COMMODORE PERRY AND WHAT FOLLOWED

The most potent cause which led to the breaking down of the Tokugawa Shogunate, was the attitude which the empire had assumed toward foreign nations. There were other causes which co-operated with this, but none which were capable of such far-reaching and revolutionary effects. We have seen that this attitude was due to the fears entertained concerning the designs of the Portuguese and the Spanish. These fears may have been unfounded, but they were none the less real and operative. Such fears may have been stimulated by the Dutch, who had no reason to deal tenderly with the fanatical enemies of the independence and religion of their country. The spirit of trade with large profits was at the bottom of the great enterprises which were sent out from Europe to the East and West Indies during the seventeenth century.

The rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese resulted in the banishment of the latter, and the establishment of the Dutch at Nagasaki in 1640. They occupied the little artificial island of Deshima, about three acres in extent, where were erected their houses, their offices and stores, and where for more than two hundred years their trade was conducted. And this, together with a like limited arrangement with the Chinese, was the sole foreign intercourse allowed with Japan.

It is plain now that this seclusion was a great mistake. It would have been of inestimable value to this enterprising and progressive people, to have kept in the race for improvement with the other nations of the world. They would not at this late day be compelled, under a dreadful strain of resources, to provide themselves with the modern appliances of civilization. Long since they would have tried the experiments with which they are now engaged, and would have found a way through the intricacies of politics to a free and stable government. To Ieyasu and his successors the way of safety seemed to be, to shut themselves up and sternly deny admittance to the outside world, while they continued to work out their destiny in their own way.

With whatever shortcomings the Dutch are to be charged in their intercourse with Japan, the world owes a great debt of gratitude to them for what they accomplished. Whatever was known concerning Japanese history and civilization down to the times of Commodore Perry, came chiefly from the Dutch. And not less than the debt of the rest of the world is that of Japan herself. Although the influence of the government was always exerted against the admission of foreign ideas, not a few of the seeds of western civilization were by them planted in a fertile soil and bore abundant fruit. To Kaempfer and Baron von Siebold particularly we must always look for our knowledge of the Japan of the days of its seclusion. Many efforts were made at successive times to open intercourse by the representatives of different nations. The Russians were the most persistent, and their attempts did not cease until the imprisonment of Captain Galowin in 1811. In comparatively recent times numerous essays were made resulting in disappointment. The American brig Morrison in 1837, the British surveying ship Saramang in 1845, Captain Cooper in 1845, Commodore Biddle in 1848, Admiral Cecille in 1848, Commander Glynn in 1849, and Commander Matheson in the same year, all made efforts to communicate with the government, but were rebuffed. It is plain that affairs were rapidly verging towards a point when the isolation of Japan must be given up.

Several causes contributed to the creation of a special interest in the United States of America, concerning the opening of negotiations with Japan. One of these was the magnitude to which the whale fishery had attained, and the large financial investments(262) held in this industry by American citizens. A second cause was the opening of China to foreign trade as a result of the opium war. But the most active cause was the discovery of gold in California in 1848, and the consequent development of that state as a centre of trade. It was an early scheme to run a line of steamers from San Francisco to the newly opened ports of China. To Hongkong the distance is about 6,149 nautical miles, and if a steamer is to traverse the whole distance without a break, she must carry an enormous load of coal. The only remedy lay in establishing a coaling station on the Japanese islands, and this could only be effected when Japan abandoned her policy of seclusion and entered with a free heart into the comity of nations.

The interest of the government and people of the United States at last eventuated in the expedition under Commodore Matthew C. Perry. He had for a long time been convinced of the importance and feasibility of such an undertaking, and when he was summoned to take charge of it he made the most thorough preparation for his task.

At his suggestion the government procured all available books, maps, and charts, and he made himself master of every conceivable detail. From manufacturing establishments he secured models of railways, telegraphic lines, and other interesting industrial equipments. He realized the necessity of taking with him such a naval force that its appearance in Japanese waters would produce a profound impression upon the government. And knowing that all his predecessors, who had sought access by way of Nagasaki, had been repelled, he resolved to avoid it and its Portuguese and Dutch traditions and venture boldly into the bay of Yedo.

As soon as it was known that a diplomatic expedition was to be despatched to Japan under the command of Commodore Perry he was deluged with applications, both from England and America, to be permitted to join it.

