THE WAR OF 1876
I returned to Montenegro in the following
June, after the diplomacy of Europe had vainly and
discordantly discussed mediation all the winter.
An armistice had suspended hostilities, but the Turks
continued the concentration of troops on the frontiers
of the principality, north and south, and refused
the conditions of the Prince for a peaceful solution.
Everything waited for the acceptance by Servia of the
programme for the war which was to be declared by the
principalities against Turkey. The official declaration
of war took place on the 2d of July, and on the 3d
the Prince set out with flying banners for the conquest
of the Herzegovina. My orders being to remain
in touch with the telegraph, I had to resign the pleasure
of the campaign, and I passed the time in studying
up accessories. The Prince started directly for
Mostar, accompanied by the Austrian military attaché,
Colonel Thoemel, one of the most intensely anti-Montenegrin
Austrian officials I ever met. If the Austrian
government had intended to inflict on the Prince the
most humiliating censor in its service, and make the
relations between the governments as bad as possible,
they could not have chosen an agent more effective
than Thoemel. In his hatred of Montenegro and
enjoyment of the fortiter in re, he entirely
threw off the suaviter in modo. He enjoyed
intensely every petty humiliation he could inflict
on the Prince, who, with the greatest tact, never
noticed his rudeness. The maintenance of good
relations with Austria tasked the Prince’s diplomacy
to the utmost. As I saw nothing of the campaign,
I will dispose of it by saying that, when the Prince
had nearly reached Mostar, the colonel informed him
officially that if he took Mostar he would be driven
out of it by the Austrian army, and, after a slight
skirmish on the hills commanding the city, the Prince
took the road towards Trebinje. Meanwhile the
operations on the southern frontier, under the direction
of the amiable and competent Bozo Petrovich, remained
for my observation.
One of the chiefs of clans who were
waiting at Cettinje for the plan of the southern campaign
was Marko Millianoff, hereditary chief of the Kutchi,
an independent Slav tribe on the borders of Albania,
generally allied in the frontier operations with the
Montenegrins. The Turks desired particularly
to subdue this people in the outset of the campaign,
as their territory commanded the upper road from Podgoritza
to Danilograd, and hostilities commenced with an attack
on them. While waiting I made the acquaintance
of Marko, whom I found to be one of the most interesting
characters I met in Montenegro. His courage and
resource in stratagem were proverbial in the principality.
I had a capital Ross field-glass, and amused him one
day by showing its powers. He had never seen
a telescope before, and his delight over it was childlike.
“Why,” he exclaimed in rapture, “this
is worth a thousand men.” “Then take
it,” I said, “and I hope it will prove
worth a thousand men.” His force of 2500
men was then blockading the little fortress of Medun,
a remotely detached item of the defensive system of
Podgoritza, and on the next day he set out for his
post.
I saw him some months later, and he
told me that when the great sortie from Podgoritza
to relieve Medun came in view of the blockading force,
though at a distance of several miles, his men declared
that they could not fight that immense army, which
filled the valley with its numbers and had the appearance
of a force many times greater than their own.
Marko looked at it through the glass and found it to
be mainly a provision train, for Medun was on the
verge of starvation, the garrison having “shaken
out the last grain of rice from their bags,”
to use the expression of the moment. When Marko’s
men found the actual number of fighting men in the
Turkish sortie, they decided to fight it out.
They didn’t mind ten to one, they said, but much
more than that had appeared to confront them.
The Turks, commanded by Mahmoud Pasha, a good Hungarian
general, were about 20,000 men, as I afterwards
learned from various sources, including the English
consulate at Scutari, comprising 7000 Zebeks,
barbarians from the country back of Smyrna, accustomed
to the yataghan, and supposed to be qualified opponents
of the Montenegrins in the employment of the cold
steel. Marko fought retreating from the morning
until about 2 P.M., when the Turks stopped to eat,
having driven the Montenegrin force back and toward
Medun about three miles. When the Turks had eaten
and began to smoke, Millianoff gave the word to charge;
and though the Turks had built thirteen breastworks
to fall back on as they advanced, they yielded to
the vigorous assault of the first line, and the Montenegrins
swept through the whole series with a rush, not permitting
the Turks to form again or gather behind one, and drove
those who escaped under the walls of Podgoritza, leaving
4700 dead on the way, for no prisoners were taken.
Millianoff said, when I saw him again, “Your
glass saved us the battle,” which was virtually
the preservation of the independence of the tribe,
and possibly the decision of the campaign on that
side. The fortress was obliged, a little later,
to surrender, and in the subsequent siege of Niksich
the artillery taken at Medun served a very good purpose,
being heavier than anything the Montenegrins had.
