SPRING, 1918
January 22nd, 1918.
April 20th, 1918.
What the ultimate object of our training
was to have been is somewhat uncertain. Our withdrawal
from the forward area after six months may have been
merely to give us a thorough rest, but with affairs
in the state they then were, we can hardly imagine
that the intention was to fit us for anything of an
offensive character for some time to come, for as
a result of the withdrawal of Russia from the war,
and the consequent release of German troops from the
Russian front, everything pointed to the Allies on
the Western front being on the defensive for some
considerable time. That the I Corps knew this
had been clear for some time before we left the St.
Elie sector. Their Headquarters had remained
in the same billets at Labuissiere since the beginning
of the war, and they were taking all precautions not
to have them disturbed in fact sometimes
we used to think that they intended to end their days
there! There was no doubt a genuine fear that
the Boche might try to break through and capture the
rest of the mining district round about Bethune and
Bruay, and this caused them to take early steps to
prevent such a catastrophe, and for some time before
we left the St. Elie sector, they had all available
labour and material disposed strengthening the defences
behind the line as far back as Bethune. This
mainly consisted of putting up row upon row of “double-apron”
barbed wire entanglements every few hundred yards,
which was looked upon, rightly we think, as the best
kind of obstacle to hold up an attack. With machine
guns skilfully placed at intervals, so as to enfilade
these entanglements, it was thought that the best
form of defence had been attained. Work on trenches
in the Division and Corps reserve lines was also pushed
on, and the machine gun emplacements were made ready
for occupation in case of need, and provided with
supplies of ammunition and water. We were called
upon to help in this work shortly after we were relieved,
and on January 30th, sent a party of 460 of all ranks
by motor lorry to Mazingarbe for this purpose.
They stayed there with Col. Blackwall himself
in charge until February 7th, and during that time
worked hard in digging reserve trenches, constructing
anti-tank trenches, and wiring “localities”
under Royal Engineer supervision, near Vermelles.
These “localities” were points in the
different reserve lines most suitable for, and capable
of, all-round defence; they were selected mainly as
having a good field of fire on all sides, and so as
to command approaches by which the enemy might advance
in case of a break through.
The detailing of such a large party
naturally left us with very few men for training at
Burbure, so that we were able to do little in that
respect. Such refitting as was possible was done,
and bathing after a good deal of trouble was arranged
at Lillers, but as was the case in many of the back
areas “billet comforts” were not good.
Just at this time, too, we suffered from a scarcity
of clean clothes, and later on the scarcity became
worse. The supply was extremely short, and more
often than not the clothes were rather dirtier on their
return from the Abbeville laundry, than when they
were sent off. This was not our experience in
the I Corps, which we had just left, and whatever we
may have thought or said about some of the doings
of that Corps, it must be confessed that many of their
“Q” matters were very well worked, and
in the whole of their area, which included the entire
region round about and in front of Bethune, in which
we spent many months, we were seldom short of anything
in the nature of supplies which one might reasonably
require, though there may have been some Battalion
Commanders who considered that there should have been
a much more liberal allowance of motor lorries, which
they were certainly very chary about letting us have.
Economy in all things was now the
order of the day, and in order to make the most of
our diminishing forces, and to reduce the number of
units, it was decided to reorganise the Army on the
basis of three instead of four Battalions to a Brigade.
This was begun whilst we were at Burbure, the 46th
Division being one of the earliest to undergo the
change. In the 139th Brigade the 7th Battalion
was the one selected to be temporarily broken up.
The change was carried out with lightning rapidity,
and within about three days of first getting the order
that they were to be so treated, our old friends the
7th, were scattered almost to the four winds.
We were very glad to be allotted of their number six
Officers, Lieuts. R. B. Gamble, S. E. Cairns,
S. Sanders, who was attached to the 139th Trench Mortar
Battery, and B. W. Dale, and 2nd Lieuts. W. S.
