The Philippine Constabulary and Public Order
During the last thirty years of Spanish
rule in the Philippines evil-doers were pursued and
apprehended and public order was maintained chiefly
by the guardia civil. At the time of its
organization in 1868 this body had a single division.
By 1880 the number had been increased to three, two
for Luzon and one for the Visayan Islands.
The guardia civil was organized
upon a military basis, its officers and soldiers being
drawn from the regular army of Spain by selection
or upon recommendation. Detachments were distributed
throughout the provinces and were commanded according
to their size by commissioned or non-commissioned
officers. Central offices were located in district
capitals; company headquarters were stationed in provincial
capitals, and detachments were sent to places where
they were deemed to be necessary.
Under ordinary conditions they rendered
service as patrols of two men each, but for the purpose
of attacking large bands of outlaws one or several
companies were employed as occasion required.
The guardia civil had jurisdiction
over all sorts of violations of laws and municipal
ordinances. They made reports upon which were
based the appointments of municipal officers, the
granting of licenses to carry firearms, and the determination
of the loyalty or the disloyalty of individuals.
They were vested with extraordinary
powers. Offences against them were tried by courts-martial,
and were construed as offences against sentinels on
duty. Penalties were therefore extremely severe.
Officers of the guardia civil
on leave could by their own initiative assume a status
of duty with the full powers and responsibilities
that go with command. This is contrary to American
practice, under which only dire emergency justifies
an officer in assuming an official status unless he
is duly assigned thereto by competent authority.
The guardia civil could arrest
on suspicion, and while the Spanish Government did
not directly authorize or sanction the use of force
to extort confessions, it was not scrupulous in the
matter of accepting confessions so obtained as evidence
of crime, nor was it quick to punish members of the
guardia civil charged with mistreatment of
prisoners.
Reports made by the guardia civil
were not questioned, but were accepted without support
even in cases of the killing of prisoners alleged
to have attempted to escape, or of men evading arrest.
This method of eliminating without
trial citizens deemed to be undesirable was applied
with especial frequency in the suppression of active
brigandage, and latterly during the revolution against
Spain. Prisoners in charge of the guardia civil
were always tied elbow to elbow. They knew full
well that resistance or flight was an invitation to
their guards to kill them, and that this invitation
was likely to be promptly accepted.
In the investigation of crime the
members of this organization arrested persons on suspicion
and compelled them to make revelations, true or false.
Eye-witnesses to the commission of crime were not needed
in the Spanish courts of that day. The confession
of an accused person secured his conviction, even
though not made in the presence of a judge. Indirect
and hearsay evidence were accepted, and such things
as writs of habeas corpus and the plea of double jeopardy
were unknown in Spanish procedure.
The guardia civil could rearrest
individuals and again charge them with crimes of which
they had already been acquitted. I have been
assured by reliable Filipino witnesses that it was
common during the latter days of Spanish sovereignty
for persons who had made themselves obnoxious to the
government to be invited by non-commissioned officers
to take a walk, which was followed either by their
complete disappearance or by the subsequent discovery
of their dead bodies.
It naturally resulted that the members
of the guardia civil were regarded with detestation
and terror by the people, but their power was so absolute
that protest rarely became public. The one notable
exception was furnished by Dr. Rizal’s book entitled
“Noli Me Tangere,” which voiced the complaints
of the Filipinos against them. There is not a
vestige of doubt that hatred of them was one of the
principal causes of the insurrection against Spain.
In 1901 the American government organized
a rural police force in the Philippines. It was
called the Philippine constabulary. The insurrection
was then drawing to a close, but there were left in
the field many guerilla bands armed and uniformed.
Their members sought to excuse their lawless acts
under the plea of patriotism and opposition to the
forces of the United States. In many provinces
they combined with professional bandits or with religious
fanatics. Various “popes” arose,
like Papa Isio in Negros. The Filipinos had become
accustomed to a state of war which had continued for
nearly six years. Habits of peace had been abandoned.
The once prosperous haciendas were in ruins.
War and pestilence had destroyed many of the work animals,
and those which remained continued to perish from disease.
