THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863.

On the morning of the 1st of July, General Buford, as stated, held the ridges to the west of Gettysburg, with his cavalry division, composed of Gamble’s and Devin’s brigades. His vedettes were thrown far out toward the enemy to give timely notice of any movement for he was determined to prevent the rebels from entering the town if possible, and knew the First Corps would soon be up to support him. The enemy were not aware that there was any considerable force in the vicinity, and in the morning sent forward Heth’s division of Hill’s corps to occupy the place, anticipating no difficulty in doing so. Buford in the meantime had dismounted a large part of his force, had strengthened his line of skirmishers, and planted his batteries at the most commanding points.

General Reynolds, in consequence of the duties devolving upon him as commander of the Left Wing of the army, that is of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, had turned over the command of the First Corps to me. He now made immediate dispositions to go forward to assist Buford.

As my corps was largely engaged in the first day’s operations, I must be excused for having a good deal to say in the first person in relation to them. Reynolds sent for me about six o’clock in the morning, read to me the various despatches he had received from Meade and Buford, and told me he should go forward at once with the nearest division-that of Wadsworth-to aid the cavalry. He then instructed me to draw in my pickets, assemble the artillery and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible. Having given these orders, he rode off at the head of the column, and I never saw him again.

The position of the two armies on the morning of the 1st of July, was as follows: The First Corps at Marsh Creek; the Second and Third Corps at Taneytown; the latter being under orders to march to Emmetsburg, to relieve the Eleventh Corps, which was directed to join the First Corps at Gettysburg; the Twelfth Corps was at Two Taverns; the Fifth Corps at Hanover, and the Sixth Corps about thirty-five miles off to the right at Manchester. Kilpatrick’s and Gregg’s divisions of cavalry were also at Hanover. The Confederate army was advancing on Gettysburg from the west and north. The concentration of their troops and the dispersion of ours are indicated on the map.

It must be remembered that the enemy had but three corps, while the Union army had seven. Each of their corps represented a third, and each of ours a seventh, of our total force. The same ratio extended to divisions and brigades.

Heth’s division, which started early in the morning to occupy the town, soon found itself confronted by Buford’s skirmishers, and formed line of battle with Archer’s and Davis’ brigades in front, followed by those of Pettigrew and Brockenborough. At 9 A.M. the first gun was heard. Buford had three cannon-shots fired as a signal for his skirmish line to open on the enemy, and the battle of Gettysburg began.

[ Lt.-Col. Kress, of General Wadsworth’s staff, entered Gettysburg about this time and found General Buford surrounded by his staff in front of the tavern there. Buford turned to him and said, “What are you doing here, sir?” Kress replied that he came on to get some shoes for Wadsworth’s division. Buford told him that he had better return immediately to his command. Kress said, “Why, what is the matter, general?” At that moment the far off sound of a single gun was heard, and Buford replied, as he mounted his horse and galloped off, "That’s the matter."]

As the rebels had had several encounters with militia, who were easily dispersed, they did not expect to meet any serious resistance at this time, and advanced confidently and carelessly. Buford gave way slowly, taking advantage of every accident of ground to protract the struggle. After an hour’s fighting he felt anxious, and went up into the steeple of the Theological Seminary from which a wide view could be obtained, to see if the First Corps was in sight. One division of it was close at hand, and soon Reynolds, who had preceded it, climbed up into the belfry to confer with him there, and examine the country around. Although there is no positive testimony to that effect, his attention was doubtless attracted to Cemetery Ridge in his rear, as it was one of the most prominent features of the landscape. An aide of General Howard-presumably Major Hall-soon after Reynolds descended from the belfry, came up to ask if he had any instructions with regard to the Eleventh Corps. Reynolds, in reply, directed that General Howard bring his corps forward at once and form them on Cemetery Hill as a reserve. General Howard has no recollection of having received any such orders, but as he did get orders to come forward, and as his corps was to occupy some place in rear, as a support to the First Corps, nothing is more probable than that General Reynolds directed him to go there; for its military advantages were obvious enough to any experienced commander. Lieutenant Rosengarten, of General Reynolds’ staff, states positively that he was present and heard the order given for Howard to post his troops on Cemetery Ridge. The matter is of some moment, as the position in question ultimately gave us the victory, and Howard received the thanks of Congress for selecting it. It is not to be supposed that either Howard or Rosengarten would mistake the matter. It is quite probable that Reynolds chose the hill simply as a position upon which his force could rally if driven back, and Howard selected it as a suitable battle-field for the army. It has since been universally conceded that it was admirably adapted for that purpose.

It will be seen from the above map, that there are two roads coming to Gettysburg from the west, making a considerable angle with each other. Each is intersected by ridges running north and south. On that nearest to the town, and about three-fourths of a mile from the central square, there is a large brick building, which was used as a Lutheran Theological Seminary. A small stream of water called Willoughby’s Run winds between the next two ridges. The battle on the first day was principally fought on the heights on each side of this stream.

Buford being aware that Ewell’s corps would soon be on its way from Heidlersburg to the field of battle, was obliged to form line facing north with Devin’s brigade, and leave Gamble’s brigade to keep back the overpowering weight of Hill’s corps advancing from the west.

While this fighting was going on, and Reynolds and Wadsworth were pressing to the front, I was engaged in withdrawing the pickets and assembling the other two divisions, together with the corps artillery. As soon as I saw that my orders were in process of execution, I galloped to the front, leaving the troops to follow, and caught up with Meredith’s brigade of Wadsworth’s division, commonly called “The Iron Brigade,” just as it was going into action.