But Perry resolutely declined all these enterprising offers. In his long career as a naval officer he had seen the danger of admitting on board men-of-war persons who were not under the authority of the commander. From such dangers he meant to be free. He therefore refused to take on board the ships of his squadron any but regularly accredited officers and men over whom he exercised legitimate control. He even made it a rule that if any of the officers kept diaries during the progress of the expedition, they should be the property of the Navy Department and could not be published without its permission and authority.

Commodore Perry carried with him a friendly letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan,(263) who is therein addressed as “Great and Good Friend.” The letter pointed out the contiguity of the two countries and the importance of their friendship and commercial intercourse; it announced that Commodore Perry had been sent to give assurance of the friendly sentiment of the President, and to arrange for privileges of trade, for the care of shipwrecked sailors, and for the appointment of a convenient port where coal and other supplies might be obtained by the vessels of the United States.

After some provoking delays and disappointments the expedition sailed from Norfolk on the 24th of November, 1852,(264) proceeding by the way of the cape of Good Hope to the China sea. There taking on board Dr. S. Wells Williams as interpreter, and visiting several ports in China, the Bonin islands, and the Ryukyu islands, they sailed to Japan. The squadron, led by the Susquehanna and followed by the Mississippi, the Plymouth, and the Saratoga, entered Yedo bay, July 8, 1853.(265)

The Japanese government had been warned of the preparation and coming of this expedition by the Dutch. Eager to maintain their position with the government the King of the Netherlands addressed to the Shogun a letter in 1844 suggesting the relaxation of the laws excluding foreign nations from trade. But in the following year he received an answer declining to make any changes.

With all the warning, however, which the government had received and the preparations which had been made for the momentous occasion, the appearance of the squadron at the entrance of Yedo bay was an intense surprise. Two large steam frigates the Susquehanna and the Mississippi and two sloops-of-war the Plymouth and the Saratoga, although much inferior to the squadron promised, composed such an array as had never before made its appearance in Yedo bay. As they plowed through the peaceful waters, in full view of the white-capped peak of Fuji-yama, every height and vantage ground along the shore seemed alive with troops and with wondering and alarmed inhabitants. The vessels came to anchor off the village of Uraga, which is not far from the present site of the dockyards at Yokosuka.

The account(266) of the preliminary negotiations conducted by Commodore Perry with the officers of the government is interesting, as showing the efforts made by them to send him to Nagasaki, and his absolute refusal to go thither or conduct his business through the Dutch or Chinese. When there seemed no other way, consent was given to receive, through an officer of adequate rank, the letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan. When he had formally delivered this letter, he took his departure with an intimation that he would return at a future day and receive the answer.(267)

There can be no doubt that the display of force which Commodore Perry took care to make in all his transactions with the Japanese officials at the same time that he was careful to convey assurances of his friendly purposes and objects, produced a deep impression on the government with which he had to deal. It is useless to deny that it was on this display of force that Commodore Perry largely relied for the success of his expedition. That he was prepared to use force had it been necessary we may feel sure.(268) But the instructions of his government and his own sense of international justice bound him to exhaust every peaceful resource before resorting to measures of coercion.

The government of the shogun was greatly troubled by this responsibility so suddenly laid upon it. They knew not what would be the result of their refusal to enter upon negotiations when Perry returned. The seclusion in which they had kept themselves so long had cut them off from a knowledge of the relations in which the nations of the world stood to each other. Notwithstanding Commodore Perry’s protestations of friendliness, they were afraid of his great ships and their powerful armaments. Should they, as they might easily do, make their way up the bay till they were within gunshot of the capital, what resistance could the government show, or how could it prevent them from battering down the castle and all the daimyos’ residences.

The sentiment of loyalty to the emperor and opposition to the shogun, which had been growing up so insidiously and had now become really formidable, was a source of the greatest perplexity to the Yedo government. Should they proceed with their negotiations and make a treaty with the Americans, this anti-shogun sentiment was ready to manifest itself against them with terrible effect. If they refused to negotiate, then they must be ready to meet the invaders of their soil with their miserable obsolete armor and with hearts that two hundred years of peace had rendered more obsolete than their armor.