Asiatic cholera was sweeping through the archipelago,
and consternation and disorder followed in its wake.
Under such circumstances the organization
of a rural police force was imperatively necessary.
Unfortunately the most critical situation which it
was to be called upon to meet had to be faced at the
very outset, when both officers and men were inexperienced
and before adequate discipline could be established.
The law providing for its establishment
was drawn by the Honourable Luke E. Wright, at that
time secretary of commerce and police and later destined
to become governor-general of the Philippines and
secretary of war of the United States.
It was intended that the constabulary
should accomplish its ends by force when necessary
but by sympathetic supervision when possible, suppressing
brigandage and turning the people towards habits of
peace. The fact was clearly borne in mind that
the abuses of the guardia civil had not been
forgotten and the new force was designed to meet existing
conditions, to allay as rapidly as possible the existing
just rancour against the similar organization established
under the Spanish regime, and to avoid the evils which
had contributed so much toward causing the downfall
of Spanish sovereignty. The law was admirably
framed to achieve these ends.
The officers of the constabulary were
selected chiefly from American volunteers recently
mustered out and from honourably discharged soldiers
of the United States army. Some few Filipinos,
whose loyalty was above suspicion, were appointed
to the lower grades. This number has since been
materially augumented, and some of the original Filipino
appointees have risen to the rank of captain.
It was inevitable that at the outset
there should be abuses. The organization was
necessarily born at work; there was no time to instruct,
to formulate regulations, to wait until a satisfactory
state of discipline had been brought about. There
were not barracks for housing the soldiers; there
were neither uniforms, nor arms, nor ammunition.
There was no system for rationing the men. All
of these things had to be provided, and they were
provided through a natural evolution of practical
processes, crystallizing into form, tested by the
duties of the day. The organization which grew
up was a true survival of the fittest, both in personnel
and in methods. The wonder is not that some abuses
occurred, but that they were so few; not that there
were occasional evidences of lack of efficiency, but
that efficiency was on the whole so high from the beginning.
The several provinces were made administrative
units, the commanding officer in each being designated
as “senior inspector.” The men who
were to serve in a given province were by preference
recruited there, and a departure was thus made from
the usual foreign colonial practice.
In 1905 the total force was fixed
at one hundred companies with a nominal strength of
two officers and fifty men each. Under special
conditions this rule may be departed from, and the
size of the companies or the number of officers increased.
Each province is divided by the senior
inspector into sections, and the responsibility for
patrol work and general policing rests on the senior
company officer in each station. The provinces
are grouped into five districts, each commanded by
an assistant chief who exercises therein the authority,
and performs the duties appropriate to the chief for
the entire Philippines. The higher administrative
positions have always been filled by detailing regular
officers of the United States army.
The constabulary soldiers are now
neatly uniformed, armed with Krag carbines and well
disciplined. They show the effect of good and
regular food and of systematic exercise, their physical
condition being vastly superior to that of the average
Filipino. They are given regular instruction
in their military duties. It is conducted in English.
The Philippine constabulary may be
defined as a body of armed men with a military organization,
recruited from among the people of the islands, officered
in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos, and
employed primarily for police duty in connection with
the establishment and maintenance of public order.
Blount’s chapters on the administrations
of Taft, Wright and Smith embody one prolonged plaint
to the effect that the organization of the constabulary
was premature, and that after the war proper ended,
the last smouldering embers of armed and organized
insurrection should have been stamped out, and the
brigandage which had existed in the Philippines for
centuries should have been dealt with, by the United
States army rather than by the constabulary.
Even if it were true that the army
could have rendered more effective service to this
end than could have been expected at the outset from
a newly organized body of Filipino soldiers, the argument
against the organization and use of the constabulary
would in my opinion have been by no means conclusive.
It is our declared policy to prepare the Filipinos
to establish and maintain a stable government of their
own. The proper exercise of police powers is obviously
necessary to such an end.
