FROM HARLEM TO TRENTON.

Washington withdrew his army to White Plains, leaving nearly three thousand of his best troops to garrison Fort Washington. Congress believed that Fort Washington could hold the Hudson secure, and therefore ordered that a strong garrison be left there. It was not according to General Washington’s idea, after he decided to retreat to White Plains, but he yielded to the request of Congress. General Putnams obstructions in the river amounted to little. Four galleys, mounted with heavy guns and swivels; two new ships, filled with stones, to be sunk at the proper moment; a sloop at anchor, having on board an infernal machine for submarine explosion, with which to blow up the men-of-war; these were among the aids to the Fort, together with batteries on either shore, to prevent the enemy ascending the Hudson. Yet, on the ninth day of October, three British war-ships sailed triumphantly up the river, sweeping through the obstructions, with little damage to themselves.

The British pursued the American army. Washington threw up intrenchments hastily, designing to make but a temporary stay there. General Lee arrived with the rear division of the army, after the temporary fortifications were well under way.

“This is but a temporary camp,” remarked Washington to Lee. “Yonder height (pointing to the north) is a more eligible location.”

“I judge so,” General Lee answered, taking in the situation at once.

“Let us ride out and inspect the ground for ourselves,” proposed Washington. And they galloped away. On arriving at the spot, General Lee pointed to still another height farther north.

“That is the ground we ought to occupy,” he said.

“Well, let us go and view it,” replied Washington.

They had not reached the location when a courier came dashing up to them.

“The British are in the camp, sir!” he exclaimed to Washington.

“Then we have other business to attend to than reconnoitering,” quickly and coolly replied the general, putting spurs to his horse and returning to camp.

The pickets are driven in, but our army is in order of battle, Adjutant-General Reed informed him, as he reached headquarters.

“Gentlemen, return to your respective posts, and do the best you can,” the general responded, without the least excitement.

By this time the British army was discovered upon the high ground beyond the village, advancing in two columns, “in all the pomp and circumstance of war.” General Heath wrote afterwards:

“It was a brilliant but formidable sight. The sun shone bright, their arms glittered, and perhaps troops never were shown to more advantage.”

A brief but hard-fought battle followed, in which there was a loss of about four hundred men on each side.

The enemy waited for reinforcements, and Washington improved the time to fall back to Northcastle, five miles, where, in the rocky fastness, he could defy the whole British army. To add to his advantages, the day on which the British commander decided upon an attack, after the arrival of reinforcements, a violent rain set in, and continued through the day, rendering an attack impossible, so that the Americans had still more time to strengthen their position.

On the night of No, a heavy rumbling sound was heard in the direction of the British camp. It continued all through the night, and resembled the noise of wagons and artillery in motion. Day break disclosed the cause: the enemy was decamping. Long trains were seen moving over the hilly country towards Dobb’s Ferry on the Hudson.

“A feint!” said General Lee, as soon as he discovered the situation.

“A retreat, more like,” replied another officer. “The enemy sees little hope in attacking this stronghold.”

“I can hardly believe that so large and well-disciplined an army is going to withdraw without giving battle,” responded Washington. “No doubt an attack upon Fort Washington is the immediate purpose; and then, perhaps an invasion into the Jerseys.

There was much speculation among the officers as to the meaning of this manoeuvre, and all of them were in more or less perplexity. Washington wrote immediately to Governor Livingston of New Jersey and hurried a messenger away with the letter:

“They have gone towards North River and King’s Bridge. Some suppose they are going into winter quarters, and will sit down in New York without doing more than investing Fort Washington. I cannot subscribe wholly to this opinion myself. That they will invest Fort Washington is a matter of which there can be no doubt, and I think there is a strong probability that General Howe will detach a part of his force to make an incursion into the Jerseys, provided he is going to New York. He must attempt something on account of his reputation, for what has he done as yet with his great army?”