Peach and O.S. Kent, also 151 other ranks, who
joined us and were absorbed into our Battalion on January
29th. On the 30th we said “Goodbye”
with much regret to their Commander Col. Toller,
who left that day with the bulk of his Headquarter
Staff, to join their corresponding unit in the 59th
Division. From the 2/8th Battalion, which was
the Sherwood Forester Battalion of the 59th Division
to be broken up, we also got a quota of five Officers,
Major F. G. Cursham, Capt. C. P. Elliott, M.C.,
Lieuts. G. G. Elliott, M.C., and G. Thomas, and
2nd Lieut. E. R. Elphick, and 85 other ranks,
who joined us on January 31. Frank Cursham, who
later met such a sad fate in England, was known to
some of the older members of the Battalion, and G.
G. Elliott too, had already served with us. This
large influx sent up our strength with a bound, and
at the end of January, we were probably the strongest
we ever touched, viz., 53 Officers and 987 other
ranks. The old nomenclature “1/8th”
and “2/8th,” used to designate the 1st
and 2nd lines of the Battalion, was no longer necessary,
and we were henceforth known simply as the “8th
Sherwood Foresters.”
On February 9th, the Division moved
back by route march to the First Army Training Area,
known officially as the “Bomy Area.”
This move was carried out as a sort of scheme, the
idea being that the Division was following up a retreating
enemy, and that at the end of the day’s move
we should billet just as though we were actually pursuing
in a hostile country, without so much prearrangement
as was generally possible. This did not tend,
perhaps, to billeting in as great comfort as one might
have wished, and we were inclined to think it was unnecessary.
Be that as it may, we found ourselves at the end of
the day with Headquarters and two Companies at Laires,
and two Companies at Livossart, all somewhat crowded.
This in the nature of things was unsatisfactory, and
steps were at once taken to try and bring about a
change, with the result that on February 13th, we moved
to a very nice little mining village, Enquin-les-Mines,
which we had to ourselves. The Headquarter Mess
was at the Maire’s House, where we were particularly
comfortable, and received much kindness from the Maire
and his family. There we had rather more callers
than on some other occasions, but none of them seemed
disappointed if we were not at home, so long as they
could leave a message with the Maire’s charming
daughter, and Officers of the Battalion positively
vied with each other in gallantry!
Musketry played the most important
part in our training, and ranges were in great demand.
An A.R.A. platoon competition was carried out in the
Division and roused considerable interest. The
winning platoon in the Battalion was N (D Company),
but unfortunately in the Brigade competition, they
were beaten by the platoon from the 5th Battalion.
Much open warfare and trench-to-trench attack practice
was also carried out, a very ominous sign being that
this consisted mainly of counter-attacks to regain
portions of trenches lost! The training culminated
in a fairly successful Brigade Field Day, near Coyecque.
Recreation of course figured largely
in the training. In a Brigade inter-Company football
competition, B Company’s team reached the semi-final,
in which they were knocked out by a team from the 5th
Battalion. For amusements we were not well off,
as we were somewhat isolated. We did, however,
manage to get the Divisional Cinema for the last week
of our stay, a very acceptable acquisition.
Whilst we were at Enquin our “tin
hats” which had recently been shorn of their
questionably ornamental or useful sandbags, with which
we had been ordered to keep them covered, were painted
a dull green, with, for some curious reason, the Transport
sign (dark blue square), and narrow light green stripe
on the left (denoting 8th Battalion) painted on the
side. The change was doubtless due to the pressing
need for economy.
By the first week in March, it was
realised on all hands that the great Boche offensive
could not long be delayed. The enemy had brought
Division after Division from the Russian front across
to the Western, and, during the Winter, had got together
an enormous concentration of troops in France and
Belgium, including at least three Austrian Divisions,
and it was now only a question of knowing exactly when
and where the onslaught would come. In these
circumstances our training was cut short, and on March
5th, we began to retrace our steps once more towards
the forward area, marching that day to Westrehem, where
we had been so comfortably billeted nearly a year before,
and were now enthusiastically greeted by our old friends.
Only one night was spent there, and the next day we
were taken in ’buses to Bethune, and billeted
once more at the Orphanage, this being our third time
to be quartered there. We were now back again
in the I Corps.