The first thing to be done was to consult the daimyos and learn to what extent they could rely on their co-operation. The daimyo of Mito,(269) a descendant of the famous Mitsukuni, seemed to have inherited one at least of the opinions of his ancestor. He advocated the observance of a greater reverence for the emperor at Kyoto, and criticised the assumption of imperial powers by the shogun. At the same time he was an ardent foreign-hater, and in 1841 had been placed in confinement because he had melted down the bells of the Buddhist temples of his domains, and cast cannon for their protection. But now he was pardoned and appointed to take measures for the defence of the country. On the 15th of July the American squadron was still in the bay, for it left on the 17th the daimyo of Mito sent in to the government a memorial(270) setting forth his decisive views on the subject. He gave ten reasons against a treaty and in favor of war. We give them here in Mr. Nitobe’s translation:

“1. The annals of our history speak of the exploits of the great, who planted our banners on alien soil; but never was the clash of foreign arms heard within the precincts of our holy ground. Let not our generation be the first to see the disgrace of a barbarian army treading on the land where our fathers rest.

“2. Notwithstanding the strict interdiction of Christianity, there are those guilty of the heinous crime of professing the doctrines of this evil sect. If now America be once admitted into our favor, the rise of this faith is a matter of certainty.

“3. What! Trade our gold, silver, copper, iron, and sundry useful materials for wool, glass, and similar trashy little articles! Even the limited barter of the Dutch factory ought to have been stopped.

“4. Many a time recently have Russia and other countries solicited trade with us; but they were refused. If once America is permitted the privilege, what excuse is there for not extending the same to other nations?

“5. The policy of the barbarians is first to enter a country for trade, then to introduce their religion, and afterward to stir up strife and contention. Be guided by the experience of our forefathers two centuries back; despise not the teachings of the Chinese Opium War.

“6. The Dutch scholars say that our people should cross the ocean, go to other countries and engage in active trade. This is all very desirable, provided they be as brave and strong as were their ancestors in olden time; but at present the long-continued peace has incapacitated them for any such activity.

“7. The necessity of caution against the ships now lying in the harbor (i.e., Perry’s squadron) has brought the valiant samurai to the capital from distant quarters. Is it wise to disappoint them?

“8. Not only the naval defence of Nagasaki but all things relating to foreign affairs have been entrusted to the two clans of Kuroda and Nabeshima. To hold any conference with a foreign power outside of the port of Nagasaki as has been done this time at Uraga is to encroach upon their rights and trust. These powerful families will not thankfully accept an intrusion into their vested authority.

“9. The haughty demeanor of the barbarians now at anchorage has provoked even the illiterate populace. Should nothing be done to show that the government shares the indignation of the people, they will lose all fear and respect for it.

“10. Peace and prosperity of long duration have enervated the spirit, rusted the armor, and blunted the swords of our men. Dulled to ease, when shall they be aroused? Is not the present the most auspicious moment to quicken their sinews of war?”

The government sent to all the daimyos copies of the American letter to the shogun, and asked for their opinions concerning the course to be pursued. Many answers were immediately received. They almost unanimously declared against the opening of the country. Some advocated the alternative suggested in the letter itself, to open the country temporarily and try the experiment for three years, or five years, or ten years. In the meantime the defences of the country and new and improved arms and armaments could be perfected. The government did indeed busy itself during Perry’s absence in hurrying forward defensive preparations. The line of forts which still are visible in the shallow water of the bay opposite Shinagawa, the southern suburb of the capital, were hastily constructed. Bells from monasteries and metal articles of luxury were melted down and cast into cannon. Lessons were given and became quickly fashionable in the use of European small-arms and artillery. The military class from the various clans flocked to Yedo and Kyoto in large numbers, expecting to be called upon to defend their country against the impudent intrusion of the barbarians.

During this busy time of perplexity and preparation the Shogun Ieyoshi, the twelfth of the Tokugawa dynasty died August 25, 1853. His son Iesada succeeded him as the thirteenth shogun. The death of the reigning shogun did not produce any marked effect upon the policy of the government. Long before this time the custom of abdication, and the habits of luxury and effeminacy in which the family of the shogun was reared, had dragged the house down to the usual impotent level. The government was conducted by a system of bureaucracy which relieved the titular shoguns from all responsibility and allowed them to live in profitless voluptuousness. So that one died and another reigned in his stead without causing more than a ripple upon the surface of current events.