In the meantime the enemy approaching from the west were pressing with great force against Buford’s slender skirmish line, and Reynolds went forward with Cutler’s brigade to sustain it. He skilfully posted Hall’s 2d Maine battery in the road, and threw forward two regiments, the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York, a short distance in advance on the left. At the same time he directed General Wadsworth to place the remaining three regiments of the brigade, the 147th New York, the 76th New York, and the 56th Pennsylvania, on the right of the road. When this formation was completed the cavalry brigade under Gamble, which had been fighting there, withdrew and formed in column on the left of the infantry; but the other cavalry brigade, under Devin, which was not facing in that direction, still held the position, awaiting the advance of Ewell’s corps from the north.

As Davis’ rebel brigade of Heth’s division fronting Wadsworth were hidden behind an intervening ridge, Wadsworth did not see them at first, but formed his three regiments perpendicularly to the road, without a reconnoissance. The result was that Davis came over the hill almost directly on the right flank of this line, which being unable to defend itself was forced back and directed by Wadsworth to take post in a piece of woods in rear on Seminary Ridge. The two regiments on the right accordingly withdrew, but the 147th New York, which was next to the road, did not receive the order, as their Colonel was shot down before he could deliver it. They were at once surrounded and very much cut up before they could be rescued from their perilous position.

The two regiments on the right, which were forced back, were veterans, conspicuous for gallantry in every battle in which the Army of the Potomac had been engaged since the Peninsula campaign. As Wadsworth withdrew them without notifying Hall’s battery in the road, or the two regiments posted by Reynolds on the left, both became exposed to a disastrous flank attack on the right. Hall finding a cloud of skirmishers launched against his battery which was now without support, was compelled to retreat. The horses of the lost gun were all shot or bayonetted. The non-military reader will see that while a battery can keep back masses of men it cannot contend with a line of skirmishers. To resist them would be very much like fighting mosquitoes with musket-balls. The two regiments posted by Reynolds, the 14th Brooklyn and 95th New York, finding their support gone on the right, while Archer’s rebel brigade was advancing to envelop their left, fell back leisurely under Colonel Fowler of the 14th Brooklyn, who assumed command of both as the ranking officer present.

I reached the field just as the attack on Cutler’s brigade was going on, and at once sent my adjutant-general, Major Halstead, and young Meredith L. Jones, who was acting as aide on my staff, to General Reynolds to ask instructions. Under the impression that the enemy’s columns were approaching on both roads, Reynolds said, “Tell Doubleday I will hold on to this road,” referring to the Chambersburg road, “and he must hold on to that one;” meaning the road to Fairfield or Hagerstown. At the same time he sent Jones back at full speed to bring up a battery.

The rebels, however, did not advance on the Fairfield road until late in the afternoon. They must have been in force upon it some miles back, for the cavalry so reported, and this caused me during the entire day to give more attention than was necessary to my left, as I feared the enemy might separate my corps from the Third and Eleventh Corps at Emmetsburg. Such a movement would be equivalent to interposing between the First Corps and the main army.

There was a piece of woods between the two roads, with open ground on each side. It seemed to me this was the key of the position, for if this woods was strongly held, the enemy could not pass on either road without being taken in flank by the infantry, and in front by the cavalry. I therefore urged the men as they filed past me to hold it at all hazards. Full of enthusiasm and the memory of their past achievements they said to me proudly, "If we can’t hold it, where will you find men who can?"

As they went forward under command of Colonel Morrow of the 24th Michigan Volunteers, a brave and capable soldier, who, when a mere youth, was engaged in the Mexican War, I rode over to the left to see if the enemy’s line extended beyond ours, and if there would be any attempt to flank our troops in that direction. I saw, however, only a few skirmishers, and returned to organize a reserve. I knew there was fighting going on between Cutler’s brigade and the rebels in his front, but as General Reynolds was there in person, I only attended to my own part of the line; and halted the 6th Wisconsin regiment as it was going into the action, together with a hundred men of the Brigade Guard, taken from the 149th Pennsylvania, to station them in the open space between the Seminary and the woods, as a reserve, the whole being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin.

[ I sent orders to Morrow under the supposition that he was the ranking officer of the brigade. Colonel W. W. Robinson, 7th Wisconsin, was entitled to the command, and exercised it during the remainder of the battle.]

It is proper to state that General Meredith, the permanent commander of the brigade, was wounded as he was coming up, some time after its arrival, by a shell which exploded in front of his horse.

Both parties were now trying to obtain possession of the woods. Archer’s rebel brigade, preceded by a skirmish line, was crossing Willoughby’s Run to enter them on one side as the Iron Brigade went in on the other. General Reynolds was on horseback in the edge of the woods, surrounded by his staff. He felt some anxiety as to the result, and turned his head frequently to see if our troops would be up in time. While looking back in this way, a rebel sharpshooter shot him through the back of the head, the bullet coming out near the eye. He fell dead in an instant, without a word. The country sustained great loss in his death. I lamented him as almost a life-long companion. We were at West Point together, and had served in the same regiment-the old 3d Artillery-upon first entering service, along with our present Commander-in-Chief, General Sherman, and General George H. Thomas. When quite young we had fought in the same battles in Mexico. There was little time, however, to indulge in these recollections. The situation was very peculiar. The rebel left under Davis had driven in Cutler’s brigade and our left under Morrow had charged into the woods, preceded by the 2d Wisconsin under Colonel Fairchild, swept suddenly and unexpectedly around the right flank of Archer’s brigade, and captured a large part of it, including Archer himself. The fact is, the enemy were careless and underrated us, thinking, it is said, that they had only militia to contend with. The Iron Brigade had a different head-gear from the rest of the army and were recognized at once by their old antagonists. Some of the latter were heard to exclaim: “There are those d -d black-hatted fellows again! ’Taint no militia. It’s the Army of the Potomac.”