From the outset we have sacrificed
efficiency in order that our wards might gain practical
experience, and might demonstrate their ability, or
lack of ability, to perform necessary governmental
functions. Does any one cognizant of the situation
doubt for a moment that provincial and municipal affairs
in the Philippine Islands would to-day be more efficiently
administered if provincial and municipal officers were
appointed instead of being elected? Is any one
so foolish as to imagine that the sanitary regeneration
of the islands would not have progressed much more
rapidly had highly trained American health officers
been used in place of many of the badly educated and
comparatively inexperienced Filipino physicians whose
services have been utilized?
Nevertheless, in the concrete case
under discussion I dissent from the claim that more
satisfactory results could have been obtained by the
use of American troops.
The army had long been supreme in
the Philippines. Every function of government
had been performed by its officers and men, if performed
at all. Our troops had been combating an elusive
and cruel enemy. If they were human it is to
be presumed that they still harbored animosities,
born of these conditions, toward the people with whom
they had so recently been fighting. Had the work
of pacification been then turned over to them it would
have meant that often in the localities in which they
had been fighting, and in dealing with the men to whom
they had very recently been actively opposed in armed
conflict, they would have been called upon to perform
tasks and to entertain feelings radically different
from those of the preceding two or three years.
A detachment, marching through Leyte,
found an American who had disappeared a short time
before crucified, head down. His abdominal wall
had been carefully opened so that his intestines might
hang down in his face.
Another American prisoner, found on
the same trip, had been buried in the ground with
only his head projecting. His mouth had been propped
open with a stick, a trail of sugar laid to it through
the forest, and a handful thrown into it.
Millions of ants had done the rest.
Officers and men who saw such things
were thereby fitted for war, rather than for ordinary
police duty.
The truth is that they had seen so
many of them that they continued to see them in imagination
when they no longer existed. I well remember
when a general officer, directed by his superior to
attend a banquet at Manila in which Americans and
Filipinos joined, came to it wearing a big revolver!
Long after Manila was quiet I was
obliged to get out of my carriage in the rain and
darkness half a dozen times while driving the length
of Calle Real, and “approach to be recognized”
by raw “rookies,” each of whom pointed
a loaded rifle at me while I did it. I know that
this did not tend to make me feel peaceable or happy.
In my opinion it was wholly unnecessary, and yet I
did not blame the army for thinking otherwise.
After the war was over, when my private
secretary, Mr. James H. LeRoy, was one day approaching
Malolos, he was sternly commanded by a sentry to halt,
the command being emphasized as usual by presenting
to his attention a most unattractive view down the
muzzle of a Krag. He was next ordered to “salute
the flag,” which he finally discovered with
difficulty in the distance, after being told where
to look. The army way is right and necessary
in war, but it makes a lot of bother in time of peace!
This was not the only reason for failing to make more
extensive use of American soldiers in police duty. A veteran colonel of
United States cavalry who had just read Judge Blounts book was asked what he
thought of the claim therein made that the army should have done the police and
pacification work of the Philippines. His reply was:
“How long would it take a regiment
of Filipinos to catch an American outlaw in the United
States? Impossible!”
Another army officer said:
“Catching Filipino outlaws with
the Army is like catching a flea in a twenty-acre
field with a traction engine.”
There is perhaps nothing so demoralizing
to regular troops as employment on police duty which
requires them to work singly or in small squads.
Discipline speedily goes to the dogs and instruction
becomes impossible.
Successful prosecution of the work
of chasing ladrones in the Philippines requires
a thorough knowledge of local topography and of local
native dialects. Spanish is of use, but only in
dealing with educated Filipinos. A knowledge
of the Filipino himself; of his habits of thought;
of his attitude toward the white man; and toward the
illustrado, or educated man, of his own race;
ability to enter a town and speedily to determine
the relative importance of its leading citizens, finally
centring on the one man, always to be found, who runs
it, whether he holds political office or not, and also
to enlist the sympathy and cooeperation of its people;
all of these things are essential to the successful
handling of brigandage in the Philippines, whether
such brigandage has, or lacks, political significance.
The following parallel will make clear some of the reasons
why it was determined to use constabulary instead of American soldiers in
policing the Philippines from the time the insurrection officially ended:
United States Army Philippine
Constabulary
Soldier costs per annum $1400. Soldier costs per annum $363.50.