Shortly after the departure of the American squadron from Yedo bay, the Russian Admiral Pontiatine appeared in the harbor of Nagasaki, and made application for a national agreement to open ports for trade, to adjust the boundary line between the two nations across the island of Saghalien, and to live in neighborly intimacy. English vessels were also in Chinese waters watching the Russians, and the war, usually called the Crimean war, actually broke out in the spring of 1854. A visit from these vessels might therefore be expected at any time.

Commodore Perry during the interval between his two visits to Japan sailed to the ports of China where the Taiping rebellion was then in action. The confusion and insecurity occasioned by this uprising rendered the presence of the squadron most acceptable to the American merchants.

On the 13th of February, 1854, he made his appearance a second time in Yedo bay with a fleet of seven ships, viz., three steam frigates and four sloops-of-war. Three additional vessels were to join, and did join, the fleet in Yedo bay. So that when the fleet was all mustered there were ten fully armed vessels, comprising such an array as had never before appeared in Japanese waters.

After some haggling about the place where the negotiations should be conducted, it was finally settled that the place of meeting should be at Kanagawa, near the village (now the city) of Yokohama. Here after much deliberation and discussion, proposals and amendments, banquets and presents, a treaty was agreed upon. The signing and exchange took place on the 31st of March, 1854. It was immediately sent to Washington for ratification.

As this was the first formal treaty(271) made with any western country we give a synopsis of its provisions.

Art. I. Peace and amity to exist between the two countries.

Art. II. The port of Shimoda to be opened immediately and the port of Hakodate to be opened in one year, and American ships to be supplied with necessary provisions in them.

Art. III. Shipwrecked persons of either nation to be cared for, and expenses to be refunded.

Art. IV. Shipwrecked and other persons not to be imprisoned but to be amenable to just laws.

Art. V. Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate not to be subject to confinement; free to go about within defined limits.

Art. VI. Further deliberation to be held between the parties to settle concerning trade and matters requiring to be arranged.

Art. VII. Trade in open ports to be subject to such regulations as the Japanese government shall establish.

Art. VIII. Wood, water, provisions, coal, etc., to be procured only through appointed Japanese officers.

Art. IX. If at any future day privileges in addition to those here enumerated are granted to any other nation, the same to be allowed to Americans.

Art. X. Ships of the United States not to resort to other ports than Shimoda and Hakodate except in stress of weather.

Art. XI. Consuls or agents of the United States to reside at Shimoda.

Art. XII. The ratification of this treaty to be exchanged within eighteen months.

As might have been expected, as soon as this treaty with the United States had been signed there was a rush of other nations to obtain similar terms. Admiral Sir John Sterling, acting in behalf of the government of Great Britain, negotiated a treaty which was signed at Nagasaki on the 15th of October, 1854. Admiral Pontiatine negotiated a similar treaty for Russia, which was signed at Shimoda on the 7th of February, 1855. A treaty with the Netherlands was signed on the 30th of January, 1856.

None of these were in any general sense commercial treaties, providing for trade and making regulations by which it might be conducted. They were rather preliminary conventions, making arrangements for vessels to obtain necessary provisions, and stipulating for the protection of those suffering shipwreck, and for vessels driven under stress of weather to take shelter in the harbors of Japan. They each provided for admission to two ports: The American treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate; the English treaty to Nagasaki and Hakodate; the Russian treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate.

All these treaties contained what is called “the most favored nation clause,” so that where the privileges granted to any one nation were in excess of those granted previously to others, these privileges were also without further negotiation extended to the nations that had already made treaties.

These dealings with foreign nations produced the most intense excitement throughout the empire. The old sentiment of hostility to foreign intercourse showed itself in unmistakable intensity. The song of the Black Ship, by which term the vessels of foreign nations were designated, was heard everywhere. Two distinct parties came into existence called the Jo-i party, who wished to expel the barbarians; and the Kai-koku party, who were in favor of opening the country.(272) The members of the latter party were principally connected with the shogun’s government, and had become impressed with the folly of trying to resist the pressure of the outside world. The Jo-i party was made up of the conservative elements in the country, who clung to the old traditions of Japan that had matured during the two centuries of the Tokugawa rule. Besides these conservatives there was also a party who nourished a traditional dislike to the Tokugawa family, and was glad to see it involved in difficulties which were sure to bring down upon it the vengeance of the nation. These were chiefly found among the southwestern daimiates such as Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa. The daimyo of Mito(273) although connected with the shogun’s family was bitterly hostile to the policy of holding any friendly relations with foreigners. He was therefore regarded as the head of the Jo-i party, and many of the disaffected samurai rallied about him as their champion and leader.

