ROOSEVELT’S FIRST ADMINISTRATION, 1901-1905

The sentiment noted at the end of the last chapter seemed to be the motive of Mr. Roosevelt’s public life.  Not only was he better informed on the whole than almost any President who had sat in the chair before, but he was a good lawyer, familiar with national and general history and awake to all contemporary doings, questions, and interests south, west, east, and abroad.  He was also more a man of action and affairs than any of his predecessors.  He had, in a very high degree, alertness, energy, courage, initiative, dispatch.  Physically as well as mentally vigorous, he read much, heard all who could usefully inform him, apprehended easily, decided quickly, and toiled like Hercules.  He was just and catholic in spirit, appreciating whatever was good in any section of the country or class of people.  He respected precedent but was not its slave.  Rather than walk always in ruts with never a jolt, he preferred some risks of tumbling over hummocks.  Few public men of any age or country have more fully met Aristotle’s test of a statesman:  “ability to see facts as they exist and to do the things needing to be done.”

He had able aids; pre-eminent among these were John Hay, Secretary of State, and Elihu Root, Secretary of War.  Each was, to say the least, the peer of his greatest predecessors in his office.  It was mainly to Mr. Root that we were indebted for starting the Cubans prosperously as an independent nation.  His service for the Philippines so far as it went was not less distinguished; and he effected vitally important reorganization and reform in the war office.

A well co-ordinated plan was developed whereby army officers were given advanced training in the various branches of military science as in the European countries.  Neither the President nor Secretary Root advocated a large standing army, but they both strove to bring the army “to the very highest point of efficiency of any army in the civilized world.”  The ability of Secretary Root to inaugurate reforms in a department which when he became its head was overridden by tradition, was well expressed by President Roosevelt as follows:  “Elihu Root is the ablest man I have known in our governmental service.  I will go further.  He is the greatest man that has appeared in the public life of any country, in any position, on either side of the ocean in my time.”

Under Secretary Hay our State Department attained unprecedented prestige, due in part to the higher position among the nations now accorded us.  This result itself Mr. Hay had done much to achieve; and he passed hardly a month in his office without making some further addition to the renown and influence of his country.  If the United States has-which may be doubted-raised up diplomatists with Mr. Hay’s mastery of international law and practice and his art and skill in conducting delicate negotiations, we have probably never had his equal in diplomatic initiative, or in the thorough preparation and presentation of cases.  He did not meet occasions merely but made them, not arbitrarily but for the world’s good.  Settling the Alaskan boundary favorably to the United States at every point save one, crumbling with the single stroke of his Pauncefote treaty that Clayton-Bulwer rock on which Evarts, Blaine, and Frelinghuysen in turn had tried dynamite in vain, were deeds seldom matched in statecraft.

By an act of Congress, in 1903, a new member was added to the President’s cabinet in the person of the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor.  George B. Cortelyou was the first man appointed to that office.  Two bureaus, those of corporations and of manufactures, were created for the department.  The other bureaus, such as the Bureau of Statistics, Bureau of Standards of Weights and Measures and Coast and Geodetic Survey, were transferred from the other departments.  The place of this new department was defined by the President in the following:  “to aid in strengthening our domestic and foreign markets, in perfecting our transportation facilities, in building up our merchant marine, in preventing the entrance of undesirable immigrants, in improving commercial and industrial conditions, and in bringing together on common ground those necessary partners in industrial progress-capital and labor.”

Among the problems engaging President Roosevelt none was of wider interest than the construction of an Atlantic-Pacific canal.  A commission of nine, Rear-Admiral Walker its head, had been set by President McKinley to find the best route.  It began investigation in the summer of 1899, visiting Paris to examine the claims of the French Panama Company, and also Nicaragua and Panama.  It surveyed, platted, took borings, and made a minute and valuable report upon the work which each of the proposed canals would require.

The most practicable routes were Nicaragua and Panama.  The Nicaragua way was between three and four times the longer-183 miles to 49; 38 hours from ocean to ocean as against 12.  The Panama way was straighter, had less elevation at its summit, and required fewer locks.  Congress finally decided to construct a high level lock-canal.  The cost of keeping up and operating a Panama canal was estimated at six-tenths that of one across Nicaragua.  Harbor expenses and facilities would be nearly the same for both lines.  The time required for construction, probably nine or ten years, would be a trifle the less at Nicaragua.  Control works, to keep always the proper depth of water in the canal, could be more easily maintained at Panama.