Then began a period of about seven
weeks activity, during which we had a considerable
amount of excitement, some of it of not too pleasant
a nature, and one was never quite certain what a day
might bring forth. The first week, however, was
spent in absolute peace at Bethune in most delightful
summer-like weather, and was thoroughly enjoyed by
all. During that time the 46th Division took over
the Cambrin sector again, and on March 14th, we relieved
the support Battalion in that sector, the 5th Lincolns,
who were holding the Annequin “Locality,”
including the whole of Annequin Fosse and its Colliery
cottages, which was being put in a state of defence,
and was to be held to the last in the event of the
enemy breaking through the front line system of trenches.
With the greatest regret we had now
to say goodbye to Col. Blackwall, who left us
for a tour of duty at home. He had been in command
of the Battalion without a break since October 15th,
1915, and during the whole time had never been off
duty, except when on leave or attending courses.
We feel sure no one felt more than he did what bad
luck it was that he should go just at this important
juncture, but he left with the best wishes of everyone
for a well-earned rest at home. At the same time
we welcomed to the command of the Battalion Lieut.-Col.
R. W. Currin, D.S.O., of the York and Lancaster Regiment,
who was destined to remain with us, with only a short
break, until the conclusion of the war.
Several other changes had recently
taken place. Hugh Kirby had left to take up a
commission in the Indian Cavalry, and the Transport
was now under the charge of Capt. Tomlinson.
We had also lost Lieuts. White, Day, and Cairns,
who had gone to England for a rest, and were followed
shortly afterwards by Lieut. H. G. Kirby.
Lieut. Gamble, and 2nd Lieuts. Sutton, Peach
and Saunders were unfit and were struck off strength,
and 2nd Lieut. Clarke went to the Machine Gun
Corps. Major Cursham had taken over C Company
from Capt. Geary, and Capt. C. P. Elliott
had succeeded Lieut. Day in command of B Company.
We had been given a new Padre, W. N. Kempe, who made
himself very popular during his few months’
stay with us. Sergt. J. Eggleston, after
a long period of excellent work as Pioneer Sergt.,
was appointed Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. of
D Company, in place of Gammon, who went home for a
commission.
Transport was lucky in being put in
lines at Le Quesnoy, probably the best constructed
and best equipped that we ever struck during the whole
war. Units which had been there before had evidently
worked hard on them to carry out improvements, and
for once we were really lucky in finding a good spot.
The stables were strongly built, well roofed, floored,
and provided with harness and fodder rooms, and to
a certain extent protected from bomb splinters by
earth revetments.
On March 20th, we relieved the 5th
Battalion in the Cambrin left sub-sector, with which
we were already well acquainted. On the following
day there took place in the South the first onslaught
of the Boche, in his great Spring Offensive of 1918.
There was no actual attack anywhere near us, the only
offensive action on our front being a “demonstration”
in the shape of a heavy bombardment with gas shells,
which was decidedly unpleasant, though not causing
us any casualties.
During the night of March 21/22nd,
we did experience a real touch of the offensive in
the shape of a big raid on the right Company, the
most vulnerable portion of the line on the whole Brigade
front. This front, which was held by A Company
was of enormous length, extending from Railway Craters
on the right to Munster Parade on the left, a distance
of about 600 yards. Three platoons (about 60 all
told) held the outpost line in small posts of four
or five men, each under a N.C.O., the fourth platoon
being held in support as a counterattacking platoon
in Old Boots Trench at the West end of Munster Tunnel.
The latter was about 400 yards behind the outpost
line, and was also occupied by the support Company,
and contained the right Company Headquarters.
The orders laid down were that in case of attack the
platoon detailed for the task was to counter-attack
either through the tunnel (quite impossible if the
enemy obtained a footing in the trench at the tunnel
mouth) or over the top.