Having captured Archer and his men, many of the Iron Brigade kept on beyond Willoughby’s Run, and formed on the heights on the opposite side.

The command now devolved upon me, with its great responsibilities. The disaster on the right required immediate attention, for the enemy, with loud yells, were pursuing Cutler’s brigade toward the town. I at once ordered my reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes to advance against their flank. If they faced Dawes, I reasoned that they would present their other flank to Cutler’s men, so that I felt quite confident of the result. In war, however, unexpected changes are constantly occurring. Cutler’s brigade had been withdrawn by order of General Wadsworth, without my knowledge, to the suburbs of Gettysburg. Fortunately, Fowler’s two regiments came on to join Dawes, who went forward with great spirit, but who was altogether too weak to assail so large a force. As he approached, the rebels ceased to pursue Cutler, and rushed into the railroad cut to obtain the shelter of the grading. They made a fierce and obstinate resistance, but, while Fowler confronted them above, about twenty of Dawes’ men were formed across the cut by his adjutant, E. P. Brooks, to fire through it. The rebels could not resist this; the greater number gave themselves up as prisoners, and the others scattered over the country and escaped.

This success relieved the 147th New York, which, as I stated, was surrounded when Cutler fell back, and it also enabled us to regain the gun which Hall had been obliged to abandon.

The enemy having vanished from our immediate front, I withdrew the Iron Brigade from its advanced position beyond the creek, reformed the line on the ridge where General Reynolds had originally placed it, and awaited a fresh attack, or orders from General Meade. The two regiments of Cutler’s brigade were brought back from the town, and, notwithstanding the check they had received, they fought with great gallantry throughout the three days’ battle that ensued.

There was now a lull in the combat. I was waiting for the remainder of the First Corps to come up, and Heth was reorganizing his shattered front line, and preparing to bring his two other brigades forward. The remnant of Archer’s brigade was placed on the right, and made to face south against Buford’s cavalry, which, it was feared, might attack that flank. What was left of Davis’ brigade was sent to the extreme left of the line, and Pegram’s artillery was brought forward and posted on the high ground west of Willoughby’s Run.

Thus prepared, and with Pender’s strong division in rear, ready to cover his retreat if defeated, or to follow up his success if victorious, Heth advanced to renew the attack.

As I had but four weak infantry brigades at this time against eight larger brigades which were about to assail my line, I would have been justified in falling back, but I determined to hold on to the position until ordered to leave it. I did not believe in the system, so prevalent at that time, of avoiding the enemy. I quite agreed with Reynolds that it was best to meet him as soon as possible, for the rebellion, if reduced to a war of positions, would never end so long as the main army of the Confederates was left in a condition to take the field. A retreat, too, has a bad effect on the men. It gives them the impression that their generals think them too weak to contend with the enemy. I was not aware, at this time, that Howard was on the ground, for he had given me no indication of his presence, but I knew that General Meade was at Taneytown; and as, on the previous evening, he had informed General Reynolds that the enemy’s army were concentrating on Gettysburg, I thought it probable he would ride to the front to see for himself what was going on, and issue definite orders of some kind. As Gettysburg covered the great roads from Chambersburg to York, Baltimore, and Washington, and as its possession by Lee would materially shorten and strengthen his line of retreat, I was in favor of making great sacrifices to hold it.

While we were thus temporarily successful, having captured or dispersed all the forces in our immediate front, a very misleading despatch was sent to General Meade by General Howard. It seems that General Howard had reached Gettysburg in advance of his corps, just after the two regiments of Cutler’s brigade, which had been outflanked, fell back to the town by General Wadsworth’s order. Upon witnessing this retreat, which was somewhat disorderly, General Howard hastened to send a special messenger to General Meade with the baleful intelligence that the First Corps had fled from the field at the first contact with the enemy, thus magnifying a forced retreat of two regiments, acting under orders, into the flight of an entire corps, two-thirds of which had not yet reached the field. It is unnecessary to say that this astounding news created the greatest feeling against the corps, who were loudly cursed for their supposed lack of spirit and patriotism.

About 11 A.M., the remainder of the First Corps came up, together with Cooper’s, Stewart’s, Reynolds’, and Stevens’ batteries. By this time the enemy’s artillery had been posted on every commanding position to the west of us, several of their batteries firing down the Chambersburg pike. I was very desirous to hold this road, as it was in the centre of the enemy’s line, who were advancing on each side of it, and Calef-exposed as his battery was-fired over the crest of ground where he was posted, and notwithstanding the storm of missiles that assailed him, held his own handsomely, and inflicted great damage on his adversaries. He was soon after relieved by Reynolds’ Battery “L” of the 1st New York, which was sustained by Colonel Roy Stone’s brigade of Pennsylvania troops, which I ordered there for that purpose. Stone formed his men on the left of the pike, behind a ridge running north and south, and partially sheltered them by a stone fence, some distance in advance, from which he had driven the rebel skirmish line, after an obstinate contest.