Panama political and commercial complications were serious.  The isthmus was Colombia territory, and, since October, 1899, a civil war had been raging in that republic.  Its financial condition was desperate.  Two hundred million inconvertible paper pesos had depreciated to the value of two cents each in gold, yet were legal tender for all obligations.  In such a country, especially as war was in progress, the only government able to maintain itself was despotic.  Civil troubles were intensified by dissension between Catholics and Protestants.  Revolution accompanied any change in administration.

Under Ferdinand de Lesseps, creator of the Suez Canal, the French company had performed extensive excavations at Panama.  The New Panama Canal Company of France held certain concessions from the Colombian government.  The value of its assets was $109,000,000 at most.  If we dug at Nicaragua these would be worth little.  Besides, a Nicaragua canal completed, some $6,000,000 of stock owned by the French company in the Panama railroad would dwindle in value.

The validity of the French company’s rights was questioned.  Its agreement to work some each year had not been kept.  Its charter was to expire in October, 1904, but, for 5,000,000 francs, the Colombia President granted a six-year extension.  Even with this the French franchise would revert to Colombia in 1910.  Colombia wished delay.  The United States transcontinental railroads did not want a canal, as it would divert from them heavy, bulky, and imperishable freight.  They therefore joined Colombia in seeking delay, playing off the Nicaragua plan against the Panama, hoping to defeat both.

Late in 1901, newspapers in the United States began urging the purchase from Colombia of a land belt across the isthmus to be United States territory.  Our Senate, December 16, 1901, by a vote of 72 to 6, ratified the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with Great Britain, in which it was agreed that we should build a canal, allowing all other nations to use it.  Meantime, spite of the fact that the Walker commission had recommended Nicaragua route, public sentiment began to favor Panama.  Even the Walker commission changed to this view.

The Spooner act of Congress, approved June 28, 1902, authorized the President to build an isthmian canal.  The Panama properties and franchises were to be bought if he could get good title and also obtain the fee of a right of way from Colombia; otherwise he must pierce Nicaragua.  The act provided for all necessary funds.  The French company’s claims were investigated, pronounced valid, and in due time acquired by the United States.

Effort to secure from Colombia the required territorial rights was made in the proposed Hay-Herran treaty, ratified by our Senate, 73 against 5, March 17, 1903, under which we were to pay Colombia, besides an annual rental $10,000,000 for the lease of a belt six miles wide from sea to sea.  August 17, 1903, the Colombian Senate rejected this treaty, and, October 18, the government of that country proposed another, involving the payment by us of $25,000,000 instead of $10,000,000.  If we offered this, would not the price rise to $30,000,000 or more?

Papers in the United States argued for a revolution in Panama.  The isthmus, it was urged, was in time nearer to Washington than to Bogota.  All Panama interests centred in the canal.  Should Nicaragua get the canal, Colon and Panama would be deserted.  Both places owed their peace to the presence of our navy.  On the principle that treaties concerning territory run with the territory, ignoring changes of sovereignty, our time-honored obligation to keep peace on the isthmus, bound us, if Panama set up for herself, to protect her even against Colombia.  England would concur.  English ships would use the canal more than ours.  Great Britain, risking and spending nothing, would gain incalculably.  France, too, would acquiesce.  The Frenchmen got some $40,000,000 if the canal crossed Panama but lost everything if it passed to Nicaragua.  Other European nations wished the canal built and felt that now was the accepted time.  Latin-American States alone showed sympathy with Colombia.

Revolution took place.  On the afternoon of November 3, 1903, the Panama city council declared that city independent of Colombia.  Colon followed.  A provisional Panama government was organized.  November 6 we recognized Panama as an independent State.  November 7 she appointed M. Bunau-Varilla her diplomatic agent at Washington.  November 13 he was, as such, formally received by President Roosevelt.  November 18 Secretary Hay and M. Bunau-Varilla signed a treaty whose first article read:  “The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama.”  Articles II and III gave us, in effect, sovereignty over a ten-mile wide canal zone between the oceans.  This treaty was ratified by Panama December 2, and by our Senate February 23, 1904.  November 16, 1903, Colombia protested to Great Britain against our action, and, November 28, offered us a canal concession free if we would permit her to subjugate Panama.