(Authority: Adjutant General
Heistand in 1910.)
American soldiers come from Constabulary soldiers are America.
enlisted in the province where they are to serve.
Few American soldiers speak All constabulary soldiers the local
dialects. speak local dialects.
Few American soldiers speak All educated constabulary any
Spanish. soldiers speak Spanish.
American soldiers usually have Constabulary soldiers, native to
but a slight knowledge of local the country, know the geography geography and
topography. and topography of their respective provinces.
Few American soldiers have had The Filipino soldier certainly
enough contact with Filipinos knows his own kind better than to understand them.
the American does.
The American soldier uses a
The constabulary soldier is ration of certain fixed
components rationed in cash and buys the imported
over sea. (A ration is food of the country where
he the day’s allowance of food for happens
to be. one soldier.)
The American ration costs
The constabulary cash ration is 24.3 cents United
States currency 10.5 cents United States currency.
(exclusive of cost of (No freight or
handling charges.) transportation and handling).
The constabulary soldier knows not Fresh meat
requiring ice to keep ice. His food grows in
the islands. it is a principal part of the He
buys it on the ground and needs American ration.
To supply it no transportation to bring it to
him. requires a regular system of transport from
the United States to Manila and from thence to local
ports, and wagon transportation from ports to inland
stations.
The American soldier is at no
The idea of enlisting the sympathy pains to enlist
the sympathy and and cooeperation of the local
cooeperation of the people; and population is
the strongest tenet his methods of discipline habits
in the constabulary creed. of life, etc.,
make it practically impossible for him to gain them.
Before preparing the foregoing statement
relative to the reasons for using Philippine constabulary
soldiers instead of soldiers of the United States
army for police work during the period in question,
I asked Colonel J. G. Harbord, assistant director
of the constabulary, who has served with that body
nine years, has been its acting director and is an
officer of the United States army, to give me a memorandum
on the subject. It is only fair to him to say
that I have not only followed very closely the line
of argument embodied in the memorandum which he was
good enough to prepare for me, but have in many instances
used his very words. The parallel columns are
his.
The constabulary soldier, thoroughly
familiar with the topography of the country in which
he operates; speaking the local dialect and acquainted
with the persons most likely to be able and willing
to furnish accurate information; familiar with the
characteristics of his own people; able to live off
the country and keep well, is under all ordinary circumstances
a more efficient and vastly less expensive police
officer than the American soldier, no matter how brave
and energetic the latter may be. Furthermore,
his activities are much less likely to arouse animosity.
Incidentally, the army is pretty consistently
unwilling to take the field unless the constitutional
guarantees are temporarily suspended, and it particularly
objects to writs of habeas corpus. The suspension
of such guarantees is obviously undesirable unless
really very necessary.
Let us now consider some of the specific
instances of alleged inefficiency of the constabulary
in suppressing public disorder, cited by Blount.
On page 403 of his book he says, speaking of Governor Taft
and disorder in the province of Albay which arose in 1902-1903:
“He did not want to order out
the military again if he could help it, and this relegated
him to his native municipal police and constabulary,
experimental outfits of doubtful loyalty, and, at best,
wholly inadequate, as it afterwards turned out, for
the maintenance of public order and for affording
to the peaceably inclined people that sort of security
for life and property, and that protection against
semi-political as well as unmitigated brigandage, which
would comport with the dignity of this nation.”
The facts as to these disorders are briefly as follows:
In 1902 an outlaw in Tayabas Province
who made his living by organizing political conspiracies
and collecting contributions in the name of patriotism,
who was known as Jose Roldan when operating in adjoining
provinces, but had an alias in Tayabas, found his life
made so uncomfortable by the constabulary of that province
that he transferred his operations to Albay.
There he affiliated himself with a few ex-Insurgent
officers who had turned outlaws instead of surrendering,
and with oath violators, and began the same kind of
political operations which he had carried out in Tayabas,
the principal feature of his work being the collection
of “contributions.”