Satisfied that General Howe intended to capture Fort Washington, he advised its evacuation. He wrote to General Greene:

“If we cannot prevent vessels from passing up the river, and the enemy are possessed of all the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am, therefore, inclined to think that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as you may judge best, and so far revoking the orders given to Colonel Morgan, to defend it to the last.”

General Greene took the responsibility to hold the fort; and when Colonel Morgan received a demand from the enemy to surrender, he replied: “I shall defend the fort to the last.”

After a manly resistance, however, he was forced to surrender; and the fort, with its garrison of twenty-eight hundred men, and abundant stores, passed into the hands of the enemy. The prisoners were taken to New York and confined in the notorious British prison-ship, where they suffered long and terribly.

This was a very unfortunate affair for the American cause, and caused the commander-in-chief great anxiety. He wrote to his brother about it in a gloomy mood, and said:

“In ten days from this date there will not be above two thousand men, if that number, of the fixed, established regiments on this side of the Hudson River, to oppose Howe’s whole army; and very little more on the other, to secure the eastern Colonies, and the important passes leading through the Highlands to Albany, and the country about the lakes.... I am wearied almost to death with the retrograde movement of things, and I solemnly protest that a pecuniary reward of twenty thousand pounds a year would not induce me to undergo what I do, and, after all, perhaps to lose my character; as it is impossible, under such a variety of distressing circumstances, to conduct matters agreeably to public expectation.”

Washington’s command was now at Fort Lee (formerly Fort Constitution). The next movement of the enemy was designed to hem them in between the Hudson and Hackensack, and capture them. The commander-in-chief ordered a hasty retreat, the want of horses and wagons making it necessary to abandon a large quantity of baggage, stores, and provisions, and even the tents and all the cannon except two twelve pounders. The retreat over the Hackensack was successfully performed, and here Washington ordered Colonel Greyson to send the following message to General Lee:

“Remove the troops under your command to this side of the North River, and there wait for further orders.

The next day Washington wrote to Lee:

“I am of opinion, and the gentlemen about me concur in it, that the public interest requires your coming over to this side of the Hudson with the Continental troops.

Not more than three thousand soldiers were with Washington at Hackensack, without intrenching tools, tents, and necessary supplies. To risk an engagement in these circumstances was hazardous in the extreme, and a further retreat became inevitable. Leaving three regiments to guard the passages of the Hackensack, and to serve as covering parties, he withdrew to Newark, on the west bank of the Passaic.

To add to the perils of his situation, the term of enlistment of General Mercer’s command was about to expire. He must have reinforcements, or his entire army would be destroyed. He hurried away Colonel Reed to Governor Livingston of New Jersey, and General Mifflin to Philadelphia, to implore aid. At the same time he depended upon General Lee for immediate reinforcements, not doubting that the latter was obeying his orders; but, to his amazement, a letter from Lee revealed the startling fact that he had not moved from Northcastle.

Washington renewed his orders to Lee to move with all possible despatch and come to his rescue. He said:

“The enemy are pushing on, and part of them have crossed the Passaic. Their plans have not entirely unfolded, but I shall not be surprised to find that Philadelphia is the object of their movement.”

“We cannot make a stand here,” said General Greene.

“By no means,” answered Washington. “My hope is to make a stand at Brunswick, on the Raritan; or, certainly, to dispute the passage of the Delaware.”

“Our retreat to Brunswick must be hastened, or the enemy will be upon us,” added Greene.

The retreat was precipitated; and when the rear-guard of Washington’s command was leaving one end of Newark, the vanguard of the British army was entering at the other.

On reaching Brunswick, Washington wrote at once to Governor Livingston, instructing him to collect all the boats and river craft on the Delaware for seventy miles, remove them to the western bank of the river, away from the enemy, and guard them.

He was doomed to additional disappointment at Brunswick. Colonel Reed raised no troops in New Jersey, and many of those raised by General Mifflin in Pennsylvania were deserting. The term of enlistment of General Mercer’s command had expired, and no inducement or entreaties could prevail upon them to remain. He could not muster over four thousand men.