Both at home and abroad the administration was charged with sharp practice for its Panama coup, and the case made out by critics was prima facie strong-less, indeed, on its legal than on its ethical and prudential side.  We had allowed ourselves to profit by Colombia’s distress, encouraged secession in federal republics like our own, and rendered ourselves and our Monroe doctrine objects of dread throughout Central and South America.  Still, Colombia had been so stiff and greedy and the settlement was in the main so happy, that censure soon subsided.  All the powerful nations speedily followed our example and recognized Panama’s independence.

In September, 1900, the city of Galveston was visited by one of the greatest disasters known in American history.  A fierce storm swept the waters of the gulf over the island on which Galveston is situated, destroying property aggregating many millions of dollars and causing the loss of 6,000 lives out of the total population of 37,000.  For a time it seemed that the site of the city would have to be abandoned, for the highest land on which buildings stood was but a few feet above the highest waves.  It was determined, however, to build a stone wall three miles in length which should be massive enough to protect the city from any similar attack.  Its top, which is five feet thick, is three feet above the highest point reached by the water.  The bottom of the wall is sixteen feet thick.  This wall, which is built concave toward the gulf, is protected by earth and stone filled in for two hundred feet, thus providing a driveway thirty feet wide with walks on either side, beautified with trees and shrubs.

The management of public affairs during the rebuilding of the city was entrusted to a committee of experts.  So efficiently and economically was the administration of the government, that the Galveston Plan, commonly spoken of as the Commission Plan, soon became a model for municipal organization.  A modification of this plan was soon put into operation at Des Moines, Iowa.  This plan consists of government by five salaried persons, one of them acting as mayor.  This body performs both legislative and executive duties, each member being in charge of a department of the city government.  The arguments in favor of this type of government are:  (1) Responsibility is easily located; (2) a few men receive such salaries that they may be expected to give their whole time to the duties of their offices; (3) more civic interest will be aroused.  All officers are subject to removal at any time by vote of a certain proportion of the people.

The Cuban government was organized in the spring of 1902.  On May 20 of that year, Governor-General Wood for the United States turned over the government house at Havana to President Tomaso Estrada y Palma.

The ceremonies attending the transfer were impressive.  A letter from President Roosevelt addressed to the President and the Congress of the Republic of Cuba was handed to President Palma.  This declared the occupation of Cuba by the United States to be at an end and tendered the sincere friendship and good wishes of this country.  At noon General Wood hauled down the American flag, which had floated above the Governor’s palace at Havana, and assisted General Gomez in raising to the breeze the red triangle with central silver star and three blue and two white stripes constituting the flag of the new republic.  All of the foreign ships in the harbor likewise ran up the Cuban flag in honor of the occasion.  Forty-five shots, one for each State in the Union, were fired as the stars and stripes were lowered from Morro Castle and the other fortresses.  The American troops saluted the new emblem, fired twenty-one guns in honor of the new nation, and then embarked for the United States.  Thus was kept to the letter-a noble example of public faith-the promise we made when invading Cuba, that we would not acquire territory.

Those who prophesied a short life for the new republic and a reign of fraud and corruption were mistaken.  During the first year economy became the rule in the administration of all branches of the public service, the government was self supporting, and a balance accumulated in the treasury.  Moreover, the reforms inaugurated by Americans continued.  Some 3,400 teachers were employed in the island and 120,000 pupils were in constant attendance upon the schools.  In all parts of the island the effects of American rule were visible.  Ten million dollars had been expended in sanitation reforms and the cleansing of Havana and the other cities.  Industrial schools for orphan boys and girls were begun and hospitals and asylums for the sick, helpless, and insane were reestablished.  By 1901 a railroad, with branch lines, was constructed between Santiago and Havana, thus giving the whole island excellent transportation facilities.

Cuba could not gain prosperity at a bound.  Whereas the island should, under natural conditions, have had $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 due her from foreign countries in 1902, she was $50,000,000 in debt.  Her manufactures were insignificant.  It was estimated that, in the year named, $80,000,000 of American money was invested in Cuba.  The main enterprises were railroads, sugar and tobacco plantations, mines, and fruit farms.

Free commercial intercourse with Spain no longer existing, Cuban sugar and tobacco producers sought markets in the United States, leading to the “reciprocity” conflict touched upon in Chapter XIII, Vol.  V. During 1902 a reciprocity treaty was negotiated and promptly ratified in Cuba.  Our Senate amended it and returned it to Cuba for reconsideration.  Brought hither again, it was passed by our Senate in December, 1903.  President Roosevelt signed it December 17, declaring its provisions effective in ten days.