The troubles in Albay were encouraged
by wealthy Filipinos who saw in them a probable opportunity
to acquire valuable hemp lands at bottom prices, for
people dependent on their hemp fields, if prevented
from working them, might in the end be forced to sell
them. Roldan soon lost standing with his new
organization because it was found that he was using
for his personal benefit the money which he collected.
About this time one Simeon Ola joined
his organization. Ola was a native of Albay,
where he had been an Insurgent major under the command
of the Tagalog general, Belarmino. His temporary
rank had gone to his head, and he is reported to have
shown considerable severity and hauteur in his treatment
of his former neighbours in Guinobatan, to which place
he had returned at the close of the insurrection.
Meanwhile, a wealthy Chinese mestizo named Don
Circilio Jaucian, on whom Ola, during his brief career
as an Insurgent officer, had laid a heavy hand, had
become présidente of the town.
Smarting under the indignities which
he had suffered, Jaucian made it very uncomfortable
for the former major, and in ways well understood
in Malay countries brought it home to the latter that
their positions had been reversed. Ola’s
house was mysteriously burned, and his life in Guinobatan
was made so unbearable that he took to the hills.
Ola had held higher military rank
than had any of his outlaw associates, and he became
their dominating spirit. He had no grievance
against the Americans, but took every opportunity to
avenge himself on the caciques of Guinobatan,
his native town.
Three assistant chiefs of constabulary,
Garwood, Baker and Bandholtz, were successively sent
to Albay to deal with this situation. Baker and
Bandholtz were regular army officers. The latter
ended the disturbances, employing first and last some
twelve companies of Philippine scouts, armed, officered,
paid, equipped and disciplined as are the regular
soldiers of the United States army, and a similar
number of constabulary soldiers. Eleven stations
in the restricted field of operations of this outlaw
were occupied by scouts. There were few armed
conflicts in force between Ola’s men and these
troops. In fact, it was only with the greatest
difficulty that this band, which from time to time
dissolved into the population only to reappear again,
could be located even by the native soldiers.
It would have been impracticable successfully to use
American troops for such work.
Referring to the statement made by
Blount that Vice-Governor Wright made a visit
to Albay in 1903 in the interest “of the peace-at-any-price
policy that the Manila Government was bent on,”
and the implication that he went there to conduct peace
negotiations, General Bandholtz, who suppressed outlawry
in Albay, has said that Vice-Governor Wright and Commissioner
Pardo de Tavera came there at his request to look
into conditions with reference to certain allegations
which had been made.
Colonel Bandholtz and the then chief of constabulary, General
Allen, were supported by the civil governor and the commission in their
recommendations that no terms should be made with the outlaws. The
following statement occurs in a letter from General Bandholtz dated September
21, 1903:
“No one is more anxious to terminate
this business than I am, nevertheless I think it would
be a mistake to offer any such inducements, and that
more lasting benefits would result by hammering away
as we have been doing.”
And General Allen said in an indorsement to the Philippine
Commission:
“... in my opinion the judgment
of Colonel Bandholtz in matters connected with the
pacification of Albay should receive favourable consideration.
Halfway measures are always misinterpreted and used
to the detriment of the Government among the ignorant
followers of the outlaws.”
These views prevailed.
Blount has claimed that the death
rate in the Albay jail at this time was very excessive,
and cites it as an instance of the result of American
maladministration.
Assuming that his tabulation of the dead who died in
the Albay jail between May 30 and September, 1903, amounting to 120, is correct,
the following statements should be made:
Only recently has it been demonstrated
that beri-beri is due to the use of polished rice,
which was up to the time of this discovery regarded
as far superior to unpolished rice as an article of
food, and is still much better liked by the Filipinos
than is the unpolished article. Many of these
deaths were from beri-beri, and were due to a misguided
effort to give the prisoners the best possible food.
Cholera was raging in the province
of Albay throughout the period in question, and the
people outside of the jail suffered no less than did
those within it. The same is true of malarial
infection. In other words, conditions inside
the jail were quite similar to those then prevailing
outside, except that the prisoners got polished rice
which was given them with the best intentions in the
world, and was by them considered a superior article
of food.
