For the great body of the people in
any modern community, the proximate ground of expenditure
in excess of what is required for physical comfort
is not a conscious effort to excel in the expensiveness
of their visible consumption, so much as it is a desire
to live up to the conventional standard of decency
in the amount and grade of goods consumed. This
desire is not guided by a rigidly invariable standard,
which must be lived up to, and beyond which there
is no incentive to go. The standard is flexible;
and especially it is indefinitely extensible, if only
time is allowed for habituation to any increase in
pecuniary ability and for acquiring facility in the
new and larger scale of expenditure that follows such
an increase. It is much more difficult to recede
from a scale of expenditure once adopted than it is
to extend the accustomed scale in response to an accession
of wealth. Many items of customary expenditure
prove on analysis to be almost purely wasteful, and
they are therefore honorific only, but after they
have once been incorporated into the scale of decent
consumption, and so have become an integral part of
one’s scheme of life, it is quite as hard to
give up these as it is to give up many items that
conduce directly to one’s physical comfort,
or even that may be necessary to life and health.
That is to say, the conspicuously wasteful honorific
expenditure that confers spiritual well-being may
become more indispensable than much of that expenditure
which ministers to the “lower” wants of
physical well-being or sustenance only. It is
notoriously just as difficult to recede from a “high”
standard of living as it is to lower a standard which
is already relatively low; although in the former
case the difficulty is a moral one, while in the latter
it may involve a material deduction from the physical
comforts of life.
But while retrogression is difficult,
a fresh advance in conspicuous expenditure is relatively
easy; indeed, it takes place almost as a matter of
course. In the rare cases where it occurs, a failure
to increase one’s visible consumption when the
means for an increase are at hand is felt in popular
apprehension to call for explanation, and unworthy
motives of miserliness are imputed to those who fall
short in this respect. A prompt response to the
stimulus, on the other hand, is accepted as the normal
effect. This suggests that the standard of expenditure
which commonly guides our efforts is not the average,
ordinary expenditure already achieved; it is an ideal
of consumption that lies just beyond our reach, or
to reach which requires some strain. The motive
is emulation the stimulus of an invidious
comparison which prompts us to outdo those with whom
we are in the habit of classing ourselves. Substantially
the same proposition is expressed in the commonplace
remark that each class envies and emulates the class
next above it in the social scale, while it rarely
compares itself with those below or with those who
are considerably in advance. That is to say, in
other words, our standard of decency in expenditure,
as in other ends of emulation, is set by the usage
of those next above us in reputability; until, in
this way, especially in any community where class distinctions
are somewhat vague, all canons of reputability and
decency, and all standards of consumption, are traced
back by insensible gradations to the usages and habits
of thought of the highest social and pecuniary class the
wealthy leisure class.
It is for this class to determine,
in general outline, what scheme of Life the community
shall accept as decent or honorific; and it is their
office by precept and example to set forth this scheme
of social salvation in its highest, ideal form.
But the higher leisure class can exercise this quasi-sacerdotal
office only under certain material limitations.
The class cannot at discretion effect a sudden revolution
or reversal of the popular habits of thought with respect
to any of these ceremonial requirements. It takes
time for any change to permeate the mass and change
the habitual attitude of the people; and especially
it takes time to change the habits of those classes
that are socially more remote from the radiant body.
The process is slower where the mobility of the population
is less or where the intervals between the several
classes are wider and more abrupt. But if time
be allowed, the scope of the discretion of the leisure
class as regards questions of form and detail in the
community’s scheme of life is large; while as
regards the substantial principles of reputability,
the changes which it can effect lie within a narrow
margin of tolerance. Its example and precept
carries the force of prescription for all classes below
it; but in working out the precepts which are handed
down as governing the form and method of reputability in
shaping the usages and the spiritual attitude of the
lower classes this authoritative prescription
constantly works under the selective guidance of the
canon of conspicuous waste, tempered in varying degree
by the instinct of workmanship. To those norms
is to be added another broad principle of human nature the
predatory animus which in point of generality
and of psychological content lies between the two
just named. The effect of the latter in shaping
the accepted scheme of life is yet to be discussed.
The canon of reputability, then, must adapt itself
to the economic circumstances, the traditions, and
the degree of spiritual maturity of the particular
class whose scheme of life it is to regulate.
It is especially to be noted that however high its
authority and however true to the fundamental requirements
of reputability it may have been at its inception,
a specific formal observance can under no circumstances
maintain itself in force if with the lapse of time
or on its transmission to a lower pecuniary class
it is found to run counter to the ultimate ground
of decency among civilized peoples, namely, serviceability
for the purpose of an invidious comparison in pecuniary
success. It is evident that these canons of expenditure
have much to say in determining the standard of living
for any community and for any class. It is no
less evident that the standard of living which prevails
at any time or at any given social altitude will in
its turn have much to say as to the forms which honorific
expenditure will take, and as to the degree to which
this “higher” need will dominate a people’s
consumption. In this respect the control exerted
by the accepted standard of living is chiefly of a
negative character; it acts almost solely to prevent
recession from a scale of conspicuous expenditure that
has once become habitual.