I had secured for correspondent with
the Prince the services of his Swiss secretary, an
excellent fellow by the name of Duby; and, as all
the interest of the war for the moment lay in the campaign
of the Prince against Mostar and its consequences,
I arranged to have my news at Ragusa by telegraph,
and there I went for the time being. On the 28th
of July I received at 11 P.M. the news of the battle
of Vucidol, in which the army of Mukhtar Pasha was
routed and nearly destroyed, Mukhtar himself barely
escaping by the speed of his horse, entering the gate
of Bilek only a hundred yards in advance of his foremost
pursuer, his wounded horse falling in the gateway.
Of his two brigadiers, one, Selim Pasha, a most competent
and prudent general, was killed, and the other, Osman
Pasha, the Circassian, taken prisoner. He lost
all his artillery, and thirteen out of twenty-five
battalions of regulars, two hundred prisoners being
taken; but while these were en route to Cettinje
they became alarmed and showed a disposition to be
refractory, and were put to death at once by the escort.
The ways of warfare in those parts were, in spite of
all the orders of the Prince, utterly uncivilized,
the Montenegrin wounded being always put to death
if they fell into the hands of the enemy, and no quarter
being given in battle by the Montenegrins, though Turks
who surrendered in a siege were kept as prisoners during
the war. I had seen Mukhtar at Ragusa during
the conference at the time of the armistice, and he
bore out in his personal appearance the description
which Osman Pasha gave of him, dreamy, fanatical,
ascetic, who gave his confidence to no one, and who
said, when Selim proposed a council of war before
Vucidol, “If my fez knew what was in my head
I would burn it,” and refused to listen to the
cautionary measures Selim advised preliminary to the
attack. The ascetic and the fanatic was written
in his face. Returning to Cettinje, I found Osman
there a prisoner on parole, and at my intercession
he was permitted to accompany me to Ragusa, where
I returned after a few days, life in Montenegro being
intolerably dull except during the fighting.
The next movement on the part of the
Turks, which was expected to be one by Dervish Pasha,
from the base of Podgoritza towards Cettinje, called
me into the field again. We took position along
the heights of Koumani, on the verge of the great
table-land which intervenes between Rieka and Danilograd,
and from which we could see the Turkish camps spread
out on the plain below us; and if the Turks had but
known where we were, they might have thrown their
shells from the blockhouses in the plain into our
camp. There was no attack for the moment, and
the scouts of the Montenegrins used to amuse themselves
by arousing the Turkish camps in the night or by stealing
the horses and mules from the guards set over them.
A band of seven stole, during this suspension of operations,
forty horses and brought them into the camp, and one,
more cunning and light-footed than the rest, stole
the pasha’s favorite horse from the tent where
he was guarded by two soldiers sleeping at the entrance,
and brought him to the Prince at Koumani. He
had to take the precaution of wrapping the creature’s
hoofs in rags before bringing him out of the tent.
When the object was to stir the Turks out of their
rest, a half-dozen men would crawl up to the stone
wall which they invariably threw up around the camp,
and lay their rifles on it, for there was never a
sentry set, and fire rapidly into the tents as many
shots as they could before rousing the camp, and then
scatter and run. The whole battalion would turn
out and continue firing in every direction over the
country for half an hour, while the artillery, as
soon as the guns could be manned, followed the example,
and almost every night we were roused from our sleep
by the booming of the guns.
The early collapse of the Servian
defense led, after some negotiations, to a truce,
and diplomacy took up the matter, and in September
I went home again. The “Times” correspondence
had given the Montenegrin question serious importance
in England, and during the winter I had several opportunities
to discuss it with men of influence, amongst whom
were Gladstone and the Marquis of Bath, who invited
me to pass some days at Longleat to inform him more
completely on it. During my last stay in Montenegro
I had been informed by Miss Irby one of
the women who distinguish their English race by their
angelic charity and works for humanity, and who, being
engaged in benevolent work in Bosnia, became one of
my firm allies that reports had been put
in circulation in London against my probity and the
trustworthiness of my correspondence, imputing to me
indeed a conduct which would have excluded me from
honorable society. This was the work of the pro-Turkish
party, enraged by the sympathy evoked by my correspondence
on behalf of the Montenegrins, and Sir Henry Elliott
had made himself the mouthpiece of it. Mr. Gladstone,
having become warmly interested in the little mountain
principality by my correspondence, had taken its case
up in a strong review article, and had persuaded Tennyson
to devote a sonnet to it. He was, as he himself
informed me, warned by Sir Henry Elliott not to trust
to my letters or to employ them as authority for his
work, for Sir Henry said that I was considered in
the Levant, where I was well known, to be an infamous
and untrustworthy character. Mr. Gladstone, therefore,
though he used my facts, referred them to the authority
of a second-hand version. Fortunately for me
and my work, Professor Freeman had heard the reports
in question, and knowing me personally, and taking
the passionate interest he did in the war against
the Turks, applied himself to the investigation of
the tales, and satisfied himself and Gladstone that
they were simple libels, without a shadow of foundation,
and even had never been heard of until they were promulgated
in London. They were the coinage of political
passion.
