nature is not to be put out
of the way with an argument showing that it has its
disutilities. So with the patriotic animus; it
is a factor to be counted with, rather than to be
exorcised.
As has been remarked above, in the
course of time and change the advance of the industrial
arts and of the institutions of ownership have taken
such a turn that the working system of industry and
business no longer runs on national lines and, indeed,
no longer takes account of national frontiers, except
in so far as the national policies and legislation,
arbitrarily and partially, impose these frontiers on
the workings of trade and industry. The effect
of such regulation for political ends is, with wholly
negligible exceptions, detrimental to the efficient
working of the industrial system under modern conditions;
and it is therefore detrimental to the material interests
of the common citizen. But the case is not the
same as regards the interests of the traders.
Trade is a competitive affair, and it is to the advantage
of the traders engaged in any given line of business
to extend their own markets and to exclude competing
traders. Competition may be the soul of trade,
but monopoly is necessarily the aim of every trader.
And the national organisation is of service to its
traders in so far as it shelters them, wholly or partly,
from the competition of traders of other nationalities,
or in so far as it furthers their enterprise by subvention
or similar privileges as against their competitors,
whether at home or abroad. The gain that so comes
to the nation’s traders from any preferential
advantage afforded them by national regulations, or
from any discrimination against traders of foreign
nationality, goes to the traders as private gain.
It is of no benefit to any of their compatriots; since
there is no community of usufruct that touches these
gains of the traders. So far as concerns his
material advantage, it is an idle matter to the common
citizen whether he deals with traders of his own nationality
or with aliens; both alike will aim to buy cheap and
sell dear, and will charge him “what the traffic
will bear.” Nor does it matter to him whether
the gains of this trade go to aliens or to his compatriots;
in either case equally they immediately pass beyond
his reach, and are equally removed from any touch
of joint interest on his part. Being private property,
under modern law and custom he has no use of them,
whether a national frontier does or does not intervene
between his domicile and that of their owner.
These are facts that every man of
sound mind knows and acts on without doubt or hesitation
in his own workday affairs. He would scarcely
even find amusement in so futile a proposal as that
his neighbor should share his business profits with
him for no better reason than that he is a compatriot.
But when the matter is presented as a proposition in
national policy and embroidered with an invocation
of his patriotic loyalty the common citizen will commonly
be found credulous enough to accept the sophistry
without abatement. His archaic sense of group
solidarity will still lead him at his own cost to favor
his trading compatriots by the imposition of onerous
trade regulations for their private advantage, and
to interpose obstacles in the way of alien traders.
All this ingenious policy of self-defeat is greatly
helped out by the patriotic conceit of the citizens;
who persuade themselves to see in it an accession
to the power and prestige of their own nation and a
disadvantage to rival nationalities. It is, indeed,
more than doubtful if such a policy of self-defeat
as is embodied in current international trade discriminations
could be insinuated into the legislation of any civilized
nation if the popular intelligence were not so clouded
with patriotic animosity as to let a prospective detriment
to their foreign neighbors count as a gain to themselves.
So that the chief material use of
the patriotic bent in modern populations, therefore,
appears to be its use to a limited class of persons
engaged in foreign trade, or in business that comes
in competition with foreign industry. It serves
their private gain by lending effectual countenance
to such restraint of international trade as would
not be tolerated within the national domain. In
so doing it has also the secondary and more sinister
effect of dividing the nations on lines of rivalry
and setting up irreconcilable claims and ambitions,
of no material value but of far-reaching effect in
the way of provocation to further international estrangement
and eventual breach of the peace.
How all this falls in with the schemes
of militant statesmen, and further reacts on the freedom
and personal fortunes of the common man, is an extensive
and intricate topic, though not an obscure one; and
it has already been spoken of above, perhaps as fully
as need be.