It was a hot place for troops; for the whole position was alive with bursting shells, but the men went forward in fine spirits and, under the impression that the place was to be held at all hazards, they cried out, "We have come to stay!" The battle afterward became so severe that the greater portion did stay, laying down their lives there for the cause they loved so well. Morrow’s brigade remained in the woods where Reynolds was killed, and Biddle’s brigade was posted on its left in the open ground along the crest of the same ridge, with Cooper’s battery in the interval. Cutler’s brigade took up its former position on the right of the road. Having disposed of Wadsworth’s division and my own division, which was now under the command of Brigadier General Rowley, I directed General Robinson’s division to remain in reserve at the Seminary, and to throw up a small semicircular rail intrenchment in the grove in front of the building. Toward the close of the action this defence, weak and imperfect as it was, proved to be of great service.

The accompanying map shows the position of troops and batteries at this time.

It will be seen that Heth’s division is formed on the western ridge which bounds Willougby’s Run and along a cross-road which intersects the Chambersburg road at right angles.

Pender’s division, posted in the rear as a support to Heth, was formed in the following order by brigades: Thomas, Lane, Scales, and McGowan (under Perrin); the first named on the rebel left and Perrin on the right. To sustain Heth’s advance and crush out all opposition, both Pegram’s and McIntosh’s artillery were posted on the crest of the ridge west of the Run.

While this was going on, General Howard, who was awaiting the arrival of his corps, had climbed into the steeple of the seminary to obtain a view of the surrounding country. At 11.30 A.M. he learned that General Reynolds was killed, and that the command of the three corps (the First, Eleventh, and Third) constituting the Left Wing of the army devolved upon him by virtue of his rank. He saw that the First Corps was contending against large odds and sent back for the Eleventh Corps to come up at double-quick. Upon assuming command of the Left Wing he turned over his own corps to Major-General Carl Schurz, who then gave up the command of his division to General Barlow. Howard notified General Meade of Reynolds’ death, but forgot to take back or modify the false statement he had made about the First Corps, now engaged before his eyes, in a most desperate contest with a largely superior force; so that General Meade was still left under the impression that the First Corps had fled from the field.

Howard also sent a request to Slocum, who was at Two Taverns, only about five miles from Gettysburg, to come forward, but Slocum declined, without orders from Meade. He probably thought if any one commander could assume the direction of other corps, he might antagonize the plans of the General-in-Chief.

Upon receiving the news of the death of General Reynolds and the disorder which it was supposed had been created by that event, General Meade superseded Howard by sending his junior officer, General Hancock, to assume command of the field, with directions to notify him of the condition of affairs at the front. He also ordered General John Newton of the Sixth Corps to take command of the First Corps.

The head of the Eleventh Corps reached Gettysburg at 12.45 P.M., and the rear at 1.45 P.M. Schimmelpfennig’s division led the way, followed by that of Barlow. The two were directed to prolong the line of the First Corps to the right along Seminary Ridge. The remaining division, that of Steinwehr, with the reserve artillery under Major Osborne, were ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill, in rear of Gettysburg, as a reserve to the entire line. Before this disposition could be carried out, however, Buford rode up to me with the information that his scouts reported the advance of Ewell’s corps from Heidlersburg directly on my right flank. I sent a staff officer to communicate this intelligence to General Howard, with a message that I would endeavor to hold my ground against A. P. Hill’s corps if he could, by means of the Eleventh Corps, keep Ewell from attacking my right. He accordingly directed the Eleventh Corps to change front to meet Ewell. As it did so, Devin’s cavalry brigade fell back and took up a position to the right and rear of this line just south of the railroad bridge.

The concentration of Rodes’ and Early’s divisions-the one from Carlisle and the other from York-took place with great exactness; both arriving in sight of Gettysburg at the same time. The other division, that of Johnson, took a longer route from Carlisle by way of Greenwood, to escort the trains, and did not reach the battle-field until sunset. Anderson’s division of Hill’s corps was also back at the pass in the mountains on the Chambersburg road. It had halted to allow Johnson to pass, and then followed him to Gettysburg, reaching there about dusk.

The first indication I had that Ewell had arrived, and was taking part in the battle, came from a battery posted on an eminence called Oak Hill, almost directly in the prolongation of my line, and about a mile north of Colonel Stone’s position. This opened fire about 1.30 P.M., and rendered new dispositions necessary; for Howard had not guarded my right flank as proposed, and indeed soon had more than he could do to maintain his line. When the guns referred to opened fire, Wadsworth, without waiting for orders, threw Cutler’s brigade back into the woods on Seminary Ridge, north of the railroad grading; a movement I sanctioned as necessary. Morrow’s brigade was concealed from the view of the enemy, in the woods where Reynolds fell, and Biddle’s brigade, by my order, changed front to the north. It could do so with impunity, as it was behind a ridge which concealed its left flank from Hill’s corps, and was further protected in that direction by two companies of the 20th New York State Militia, who occupied a house and barn in advance, sent there by the colonel of that regiment, Theodore B. Gates, whose skill and energy were of great service to me during the battle.

It would of course have been impossible to hold the line if Hill attacked on the west and Ewell assailed me at the same time on the north; but I occupied the central position, and their converging columns did not strike together until the grand final advance at the close of the day, and therefore I was able to resist several of their isolated attacks before the last crash came.

Stone’s brigade in the centre had a difficult angle to defend, but was partially sheltered by a ridge on the west. His position was in truth the key-point of the first day’s battle. It overlooked the field, and its possession by the enemy would cut our force in two, enfilade Morrow’s and Biddle’s brigades, and compel a hasty retreat.