Gladstone sent me word through Freeman
that he wished me to call on him to receive personally
his apologies for having believed and been influenced
by them, and I went to see him as he requested for
that purpose. He told me at the same time that
though he did not usually read the “Times,”
he had taken it to read my letters. He asked me
many questions about the principality, showing his
great interest, as well as his political acumen, and
amongst the questions was one which, at the time,
gave me great thought, and still retains its significance.
It was, “Have the Montenegrins any institutions
on which a national future can be built?” He
was desirous of knowing if Montenegro could be made
the nucleus of a great south Slavonic organization.
I was unable to give him any assurance of the existence
of anything beyond the primitive and patriarchal state
which fitted its present position, in which a personal
government by a wise prince is sufficient to reach
all the needs of the population. And to-day I
am of the opinion that a greatly enlarged Montenegro
would run the danger of becoming a little Russia,
in which the best ruler would be lost in the intricacies
of the intrigues and personal ambitions that facilitate
corruption and injustice, and where the worst ruler
might easily become a curse to all his neighbors.
Gladstone’s good-will had its issue later in
the enforced restitution to Montenegro of the district
of Antivari and Dulcigno, which the Montenegrin army
had taken, but evacuated, pending the disposition
of the congress which after S. Stefano regulated the
treaty of peace.
Lord Bath, beside the political question,
was interested in the religious situation of the principality,
which has maintained its national existence and character
through its form of ecclesiastical organization, that
of the Orthodox faith. He had sent me on two
occasions considerable sums of money for the wounded
and the families of the killed in the war, and always
took a vivid interest in its fortunes. He repeated
to me a conversation he had had at Longleat with Beaconsfield,
in which he had asked the minister what interest England
had in Montenegro that induced the government to give
it aid and countenance, as it did after a certain
stage in the war. Beaconsfield had replied that
“England had no interest whatever in Montenegro,
but that the letters in the ‘Times’ had
created such an enthusiasm for the principality that
the government had been obliged to take it into account.”
The Prince was fully informed on this score, and he
and all his people recognized the debt they owed the
“Times,” and, as an exception to all my
political experience, they have shown themselves a
grateful people, and Prince as well as people have
always shown their gratitude in all ways that I could
permit. The Greeks almost unanimously became
hostile to me when I became the advocate of a Slavonic
emancipation, and of the Hellenic friends I made while
in Crete, Tricoupi alone of men of rank remained my
personal friend after the Montenegrin campaigns.
Amongst the Russian fellow campaigners
there were several with whom I contracted friendships
which endure, chief among them being Wassiltchikoff,
the head of the Red Cross staff, who was also dispenser
of the bountiful contributions of the Russian committees
for the wounded and the families of the killed.
I must confess a strong liking for the Russian individual,
and I have hardly known a Russian whom I did not take
to, in spite of a looseness in matters of veracity
in which they are so unlike the Anglo-Saxon in general.
I think that the time is coming when the evolution
of the Russian character will make the race the dominant
one in Europe; and that, when the vices inherent in
a people governed despotically have been outgrown,
they will develop a magnificent civilization, which,
in poetry, in music, and in art, even, may distance
the West of to-day. But in the crude and maleficent
despotic form of government which now obtains, they
are likely to menace for a long time the well-being
of the world. The struggle between the German
and the Slav, however long it may be postponed, is
inevitable, and the defeat of the German secures the
Russian domination of Europe. Napoleon’s
alternative, “Cossack or Republican,”
is substantially prophetic, though the terms are more
probably “Despotic or Constitutional.”
I have no animosity toward Russia, but any advance
of her influence in the Balkans seems to me to be
a battle gained by her in this conflict. Established
at Constantinople, her next stage would be Trieste;
and the ultimate Russification of all the little Slavonic
nationalities of the Balkans, of which she is now
the champion, becomes inevitable. The only safeguard
against this is the maintenance of Austria as the suzerain
power in the peninsula.
But, for the personal Russian, as
I have said, I have always had a thorough liking,
and all through the Montenegrin campaigns I held those
who were there as warm friends. The official Russians
were not, however, popular in Montenegro, the people
possessing an unusual degree of independence, and
the Russians attaching more importance to their aid
and coöperation than the circumstances made it politic
to show; and Jonine, who became minister-resident
at Cettinje, was, perhaps, the most unpopular foreigner
there, while Monson, who became English agent there,
was, both with prince and public, the most popular.
The entry into the alliance with Russia made little
difference in the sentiments of the people, and even
the Prince resisted, in an extraordinary and even
impolitic degree, the Russian suggestions in the conduct
of the war.