Shortly after midnight, the enemy
put down an intense barrage of trench mortars, wing
bombs, and shells of all calibres, along the whole
of the Brigade front and support lines, forward communication
trenches, Battalion Headquarters, the Village Line,
and extending even to roads, villages, and batteries
far behind the line. Telephone wires were broken
immediately, but the “S.O.S.” was sent
by signal rocket and power buzzer, and our artillery
and machine guns replied at once. There had been
no preliminary bombardment or warning of any kind.
The enemy entered our trenches directly behind his
barrage from the cover of the craters on the right,
between our right post and the left Company of the
138th Brigade, who were on our right, also near Dundee
Walk in the centre, and just North of Munster Tunnel
on the left. Such wire as had been put up by
the few men who were usually available was swept away
by the hurricane bombardment, which prevented movement
of any kind, either to or from the front or support
lines. Two runners were wounded whilst attempting
to take messages between Company Headquarters and
Munster Tunnel, a distance of 50 yards. The posts
in the front line were unable, owing to their small
numbers, to offer any prolonged resistance, or on
account of the distance between them, to assist neighbouring
posts.
The front line entrance to Munster
Tunnel was held by us the whole time, and an attempt
to blow it in, which was one of the main objects of
the raid, was frustrated, 2nd Lieut. Hartle being
wounded by a hand grenade. That the garrison
of the outpost line withstood the onslaught to their
utmost there is no doubt, and to this the pools of
blood and reeking bayonets of some of the rifles found
afterwards in the trench, bore convincing testimony.
After the enemy’s withdrawal, one unwounded
and one seriously wounded German were left in our hands,
the former having apparently become detached from
his party, and being discovered later in front of
our trench with a sheet of newspaper fluttering from
his rifle.
The thoroughness with which the Boche
trained for this raid was proved from the prisoners’
statements and documents, which afterwards came into
our hands. For six weeks the raiding party, consisting
of about 250 men, had been training over an exact
replica of our trenches, constructed with the help
of an aeroplane photograph. The training had
also included the teaching of several words of English.
The work of the raiders was extraordinary, and our
own men in the front line testified to the remarkable
dexterity with which they removed their casualties.
This is the more wonderful inasmuch as they had to
penetrate our barrages, in order to regain their trench,
and there is no doubt that in doing so they lost heavily.
Our casualties amounted to three other ranks killed,
including a very gallant N.C.O., Corpl. Tyne,
26 other ranks missing, and one Officer (Hartle), and
ten other ranks wounded. We should like to pay
tribute to the excellent work done by the Signallers,
who as usual worked their hardest, to try and keep
their lines in order, in spite of the heavy shelling.
L.-Corpl. Parry’s efforts to repair the
broken lines back from one of the front Companies,
were especially praiseworthy.
Though there was an element of surprise
in the raid, there is no doubt that its success was
due to the fact that the defence was designed for
an attack on a large scale, and led inevitably to a
weakening of our outpost line, making it peculiarly
vulnerable to a raid or attack with a limited objective.
The following night, the whole Battalion
was ordered to wire as hard as possible, and hundreds
of reels of barbed wire were put out. Even Battalion
Headquarters shared in the work, the whole staff being
out in an endeavour to wire themselves in.
On March 24th, we were relieved by
the 6th Battalion, Headquarters and two Companies
proceeding to Beuvry, and two Companies remaining in
the trenches in close support. “Wind”
at this time was very “high,” and our
Intelligence reported that we must be prepared for
any eventuality. The enemy had made enormous
progress in their attack in the South, and everything
pointed to the possibility of a general attack along
the whole front. As a matter of fact no such attempt
was ever made on the Cambrin-St. Elie sector, but
we had to take every precaution, and for the next
two or three nights, we marched up to our battle positions
in front of Cambrin, in case the expected attack should
mature. We even made arrangements for a possible
retreat, and worse than that, all leave was stopped.
It was at this juncture that our Brigade
Commander, General Carey left us to take Command of
the 20th Division, with everyone’s good wishes
and congratulations. He arrived near Amiens in
time to assume Command of a composite Army, known
as “Carey’s Force,” and to assist
materially in finally stopping the great German onslaught.
He was succeeded by General Wood.