It was charged against the shogun that in making treaties with foreign nations he had transcended the powers(274) that rightly belonged to him. He was not the sovereign of Japan and never had been. He was only the chief executive under the emperor, and was not even next in rank to the emperor. It was impossible, therefore, that treaties made by the shogun and not ratified by his sovereign should be regarded by the Japanese as legitimate and binding.

The question of the legality of the treaties which the shogun had made was an important one, and interested not only the Japanese themselves but the foreigners whose privileges under these treaties were at stake. There is no doubt that Commodore Perry as well as all the subsequent negotiators, believed that in making treaties with the shogun they were dealing with a competent authority. The precedents occurring in the history of Japan seemed all to bear in this direction. The Portuguese and the Spanish had dealt with the shogun and never with the emperor. The Dutch had received from Ieyasu the privileges of trade and had ever since continued under the shogun’s protection. Captain Saris in his negotiations in 1614 received written assurances of protection and privileges of trade from the shogun.

It was because the shogun’s power had become weakened, and there had grown up an active sentiment against him, that the question in reference to his legitimate authority arose. “Had the treaty” (with Perry) “been concluded when the power of Yedo was at its former height, it is probable that no questions would have been asked."(275)

According to the terms of the treaty made with the United States it was provided that a consul should be appointed “to reside at Shimoda at any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the signing the treaty.” In execution of this provision the United States government sent out Townsend Harris, who arrived in August, 1856. After some hesitation he was allowed to take up his residence at Shimoda. He was a man of great patience and tact, and gradually urged his way into the confidence of the government. He became the counsellor and educator of the officials in everything pertaining to foreign affairs. He was received December 7, 1857, by the shogun with the ceremony due to his new rank of plenipotentiary which he had then received.(276) In a despatch, dated July 8, 1858, he tells of a severe illness which he had suffered; how the shogun sent two physicians to attend him, and when a bulletin was sent to Yedo that his case was hopeless, the physicians “received peremptory orders to cure me, and if I died they would themselves be in peril.”

The principal effort of Mr. Harris was the negotiation of a commercial treaty which should make provision for the maintenance of trade in specified ports of Japan. The treaties already made by Japan with foreign nations only provided for furnishing vessels with needed supplies, and for the protection of vessels driven by stress of weather and of persons shipwrecked on the Japanese islands. It remained to agree upon terms, which should be mutually advantageous, for the regular opening of the ports for trade and for the residence at these ports of the merchants engaged in trade.

The excitement occasioned by the steps already taken rendered the shogun’s government exceedingly reluctant to proceed further in this direction. It was only after much persuasion, and with a desire to avoid appearing to yield to the appearance of force(277) with which the English were about to urge the negotiation of a commercial treaty, that at last, on the 17th of June, 1857, a treaty “for the purpose of further regulating the intercourse of American citizens within the empire of Japan” was duly concluded. The port of Nagasaki was to be opened in addition to those already stipulated. American citizens were to be permitted to reside at Shimoda and Hakodate for the purpose of supplying the wants of the vessels which visited there.

This does not seem to have been adequate, for only about a year later a further treaty, revoking that of June, 1857, was arranged. It was signed at Yedo on the 29th of July, 1858. Equivalent treaties were negotiated by other nations, and it is under the terms of these that the intercourse between Japan and the nations of Europe and America is still conducted. They provided for the opening of the ports of Ni-igata and Hyogo, and for the closing of Shimoda, which had been found unsuitable, and the opening in its place of Kanagawa.(278) They fixed dates for the opening of the cities of Yedo and Osaka, and provided for the setting apart of suitable concessions in each of them for residence and trade. They provided that all cases of litigation in which foreigners were defendants should be tried in the consular court of the nation to which the defendant belonged, and all cases in which Japanese citizens were defendants should be tried in Japanese courts. They fixed the limits within which foreigners at any of the treaty ports could travel, but permitted the diplomatic agent of any nation to travel without limitation. They prohibited the importation of opium. Commercial regulations were attached to the treaties and made a part of them, which directed that a duty of five per centum should be paid on all goods imported into Japan for sale, except that on intoxicating liquors a duty of thirty-five per centum should be exacted. All articles of Japanese production exported were to pay a duty of five per centum, except gold and silver coin and copper in bars. These trade regulations stipulated that five years after the opening of Kanagawa the export and import duties should be subject to revision at the desire of either party. The treaties themselves provide that on and after 1872 either of the contracting parties may demand a revision of the same upon giving one year’s notice of its desire.