Still worse, a letter from General Lee to Colonel Reed disclosed the fact that the former had not given heed to the orders of his chief, and he was still at Northcastle. Moreover, the letter revealed that General Lee was plotting against him. Colonel Reed was absent when the letter arrived, and, according to his custom, Washington opened the letter, supposing it related to military business. What was his surprise to find that the letter contained insinuations against himself, and also implicated Colonel Reed, his old friend, in a plot to make Lee commander-in-chief.

We will say here, once for all, that, while General Lee was an able military officer, he was an ambitious, arrogant, and deceitful man. On his return from the South, his fame had reached the zenith, and some thought he ought to lead the American army. Washington’s continued retreats increased this feeling, until General Lee evidently thought there was a fair prospect of the removal of Washington, and his own promotion to commander-in-chief. Even Colonel Reed entertained this opinion, though afterwards he saw his mistake, and made suitable amends. This explains Lee’s conduct before and after Washington retired from Brunswick.

Judge Jay related the following incident: “A short time before the death of John Adams, I was conversing with my father about the American Revolution. Suddenly he remarked:

“’Ah, William! The history of that Revolution will never be known. Nobody now alive knows it but John Adams and myself.’

“‘You surprise me, father; to what can you refer?’

“‘The proceedings of the old Congress.

“‘What proceedings?’

“’Those against Washington; from first to last there was a bitter party against him.’”

The “old Congress” sat with closed doors, so that the public learned only what it was wise to disclose.

Washington waited for recruits at Brunswick until the 1st of December. On that day the vanguard of the British army appeared on the opposite side of the Raritan. Washington destroyed the end of the bridge next to the village, to intercept the pursuit of the enemy, and retreated. Stopping at Princeton temporarily, he left twelve hundred troops there, under Lord Stirling and General Stephens, to keep an eye on the foe, and continued his retreat to Trenton.

While the American army decreased from week to week, the British army in pursuit was augmented; for, through the Jerseys, General Howe impressed men, horses, and wagons, and at the same time many Tories flocked to his standard. He issued a proclamation, also, offering pardon and protection to all citizens who would take the oath of allegiance to the king. There was so little hope of the American cause at that time, and Washington’s army appeared so plainly to be near destruction, that many citizens took the oath and joined the British army, as they thought, from absolute necessity. “Many who had been prominent in the cause, hastened to take advantage of this proclamation,” says Irving. “Those who had the most property to lose were the first to submit; the middle ranks remained generally steadfast in this time of trial.”

A British officer wrote to his friends in London:

“The rebels continue flying before our army. Lord Cornwallis took the fort opposite Brunswick, plunged into Raritan River, and seized the town.... Such a panic has seized the rebels that no part of the Jerseys will hold them, and I doubt whether Philadelphia itself will stop their career. The Congress have lost their authority.... They are in such consternation that they know not what to do. The two Adamses are in New England; Franklin gone to France; Lynch has lost his senses; Rutledge has gone home disgusted; Dana is persecuting at Albany; and Jay is in the country, playing as bad a part, so that the fools have lost the assistance of the knaves.

“This,” says Sparks, “was the gloomiest period of the war. The campaign had been little else than a series of disasters and retreats. The enemy had gained possession of Rhode Island, Long Island, the city of New York, Staten Island, and nearly the whole of the Jerseys, and seemed on the point of extending their conquests into Pennsylvania. By the fatal scheme of short enlistments, and by sickness, the effective force with General Washington had dwindled away, till it hardly deserved the name of an army.”

Still Washington was hopeful, and expected that the cause of right would triumph. When and how he could not tell; but he continued to say, “That Providence which has brought us out of many difficulties will yet crown our righteous cause with success.

“I expected substantial aid from the Jerseys,” he said to General Mercer. “I am disappointed that the people have not flocked to our standard.”