With the present knowledge of the
methods of dissemination of Asiatic cholera gained
as a result of the American occupation of the Philippines,
we should probably be able to exclude it from a jail
under such circumstances, as the part played by “germ
carriers” who show no outward manifestations
of infection is now understood, but it was not then
dreamed of. One of the greatest reforms effected
by Americans in the Philippines is the sanitation of
the jails and penitentiaries, and we cannot be fairly
blamed for not knowing in 1903 what nobody then knew.
The troubles in Albay ended with the
surrender of Ola on September 25, 1903. Blount
gives the impression that he had a knowledge of them
which was gained by personal observation. He arrived
in the province in the middle of November, seven weeks
after normal conditions had been reestablished.
On October 5, 1903, General Bandholtz telegraphed with
reference to the final surrender of Olas band:
“The towns are splitting themselves
wide open celebrating pacification and Ramon Santos
(later elected governor) is going to give a record-breaking
fiesta at Ligao. Everybody invited. Scouts
and Constabulary have done superb work.”
Blount makes much of disorders in
Samar and Leyte. Let us consider the facts.
In all countries feuds between highlanders
and lowlanders have been common. Although the
inhabitants of the hills and those of the lowlands
in the two islands under discussion are probably of
identical blood and origin, they long since became
separated in thought and feeling, and grew to be mutually
antagonistic. The ignorant people of the interior
have always been oppressed by their supposedly more
highly civilized brethren living on or near the coast.
The killing of Otoy by the constabulary
in 1911 marked the passing of the last of a series
of mountain chiefs who had exercised a very powerful
influence over the hill people and had claimed for
themselves supernatural powers.
Manila hemp is the principal product
upon which these mountaineers depend in bartering
for cloth and other supplies. The cleaning of
hemp involves very severe exertion, and when it is
cleaned it must usually, in Samar, be carried to the
seashore on the backs of the men who raise it.
Under the most favourable circumstances, it may be
transported thither in small bancas down
the streams.
The lowland people of Samar and Leyte
had long been holding up the hill people when they
brought in their hemp for sale in precisely the way
that Filipinos in other islands are accustomed to hold
up members of the non-Christian tribes. They
played the part of middlemen, purchasing the hemp
of the ignorant hill people at low prices and often
reselling it, without giving it even a day’s
storage, at a very much higher figure. This system
was carried so far that conditions became unbearable
and finally resulted in so-called pulajanism
which began in the year 1904.
The term pulajan is derived
from a native word meaning “red” and was
given to the mountain people because in their attacks
upon the lowlanders they wore, as a distinguishing
mark, red trousers or a dash of red colour elsewhere
about their sparse clothing. They raided coast
towns and did immense damage before they were finally
brought under control. It should be remembered
that these conditions were allowed to arise by a Filipino
provincial governor, and by Filipino municipal officials.
It is altogether probable that a good American governor
would have prevented them, but as it was, neither their
cause nor their importance were understood at the
outset. The pulajan movement was directed
primarily against Filipinos.
The first outbreak occurred on July
10, 1904, in the Gandara River valley where a settlement
of the lowlanders was burned and some of its inhabitants
were killed. Eventually disorder spread to many
places on the coast, and one scout garrison of a single
company was surprised and overwhelmed by superior
numbers. Officers and men were massacred and
their rifles taken.
In point of area Samar is the third
island in the Philippines. In its interior are
many rugged peaks and heavily forested mountains.
It was here that a detachment of United States marines
under the command of Major Waller, while attempting
to cross the island, were lost for nearly two weeks,
going without food for days and enduring terrible
hardships.
At the time in question there were
not five miles of road on the island passable for
a vehicle, nor were there trails through the mountains
over which horses could be ridden. The only interior
lines of communication were a few footpaths over which
the natives were accustomed to make their way from
the mountains to the coast.
Troops have perhaps never attempted
a campaign in a country more difficult than the interior
of Samar. The traditional needle in the haystack
would be easy to find compared with an outlaw, or band
of outlaws, in such a rugged wilderness.