After Hall’s battery was driven back, no other artillery occupied the ground for some time, then General Wadsworth borrowed Calef’s regular battery from the cavalry, and posted it in rear of the position Hall had occupied. When the remainder of the division came up, Captain Reynolds’ Battery “L” of the 1st New York Artillery, as already stated, was sent to assist Calef in keeping down the fire of two rebel batteries on the ridge to the west; but when Ewell’s artillery also opened, the cross fire became too severe. Calef was withdrawn, and Reynolds was severely wounded. The rebel batteries soon after ceased firing for the time being; and at Wadsworth’s request, Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery to the First Corps, posted a section of Reynolds’ battery, under Lieutenant Wilbur, on Seminary Ridge, south of the railroad cut; Stewart’s Battery “B” 4th United States being on a line north of the cut. Cooper’s battery was directed to meet Ewell’s attack from the north, and Stevens’ 5th Maine battery was retained behind the Seminary in reserve.

Barlow’s division on the right and Schimmelpfennig’s on the left, formed somewhat hastily against Ewell, whose line of battle faced south. Barlow rested his right on a wooded knoll, constituting part of the western bank of Rock Creek. As there was an open country to the east he considered that flank secure, for no enemy was in sight then, and if they came from that direction, there would be time to make fresh dispositions. After the formation there was an interval of a quarter of a mile between their left and the First Corps, which might have been avoided by placing the two divisions further apart. This was a serious thing to me, for the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy from penetrating there, lengthened and weakened my line, and used up my reserves. It seems to me that the Eleventh Corps was too far out. It would have been better, in my opinion, if the left had been echeloned in rear of the right of the First Corps, and its right had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone foundations at the Almshouse. The enemy then could not have turned the right without compromising the safety of the turning column and endangering his communications; a movement he would hardly like to make, especially as he did not know what troops might be coming up. Still they had a preponderating force, and as their whole army was concentrating on Gettysburg, it was not possible to keep them back for any great length of time unless the First and Eleventh Corps were heavily reinforced. The position of our forces and those of the enemy, will be best understood by a reference to the map on page 125.

About 2 P.M., after the Eleventh Corps line was formed, General Howard rode over, inspected, and approved it. He also examined my position and gave orders, in case I was forced to retreat, to fall back to Cemetery Hill. I think this was the first and only order I received from him during the day.

Rodes’ division of five brigades was formed across Seminary Ridge, facing south, with Iverson on the right, supported by Daniel and O’Neill in the centre, and Doles on the left, Ramseur being in reserve. Iverson was sent to attack the First Corps on Seminary Ridge, and O’Neill and Doles went forward about 2.45 P.M., to keep back the Eleventh Corps. When the two latter became fairly engaged in front, about 3.30 P.M., Early came up with his whole division and struck the Union right. This decided the battle in favor of the enemy.

Barlow had advanced with Von Gilsa’s brigade, had driven back Ewell’s skirmish line, and with the aid of Wilkinson’s battery was preparing to hold the Carlisle road. He was not aware that Early was approaching, and saw Doles’ advance with pleasure, for he felt confident he could swing his right around and envelop Doles’ left; a manoeuvre which could hardly fail to be successful.

Schimmelpfennig now threw forward Von Amberg’s brigade to intervene between O’Neill and Doles, and to strike the right flank of the latter; but Doles avoided the blow by a rapid change of front. This necessarily exposed his left to Barlow, who could not take advantage of it as he was unexpectedly assailed by Early’s division on his own right, which was enveloped, and in great danger. His men fought gallantly, and Gordon, who attacked them, says, made stern resistance until the rebels were within fifty paces of them. As Barlow was shot down, and their right flank enveloped, they were forced to retreat to the town. This isolated Von Amberg’s brigade, and Doles claims to have captured the greater portion of it.

The retrograde movement of the Eleventh Corps necessarily exposed the right flank of the First to attacks from O’Neill and Ramseur.

Howard sent forward Coster’s brigade, of Steinwehr’s division, to cover the retreat of the Eleventh Corps; but its force was too small to be effective; its flanks were soon turned by Hays’ and Hoke’s brigades, of Early’s division, and it was forced back with the rest.

We will now go back to the First Corps and describe what took place there while these events were transpiring.

When the wide interval between the First and Eleventh Corps was brought to my notice by Colonel Bankhead of my staff, I detached Baxter’s brigade of Robinson’s division to fill it. This brigade moved promptly, and took post on Cutler’s right, but before it could form across the intervening space, O’Neill’s brigade assailed its right flank, and subsequently its left, and Baxter was forced to change front alternately, to meet these attacks. He repulsed O’Neill, but found his left flank again exposed to an attack from Iverson, who was advancing in that direction. He now went forward and took shelter behind a stone fence on the Mummasburg road, which protected his right flank, while an angle in the fence which turned in a southwesterly direction covered his front. As his men lay down behind the fence, Iverson’s brigade came very close up, not knowing our troops were there. Baxter’s men sprang to their feet and delivered a most deadly volley at very short range, which left 500 of Iverson’s men dead and wounded, and so demoralized them, that all gave themselves up as prisoners. One regiment, however, after stopping our firing by putting up a white flag, slipped away and escaped. This destructive effect was not caused by Baxter alone, for he was aided by Cutler’s brigade, which was thrown forward on Iverson’s right flank, by the fire of our batteries, and the distant fire from Stone’s brigade. So long as the latter held his position, his line, with that of Cutler and Robinson’s division, constituted a demi-bastion and curtain, and every force that entered the angle suffered severely. Rodes in his report speaks of it as “a murderous enfilade, and reverse fire, to which, in addition to the direct fire it encountered, Daniel’s brigade had been subject to from the time it commenced its final advance.”