“I am more than disappointed,” replied Mercer; “I am shocked and vexed at the cowardice of the people.”

“What think you,” continued Washington, “if we should retreat to the back part of Pennsylvania, would the Pennsylvanians support us?”

The mountainous regions of Pennsylvania were the field of his early exploits against the French and Indians, and Mercer was with him there.

“If the lower counties give up, the back counties will do the same,” Mercer answered in a desponding way.

“We must then retire to Augusta County, Virginia,” responded Washington, his indomitable spirit rising superior to all discouragements. “Numbers will repair to us for safety, and we will try a predatory war. If overpowered, we must cross the Alleghanies.

Before this time, Colonel Reed said to him one day, “When shall we stop this everlasting retreating and make a stand?”

Washington answered, without the least show of resentment:

“If it becomes necessary, we will retreat over every river and mountain in America.”

Such an unconquerable spirit receives its reward at last.

Lee did not leave Northcastle until the last of November. True, he ordered General Heath to a movement that he claimed would support Washington; but when General Heath found that Lee was not obeying the orders of the commander-in-chief, he refused to entertain his commands.

“I am amenable to the commander-in-chief, and cannot supply you with troops as you order,” he said.

“In point of law you are right,” said Lee, “but in point of policy I think you are wrong. I am going into the Jerseys for the salvation of America; I wish to take with me a larger force than I now have, and request you to order two thousand of your men to march with me.”

“I cannot spare that number.”

“Then order one thousand.”

“No, not a thousand.”

“How many, then?” continued Lee.

“Not one,” answered Heath. “I may as well bring this matter to a point at once; not a single man will I furnish from this post by your order.”

“Then,” exclaimed Lee in an excited manner, “I will order them myself.”

“That makes a wide difference,” rejoined Heath. “You are my senior, but I have received positive written instructions from him who is superior to us both, and I will not myself break those orders. Read them.”

He handed Washington’s letter to Lee, in which he positively forbade the removal of any troops from that post.

“The commander-in-chief is now at a distance,” said Lee, after reading the letter, “and he does not know what is necessary here as well as I do.”

Turning to Major Huntington, Lee said authoritatively:

“You will order two regiments (designating the two) to march early to-morrow morning to join me.”

General Heath was surprised and indignant at Lee’s assumption of authority, and he said to the major, “Issue such orders at your peril!”

Then turning to Lee, he added:

“Sir, if you come to this post, and mean to issue orders here which will break the positive ones I have received I pray you do it completely yourself, and through your own deputy adjutant-general, who is present, and not draw me or any of my family in as partners in the guilt.”

“It is right,” answered Lee. “Colonel Scammel, do you issue the order.”

“I have one more request to make,” interrupted General Heath, “and that is, that you will be pleased to give me a certificate that you exercise command at this post, and order from it these regiments.

Lee objected, but General George Clinton, who was present, said:

“That is a very reasonable request, General Lee, and surely you cannot refuse it.”

Without replying, he immediately wrote the following:

“For the satisfaction of General Heath, and at his request, I do certify that I am commanding officer, at this present writing, in this post, and that I have, in that capacity, ordered Prescott’s and Wyllis’ regiments to march.”

The next morning General Lee rode up to Heath’s door, and said:

“Upon further consideration I have concluded not to take the two regiments with me. You may order them to return to their former post.”

Evidently the ambitious and conceited general had come to the conclusion that “discretion is the better part of valor.”

General Lee did not cross the Hudson until the 4th of December, moving snail-like, although he knew that Washington’s army was in imminent peril.

“Do come on,” Washington’s last plea was; “your arrival may be fortunate, and, if it can be effected without delay, it may be the means of preserving a city whose loss must prove of the most fatal consequence to the cause of America.”

The “city” referred to was Philadelphia. Washington had written to him that the enemy was designing to capture Philadelphia, a calamity that must be prevented if possible.