Upon the outbreak of trouble troops
were hurried to Samar, and by December, 1904, according
to Blount himself, there were some 1800 native soldiers
on the island who were left free for active operations
in the field by the garrisoning of various coast towns
with sixteen companies of United States infantry.
If the nature of the feuds between
the Samar lowlanders and highlanders had then been
better understood, the ensuing troubles, which were
more or less continuous for nearly two years, might
perhaps have been avoided. As soon as it became
evident that the situation was such as to demand the
use of the army it was employed to supplement the
operations of the constabulary.
About the time that trouble ended
in Samar it began in Leyte. There was no real
connection between the disorders in the two islands.
No leader on either island is known to have communicated
with any leader on the other; no fanatical follower
ever left Samar for Leyte or Leyte for Samar so far
as we are informed.
For convenience of administration
the two islands were grouped in a single command after
the army was requested to take over the handling of
the disturbances there, in cooeperation with the constabulary.
The trouble ended in 1907 and both islands have remained
quiet ever since. The same causes would again
produce the same results now or at any time in the
future, and they would be then, as in the past, the
outcome of the oppression of the weak by the strong
and without other political significance. Under
a good government they should never recur.
Many circumstances which did not exist
in 1902 and 1904 made it feasible to use the army
in Samar and Leyte during 1905 and 1906. The
high officers who had exercised such sweeping powers
during the insurrection had meanwhile given way to
other commanders. Indeed, a practically new Philippine
army had come into existence. The policy of the
insular government as to the treatment of individual
Filipinos had been recognized and indorsed by Americans
generally, but many of the objections to the use of
the troops, including the heavy expense involved,
still existed and I affirm without fear of successful
contradiction that had it been possible to place in
Samar and Leyte a number of constabulary soldiers
equal to that of the scouts and American troops actually
employed, disorder would have been terminated much
more quickly and at very greatly less cost.
With the final breaking up of organized
brigandage in 1905 law and order may be said to have
been established throughout the islands. It has
since been the business of the constabulary to maintain
it. The value of the cooeperation of the law-abiding
portion of the population has been fully recognized.
The newly appointed constabulary officer has impressed
upon him the necessity of manifesting an interest in
the people with whom he comes in contact; of cultivating
the acquaintance of Filipinos of all social grades,
and of assisting to settle their disagreements and
harmonize their differences whenever possible.
He is taught a native dialect.
The constabulary have to a high degree
merited and secured the confidence and good-will of
the people, whose rights they respect. There
is a complete absence of the old arbitrary procedure
followed by the guardia civil and as a result
there are frequent requests from Filipino officials
for additional detachments, while the removal of a
company from a given community is almost invariably
followed by vigorous protests. The power of human
sympathy is very great, and as the attitude of constabulary
officers and men is usually one of sympathy, conciliation
and affection, that body has earned and deserved popularity.
The success of the constabulary in
apprehending criminals has been both praiseworthy
and noteworthy. The courage and efficiency which
have often been displayed by its officers and men in
hard-fought engagements with Moro outlaws or with
organized bands of thieves and brigands have been
beyond praise. Many of its officers have rendered
invaluable service in bringing the people of the more
unruly non-Christian tribes under governmental control,
not only bravely and efficiently performing their
duty as police officers, but assisting in trail construction
or discharging, in effect, the duties of lieutenant-governors
in very remote places which could be visited by the
actual lieutenant-governors only infrequently.
I later take occasion to mention the valuable work
done by Lieutenant Case in the early days of Ifugao,
and to dwell at length on the splendid service rendered
there by Lieutenant Jeff D. Gallman, who was for many
years lieutenant-governor of the subprovince while
continuing to serve as a constabulary officer.