[ General Robinson states that these changes of front were made by his orders and under his personal supervision.]

While Iverson was making his attack, Rodes sent one of his reserve brigades-the one just referred to, that of Daniel-against Stone. This joined Davis’ brigade of Hill’s corps, and the two charged on Stone’s three little regiments. Stone threw forward one of these -the 149th Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight, to the railroad cut, where they were partially sheltered. Colonel Dana’s regiment, the 143d Pennsylvania, was posted on the road in rear of Dwight and to the right. When I saw this movement I thought it a very bold one, but its results were satisfactory. Two volleys and a bayonet charge by Dwight drove Daniel back for the time being. In this attack Colonel Stone was severely wounded, and the command of his brigade devolved upon Colonel Wister of the 150th Pennsylvania.

[ Dwight was a hard fighter, and not averse to plain speaking. Once, when Secretary of War Stanton had determined to grant no more passes to go down to the army, Dwight applied for permission for an old man to visit his dying son. The request was refused; whereupon Dwight said: "My name is Dwight, Walton Dwight, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 149th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. You can dismiss me from the service as soon as you like, but I am going to tell you what I think of you," and he expressed himself in terms far from complimentary; whereupon Stanton rescinded the order and gave him the pass.]

This attack should have been simultaneous with one from the nearest troops of Hill’s corps, but the latter were lying down in a sheltered position, and Daniel urged them in vain to go forward.

Not being able to force his way in front on account of Dwight’s position in the railroad cut, Daniel brought artillery to enfilade it, and threw the 32d North Carolina across it. The cut being no longer tenable, Dwight retreated to the road and formed on Dana’s left.

Daniel had been originally ordered to protect Iverson’s right, but Iverson swung his right around without notifying Daniel, and thus dislocated the line.

Ramseur now came forward to aid Iverson, and I sent Paul’s brigade of Robinson’s division, which was preceded by Robinson in person, to assist Baxter, and, if possible to fill the interval between the First and Eleventh Corps, for I feared the enemy would penetrate there and turn my right flank.

When Paul’s brigade arrived, Baxter was out of ammunition, but proceeded to refill his cartridge-boxes from those of the dead and wounded.

General Howard has stated that the interval referred to was filled by Dilger’s and Wheeler’s batteries of the Eleventh Corps, but a glance at the official map will show that, before Paul’s advance, these batteries were several hundred yards distant from the First Corps.

Another attack was now made from the north and west by both Daniel’s and Davis’ brigades. Colonel Wister faced his own regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Huidekoper, to the west, and the other two regiments to the north. The enemy were again repulsed by two volleys and a gallant bayonet charge, led by Huidekoper, who lost an arm in the fight. Colonel Wister having been shot through the face, the command devolved upon Colonel Dana, another veteran of the Mexican war.

There had been a great lack of co-ordination in these assaults, for they were independent movements, each repulsed in its turn. The last attack, however, against Wister by extended by Brockenborough’s and Pettigrew’s brigades to Morrow’s front in the woods, but Morrow held on firmly to his position.

I now sent my last reserve, the 151st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel McFarland, to take post between Stone’s and Biddle’s brigades.

So far I had done all that was possible to defend my front, but circumstances were becoming desperate. My line was very thin and weak, and my last reserve had been thrown in. As we had positive information that the entire rebel army was coming on, it was evident enough that we could not contend any longer, unless some other corps came to our assistance. I had previously sent an aide- Lieutenant Slagle-to ask General Howard to reinforce me from Steinwehr’s division, but he declined to do so. I now sent my Adjutant-General, Halsted, to reiterate the request, or to obtain for me an order to retreat, as it was impossible for me to remain where I was, in the face of the constantly increasing forces which were approaching from the west. Howard insisted that Halstead mistook rail fences for troops in the distance. The lorgnettes of his staff finally convinced him of his error; he still, however, refused to order me to retire, but sent Halsted off to find Buford’s cavalry, and order it to report to me. The First Corps had suffered severely in these encounters, but by this additional delay, and the overwhelming odds against us, it was almost totally sacrificed. General Wadsworth reported half of his men were killed or wounded, and Rowley’s division suffered in the same proportion. Hardly a field officer remained unhurt. After five color-bearers of the 24th Michigan Volunteers had fallen, Colonel Morrow took the flag in his own hands, but was immediately prostrated. A private then seized it, and, although mortally wounded, still held it firmly in his grasp. Similar instances occurred all along the line. General Robinson had two horses shot under him. He reported a loss of 1,667 out of 2,500. Buford was in a distant part of the field, with Devin’s brigade, covering the retreat of the Eleventh Corps, and already had all he could attend to. He expressed himself in unequivocal terms at the idea that he could keep back Hill’s entire corps with Gamble’s cavalry brigade alone.

As Howard seemed to have little or no confidence in his troops on Cemetery Hill, he was perhaps justified in retaining them in line there for the moral effect they would produce.

About the time the Eleventh Corps gave way on the right, the Confederate forces made their final advance in double lines, backed by strong reserves, and it was impossible for the few men left in the First Corps to keep them back, especially as Pender’s large division overlapped our left for a quarter of a mile; Robinson’s right was turned, and General Paul was shot through both eyes in the effort to stem the tide. They could not contend against Ramseur in front, and O’Neill on the flank, at the same time.

Under these circumstances it became a pretty serious question how to extricate the First Corps and save its artillery before it was entirely surrounded and captured.