The “wind” in this quarter,
dropped for the moment, but we heard that things just
North of Arras were not looking too bright. The
enemy were expected to attack at Vimy, and the Canadians
who were holding the sector opposite Lens, were to
be moved to that part to help the defence. As
a result, we got orders on March 25th, to move back
once more to the Lens region, to relieve the Canadians.
Hasty plans were made by which the 11th Division took
over from us, and on March 27th, we marched to Calonne
and relieved the 72nd Canadian Battalion there in
reserve, moving up the following night to the St. Emile
sector, in front of St. Pierre, where we took over
the right sub-sector front line from the 78th Canadian
Battalion. The completion of the relief had to
be rather hurried, as the enemy attacked at Oppy on
March 28th, and the Canadians were hastily sent there
to help. Transport and Quarter-Master’s
Stores had meanwhile gone to Fosse 10.
The front line in this sector was
now of course much further forward, than when we were
last there, as the Canadians in connection with their
attack on Hill 70, had forced the enemy out of the
whole of St. Pierre, St. Laurent, and St. Emile Cites,
back to the outskirts of Lens itself. These Cites
were now to all intents and purposes destroyed, and
presented nothing but a mass of streets heaped up with
broken tiles, brick and other debris, interspersed
here and there with trenches, the remains of houses,
and a few shattered trees. Amongst the ruins
the Canadians had laid a splendid system of tramways,
and the transport of stores and rations to the line
was carried out every night by this means, in a most
expeditious manner. Canadian Engineers continued
to run the lines during our stay, and we must confess
that we did not envy the drivers their job, for the
lines went up uncomfortably close to the front line,
and a good deal of noise accompanied the arrival and
departure of the trains, unloading of stores, and
loading of empties for the return journey, the guard
or man in charge usually helping matters with a few
shrill blasts of his whistle, quite in approved Canadian
fashion.
After a quiet tour of four days, we
were relieved in the early morning of April 1st, by
the 6th Battalion, and went back to Brigade support
at St. Pierre, where we lived in the cellars of the
otherwise destroyed houses. Our stay there was
rendered less pleasant than it might have been, by
the fact that practically the whole of the village
was under observation from Lens, so that during the
day hardly any movement was possible, and most of
our exercise had to be taken by night, when we were
kept pretty busy with carrying and working parties.
The nightly gas shelling of the village made this work
anything but pleasant. Bathing parades too, were
held at night, and took place in the weirdest bathing
establishment we ever met, which was in the crypt
of the church. It was well protected by the ruins
of the church, and had been fitted up with a spray
bath.
On April 3rd, we relieved the 5th
Battalion in the line, and had a somewhat “thin”
six days, owing to the enemy being extremely active,
particularly with heavy trench mortars, with which
he did a lot of damage to our front line, being particularly
obnoxious on the night of April 5/6th, in retaliation
for one of our gas projector shows. L.-Corpl.
Beech did especially commendable work during these
days in charge of a Lewis gun post.
One morning during a tour in the front
line in this sector. Col. Currin very nearly
lost his runner. It was a rather foggy morning,
and the Commanding Officer sent him to find an Officer
in an adjoining Company. Unfortunately the runner
made a mistake at a trench junction, and gaily followed
an old communication trench, running straight to the
enemy’s lines. It was doubtful which party
was the more surprised when he suddenly found himself
confronted by a Boche sentry post behind a barricade.
At any rate the latter were too amazed to shoot, whilst
true to his calling the runner ran, and never stopped
until he nearly crashed into the arms of the Colonel,
who was wondering what on earth had happened.
On April 9th, the 6th Battalion relieved
us again, and we went back to St. Pierre. On
the same day there happened an event which was to have
an enormous effect on the future of the war, at any
rate so far as the fighting on the Northern portion
of the front was concerned, viz., the attack
on the British line immediately North of the La Bassee
Canal, and on the Portuguese in the Neuve Chapelle
area. The result was that whilst the 55th
Division put up a magnificent defence on the Canal,
and completely beat off all the enemy attacks, the
Portuguese gave way, and the enemy were able to push
on West for a considerable distance, until brought
to a halt by the British, who were later helped by
reinforcements rapidly sent up by the French.