A standard of living is of the nature
of habit. It is an habitual scale and method
of responding to given stimuli. The difficulty
in the way of receding from an accustomed standard
is the difficulty of breaking a habit that has once
been formed. The relative facility with which
an advance in the standard is made means that the
life process is a process of unfolding activity and
that it will readily unfold in a new direction whenever
and wherever the resistance to self-expression decreases.
But when the habit of expression along such a given
line of low resistance has once been formed, the discharge
will seek the accustomed outlet even after a change
has taken place in the environment whereby the external
resistance has appreciably risen. That heightened
facility of expression in a given direction which
is called habit may offset a considerable increase
in the resistance offered by external circumstances
to the unfolding of life in the given direction.
As between the various habits, or habitual modes and
directions of expression, which go to make up an individual’s
standard of living, there is an appreciable difference
in point of persistence under counteracting circumstances
and in point of the degree of imperativeness with
which the discharge seeks a given direction.
That is to say, in the language of
current economic theory, while men are reluctant to
retrench their expenditures in any direction, they
are more reluctant to retrench in some directions
than in others; so that while any accustomed consumption
is reluctantly given up, there are certain lines of
consumption which are given up with relatively extreme
reluctance. The articles or forms of consumption
to which the consumer clings with the greatest tenacity
are commonly the so-called necessaries of life, or
the subsistence minimum. The subsistence minimum
is of course not a rigidly determined allowance of
goods, definite and invariable in kind and quantity;
but for the purpose in hand it may be taken to comprise
a certain, more or less definite, aggregate of consumption
required for the maintenance of life. This minimum,
it may be assumed, is ordinarily given up last in
case of a progressive retrenchment of expenditure.
That is to say, in a general way, the most ancient
and ingrained of the habits which govern the individual’s
life those habits that touch his existence
as an organism are the most persistent
and imperative. Beyond these come the higher
wants later-formed habits of the individual
or the race in a somewhat irregular and
by no means invariable gradation. Some of these
higher wants, as for instance the habitual use of
certain stimulants, or the need of salvation (in the
eschatological sense), or of good repute, may in some
cases take precedence of the lower or more elementary
wants. In general, the longer the habituation,
the more unbroken the habit, and the more nearly it
coincides with previous habitual forms of the life
process, the more persistently will the given habit
assert itself. The habit will be stronger if
the particular traits of human nature which its action
involves, or the particular aptitudes that find exercise
in it, are traits or aptitudes that are already largely
and profoundly concerned in the life process or that
are intimately bound up with the life history of the
particular racial stock. The varying degrees of
ease with which different habits are formed by different
persons, as well as the varying degrees of reluctance
with which different habits are given up, goes to
say that the formation of specific habits is not a
matter of length of habituation simply. Inherited
aptitudes and traits of temperament count for quite
as much as length of habituation in deciding what
range of habits will come to dominate any individual’s
scheme of life. And the prevalent type of transmitted
aptitudes, or in other words the type of temperament
belonging to the dominant ethnic element in any community,
will go far to decide what will be the scope and form
of expression of the community’s habitual life
process. How greatly the transmitted idiosyncrasies
of aptitude may count in the way of a rapid and definitive
formation of habit in individuals is illustrated by
the extreme facility with which an all-dominating
habit of alcoholism is sometimes formed; or in the
similar facility and the similarly inevitable formation
of a habit of devout observances in the case of persons
gifted with a special aptitude in that direction.
Much the same meaning attaches to that peculiar facility
of habituation to a specific human environment that
is called romantic love.
Men differ in respect of transmitted
aptitudes, or in respect of the relative facility
with which they unfold their life activity in particular
directions; and the habits which coincide with or proceed
upon a relatively strong specific aptitude or a relatively
great specific facility of expression become of great
consequence to the man’s well-being. The
part played by this element of aptitude in determining
the relative tenacity of the several habits which constitute
the standard of living goes to explain the extreme
reluctance with which men give up any habitual expenditure
in the way of conspicuous consumption. The aptitudes
or propensities to which a habit of this kind is to
be referred as its ground are those aptitudes whose
exercise is comprised in emulation; and the propensity
for emulation for invidious comparison is
of ancient growth and is a pervading trait of human
nature. It is easily called into vigorous activity
in any new form, and it asserts itself with great
insistence under any form under which it has once
found habitual expression. When the individual
has once formed the habit of seeking expression in
a given line of honorific expenditure when
a given set of stimuli have come to be habitually
responded to in activity of a given kind and direction
under the guidance of these alert and deep-reaching
propensities of emulation it is with extreme
reluctance that such an habitual expenditure is given
up. And on the other hand, whenever an accession
of pecuniary strength puts the individual in a position
to unfold his life process in larger scope and with
additional reach, the ancient propensities of the race
will assert themselves in determining the direction
which the new unfolding of life is to take. And
those propensities which are already actively in the
field under some related form of expression, which
are aided by the pointed suggestions afforded by a
current accredited scheme of life, and for the exercise
of which the material means and opportunities are
readily available these will especially
have much to say in shaping the form and direction
in which the new accession to the individual’s
aggregate force will assert itself. That is to
say, in concrete terms, in any community where conspicuous
consumption is an element of the scheme of life, an
increase in an individual’s ability to pay is
likely to take the form of an expenditure for some
accredited line of conspicuous consumption.