Biddle, Morrow, and Dana were all forced back from the ridge they had defended so long, which bordered Willoughby’s Run. Each brigade was flanked, and Stone’s men under Dana were assailed in front and on both flanks. Yet even then Daniel speaks of the severe fighting which took place before he could win the position.

What was left of the First Corps after all this slaughter rallied on Seminary Ridge. Many of the men entered a semi-circular rail entrenchment which I had caused to be thrown up early in the day, and held that for a time by lying down and firing over the pile of rails. The enemy were now closing in on us from the south, west, and north, and still no orders came to retreat. Buford arrived about this time, and perceiving that Perrin’s brigade in swinging around to envelop our left exposed its right flank, I directed him to charge. He reconnoitered the position they held, but did not carry out the order; I do not know why. It was said afterward he found the fences to be an impediment; but he rendered essential service by dismounting his men and throwing them into a grove south of the Fairfield road, where they opened a severe fire, which checked the rebel advance and prevented them from cutting us off from our direct line of retreat to Cemetery Hill.

The first long line that came on us from the west was swept away by our artillery, which fired with very destructive effect, taking the rebel line en écharpe.

Although the Confederates advanced in such force, our men still made strong resistance around the Seminary, and by the aid of our artillery, which was most effective, beat back and almost destroyed the first line of Scales’ brigade, wounding both Scales and Pender. The former states that he arrived within seventy-five feet of the guns, and adds: “Here the fire was most severe. Every field officer but one was killed or wounded. The brigade halted in some confusion to return the fire.” My Adjutant-Generals Baird and Halstead, and my aides Lee, Marten, Slagle, Jones, and Lambdin had hot work carrying orders at this time. It is a marvel that any of them survived the storm of bullets that swept the field.

Robinson was forced back toward the Seminary, but halted notwithstanding the pressure upon him, and formed line to save Stewart’s battery north of the railroad cut, which had remained too long, and was in danger of being captured.

Cutler’s brigade in the meantime had formed behind the railroad grading to face the men who were pursuing the Eleventh Corps. This show of force had a happy effect, for it caused the enemy in that direction to halt and throw out a skirmish line, and the delay enabled the artillery soon after to pass through the interval between Cutler on the north and Buford’s cavalry on the south.

As the enemy were closing in upon us and crashes of musketry came from my right and left, I had little hope of saving my guns, but I threw my headquarters guard, under Captain Glenn of the 149th Pennsylvania, into the Seminary and kept the right of Scales’ brigade back twenty minutes longer, while their left was held by Baxter’s brigade of Robinson’s division, enabling the few remaining troops, ambulances, and artillery to retreat in comparative safety. It became necessary, however, to abandon one gun of Captain Reynolds’ battery, as several of the horses were shot and there was no time to disengage them from the piece. Three broken and damaged caisson bodies were also left behind. The danger at this time came principally from Hoke’s and Hays’ brigades, which were making their way into the town on the eastern side, threatening to cut us off from Cemetery Hill. The troops in front of the Seminary were stayed by the firm attitude of Buford’s cavalry, and made a bend in their line, apparently with a view to form square.

I waited until the artillery had gone and then rode back to the town with my staff. As we passed through the streets, pale and frightened women came out and offered us coffee and food, and implored us not to abandon them.

Colonel Livingston of my staff, who had been sent on a message, came back to the Seminary, not knowing that we had left. He says the enemy were advancing toward the crest very cautiously, evidently under the impression there was an ambuscade waiting for them there. They were also forming against cavalry.

On the way I must have met an aide that Howard says he sent to me with orders to retreat, but I do not remember receiving any message of the kind.

I observe that Howard in his account of the battle claims to have handled the First and Eleventh Corps from 11 A.M. until 4 P.M.; but at 11 A.M. his corps was away back on the road, and did not arrive until about 1 P.M.

The map previously given on page 125 demonstrates that we were a mere advance guard of the army, and shows the impossibility of our defending Gettysburg for any length of time.

The First Corps was broken and defeated, but not dismayed. There were but few left, but they showed the true spirit of soldiers. They walked leisurely from the Seminary to the town, and did not run. I remember seeing Hall’s battery and the 6th Wisconsin regiment halt from time to time to face the enemy, and fire down the streets. Both Doles and Ramsey claim to have had sharp encounters there. Many of the Eleventh Corps, and part of Robinson’s division, which had been far out, were captured in the attempt to reach Steinwehr’s division on Cemetery Hill, which was the rallying point.

When I arrived there I found General Howard, surrounded by his staff, awaiting us at the main gate of the cemetery. He made arrangements to hold the road which led up from the town, and which diverged to Baltimore and Taneytown, by directing me to post the First Corps on the left in the cemetery, while he assembled the Eleventh Corps on the right. Soon after he rode over to ask me, in case his own men (Steinwehr’s division) deserted their guns, to be in readiness to defend them. General Schurz about this time was busily engaged in rallying his men, and did all that was possible to encourage them to form line again. I understood they were told that Sigel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction thought justifiable under the circumstances. It seemed to me that the discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in a measure injured their morale and esprit-de-corps, for they were rallied with great difficulty.

About 3.30 P.M., General Hancock arrived with orders from General Meade to supersede Howard. Congress had passed a law authorizing the President to put any general over any other superior to rank if, in his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and General Meade now assumed this power in the name of the President. Owing to the false despatch Howard had sent early in the day, Meade must have been under the impression that the First Corps had fled without fighting. More than half of them, however, lay dead and wounded on the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped.