These stipulations in reference to a revision of the treaties, and especially of the tariff of duties to be paid on imported goods, have been a source of great anxiety and concern to the Japanese government. The small duty of five per centum, which it has been permitted to collect on the goods imported, is scarcely more than enough to maintain the machinery of collection. And while the initiative is given to it to ask for a revision of the treaties, it has never yet been able to obtain the consent of the principal nations concerned to any change in the original hard terms.

Another provision in the treaties which has been the occasion of endless debate is that which requires all foreigners to remain under the jurisdiction of the consuls of their respective countries. It is claimed on the part of the Japanese that this provision, which was reasonable when the treaties were first made, is no longer just or necessary. The laws have been so far perfected, their judges and officers have been so educated, and the machinery of their courts have been so far conformed to European practice that it is no longer reasonable that foreigners residing in Japan should be under other than Japanese jurisdiction. It is earnestly to be hoped that these sources of irritation between Japan and the treaty powers may speedily be removed, and that the efforts of this progressive race to fall into line in the march of civilization may be appreciated and encouraged.

Any one who reads the diplomatic correspondence covering this period will see how serious were the troubles with which the country was called upon to deal. He will realize also how almost impossible it was for the diplomatic representatives of the western powers to comprehend the difficulties of the situation or know how to conduct the affairs of their legations with justice and consideration.

A succession of murders and outrages occurred, which awakened the fears of the foreign residents. It is plain enough now that this state of things was not so much due to the want of effort on the part of the government to carry out its agreements with foreign nations, as to the bitter and irreconcilable party hatred which had sprung up in consequence of these efforts. The feudal organization of the government, by which the first allegiance was due to the daimyo, rendered the condition of things more demoralized. It was an old feudal custom, whenever the retainers of a daimyo wished to avenge any act without committing their lord, they withdrew from his service and became ronins. Most of the outrages which occurred during the years intervening between the formation of the treaties and the restoration were committed by these masterless men. Responsibility for them was disclaimed by the daimyos, and the government of Yedo was unable to extend its control over these wandering swash-bucklers. There was no course for the foreign ministers to pursue but to hold the shogun’s government responsible for the protection of foreigners and foreign trade. This government, which was called the bakufu,(279) had made the treaties with the foreign powers, as many claimed, without having adequate authority, and had thus assumed to be supreme in matters of foreign intercourse. It was natural therefore that the representatives of the treaty powers should look to the bakufu for the security of those who had come hither under the sanction of these treaties.

It was in consequence a bloody time through which the country was called to pass. The prime minister and the head of the bakufu party was Ii Kamon-no-kami,(280) the daimyo of Hikone in the province of Mino. On account of the youth of the shogun he was created regent. He was a man of great resolution and unscrupulous in the measures by which he attempted to carry out the policy to which he was committed. By his enemies he was called the “swaggering prime minister (bakko genro).” Assured that the foreign treaties could not be abrogated without dangerous collisions with foreign nations, he sought to crush the opposition which assailed them. The daimyo of Mito, who had been the head of the anti-foreign party at Yedo, he compelled to resign and confined him to his private palace in his province. Numerous other persons who had busied themselves with interfering with his schemes and in promoting opposition in Kyoto, he also imprisoned.

Suddenly on the 23d of March, 1860, Ii Kamon-no-kami was assassinated as he was being carried in his norimono from his yashiki outside the Sakurada gate to the palace of the shogun.

The assassins were eighteen ronins of the province of Mito, who wished to avenge the imprisonment of their prince. They carried the head of the murdered regent to the Mito castle, and after exhibiting it to the gloating eyes of the prince, exposed it upon a pike at the principal gate.

The death of the regent was an irreparable blow to the government. There was no one who could take his place and assume his rôle. His loss must be reckoned as one of the principal events which marked the decadence of the shogun’s power.