The Philippine Commission (Chapter XV, Vol.  V), four Americans and three islanders, at first enacted laws by the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief.  After the Congressional Act of July 1, 1902, the formula ran:  “By authority of the United States be it enacted by the Philippine Commission.”  The government was pronouncedly civil both in nature and in spirit, the natives being gradually placated, and only an occasional outbreak demanding the presence of troops.  Schools were established, the English language and American ideas of government and business introduced.  No promise of Philippine independence was given, yet the tenor of our whole policy toward the Filipinos, of official utterances and of public sentiment relating to them, was to the effect that we should never look upon any of the islands as a crown colony.

The same interests that forbade Cuban reciprocity opposed tariff concessions to the Philippines.  A 25 per cent reduction from the Dingley rates was the best that Congress would grant, though the commission besought one of at least 75 per cent.  For a time our behavior in this too much resembled English and Spanish dealings with colonies centuries ago.  The United States acquired from the Philippine religious orders 422,337 acres of land, three-fifths of it highly cultivated and thickly inhabited, for $7,239,000.  In all, the government owned about 61,000,000 out of the perhaps 70,000,000 acres of land in the islands.  Of the government lands, 40,000,000 acres were forest.

The law of July 1, 1902, to supplement the commission, provided for a native assembly of not more than 100 members or less than 50, with annual sessions of 90 days.  Municipal autonomy was allowed and became common.  An efficient constabulary was established, also a Philippine mint and coinage system on a gold basis.  Careful exploitation of the agricultural, mineral, and other resources of the islands was provided for, as well as an increasing number of public improvements in the interest of order, health, and cleanliness.  To promote investment in the Philippine public works, 4 per cent bonds were issued, guaranteed by the United States.

Preparatory to forming the Philippine Assembly the commission took a census of the islands.  In 1905 the population returned from 342 islands was 7,635,426.  Of this number only about 9 per cent were wild tribes, though more than half the entire population could neither read nor write in any language.  Of the 370,000 pupils in the newly established schools, or double the number in attendance two years previously, one in nine on the average had some understanding of English.  Twelve thousand adults were in the night schools, chiefly engaged in acquiring the English language.

In February, 1904, a fire broke out in the heart of the city of Baltimore.  Some 1,337 structures were either entirely destroyed or rendered unfit for occupancy.  The loss in buildings and other property destroyed was about $75,000,000.  With a few exceptions, the financial district of the city was burned.  For a time it was feared that the losses would be so great that restoration could not be made, but new plans were projected which included broader streets and better buildings.  Instead of a decrease in the number of business concerns, there was an increase through the entrance of firms from the outside.

The Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis was opened April 30, 1904, and continued for seven months.  It commemorated the acquisition of the Louisiana territory which was consummated April 30, 1803, marking one of the greatest events in American history.  Out of this area had been carved thirteen States and two territories wherein over 17,000,000 people were making their homes.

The design for the exposition represented the work of ten of the most distinguished architects of the country.  The buildings, grouped in perfect taste, mostly of noble style, had 128 acres of floor space, far beyond that at the disposal of any preceding fair.  The grounds also were unprecedentedly ample and beautifully diversified, containing about 1,200 acres.  The total attendance, 18,741,073, fell short of that at Chicago in 1893 by over 8,000,000.

The general plan of the exposition was intended to symbolize the history of the Louisiana territory representing the successive occupants of the soil-the wild animals; the Indians; the discoverers; the explorers; the hunters; the trappers, and the pioneers.  The aim was to make it one vast educational object lesson.  To that end there were extensive exhibits from thirty States and from the chief cities of work done in the primary and secondary schools and in the universities and colleges of the country.  This feature culminated in the International Congress of Arts and Sciences.  Over 100 of the leading scholars from England, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, the United States, and a number of other countries made addresses and took part in the various discussions.  All the fields of human knowledge were represented by these specialists.

One feature of this exposition was unique:  it represented to an unprecedented extent processes in lieu of products or in addition to them.  Every day at almost every point something was literally doing, going on.  Machinery whizzed, mines were operated, artists were at work, experts showed their craft; Indians, Filipinos, the blind, deaf, and dumb were taught.