At this time Washington had removed the baggage and stores of his army across the Delaware. Being reinforced, however, by fifteen hundred Pennsylvania militia, he resolved to march back to Princeton and await developments. On his way he met General Stirling, who had evacuated Princeton, as Cornwallis was marching upon it with a large force. Returning to Trenton, he hastily collected all the boats possible, and conveyed his whole force over the Delaware, including General Stirling’s command from Princeton. The rear-guard had scarcely crossed the river when Cornwallis appeared in the distance with his “bannered hosts. As Washington had taken possession of all the boats and transports, the enemy could not cross.

The tact and skill of Washington as a general were as conspicuous in his retreat through the Jerseys as they were on any battlefield. Thomas Paine accompanied the army, and he wrote:

“With a handful of men we sustained an orderly retreat for near an hundred miles, brought off our ammunition, all our field-pieces, the greatest part of our stores, and had four rivers to pass. None can say that our retreat was precipitate, for we were three weeks in performing it, that the country might have time to come in. Twice we marched back to meet the enemy, and remained out until dark. The sign of fear was not seen in our camp; and had not some of the cowardly and disaffected inhabitants spread false alarms through the country, the Jerseys had never been ravaged.”

On the 12th of December, General Lee had marched no farther than Vealtown, eight miles from Morristown. He continued to disregard Washington’s appeals and instructions, receiving one almost every day. In some of them the commander-in-chief showed that his patience was well nigh exhausted.

“I am surprised that you should be in doubt about the route you are to take after my definite instructions,” he wrote on the 11th of December.

“I have so frequently mentioned our situation, and the necessity of your aid, that it is painful for me to add a word on the subject,” he wrote on the same day.

At Vealtown Lee left his troops in command of General Sullivan, and took up his own quarters at a “tavern” in Baskingridge, three miles off. He was very partial to “taverns” especially if well stocked with certain articles to please his palate.

On the next morning, about 11 o’clock, General Lee was writing at the table, and Major Wilkinson was looking out of the window. The latter arrived early in the morning with a letter from his commander, General Gates, and General Lee was replying to it.

“The British cavalry are upon us!” shouted Wilkinson in consternation.

“Where?” exclaimed Lee, springing from his chair.

“Right here, around the house,” answered Wilkinson, who beheld a detachment of British cavalry surrounding the tavern.

“Where are the guards?” cried out Lee, in his surprise and horror. “Why don’t they fire?”

It was a cold morning, and the guards had stacked their arms, and passed around to the south side of the house to sun themselves. They scarcely observed the enemy’s presence until they heard the demand to surrender.

“If General Lee does not surrender in five minutes I will set fire to the house!”

At the same time the guards were chased in different directions. The demand for Lee to surrender was repeated, and he did surrender. Hastily he was put upon Wilkinson’s horse, which stood at the door, and within three hours the enemy were exulting over him at Brunswick.

“No one to blame but himself,” remarked Heath.

Good enough for him, said many Americans.

General Sullivan was now in command, and he joined the commander-in-chief as soon as possible.

In Wilkinson’s memoir it is said that Lee delayed so strangely in order to intercept the enemy in pursuit of Washington; and it is added:

“If General Lee had anticipated General Washington in cutting the cordon of the enemy between New York and the Delaware, the commander-in-chief would probably have been superseded. In this case Lee would have succeeded him.”

Washington was too magnanimous to exult over the fall of Lee. Notwithstanding his knowledge of Lee’s plans to supersede him, he wrote to his brother:

“Before you receive this letter, you will undoubtedly have heard of the capture of General Lee. This is an additional misfortune; and the more vexatious, as it was by his own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good, that he was taken. As he went to lodge three miles out of his own camp, and within twenty miles of the enemy, a rascally Tory rode in the night to give notice of it to the enemy, who sent a party of light-horse, who seized him, and carried him off with every mark of triumph and indignity.”