SOPHISMS OF PROTECTION: CHAPTER XV
RECIPROCITY AGAIN.
Mr. de Saint Cricq has asked:
“Are we sure that our foreign customers will
buy from us as much as they sell us?”
Mr. de Dombasle says: “What
reason have we for believing that English producers
will come to seek their supplies from us, rather than
from any other nation, or that they will take from
us a value equivalent to their exportations into
France?”
I cannot but wonder to see men who
boast, above all things, of being practical,
thus reasoning wide of all practice!
In practice, there is perhaps no traffic
which is a direct exchange of produce for produce.
Since the use of money, no man says, I will seek shoes,
hats, advice, lessons, only from the shoemaker, the
hatter, the lawyer, or teacher, who will buy from
me the exact equivalent of these in corn. Why
should nations impose upon themselves so troublesome
a restraint?
Suppose a nation without any exterior
relations. One of its citizens makes a crop of
corn. He casts it into the national circulation,
and receives in exchange what? Money,
bank bills, securities, divisible to any extent, by
means of which it will be lawful for him to withdraw
when he pleases, and, unless prevented by just competition
from the national circulation, such articles as he
may wish. At the end of the operation, he will
have withdrawn from the mass the exact equivalent of
what he first cast into it, and in value, his consumption
will exactly equal his production.
If the exchanges of this nation with
foreign nations are free, it is no longer into the
national circulation but into the general
circulation that each individual casts his produce,
and from thence his consumption is drawn. He
is not obliged to calculate whether what he casts
into this general circulation is purchased by a countryman
or by a foreigner; whether the notes he receives are
given to him by a Frenchman or an Englishman, or whether
the articles which he procures through means of this
money are manufactured on this or the other side of
the Rhine or the Pyrénées. One thing is certain;
that each individual finds an exact balance between
what he casts in and what he withdraws from the great
common reservoir; and if this be true of each individual,
it is not less true of the entire nation.
The only difference between these
two cases is, that in the last, each individual has
open to him a larger market both for his sales and
his purchases, and has, consequently, a more favorable
opportunity of making both to advantage.
The objection advanced against us
here, is, that if all were to combine in not withdrawing
from circulation the produce from any one individual,
he, in his turn, could withdraw nothing from the mass.
The same, too, would be the case with regard to a
nation.
Our answer is: If a nation can
no longer withdraw any thing from the mass of circulation,
neither will it any longer cast any thing into it.
It will work for itself. It will be obliged to
submit to what, in advance, you wish to force upon
it, viz., Isolation. And here you
have the ideal of the prohibitive system.
Truly, then, is it not ridiculous
enough that you should inflict upon it now, and unnecessarily,
this system, merely through fear that some day or
other it might chance to be subjected to it without
your assistance?