Hancock being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit to his authority and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff, who was present, refused to do so. Howard stated in a subsequent account of the battle that he merely regarded General Hancock as a staff officer acting for General Meade. He says “General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner and used these words, ‘General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.’ I replied, ’All right, Hancock. This is no time for talking. You take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the right.’ I noticed that he sent Wadsworth’s division, without consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps to Culp’s Hill, but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection.” He adds that Hancock did not really relieve him until 7 P.M. Hancock, however, denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as a staff officer. He says he assumed absolute command at 3.30 P.M. I know he rode over to me and told me he was in command of the field, and directed me to send a regiment to the right, and I sent Wadsworth’s division there, as my regiments were reduced to the size of companies.

Hancock was much pleased with the ridge we were on, as a defensive position, and considered it admirably adapted for a battle-field. Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders to shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding éminences on either flank, where far-reaching batteries could be posted, were great advantages. It covered the principal roads to Washington and Baltimore, and its convex shape, enabling troops to reinforce with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving along the chord of this arc, was probably the cause of our final success. The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of battle, was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly, nor could the different corps co-operate promptly with each other. It was Hancock’s recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate his army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of Congress for selecting the position. He, doubtless, did see its advantages, and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took measures to hold it as a battle-ground for the army, while Howard merely used the cemetery as a rallying point for his defeated troops. Hancock occupied all the prominent points, and disposed the little cavalry and infantry he had in such a way as to impress the enemy with the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying Culp’s Hill, on the right, with Wadsworth’s brigade, and posting the cavalry on the left to take up a good deal of space, he made a show of strength not warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ewell had received some stunning blows during the day, and were disposed to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take the heights, as they could easily have done at this time, but not so readily after an hour’s delay, for then Sickles’ corps from Emmetsburg, and Slocum’s corps from Two Taverns, began to approach the position. The two rebel divisions of Anderson and Johnson, however, arrived about dusk, which would have still given the enemy a great numerical superiority.

General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the retreat of the First and Eleventh Corps, and Hancock’s movements and dispositions through his field-glass. He was not deceived by this show of force, and sent a recommendation-not an order-to Ewell to follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion as a corps commander, did not do so. He had lost 3,000 men, and both he and Hill were under orders not to bring on a general engagement. In fact they had had all the fighting they desired for the time being. Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell’s staff, states that the latter was preparing to move forward against the height, when a false report induced him to send Gordon’s brigade to reinforce Smith’s brigade on his extreme left, to meet a supposed Union advance in that direction.

The absence of these two brigades decided him to wait for the arrival of Johnson’s division before taking further action. When the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, and the opportunity for a successful attack had passed.

In sending Hancock forward with such ample powers, Meade virtually appointed him commander-in-chief for the time being, for he was authorized to say where we would fight, and when, and how. In the present instance, in accordance with his recommendation, orders were immediately sent out for the army to concentrate on Cemetery Ridge. Two-thirds of the Third Corps, and all of the Twelfth came up, and by six o’clock the position became tolerably secure. Stannard’s Second Vermont brigade also arrived, and as they formed part of my command, reported to me for duty; a very welcome reinforcement to my shattered division. Sickles had taken the responsibility of joining us without orders, knowing that we were hard pressed. His command prolonged the line of the First Corps to the left. Slocum’s Corps-the Twelfth-was posted, as a reserve, also on the left.

Hancock now relinquished the command of the field to Slocum and rode back to Taneytown to confer with Meade and explain his reasons for choosing the battle-field.

Longstreet’s corps soon arrived and joined Ewell and Hill; so that the whole rebel army was ready to act against us the next morning, with the exception of Pickett’s division.

At the close of the day General John Newton rode up and took charge of the First Corps by order of General Meade, and I resumed the command of my division. Several incidents occurred during the severe struggle of the first day which are worthy of record.

Colonel Wheelock of the 97th New York was cut off during the retreat of Robinson’s division, and took refuge in a house. A rebel lieutenant entered and called upon him to surrender his sword. This he declined to do, whereupon the lieutenant called in several of his men, formed them in line, took out his watch and said to the colonel, “You are an old gray-headed man, and I dislike to kill you, but if you don’t give up that sword in five minutes, I shall order these men to blow your brains out.” When the time was up the Colonel still refused to surrender. A sudden tumult at the door, caused by some prisoners attempting to escape, called the lieutenant off for a moment. When he returned the colonel had given his sword to a girl in the house who had asked him for it, and she secreted it between two mattresses. He was then marched to the rear, but being negligently guarded, escaped the same night and returned to his regiment.

Another occurrence recalls Browning’s celebrated poem of “An Incident at Ratisbon.” An officer of the 6th Wisconsin approached Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes, the commander of the regiment, after the sharp fight in the railroad cut. The colonel supposed, from the firm and erect attitude of the man, that he came to report for orders of some kind; but the compressed lips told a different story. With a great effort the officer said, "Tell them at home I died like a man and a soldier." He threw open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound, and dropped dead at the colonel’s feet.

Another incident was related to me at the time, but owing to our hurried movements and the vicissitudes of the battle, I have never had an opportunity to verify it. It was said that during the retreat of the artillery one piece of Stewart’s battery did not limber up as soon as the others. A rebel officer rushed forward, placed his hand upon it, and presenting a pistol at the back of the driver, directed him not to drive off with the piece. The latter did so, however, received the ball in his body, caught up with the battery and then fell dead.

We lay on our arms that night among the tombs at the Cemetery, so suggestive of the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame; but the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these and were too much exhausted to think of anything but much-needed rest.