With the exception of the instinct
of self-preservation, the propensity for emulation
is probably the strongest and most alert and persistent
of the economic motives proper. In an industrial
community this propensity for emulation expresses
itself in pecuniary emulation; and this, so far as
regards the Western civilized communities of the present,
is virtually equivalent to saying that it expresses
itself in some form of conspicuous waste. The
need of conspicuous waste, therefore, stands ready
to absorb any increase in the community’s industrial
efficiency or output of goods, after the most elementary
physical wants have been provided for. Where
this result does not follow, under modern conditions,
the reason for the discrepancy is commonly to be sought
in a rate of increase in the individual’s wealth
too rapid for the habit of expenditure to keep abreast
of it; or it may be that the individual in question
defers the conspicuous consumption of the increment
to a later date ordinarily with a view
to heightening the spectacular effect of the aggregate
expenditure contemplated. As increased industrial
efficiency makes it possible to procure the means of
livelihood with less labor, the energies of the industrious
members of the community are bent to the compassing
of a higher result in conspicuous expenditure, rather
than slackened to a more comfortable pace. The
strain is not lightened as industrial efficiency increases
and makes a lighter strain possible, but the increment
of output is turned to use to meet this want, which
is indefinitely expansible, after the manner commonly
imputed in economic theory to higher or spiritual wants.
It is owing chiefly to the presence of this element
in the standard of living that J. S. Mill was able
to say that “hitherto it is questionable if all
the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the
day’s toil of any human being.” The
accepted standard of expenditure in the community
or in the class to which a person belongs largely determines
what his standard of living will be. It does
this directly by commending itself to his common sense
as right and good, through his habitually contemplating
it and assimilating the scheme of life in which it
belongs; but it does so also indirectly through popular
insistence on conformity to the accepted scale of
expenditure as a matter of propriety, under pain of
disesteem and ostracism. To accept and practice
the standard of living which is in vogue is both agreeable
and expedient, commonly to the point of being indispensable
to personal comfort and to success in life. The
standard of living of any class, so far as concerns
the element of conspicuous waste, is commonly as high
as the earning capacity of the class will permit with
a constant tendency to go higher. The effect
upon the serious activities of men is therefore to
direct them with great singleness of purpose to the
largest possible acquisition of wealth, and to discountenance
work that brings no pecuniary gain. At the same
time the effect on consumption is to concentrate it
upon the lines which are most patent to the observers
whose good opinion is sought; while the inclinations
and aptitudes whose exercise does not involve a honorific
expenditure of time or substance tend to fall into
abeyance through disuse.
Through this discrimination in favor
of visible consumption it has come about that the
domestic life of most classes is relatively shabby,
as compared with the eclat of that overt portion of
their life that is carried on before the eyes of observers.
As a secondary consequence of the same discrimination,
people habitually screen their private life from observation.
So far as concerns that portion of their consumption
that may without blame be carried on in secret, they
withdraw from all contact with their neighbors, hence
the exclusiveness of people, as regards their domestic
life, in most of the industrially developed communities;
and hence, by remoter derivation, the habit of privacy
and reserve that is so large a feature in the code
of proprieties of the better class in all communities.
The low birthrate of the classes upon whom the requirements
of reputable expenditure fall with great urgency is
likewise traceable to the exigencies of a standard
of living based on conspicuous waste. The conspicuous
consumption, and the consequent increased expense,
required in the reputable maintenance of a child is
very considerable and acts as a powerful deterrent.
It is probably the most effectual of the Malthusian
prudential checks.
The effect of this factor of the standard
of living, both in the way of retrenchment in the
obscurer elements of consumption that go to physical
comfort and maintenance, and also in the paucity or
absence of children, is perhaps seen at its best among
the classes given to scholarly pursuits. Because
of a presumed superiority and scarcity of the gifts
and attainments that characterize their life, these
classes are by convention subsumed under a higher
social grade than their pecuniary grade should warrant.
The scale of decent expenditure in their case is pitched
correspondingly high, and it consequently leaves an
exceptionally narrow margin disposable for the other
ends of life. By force of circumstances, their
habitual sense of what is good and right in these
matters, as well as the expectations of the community
in the way of pecuniary decency among the learned,
are excessively high as measured by the
prevalent degree of opulence and earning capacity of
the class, relatively to the non-scholarly classes
whose social equals they nominally are. In any
modern community where there is no priestly monopoly
of these occupations, the people of scholarly pursuits
are unavoidably thrown into contact with classes that
are pecuniarily their superiors. The high standard
of pecuniary decency in force among these superior
classes is transfused among the scholarly classes with
but little mitigation of its rigor; and as a consequence
there is no class of the community that spends a larger
proportion of its substance in conspicuous waste than
these.