Lieutenant Maimban at Quiangan, and Lieutenant Dosser
at Mayoyao, have been and are most useful, though
they do not hold official positions under the Mountain
Province or receive any additional compensation for
the special services which they render. Captain
Guy O. Fort served most acceptably as governor of
the province of Agusan during the interim between the
resignation of Governor Lewis and the appointment
of Governor Bryant and Lieutenants Atkins and Zapanta
have also rendered valuable service as assistants to
the provincial governor. Lieutenant Turnbull is
now assistant to the governor of Nueva Vizcaya
for work among the Ilongots on the Pacific coast of
northern Luzon. Other constabulary officers, who
have not been called upon for special service of this
kind, have performed their ordinary duties in such
a way as to demonstrate that they were actuated by
the spirit of cooeperation and have been of great help.
But the work of the constabulary has
not been confined to police duty. They have been
of the greatest assistance to the Director of Health
in effectively maintaining quarantine, and making possible
the isolation of victims of dangerous communicable
diseases like cholera and smallpox, when inefficient
municipal policemen have utterly failed to do their
duty. They have given similar assistance to the
Director of Agriculture in the maintenance of quarantine
in connection with efforts to combat diseases of domestic
animals. In great emergencies such as those presented
by the recent eruption of Taal volcano, and the devastation
caused by great typhoons, they have been quick to
respond to the call of duty and have rendered efficient
and heroic service. They assist internal revenue
officers. Except in a few of the largest cities
they are the firemen of the islands and by their effective
work have repeatedly checked conflagrations, which
are of frequent occurrence and tend to be very destructive
in this country, where most of the houses are built
of bamboo and nipa palm, and where roofs become dry
as tinder during the long period when there is little
or no rain. They have aided in combating pests
of locusts, and, in short, have been ready to meet
almost any kind of an emergency which has arisen.
The importance of having such a body
of alert, industrious, disciplined, efficient men
inspired by a high sense of duty, and physically so
well developed that they can continue to perform that
duty in the face of long-continued privations and hardships,
is beyond dispute. The results which have been
obtained by the Philippine constabulary have abundantly
justified the policy which led to its organization.
Its task has been no sinecure.
Eleven officers and one hundred ninety-seven enlisted
men have been killed in action. Forty-eight officers
and nine hundred ninety-one men have died of disease.
Forty-six officers have been wounded in action.
Seven hundred sixty-eight men have been discharged
for disability. Seven thousand four hundred twenty-four
firearms and 45,018 rounds of ammunition have been
captured by, or surrendered to, the constabulary.
Four thousand eight hundred sixty-two outlaws have
been killed and 11,977 taken prisoners. Twelve
thousand two hundred sixty-two stolen animals have
been recovered.
There are many things which are not
brought home to the reader by such statistics.
The weary days and nights on tropical trails; the
weakness and pain of dysentery; the freezing and the
burning of pernicious malaria; the heavy weight of
responsibility when one must act, in matters of life
and death, with no superior to consult; the disappointment
when carefully laid plans go wrong; the discouragement
caused by indifference; the danger of infection with
loathsome diseases; ingratitude; deadly peril; aching
wounds; sudden death, and, worse yet, death after
suffering long drawn out, when one meets one’s
end knowing that it is coming and that one’s
family will be left without means or resources, these
are some of the things that the officers and men of
this gallant corps have faced unflinchingly.
The work of the constabulary and of
the Philippine scouts has conclusively demonstrated
the courage and efficiency of the Filipino as a soldier
when well disciplined and well led.
The establishment and maintenance
of order in the Philippines have afforded opportunity
for some of the bravest deeds in the annals of any
race, and the opportunity has been nobly met.
The head-hunters of the Mountain Province, the Mohammedan
Moros of Mindanao, Jolo and Palawan, the bloody pulajanes
of Samar and Leyte, the wily tulisanes of Luzon,
all unrestrained by any regard for the rules of civilized
warfare, have for twelve years matched their fanatical
bravery against the gallantry of the khaki-clad Filipino
soldiers. Time and again a single officer and
a handful of men have taken chances that in almost
any other land would have won them the Victoria cross,
the legion of honor, or some similar decoration.
Here their only reward has been the sense of duty
well done.
The force known as the Philippine
constabulary was organized for the purpose of establishing
and maintaining order. It has established and
is maintaining a condition of order never before equalled
or approached in the history of the islands.
The policy which led to its organization has been
a thousand times justified.