This had an almost immediate effect on us, for on
the night of April 11/12th, we were taken out of the
line, being relieved once more by the Canadians (13th
Battalion) who were hurried up from the area North
of Arras, where things seemed to be quiet once more.
After a great scramble, relief was completed by 5.30
a.m. when it was practically daylight. Some got
rides on the trains which brought up the Canadians,
but the rest had to walk, and eventually we all got
to Noeux-les-Mines, where we had breakfast and dinner,
and proceeded in the afternoon to Vaudricourt.
The whole Division had been relieved one
of the quickest reliefs known and we now
found ourselves in Army Reserve, to be sent to any
spot where we might be required.
Things once more were in a very “nervy”
state, as it was felt that ere long the enemy would
make another desperate attempt to capture the rest
of the mining area, either by direct frontal attack
from the East towards Bethune, or by continuing his
enveloping movement from the North, and attacking
it from that direction across the La Bassee Canal.
A large part of this area now formed a prominent salient,
with the enemy on the East and North, and the consequence
was a rapid evacuation of the French inhabitants from
many of the mining towns and villages in that district,
including Bethune, Beuvry, Annequin, Sailly-Labourse,
Noeux-les-Mines, and Bully Grenay all of
which we knew well. For several days we watched
the wretched inhabitants toiling along the roads,
taking with them by whatever means they could, the
few belongings they most treasured or required.
Some had carts loaded with bedding and furniture,
some their little dog carts full to overflowing, others
footed it burdened with loads almost beyond human
strength to carry. Ever the throng kept passing
back from the forward regions, having left everything
that they could not carry just as it was in their
houses, with no other protection than locked doors.
Their cattle and horses too, were driven back, and
taken to pounds in villages in safer regions.
Several more mines had to cease work, and the French
miners thus thrown out of employment were mostly set
to work in digging line upon line of additional trenches
about Fouquieres and Drouvin, for us to fall back
on in case of a break through, as it was determined
to contest every bit of the ground to the very utmost.
Right well they worked, and in an incredibly short
time, they had dug miles of trenches, and well wired
them in front with substantial entanglements.
Our only fear was that if the enemy got through, we
should not have sufficient men to garrison these trenches
so excellently dug!
This was probably the darkest period
of the war. The inspiring message from the Commander-in-Chief
was read to all ranks, and all indeed realised that
we had our backs to the wall and were fighting for
our very existence, and that it was touch and go whether
the Hun would not, after all, break through the whole
line and sweep through to the coast, and ultimately
to England.
It was in these circumstances, after
a few days quiet training about Vaudricourt, that
we got word at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of April 18th,
that a German prisoner had been captured, and had given
information to the effect that the enemy were going
to make another desperate attack that morning along
the La Bassee Canal. We were accordingly ordered
at once to man part of the Sailly-Labourse “Locality,”
known as the “Tuning Fork Line,” just in
front of that village, so-called because it formed
part of a system of trenches and breastworks shaped
like a tuning fork. There was some slight delay
in getting the orders passed on, and it was 4.30 a.m.
before we marched off. This was unfortunate,
for we were not able to reach our battle position
before dawn, when the enemy’s barrage began.
This as usual included heavy shelling of the rear
roads and villages through which we had to pass, particularly
Verquigneul and Sailly, where we suffered several
casualties, and lost Corpl. Caudwell, who had
done such good work with the Transport, and two men
killed and several others wounded. One of the
cookers was also badly blown about by a shell in Verquigneul.
We got to our position at 6.30 a.m. where we were
comparatively comfortable. The enemy had actually
attacked at Givenchy, but once again, thanks to the
1st and 55th Divisions, he was completely defeated,
and never again did he try to get through on this
part of the front. We were kept in our positions
here for two days, by which time things had become
normal once more, and in the afternoon of April 20th,
we marched back to our billets at Vaudricourt.